

THE MAKING AND THE CRISIS OF TURKISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY:
ROOTS, DISCOURSES AND STRATEGIES

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

HASAN BÜLENT KAHRAMAN

tarafından hazırlanmıştır

In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

February, 1999

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE MAKING AND THE CRISIS OF TURKISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY ROOTS, DISCOURSES AND STRATEGIES

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February 1999

The making and the crisis of social democracy in Turkey has a structural and historical context. It is also an agent of Turkish political modernisation which is an authoritarian one. In this sense it is interrelated with the constitutive ideology and the parameters of Turkey's hegemonic state discourse, namely Kemalism. The condition faced by Turkish social democracy is an outcome of the crisis of modernity started in the 1980s and in the 1990s, under such influences as postmodernism and globalisation. In order to reach the deep causes of the crisis the analysis develops both on the vertical and horizontal axis, the first encompassing the internal and the latter encircling the external conditions. As the main cause of the crisis is assumed to be the nationalist, parochial character of Turkish social democracy, and its inability in getting adopted to the new emerging conditions, the thesis, as a conclusion, develops a prospective approach drawing on the recent theories that has helped the upheaval of this political ideology in West-European countries.

Keywords: Turkish social democracy, Republican People's Party, Turkish Political Modernization, Kemalism, Globalisation, Third Way.

ÖZET

TÜRK SOSYAL DEMOKRASİSİNİN OLUŞUMU VE KRİZİ KÖKENLER, SÖYLEMLER VE STRATEJİLER

Hasan Bülent Kahraman

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman

Şubat 1999

•

Bu çalışma, Türk sosyal demokrasisinin oluşumunu ve özellikle 1980'lerden bu yana yaşadığı krizi tarihsel bir bağlamda ele almaktadır. İncelenen siyasal ideoloji, Türk siyasal modernizasyonunun bir bileşeni olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu yanıla Türk sosyal demokrasisi ulusçu ve yerel kimliği içinde kurucu devlet ideolojisiyle, Kemalizmle, sarmal ilişkisi yönünden değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, kriz, anılan dönemlerde gelişen modernite krizinin bir uzantısı olarak çözümlenmiş, bu yanıla da yapısal olarak nitelendirilmiştir. Tartışmanın yöntemsel uzantısı olarak Türk sosyal demokrasisi, dışsal ve içsel olmak üzere, iki temel aks üzerinde irdelenmiştir. Post-modernite ve küreselleşme tezin ayrıca irdedeği süreçler olarak belirirken, sonuç olarak, çalışma, Batı Avrupa'da sosyal demokrasinin yükselişini doğuran koşulların ve kuramsal yönelimleri çözümleyerek Türk sosyal demokrasisi için belli bir gelecek tasarımı sunmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türk sosyal demokrasisi, CHP, SODEP, SHP, Kemalizm, küreselleşme, Üçüncü Yol

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

If, after a work is written and finished, still the remaining is the sense and eagerness of continuing with one another work which would dwell on conclusions of the achieved one, than the tiresome and painful efforts are forgotten. However, the reverse of this assumption is also true. One does always remember the suffering that could only be surpassed by another but similar process. Nevertheless, the pain does not a physical one. It is much more a complicated issue which, in fact, is the tension between the subjectivity that lies at the basis of a work and the objectivity that it deserves. What fits to this definition is never the books written but always a thesis. In this sense the habits and obsessions that are abandoned are the prices that are paid to reach an end in the process of writing a thesis.

Keeping this in mind, it is my privilege to say that in writing this thesis I have benefited from my friends. First of all, comes the support, encouragement and friendship of Erdağ Aksel, to whom this work is dedicated. Ayşe Kadioğlu's 'social' and 'academic' friendship was invaluable with her considerate and conscientious interest. However, this thesis, as well as myself and my 'intellectual' life in the last years, owes a lot to E. Fuat Keyman. He has been a mentor and a source of inspiration with a dedicated friendship. For somebody, me, who does not believe in the virtue of life, this benevolence has been a splendid and unexpected surprise. I am grateful to these friends. I am happy that I can use this opportunity to thank Mete Tunçay, not only for reading the early manuscript of a part of this thesis, with valuable suggestions, but because I have been a humble admirer of and indebted to his great work in the last twenty five years.

Eventually, my sincere thanks also go to the members of the jury, Akşin Somel and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya who have taken the pain of reading this thesis. Nevertheless, I remember Ergun Özbudun's support with gratefulness. It, since the beginning, has contributed a lot to the achievement of this thesis when others, at the proposal level, were declaring their hesitations and reserves and when others were shifting to a new position, due to this disbelief, just immediately after expressing their appreciation. My sincere thanks go to members of Sabancı University. Especially to President Tosun Terzioğlu for his understanding since the beginning. To Ahmet Evin for his friendly support. To Sibel Kamışlı for her valuable and altruistic backing. To Evrim Yılmaz for her kind helps. To the members of Sabancı University Information Centre for their kindness in supplying the material I was unceasingly in need of. Cara Murphy Keyman was kind enough not only for her very sincere friendship but also for being so kind when I was stealing her husband's time in the beautiful summer time week-ends. Baysan Bayar was always encouraging, full of with love and generosity. Banu Helvacıoğlu was all the novels and the poems I could not read in this period. My thanks also go to my other friends, to those who did not refrain from lending me their supports without knowing that I was in the process of writing a thesis. Thinking what they would be doing had they known it is my most valuable asset. I started writing this thesis after I started living in Istanbul and leaving Ankara. May I say, as a last word, that what is still uncertain for me is whether this has been the gift of Istanbul or the revenge of Ankara?

To Erdağ Aksel

amicus usque ad aras

*"nadanlar eder sohbeti nadanla telezzüz
divanelerin hemdemi divane gerektir"*

Ziya Paşa

PREFACE

One of the most complicated issues one could ever find in the realm of political ideologies and theory, is the history and the problematics of the social democracy. Even though the political history and practice of the twentieth century is, to a large extent, demarcated by this concept, in the West European countries, however, it has never been immune to harsh criticism and controversial approaches. As a double-feeding system, this might be due to the deep transformations social democracy has undergone since its birth. But, on the other hand, this very condition can be taken as one of the most important reasons provoking the continuous process of change and enabling it to come out of the paralysing crisis it has faced. If the landmarks of this history are victories and defeats, then the basic idiosyncrasy of social democracy could easily be put as its pragmatism and practicality.

In comparison to its 'genuine' history, in Turkey, social democracy has a rather strange position. First of all, when certain parameters are taken into consideration, the existence of such an ideology is well a matter of discussion. Even if it is used as a generic name for a certain political attitude, the 1980s and late 1990s have witnessed how this concept is ambiguous and vague in Turkey. The whole debate of social democracy in this country is devoted, both on the political-practical and ideological-theoretical realms, to the

effort of proving how much it is compatible with and a part and parcel of the founding ideology of the state. Namely, social democracy, rather than resting on the universal social democratic norms, is accepted and expected to be a component of Kemalism in Turkey. In this sense, Turkish social democracy has two distinctive characteristics. First, it is parochial and has strictly been wanted to be parochial, second, the importance of it comes from its resistance to change, differentiation and transformation.

In this regard, it would not be a astonishing to identify Turkish social democratic practice with Republican Peoples' Party (RPP), which has never defined itself as 'social democratic', if the last period is omitted. It is interesting that, on the other hand, the history of the other political parties, such as Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), which were formed as social democratic parties, are omitted and not remembered. This very distinctive symptom might be taken as the most distinguishing structural peculiarity of social democracy in Turkey and of its epistemological roots. In a period when universal-European social democracy is in the effort of adopting itself to the new political trends and concepts, and having another transformative period, as a consequence of the radicalisation of democracy, to use the term in its broadest meaning, Turkish social democracy's problematic position is also widening.

This thesis has intended to be an attempt to capture the social democratic 'reality' in Turkey from a political science view point. In this context, its chief and leading aim has been to seize its epistemological and ideological origins and roots, as well as its political strategies. To construct an articulative structure and to show the basic constraints of Turkish social democracy, the 'history' of RPP is analysed, with a keen interest in its ideological repercussions, referring to its ruptures and turning points. On top of the lack

of documents, the scarcity of the resources, the absence of archives, the insufficiency of the works conceiving both the early republican period and later developments has been the basic difficulties that the thesis has faced. The monumental and unsurpassable book by Mete Tunçay is the only work that deals directly with the early RPP having a plethora of inspirations for both historians and political scientists. The standard work by Suna Kili, although brings the history to the 1970s and is written with a political science orientation, yet is lacking of a critical approach. Hikmet Bila's book, although connects the history to early 1980s is totally a journalistic book, even though it is widely referred. In this framework, only the recent analysis concerning the early ideological formation period is worth to mention, like those of Taha Parla.

In this regard, the analysis of the 1980s and 1990s is, for the first time, attempted to be conceived from a social democratic angle in this thesis. Once more it should be emphasised that the political science approach has forced me to take into consideration not only the history and practice, and its 'events', but more their reflections on the concepts and the concepts preparing them. Not only the history and the politics of RPP but the whole attempt for the construction and the implementation of social democracy is analysed in the thesis. The aim immediately carries the scope of the work to the realm of ideologies. In this sense, through Turkish social democracy's interaction and coalescence with the state ideology, which is referred in the thesis as the symbiotic relationship between Turkish social democracy and the state, the discourse, epistemology and ideological standing of the origins of Turkish political modernity is discussed. Whereas Turkish political modernity is identified with Turkish social democracy, the crisis of the latter is taken as the crisis of the former in the late modern times.

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In reality the history of the country for the last ten years is the history of Republican Peoples' Party from the view point of politics.

Recep Peker

To write the history of a party is to write the general history of a country from a monographic point of view

Anthony Gramsci

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

If there is a subject-matter within Turkish political life, on which one could witness a consensus among different and various academic and public discourses about the changing nature of Turkish politics, it is the crisis of Turkish social democracy as a political ideology, as a political party and as a political movement. Since the 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, social democracy in Turkey has been facing a serious crisis in terms of its legitimacy in the eyes of the voters, thereby losing constantly its popular support. As a political ideology, social democracy has been unable to create convincing economic, political and social policies to cope with the problems and the demands of societal affairs in Turkey, which has resulted in its 'legitimacy crisis.' As a political party, it is faced with 'representation crisis', as a drastic decline in its popular support as the 1994 national election indicates. As a political movement, it has lost its attachments with Turkish society, acted as a state ideology, and thus began to become a marginal movement in Turkish political life, whose activities are limited to its internal organisational and leadership problems. In a time when Europe is welcoming a movement of social democratic upheaval, as in the case of England and Germany, as well as France, and when the discourses of 'new left' and 'third way' are gaining ideological and political currency, Turkish social democracy and its bearer, the Republican Peoples

Party (RPP), is increasingly becoming a small actor of political life, to the extent that it is now living with the possibility that it might not have enough popular support to form a group in the new parliament after the national election of 1999/April.

The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the various ways in which the crisis of social democracy has occurred and become increasingly apparent in Turkish political life, especially during the 1990s. In doing so, the thesis will analyse in a detailed fashion the conditions under which Turkish social democracy has entered a serious crisis, ideologically, organisationally, and as a political movement. The crisis occurs both as a legitimacy crisis and a representation crisis. It is a legitimacy crisis to the extent that as a political ideology Turkish social democracy has been viewed and treated by different social groups and political actors as an ideology incapable of responding the needs of and demands of Turkish society. It is also a representation crisis to the degree that as a political party and political movement social democracy has lost its popular support. The thesis, in this sense, aims at exploring and analysing the causes, in fact the multi-dimensional causes, that have brought about the legitimacy and representation crisis of Turkish social democracy, which has become evident during the 1990s.

The thesis argues that the crisis of Turkish social democracy should be seen as a 'structural crisis', the causes of which cannot be reduced to one determining factor or a prime mover. The crisis of Turkish social democracy is not a crisis which can be explained only by pointing out the constant declines in the amount of popular support for social democratic parties since the 1980s. Moreover, it is not a crisis which can be solved by short-term changes in party politics and programs. Instead, as the thesis argues and attempts to elaborate in a comprehensive manner, is a structural crisis whose conditions of existence are historically, discursively and organisationally constructed. It is a crisis

which has occurred as a result of articulation of internal and external factors, all of which have created a discursive gap between Turkish social democracy and the needs and demands of the rapidly changing societal affairs in Turkey. It is for this reason that the thesis suggests that a comprehensive account of the crisis of Turkish social democracy should be constructed by taking into consideration both historical and discursive changes that have framed the changing nature of politics to which social democracy as a political movement seems to be unable to adopt itself.

These historical and discursive changes appear to have been stemmed from two interrelated processes: namely, those of the 'crisis of modernity' and what has come to be known as 'globalization'. While the crisis of modernity brings about radical changes in the epistemological and discursive foundation of politics, the processes of globalization(s) have played historically constitutive role in the emergence of new actors, new demands and new grammar of politics. As has been argued, 'the nature of the present', in this sense, can be seen as a historical epoch, characterised by a dialectic relationship between the certainties of modernity that are dismantling and the new that cannot be born yet. The crisis of Turkish social democracy is not immune from these changes, in fact it is embedded in them and appears to be multi-dimensional in terms of its causes and roots. In this thesis, these roots and causes will be explored and it will be attempted to demonstrate that a full account of the crisis of Turkish social democracy should entail analysing both its internal relation with Kemalism as the hegemonic discourse of Turkish modernity, and its connection with and determination by global changes that have an important impact on societal affairs.

In this sense the thesis provides a two-fold analysis of the structural crisis of Turkish social democracy: first, by arguing that Turkish social democracy has always

acted as a nationalist and parochial political ideology, not much influenced by universal norms of social democracy in the world, the thesis attempts to provide a detailed analysis of Kemalism which has been the foundational ground for the epistemological and normative characteristics of social democratic ideology in Turkey. Second, by pointing out the importance of the processes of globalization that have created radical changes in political life, the thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of the changing nature of politics in last two decades to which social democracy have been unable to adopt itself, and as a result remained detached from the needs and demands of societal affairs. This two-fold analysis, the thesis suggests, is necessary not only to understand the way in which Turkish social democracy is faced with a structural crisis, but also to construct a set of plausible strategies to cope with this crisis, which will be delineated in the last chapter of the thesis.

In a sense, the history of social democracy in Turkey has always been the history of the Republican Peoples Party to the extent that Kemalism has always acted as constitutive of Turkish social democratic ideology. Calls for the need for a 'genuine left' or an appeal to a 'national left' have always been prior to and assumed primacy over the universal principles of social democracy. Turkish social democracy chose to be a parochial ideology corresponding to 'Turkish reality', as if that reality is immune from global affairs. This parochiality and the nationalist /statist discourse it has produced is to a large degree framed by Turkish modernity in which Kemalism operates as the constitutive ideology of the state. It is Kemalism that gives meaning to the ideological formation of Turkish social democracy and its attempt to bring to the fore the statist reading of Turkish society, to act as an ideology of the state, and thereby to make a pre-determined public good (that is, what is good for society) a primary point of reference for politics, rather than taking into account societal and group demands in doing politics.

Modernity, in Turkey, through Kemalism, directly attributes to the implementation of 'rational thinking', which is a deep devotion to positivism, the construction of the citizen, and the accomplishment of secularism. In this process, state has played the leading and the major role. Statism has not only been a concept pertaining to a specific economic approach but having a wider connotation, stretching over the social and political. This implies that, the modernity process in Turkey, depends, structurally, on a 'from the above' type regulation and, the realisation of the project has been achieved by the coalition of the party, the state, with which it has united in the 1930s, and the elites. In other words, social democracy in Turkey has its roots in a para-militarist grassroots organisation, the centralist approach, and the authoritarian notion of developmentalism, inclusive of the particularly defined citizenship, taken as a subject obeying the state and accepting the two basic tenets of the ideology, i.e. nationalism and secularism.

This symbiotic relation between Kemalism and Turkish social democracy, as the thesis will analyse in-depth, constitutes one of the causes of the structural crisis that the latter faces today. As Kemalism, that is, modernity, faces a legitimacy crisis, and looses its hegemony over the formation of Turkish modernity, as a result of postmodern developments and globalization processes, and as alternative modernities begin to challenge Kemalism and play a role in political life, foundational ground on which social democracy rests becomes shaky and slippery. Nevertheless, Turkish social democracy, in every step of its development, including the latest formations in the late twentieth century, namely in the 1990s, preferred to approximate itself to Kemalism rather than to the norms of universal social democratic ideology.

In this regard, two major transformation opportunities have been missed by Turkish social democracy. The first one is the new openings created in the political realm in the 1960s, by the initiative taken by Western European socialist and social democratic parties. In coalescence with the epistemological characteristic of West European social democracy, which is qualified as 'revisionism', and its ability to transform itself, this political ideology, has renovated itself in the 1960s after the monumental Bad Godesberg movement. The very well known notion of 'new left' is based on the assessments concerning the self and individual with the *force majeure* of the new social and political movements, which are developed on the basis of changes observed on the technological level.

The second threshold consists of the movements developed in the post-1980 period. This time period, as long as the political agenda is concerned, has developed on two major axis. On the one hand, the decade has witnessed the development of the neo-liberal, new rightist policies with a call for the minimal state and absolutely free market economy. On the other hand, the 1980s is demarcated by the culmination of New Social and Political Movements carving out a new space in the society and proposing and configuring a new understanding of the social and the political. Nevertheless, the period starting by 1960s and reaching the edge of 2000, has been, largely, a critic of modernity. From this reassessment of modernity, comes out a new understanding of democracy. Incorporating a new notion of self, i.e. individual and, trying to delineate a new social and political structure, new democracy models, largely, depend on the demise of the hegemonic discourse and location of the state. This is rather due to the recognition of the differences, a new conceptualisation of the notion of tolerance, ethics, and indispensable importance of pluralism. In this sense, pluralism goes out for the multicultural formations

and, especially the 1990s is demarcated by the dismantling of the nation state. The new condition of the nation-state, shaded by the upsurge of the civil movements, the restructuring of the civil society also denotes the end of the authoritarian notion of modernity, by the Fall of the Berlin Wall.

Turkish social democracy, contrary to the developments achieved in the West-European models, has stayed immune to these movements. Whereas the social democratic parties of West European countries have attuned themselves to the new formations, even accepting the basic tenets of the neo liberal movement, Turkish social democracy, emanating totally from a different epistemology, has never perceived and conceptualised the new developments. Not having taken 'revisionism' as a basis of political and ideological formation, Turkish social democracy, has rather run into a contradiction with the post-modern developments, in the sense that, in a period of post-nation-state period, it has been for the rejuvenation of the nationalism and the appraisal of a centralist, authoritarian, regulationist model of economic development. This conveys to the incorporation of the contradictions between the state and society in Turkey by social democracy, as seen in the 1990s, due to its coalescence with the nationalist, republican epistemology. The rejection of genuine social democratic ideology, doubtless, has played a major role in this formation. As a consequence, Turkish social democracy has become, as empirical studies have shown, a marginal ideology, with its political parties being exposed to patronage relations and depending on a clientalist structure.

In this context, the thesis will expand both on the horizontal and vertical levels. On the vertical axis it will focus on the procedural issues of Turkish social democracy, more emphasising the historical thresholds, taken as decades. In this regard the thesis concentrates on four significant decades; the 1923 and 1930; 1930-1960; 1960 and 1970

and, the post 1980 period. In the first period the formation of the RPP is analysed with its political and ideological background; in the second period an insight is given to the state-party merger and, the basis of an authoritarian model of modernisation and its ideology is analysed. The third period is reserved to the formation of left of centre and democratic left politics. The post 1980 period is discussed by focusing on the 1980s and 1990s respectively. In this framework, the thesis largely depends on the original resources and documents.

On the horizontal axis, the thesis will accentuate the ideological and more implicit variables of the Turkish social democracy. In this context, the thesis will rely on various different but major arguments. The main argument of the thesis is the symbiotic relationship between the state, the constitutive ideology and the Turkish social democracy. The thesis will show how this structure is constructed. Nevertheless, this does not need to take an essentialist position as well as it does not bring out a causality between the variables. Secondly, the thesis argues that Turkish social democracy is a part and parcel of Turkish political modernisation and, unless the links between Kemalism and modernity are analysed, and the critics of modernity is discussed, the existing situation of this ideology is unachievable. Thirdly, it is debated that, Turkish social democracy, as a consequence of the all above mentioned issues, has developed more a political culture than a political ideology. The lack of a genuine ideology is replaced by the hegemonic discourse of the state. In the background of this idiosyncrasy lies the solidarist, corporatist, organic society understanding. Lastly, beyond the aforementioned elements, a certain formation, which have come out in the globalisation period, the rise of political Islam, has played a certain role in the reevaluation of both social democracy and Kemalism; for in the thesis it will be argued that, these two concepts, Kemalism and Islam are the 'constitutive outside' of each other. In the last part of the thesis, in search of

a prospect for the Turkish social democracy, by referring mainly to the recent developments observed in the British Labour Party, the possibilities of a new opening is discussed. In short, the thesis argues that, Turkish social democracy, although has been successful in the achievement of the first-wave modernity, is unsuccessful in getting adopted to the second phase, which has started in the 1980s. In this sense, the thesis aims to be a political analysis of the formation and the crisis of Turkish social democracy, trying to explore the roots, discourses and the strategies. The subject-matters and the concerns of the chapters are as below.

The second chapter analysis the early formation phase of RPP. It concentrates on the period of 1919 and 1930. In this section the political background of the events is dissected, while some methodological questions are discussed. In the same line, it is argued that, this phase might be conceptualised as a 'party-led state' period. The chapter focuses on the political and social events of the period, referring to the ideological background. The transition from the Ottoman empire to a republican system is analysed in this chapter. The chapter focuses on the roots of the epistemology of the republican understanding in Turkey.

In the third chapter, the thesis argues that, as the conditions are radically changed, RPP becomes rather a 'state-led party' in the time period of 1930 and 1946 and it is again in this period that, single-party model is accepted and the ideological indoctrination of the society, by way of newly established institutions, is realised. This is analysed in the chapter as the ideology of culture and the culture of ideology. The party and the state unification continues up until the formation of the Democrat Party. The state/party/elites coalition, which will be the peer of the later debates and a constitutive model for Turkish

(political) modernity is achieved mostly in this period. Nevertheless, the development of the DP, it is argued that, is a reaction of the periphery against the centre and it is also the urge of the bourgeoisie to grasp the political power, through a unification with peasantry, which was left to state elites, i.e. bureaucracy and the military. The solidarist and corporatist society model is another characteristic of this period. Nevertheless, the chapter also analysis and concentrates on the conditions and the outcomes of the transformation that RPP has undergone in the late 1950s.

In the formation process of Turkish social democracy, the first, seemingly radical, break with the traditional past occurs in the 1960s and 1970s, by the declaration of 'left of centre' politics. Nevertheless, the thesis, in the fourth chapter, will argue that, this move is another but revised version of statism, in corporation with the elites. It is a consequence of the leftist movements which have developed outside Turkey. The chapter argues that, as Turkey faced the radical leftist upheavals in the 1960s and 1970s, the left of centre politics, contrary to the accepted assumption, intended to be a barrier for those political and social movements. In this sense, the left of centre, according to the arguments of the chapter is a new version of the statist-elitist understanding. That is why the left of centre politics will be qualified as a long transition period. The 1970s, on the other hand, as will also be discussed in the fourth chapter, is the transition to 'democratic left' politics and this brings the irreversible parochial, local character of Turkish social democracy.

One of the main radical ruptures in the history of Turkish modernity, although is a matter of debate, has been the rise of the Motherland Party in the post-1980 military coup period. This period, in this thesis and in the fifth chapter, is qualified as a new search for modernity. In Turkey, under the influence of the neo-liberal, new rightist economic and

social policies in America and England, as well as the display of the post-modern social formations, the foundational ideology of the republican period, for the first time, has been opened to criticism. Doubtless, the period is also backed by the *glasnost* and *perestroika* which, in a sense, perceived as a demise of the left. In this sense, the 1980s in Turkey, in the fifth chapter is analysed from the view point of neo-liberal politics, as the latter is analysed in-depth as the formation of a new hegemonic discourse in the post-Fordist era in the West.

The condition of the Turkish social democracy in the 1980s is the subject-matter and the concern of the sixth chapter. The social democracy, showing ups and downs in the decade, is more attuned, for the first time, to the implementation of the concept of 'social democracy' through newly formed political parties. This is qualified in the chapter as a 'reconstruction' period, creating much of a dispute within the left wing politics. In this decade, there occurs not only two different political parties, Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) and Democratic Left Party (DLP), but also, as a consequence of the early and hidden criticism directed to the foundational ideology, the social democratic wing, which is SDPP, is split into two parts. The long-time perpetuated debates are analysed in-depth in this chapter, referring to the original documents.

The seventh chapter is reserved to the arguments concerning globalisation. A wide analysis of this foundational concept is given in this chapter and, its reflections on the social democratic politics in Turkey is analysed. Social democracy, in the 1990s, not only in Turkey, but also in Europe is deeply affected by this movement and, above all, globalisation is the basis in the process of a search for a new understanding of democracy. In this chapter, the new formations within SDPP is analysed, referring to the manifestations and the arguments and debates of the intra-party factions. The re-

establishment of the RPP is also discussed in this chapter. The chapter focuses on the first half of the 1990s, taking the years 1990 and 1994 into account.

In the eighth chapter, the 1994 and 1998 part of the 1990s is analysed. The merger of the two parties, SDPP and RPP, the rise of the nationalist rhetoric of the latter, the conditions of returning to the foundational ideology is the concern of this chapter. The rise of the political Islam, the upsurge of the militant approach to secularism, as a counter-balancing issue, and, above all, the drastic and dramatic loss of the 1995 general elections, just after the merger, is discussed in this chapter. One of the main contributions of the chapter to the thesis is the argument that, there is a radical change on the grassroots and in the structural aspects of Turkish social democracy. It is argued that, this condition is a consequence of the social, economic and cultural changes and, the traditional support groups and the cleavage does not run anymore for the RPP. The fragmentation, polarisation and volatility in the political scenery has also contributed to this development.

In the ninth chapter, starting from the 1995 elections, the ideological background of Turkish social democracy is analysed in- depth. In the chapter, not only the aspects of globalization is debated further but, apart from that, the ideological structure of Turkish social democracy, with its symbiotic relationship with the state and its inherited epistemologically genetic modernist characteristics are discussed. In this sense, the Kemalism debates of the late 1990s are reviewed and the rise of the Islam is dissected by referring to its epistemological components. In this regard the Welfare Party effect on the political agenda is debated with its implicit relation to Kemalism and modernity. In this sense, the chapter focuses on the 'hidden' interaction between Kemalism and radical Islam, with a reference to their epistemological origins. This framework incorporates and tries to display the ineptness of Turkish social democracy in getting adopted to the new

formations and, it is argued in the chapter that, this deteriorating idiosyncrasy is an outcome of what has been argued in the previous chapter: the loss of support groups and the problematic position of Turkish, from-the-above modernisation. Nevertheless, it is argued that social democracy has fallen into a loop, i.e. a vicious circle, in this period because ideological insufficiency and alienation destroys the grassroots and, due to its parochial characteristic it cannot formulate an alternative to its existing political and structural idiosyncrasy.

In the last, Conclusion, chapter of the thesis, while a prospective projection is directed to Turkish social democracy, it is, more, an attempt to display how the European social democracy has overcome the crisis it has faced. On the other hand, it also shows the new ideological concerns of the West European social democracy, especially relying on the debate on the basic concept of the 1990s, which is the Third Way. In this context, the chapter adjacently shows the split of the European social democratic parties in their approach to the Third Way and, argues, whether this concept can be taken as a new understanding of politics or not. Doubtless the main concern of the chapter is trying to understand if Turkish social democracy is able to grasp this new formation with its existing structural and ideological properties. As a conclusion, in this context, the thesis argues that Turkish social democracy is more a metaphysical neumen, to say it with a Kantian notion, than a physical phenomenon.

CHAPTER II

THE SHORT TRANSITION TO REPUBLIC EARLY REPUBLICAN PEOPLES' PARTY: 1919-1930

2.1. Some Methodological Concerns

21.1. The Periodization of Republican People's Party

The formation of RPP is rooted in a long process. This process consists of five main steps. 1) The first one is the establishment of the idea of nationality with the national independence. This period is reflected through the Amasya Decree, Erzurum and Sivas Congresses. 2) The second step is the two motions proposed by Mustafa Kemal, on April 24 and July 12, 1920 later known as the 'Populism Program' in the related literature. The latter constituted both the basis for the 1921 Constitution and the early ideological framework for RPP. 3) The third step is the formation of the First Group in the National Assembly on May 10, 1921. 4) The fourth step is the declaration of Nine Principles on April 8, 1923 and finally, 5) the fifth step is the formation of the People's Party in 1923 and its subsequent merge with Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. This framework signifies a two-tier programme. The first one is more practical (items 1, 3, 5), whereas the second one (items 2, 4) encompasses the RPP's ideological basis and background. In this case,

RPP, with its later policies through these issues, played the leading role in both the modernisation of Turkey and in the formation of the political traditions.

RPP should be considered not only as a political party but also as an entity rooted in a process which includes different issues, anticipating different facts that played an important role in the early republican period. Again the idiosyncrasies of this period do not only establish the complicated political life of the early 1920s but they have also given birth to different developments further in the social and political climate of Turkey. In this chapter first the more practical side of the problem (items 1, 3 and 5), will be discussed. The ideological issues (2 and 4) will be analysed later, with references to the ideological components of the problematics, categorised in the first group.

It should here be noted that the studies concerning RPP have not yet been based on a settled periodization of this party. On the other hand, the only likewise work is related with the different time fractures of the Kemalist regime. Rustow, in this endeavour has analysed the development of the Kemalist regime in three periods: as the War of Independence, the second period, lying between the years 1923-1927, and the third mostly related with the period pertinent to the 1930s.¹ Rustow, in another article written after the mentioned one, has changed his approach.² He, again,

¹Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State," in *Prof. Dr. Yavuz Abadan'a Armağan* (Ankara: A.Ü.Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayını, 1969), 532. For a discussion of this approach see, Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime" in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, ed. A.Kazancıgil and E.Özbudun (London:Hurst and Company, 1997), 79-102.

²Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution Builder" in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, eds., *Atatürk*, 57-77.

concentrating not on RPP, but mainly on "Kemal Atatürk's record as an institution builder", starts this history in the year 1920 and ends it with the year 1926, in which various different codes of law, which were already in use in some European countries, are adopted.³ Still, Rustow, believing that this development is based on gradualism, prefers to describe this process and transition in four phases: "(1) a preparatory phase (ca. 1915-May 1919); (2) an experimental phase (November 1918-March 1924); (3) a decisional or institutional phase (September 1919-26); and (4) a consolidation phase (1923-38)."⁴ Might be due to the implementation of the concept on the basis of Mustafa Kemal himself, his personal career and as Kemalism, lacking is the specificity of RPP in these periods. With this viewpoint, as a party founded in 1923, RPP might understandably be excluded from this process. Nevertheless, unless the interaction between first the Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia and, second, the First Group in the First National Assembly, not only the history of RPP but also the specific analysis of Kemalism is objective enough. As there has always been an unbreakable link between Mustafa Kemal himself and the political life of Turkey beginning in 1919 RPP's history should have necessarily been started with this year. The history of RPP, in this context, should first be elaborated between the years 1919, when Turkish Independence War started together with the other local initiatives and organisations and 1923, the very year the party was formed, as the first period of development.

³Ibid., 60.

⁴Ibid., 61.

Mete Tunçay, taking the year 1923 as an initial year and terminating it in 1931, defines the phase as 'The Establishment of a One-Party Government'⁵. In this regard, according to Tunçay, tacitly, the second phase of RPP might be considered embedded within these years. Tunçay, himself explains, why he preferred. The main point is that, Tunçay does not see the period between 1923 and 1931 as the only crucial time limitation; for, he rather insists on the exigency of the whole one-party period, which covers, bearing the Progressive Republican Party and Free Party endeavours in mind, the period between 1923 and 1946. Second, for Tunçay the more significant moment in this effort is the year Atatürk died, namely 1938. But since time intervals are too long to study, he decides to stay on the period between 1923 and 1931, and takes the year 1931 as a remarkable milestone, because of the Party Congress which was held then and which brought a structural renovation to the party.⁶

On the other hand, the emergence of a one-party-state concept has also been analysed by Zürcher.⁷ However, Zürcher is prone to make a distinction within the concept, for he underlines the difference between the notion of 'emergence', in other words, the preparation years and 'the Kemalist one-party state.' The latter conceals the years 1925-45, whereas the first period is settled, according to Zürcher, between 1923-27.⁸ Here two points need attention. First, Zürcher, closes the first period by referring to Mustafa Kemal's reading his 'Speech' in National Assembly in the 1927

⁵Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981).

⁶*Ibid.*, 3.

⁷Erich Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), 173.

⁸*Ibid.*, 173-184, 185-215.

Congress of PP, which is described by Zürcher as 'the end of an era.' Second, the following period did not start in 1927 but in 1925. Here, Zürcher's point of departure is the Law on the Maintenance of Order, issued in March 1925. Despite this, the acceptability of the argument, as the same fact is accentuated also by Tunçay, is dependent if a more historically-prone approach is preferred more than a political science view point, for the argument rests on the historical mile-stones or turning points. A similar point might be observed in Weiker, for he seizes RPP in three concentric periods. First he deliberates on "party politics during the war of independence⁹." Then, he concretises the party politics as 'from organisation to party.' Under the shelter of the same argument, the author also takes the years 1923-25 as the "elimination of the conservative opposition"¹⁰. The last period, for Weiker is the 1926-30 phase, which he characterises as "the period of RPP monopoly."¹¹

A more politically established comprehension of the matter is proposed by Tunaya. In the first look, Tunaya, in a manner not different from Tunçay or Zürcher, also underlines the prominent power of the historical events, as he starts with the 'Societies period.' But Tunaya shows a significant will in studying RPP depending on the party congresses. Tunaya, after starting his analysis again by the 'Societies period', immediately continues by dividing the history into two parts, as the "years of power" and "the years of opposition."¹² In this resolving issue is the importance he

⁹Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: Free Party and Its Aftermath* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973).

¹⁰Ibid., 187-190.

¹¹Ibid., 190-194.

¹²Farık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler: 1859-1952*, (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, tıpkıbasım, 1995), 559-567.

attributes to party congresses by saying, "the evolution attained by the party have always been officially realised by way of Congresses."¹³

The difficulty of separating the realms of history and the political might be observed in Kili's book, devoted to RPP.¹⁴ It is not a matter of speculation or ambiguity to place Kili's book on this fault line for, she herself describes her book as an 'Analysis From the Angle of Political Science.' Though at the beginning, Kili tackles with the question of modernism and the relationship between political parties and modernity, beginning her specific analysis of RPP, she goes back in history and refers to early years of National Resistance. This is again taking the 1919-1923 as the first period and Kili puts the second period directly related with Atatürk, which takes the end year of the second period as 1938¹⁵, with special emphasis on the development of the ideological dimension of PP, staying on the reality of congresses and namely the implementation of Six Arrows. It is interesting that Kili does not mix the years 1938-45 with the years of the single-party period, taking the latter as compact and uniform period but detaches it as the 'Period of National Leader.'¹⁶ The same understanding is clear both in Tunçay's elaborations, mentioned above, and might also be followed through Koçak's book.¹⁷ Giritlioglu also takes a similar position. Although he is distinct in the first period of his understanding when he refers

¹³Ibid., 567.

¹⁴Suna Kili, *1960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nde Gelişmeler: Siyaset Bilimi Açısından Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1976).

¹⁵Ibid., 49-77.

¹⁶Ibid., 85-91.

¹⁷Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986).

to it as "The Birth Phase of RPP"¹⁸, his significant approach appears when he makes a distinction between "Single-Party Dominance Era"¹⁹ and "RPP Government in the Single-Party Life."²⁰ Here, it should be noted that, Giritlioğlu, without giving, mentioning or referring to any concrete date, rather specifies the political dimensions of the subject matter. On the other hand, in an official publication of the RPP, history is divided into three main phases as, "1. The National Independence War and National Sovereignty Period, From the Sivas Congress to 9.9.1923. 2. The government period, between 9.9.1923 and 14.5.1950. 3. Opposition years 14.5.1950 and 27.5.1960"²¹

Through these it is possible to say that, the second period of PP could be framed, if a more political scientific approach is accepted and foreseen, between 1923 and 1931. Nevertheless, this periodization should be divided into various different phases in itself. First of all, the major and alleged determinant of this long era is the second National Assembly years, 1923-1927, on condition that the year 1923 should be started by the proclamation of the republic. This is the second time period in which historical and political is coincided, for there are many different issues at stake as well as many other reasons enabling us for such a categorisation. The first one is, above all, within these years the basic and the most radical changes which are usually referred as '*devrimler*' which might be translated into English as either revolutions or

¹⁸Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Hayatında Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), 11-42.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 55-169.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 181-256.

²¹Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi İstanbul İl İdare Kurulu, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Tarihçesi* (İstanbul: Şevket Ünal Matbaası, 1962), 10.

reforms²² have been implemented, the most eminent one, the abolishing of the caliphate. This is supported by the unification of the education. Second, the 1924 Constitution has been developed and issued by the National Assembly²³. The constitutional process should be thought together with the abolishing of the religious courts and the implementation of the Civil Code. Third, the early opposition attempt against the PP, has been both transformed into a political party under the name of Progressive Republican Party which is dissolved in the same period²⁴. This is backed by Law on the Maintenance of Order, 1925, and the İzmir trials, which is the reckoning with the late opposition groups of both CUP and PRP. Fourth, in 1927 the Second Congress of PP is held²⁵ and in this meeting, to say it with Zürcher, the period is closed by Mustafa Kemal, reading his Speech²⁶. Also the elections of 1927

²² Özbudun, "The Nature", 91.

²³ Marcie J. Patton, "Constitutionalism and Political Culture in Turkey," in *Political Culture and Constitutionalism*, ed. D.P. Franklin, M.J. Baun (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 138-158; Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998); Tarık Zafer Tunaya, "1924 Anayasasının İdeolojik Karakteri" in *Devrim Hareketleri İçinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, genişletilmiş 2. Basım, 1981).

²⁴ Ulrich Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925* (Leiden, New York, København, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1991).

²⁵ Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 568-569; Hikmet Bila, *Sosyal Demokrat Süreç İçinde CHP ve Sonrası* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1987), 69-72.

²⁶ Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk, Cilt I: 1919-1920* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Altıncı Baskı, 1963); *Nutuk, Cilt II: 1920-1927* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Beşinci Baskı, 1962); *Nutuk, Cilt III: Vesikalar* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Yedinci Baskı, 1963). Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Cilt 1: Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991).

marks the end of this period.²⁷ This period, as has been aforementioned, even though is enshrined by specific but strictly political developments, is, however, a period in which the state is formed and founded rather than a political ideology implemented.

Following this first era of the second period comes the second era in which an ideology is implemented and the steps put forward are more political. Nevertheless, in this period, one of the most drastic changes has appeared; which is the Alphabet change of 1927. This change, more radically than the other reformatations, has played a dual role in the formation of a new epoch. It is, no doubt that, an ideological decision but, it could also be taken as the basis for the political-ideological changes whose repercussions are still debated in Turkey. This period can be stretched up until the death of Kemal Atatürk in 1938. The crucial point is that during this period it is more reasonable to dwell on the political issues, which are the adjacent issues to the ideological expansion of the state and state-led ideology. The only historio-political demarcation of the period is the culmination of Free Republican Party²⁸ in 1930 and its abolishing within six months. Apart from this, all other factors affecting the period are the decisions reached and the model set in the RPP congresses of 1931²⁹ and

²⁷For the first general elections of the Republic see, Tevfik Çavdar, *Müntehib-i Sani'den Seçmene* (Ankara: V Yayınları, 1987), 77-79.

²⁸Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 622-635, Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 64-68. (Karpat translates the name of the party as 'Liberal Party.') ; Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997); Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: Free Party and its Aftermath* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973) (Weiker, insists on translating the name of the party as 'Free Party.') ; Walter Weiker, "The Free Party, 1930" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. M.Heper and J.M.Landau (London, New York: I.B.Tauris&Co Ltd), 83-99.

²⁹Suna Kili: *CHP'de*, 57-77; Hikmet Bila: *CHP*, 84-91; Tarık Zafer Tunaya: *Siyasi Partiler*, 569-570; Fahir Giritlioğlu: *Türk*, 89-100.

1935³⁰. The extraordinary congress of 1938 starts a new period, namely the years of İsmet İnönü both as president of Turkey and RPP which would last up until the 1950 elections, when the government is rendered to Democrat Party after the elections. Even though there are five more congress between 1939 and 1950 (inclusive), following Kili, it is putative mentioning that in this period there is no radical political change observed and, the path followed is again the reinforcement of the established model of republic.³¹ Staying in this framework it is possible to say that the periodization, after 1923-1927, continues with the period of 1927-1950 with specific emphasis on 1931 and 1935 congresses, staying on the political discussion, which is strictly related with the ideological background of the state founded. But this approach needs a further theoretical analysis which is below.

2.1.2. Political Science or History

Under these assumptions, PP can further be analysed on the basis of political science, which is a trial to situate the party politics and its epistemology in an ideological framework³². To accomplish this, it is necessary to divide the party history into two parts, depending on two different epistemological analysis. In the first part,

³⁰CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay Görüşmeleri Tutanakları (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1935); Hikmet Bila: *CHP*, 91-106; Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 100-113; Suna Kili: *CHP'de*, 76-79; Tarık Zafer Tunaya: *Siyasi Partiler*, 570-72.

³¹According to Kili who has concentrated on the party politics up until 1974, between 1931 and 1974 there are 20 regular, 5 extraordinary congresses, 1 chairman election congress and 1 Statute Congress held. Bila, who brings the party history up to the dissolving of the party in 1981 by the National Security Council, emphasises that there are two more congresses. After the reestablishment of the RPP in 1992 the party has continued to held congresses with subsequent numbers.

³²For a deliberation on the intersection as well as interaction between ideology and political science see, Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 97-131.

between 1919 and 1923, a more historical account seems more suitable, for the appearance and development of the facts are less 'constructive' and intentional³³. To put it in another way, it is possible to say that, before the establishment of the party, historical events and practical positions determine the political situation and the whole process is aimed at the making of a political party. On the contrary, after the formation of the party, historical events and even the social conditions are regulated by an *a priori* political decision and this is the making of history through politics.³⁴ This pushes forward the requirement of sticking to a specific analysis of the party which rests on a more abstract basis and more relying on the analysis of the constructed values, system and structure, usually embedded in the party programs. As party programs or statutes are issued in the party congresses, the deliberation of the party and its reflections and repercussions could better be comprehended by referring to these political events. It is to say that following the second period of PP in which still the historical events help to shape the political situation rather than political decisions influence the former, it will be relevant to assign some of them whereas, in the consecutive periods, up until the 1960s, the history will be seen through more concepts than events. Here the periods can be categorised on a concept-base model. The 1923-1927 is the preparation and transition period of the republic which is not a consequence of already planned and decided model but rather staying alert to the pragmatic and practical events and issues. The 1923-1931 period is the formation of the state together with the proclamation of the republic. This period can also be

³³For a discussion of this understanding of the relation between history and ideology see, Conal Condren, "Political Theory and the Problem of Anachronism" in *Political Theory: Tradition and Diversity*, ed. Andrew Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 45-64.

³⁴For a discussion to understand how ideologies construct the history see, R.Boudon, *The Analysis of Ideology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 37 and 117.

characterised as 'state-led party.' The last phase of the construction period is the 1931-1950 years which is the construction of a cultural ideology and which could also be qualified as 'party-led state.' The implementation of the Six Arrows, the political symbol of RPP, to Constitution and the denouncement of party-state togetherness are the crux of this symbiotic relationship.

2.2. Foundation of People's Party as a Political Process

2.2.1 Erzurum and Sivas Congress

The roots of Republican People's Party, as have been indicated by various scholars, are found in the years encompassing the National Independence War. Atatürk, himself, as the first leader of RPP, has declared the relationship between the cadres organising the Independence War and RPP. According to him, the first congress of RPP should be taken as the Sivas Congress which was held on September the 4, 1919.

Sivas Congress is the first political organisation aiming to control the different political and military organisations developed to a certain extent spontaneously in different parts of the country under the name *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*, beginning as early as late 1918 just after the Armistice of Mudros. The first societies have been organised in Kars, Erzurum, İzmir and Edirne; a good selection pointing the wide range the organisations formed. The unification of these groups and the construction of a control mechanism concerning them has been the basic interest of the core military group planning the Independence War which, in time, would turn out to be the kernel of the RPP. Even though Sivas Congress is the hearth of this procedure as the process started in Erzurum Congress and, as the latter is the extent of the former, in order to

understand the climate and the basic issues elaborated, Erzurum Congress should be analysed in brief.

After Atatürk's landing in Samsun, according to Zürcher, he was forced to join the meeting held in Erzurum. Erzurum Congress which was held in 23 July, 1919 and continued up until 17 August, was more a local idea developed by the *Erzurum Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*, and supported by the idea of the former Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) cadres, rather than Mustafa Kemal Paşa himself. The left over group of this party, which did abolish itself on November 5, 1918 has already passed to Anatolia and started the early endeavours for a resistance movement. The core group might be divided into two sub groups. The first one is the civil cadres of CUP, active in the political life and usually the former members of the Ottoman Parliament,³⁵ whereas the second group includes the generals who have decided and proposed Mustafa Kemal Paşa to direct the movement. There was a close relationship between the groups.

The basic expectation of a congress that would be held in Erzurum was the unification of the local, scattered and disorganised resistance groups of the Eastern towns. In fact, in the days preceding this mission, there was already an attempt initiated by Atatürk when he was in Amasya, suggesting that the disorganised and spontaneously formed defence and resistance groups should come together. As a

³⁵The first official resistance organisation established in Kars is after the attempts of Cihangiroğlu İbrahim, the former CUP chairman in Kars. Founders of Vilayet-i Şarkiye Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Milliye are Süleyman Nazif, the poet and the former mayor in the CUP era, Hoca Raif (Dinç), a former Erzurum deputy. The Erzurum branch of this organization was founded by both Hoca Raif and Dursunbeyzade Cevat (Dursunoğlu) an Erzurum lawyer having close affiliation to CUP. See, Zürcher, *Opposition* 164-65.

proof of this he had already send a message to Karabekir asking the necessary information about the local resistance movement. But the local Congress of Erzurum Town was already under decision and Mustafa Kemal, more for tactical reasons had to attend it.³⁶ The basic reasons can be analysed as

i) After Mustafa Kemal's transferring to Anatolia, there occurs a contradiction between the General Staff in Istanbul and Mustafa Kemal. The clash was more attuned to the diverse approaches to the existing condition. Because the Minister of War, Fevzi Paşa, believed in the diplomatic solutions, the official Army perceived not only Mustafa Kemal himself as a danger but also his actions a rebellion agitating the Allied Forces to an armed struggle.³⁷³⁸ ii) Even though the official army found the assembly of the Parliament in Istanbul after 1919 elections acceptable, Mustafa Kemal was insistent on its convention in Anatolia³⁹. iii) Istanbul, was keen enough to see the movement as a tool to protect and save the Palace whereas, its counterpart, Mustafa

³⁶The first date for the Congress was July 10; however because some of the representatives could not arrive the date postponed to July the 23 which was the eleventh anniversary of the 1908 'Revolution. See, Mazhar Müfit Kansu, *Erzurum'dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber, 1. cilt* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), s.47. Even, the leader of the resistance organization in Trabzon has clearly indicated that the members were selected among the well known CUP cadres." Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 507.

³⁷Zürcher, *Unionist*, 184.

³⁸Still this point needs further clarification. For the initiation of Anatolian Resistance Movement there are two basic explanations. The first one occurs from Atatürk's own approach putting himself and his decision first. The second opinion dwells on the role of the former CUP and related organizations and the other high rank generals. It could be deduced that Generals decided both for an armed struggle and compromised on Mustafa Kemal's name as the head of the movement. In this respect the Generals' will to overthrow him out seems a vague point or a point more related with a fear towards the political ambition and methods of Mustafa Kemal.

³⁹Atatürk, *Nutuk*, vol.1, 270-273.

Kemal was more inclined to see the military forces in Istanbul and, especially the Karakol group, as the tool of the Anatolian forces.⁴⁰ The delicate struggle between the sides is related with the Karakol group, a semi-military organisation founded after the 1918 armistice as the main structure for the resistance movement. Karakol, always believed that it is after the organisation's help that the cadres of Anatolia have been established. Depending on these issues it was clear that Istanbul and Fevzi Paşa, with his close friends, thought to replace Mustafa Kemal with Kazım Karabekir.⁴¹

Erzurum Congress was, in a sense, the imposition of these Principles on Mustafa Kemal and, to a certain extent, the accentuation of the Istanbul through Kazım Karabekir, even though with face value, everything seems to be controlled by Mustafa Kemal. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal as a general resigned from the Ottoman army, and continuing his career by the clear support of Kazım Karabekir, was able to surpass the situation with distinct tactics and forcing the congress to decide the convention of a new one in Sivas.

Sivas Congress, started on September 4, 1919, is later defined by Atatürk himself, as the first congress of Republican People's Party. The striking events of the congress could be analysed as the clash between the Istanbul CUP group and Mustafa Kemal Paşa, the unification of Societies for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia and decisions reached for the rejection of the idea of mandate and of resistance against the invaders. The most beneficial issue achieved through Sivas Congress decisions for Mustafa Kemal was that he started to see the opposition

⁴⁰Zürcher, *Unionist*, 185.

⁴¹Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz* (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1960) 391.

developing against him. Definitely, the CUP residues and Karakol group, through a complicated web of relations, first tried to obstruct the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. Apart from that what is worth indicating is that some of Mustafa Kemal's most close friends clearly proposed the American mandate. Even though they were active for the independency they also urged for the preservation of the basic institutions of the Ottoman Empire, as the Sultanate, Caliphate and Istanbul as the capital of the Empire. This very condition, is usually and for a long time believed to signify the differentiation and separation between the later First and the Second Group in the National Assembly, as well as paving the way to the formation of an organised opposition against Mustafa Kemal and Republican Peoples Party under the name of Progressive Republican Party.

The last important decision reached in the Sivas Congress is the unification of separate and independent societies usually referring and defining themselves as a 'Society for the Defence of Rights' established both in the Western and Eastern parts of the country. In the final decree announced by the Sivas Congress this is certified under the name of 'Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia-SDRAR' Not less important than this, the other move, related with the philosophy backing this development, which is the centralisation of the Independence movement, is the new role given to Committee of Representatives (Heyet-i Temsiliye). This organisation, first founded in the Erzurum Congress, was the representative of all of the Societies for the Defence of Rights of Eastern Anatolia. In this case its function is enlarged to represent all of the societies found all around the Anatolia as a consequence of the unification of them.

2.2.2 Foundation of the 'First Group'

Foundation of the First Group, usually referred as Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu (Defence of Rights Group-DRG) is the major practical step taken in the formation of Republican Peoples Party. The First Group is formed by Mustafa Kemal himself in the Grand National Assembly on May the 10, 1921. The group consisted of some of the deputies already existing in the parliamentary.

In *Speech*, Mustafa Kemal explains the necessity for such an approach by referring to a certain issue: according to him, before the formation of the First Group, there were already a number of 'groups' appearing in the Assembly. These groups were Solidarity Group (*Tesaniit Grubu*), Independence Group (*İstiklal Grubu*), Defence of Rights Faction (*Müdafaai Hukuk Zümresi*), Peoples' Faction (*Halk Zümresi*), Reform Group (*Islahat Grubu*). The problem is that there were contradictions and clashes but no compromise among these groups. Mustafa Kemal complains on this issue saying that it was difficult to reach a decision in the Assembly due to the tense and long lasting debates.⁴² In the end he decides to organise a group by talking to deputies belonging to different groups and convinces them to get united as a group to follow certain principles. These principles are set and defined as the 'Regulations of Defence of Rights Group'.⁴³ The importance of the organisation of this group is larger than the reason put forward by Atatürk himself. As Tunçay points out, there are early indicators showing that Mustafa Kemal was already in search of such a move. Tunçay draws the attention to a circular signed and sent to various different cities and towns by Mustafa Kemal Paşa, in February 1921 asking the names of the members of the central committees of DRAR.

⁴²Kemal Atatürk: *Nutuk*, vol.2, 594.

⁴³Even though in various different sources this Regulation is found the most complete and reliable one is in Tunçay *Tek Parti*, 347-348.

This circular has two important points. First one is that, DRG is founded on the basis of SARDR. Second, it is the second attempt in the centralisation and the central control of organisations. Not less important than this, it should be pointed out that Atatürk never refers any one of the groups formed in the Assembly as 'factions' or with any other possible name. They were only the 'groups', but he refers to his organisation in the *Speech* as 'political group' and by saying "as there was SARDR in the country there occurred the political group of it in the Assembly", he shows that this new group did not only come out as a possibility to eradicate the clashes among different groups, enabling the Assembly to operate but as a more coherent body.⁴⁴ One another tacit point which determines that this group is mainly a party, in Atatürk's words, is when he identifies this group with the one which he wanted to form in the last Ottoman Parliament, but has never achieved .⁴⁵

The organisation of the group, at the first instance, seems to be related with the goal of achieving majority in the Assembly to help decisions to be reached more swiftly and with less conflict. This very condition is based on the certain assumption

⁴⁴Tunçay also takes this point into consideration in two ways. First, he explains the linguistic meaning of the word (parliamentary) 'group' in the political jargon of those days. Second, going back to the historical development path of the Western political parties, he signifies that the development trajectory have always been from groups to parties. Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, , 42.

⁴⁵Atatürk, after Mudros Armistice insisted his friends that after the abolishing of Community for Union and Progress in the Ottoman Parliament should there be a group supporting the ideas later defended by SDRAR. Rauf Bey responsible for this task when intended to organise such a group, he ended up with what is known as Recovery of the Country Group (*İelah-ı Vatan Grubu*) both a loose and disorganised league as well as ambiguous in its views. For an analysis of this group see, Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 519.

that the *raison d'être* of the Assembly is to save the country from the invasion and to re-establish the power of the Sultanate and Caliphate. At the beginning, as is understood from Mustafa Kemal's Speech, only a few deputies did not enter the group. But it is apparent that those "who did not enter the group as they wanted to be free"⁴⁶ were those who were left out. Hüseyin Avni (Ulaş), later, in his talk in the Assembly, rejected the argument that he wanted to stay out and, declared that not only himself but all members of the Assembly are natural members of the group.

This very argument that every member of the Assembly is a natural member of the Group seems not true. Because if the truth of this approach is accepted than it is not easy to understand the existence of different groups in the Assembly. At this point another speculation might be made by saying that Mustafa Kemal, by forming a group, not only fortified his leadership and developed further his plans towards a more radical leadership, but also forced the opposition in the Assembly to become more distinct. He would also assume that to tackle with the opposition would be much more easier if he had dependent on a certain group which would in the eliminate the others. Nevertheless, this milestone clarifies two points. First, Mustafa Kemal, definitely left some deputies out and, secondly, wanted to have an organisation supporting his leadership and dominance and continuing under his personal and strict control. On the other hand, the real differentiation in the Assembly started after the proclamation of the Regulations of the Defence of Rights Group. The initiative for this process is the second article of the Regulation.

⁴⁶Atatürk, *Nutuk*, v.1, 186.

The first⁴⁷ Regulation for the First Group consists of two parts. The first part has three paragraphs and is named as the Basic Article (Madde-i Esasiye).⁴⁸ In the introductory paragraph the reason of being of the group is stated as the achievement of the independency of the country and nation. It should be stated here that there is no indication signifying that the Group is a new formed body. On the contrary, with references to Erzurum and Sivas congresses and to the National Assembly, the group is defined as that the whole body of the Assembly. Here, in other words, the Group is conceived as the National Assembly itself and where 'group' is mentioned it signifies the SARDR.

The second paragraph is reserved to the specification of the mission. Here, the group, to be able to operate, is permitted to use all the physical and moral values and possibilities of the nation. Further, in the second sentence of the second paragraph, which created discomfort among different circles and groups, is argued that the group will try to force all public and private physical and moral organisations to achieve its goal. This is a critical clause because, for the first time, it is mentioned that the private and state organisations are or will be put under the control of the group whereas, in the following article, this is extended to and related with Constitution known as Law on Fundamental Organisation (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*). Here, it is stated that although the Group would be working primarily to the accomplishment of the determined

⁴⁷The Regulations is later amended in 1922 after the establishment of the Second Group declaring its own Regulations.

⁴⁸Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 347.

national purpose, still, beginning right now, it would also try to (re)arrange the organisations of the nation and country according to Constitutional Act.^{49,50}

In various sources, it is argued that the groups, either already existing or established after the proclamation of Regulation, never argued the first purpose stated in the first and second paragraph. But, the third one, related with the reorganisation of the state according to Law of Constitution, 1876, created an irreversible differentiation, bringing an end to the solidarity and homogeneity of the Assembly. This point is also stressed by Mustafa Kemal in the *Speech*.⁵¹ To understand this argument, it is necessary to analyse the structure and nature of the Constitution. Though a critical assessment, regarding the Constitution will be given in the following section, here suffice is to say that the Constitution was depending on the tension between the protection and sustaining of the Caliphate and Sultanate and accepting that "sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation and the National Assembly is the expression of national will and the source of authority."⁵²

These contradictory issues held in the Constitution were controllable with a reference to the goal of the Assembly as the salvation of the nation. When analysed in detail, it is clear that in the Constitutional Act of 1921, the sovereignty issue is always

⁴⁹Karpat translates this verdict as "'to reorganize the state and nation within the framework of the Constitutional Act.'" Kemal Karpat, "The Republican People's Party" in Heper and Landau, *Political*, 46.

⁵⁰ Atatürk, in his *Speech*, talks about the second issue of the Bill which is the third paragraph of the original text. This also shows that among the deputies there was not any contradiction regarding the basic reason of being of the Group.

⁵¹ Atatürk, *Nutuk*, v.2, 596.

⁵² Karpat, "The Republican", 48-49.

expressed as an act left to the practicality of the National Assembly. In other words, it is a natural legitimacy basis for the formation of the Assembly hindering the necessity of emphasising any ideological approach or choice. It is also interesting that this principle is never mentioned in the text other than the paragraph regarding the state (re)organisation. As has been mentioned above, after the declaration of the Regulations, the unity among the Assembly shattered and the so called unified group began to differentiate arguing that third paragraph would be the main initiation for the establishment of Republic.⁵³

Mustafa Kemal, in *Speech* publishes the telegraphs exchanged between him and Kazım Karabekir. Karabekir objects the foundation of the Group, mainly relying on the mentioned article. Mustafa Kemal also mentions the formation of different organisations in various parts of the country which were against this very article. The names of those organisations are sufficiently expressive: 'Society for the Protection of Sacred Values (Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Cemiyeti).

At this point it could be argued that the notion of Republic encompasses the frame of the first ideological split. This is also related with the other ideological arguments hidden in the Constitutional Act *par excellence* and, more, in the process of preparing it. Before moving to the analysis of that issue, here it should be noted that not by the establishment of the SARDR but, mainly, the establishment of the First Group, RPP's ideological and practical basis is constructed. The political characteristic of this party is also embedded in this process, for the FG resembles the other factors,

⁵³This is an interesting issue which needs further elaboration. It shows that already there was an idea of republic in the society even though this, in those years, was something very similar, and to a certain extent identical, with Bolshevism.

such as unification of the executive and legislative, which could easily be conducive to the hegemony of the personal will of the leader over the parliamentary. This ideological debates further will be analysed in the related sections below. Now, it is necessary to discuss the foundation of the RPP or the transformation of the FG to RPP.

2.2.3. Formation of RPP

RPP was founded in the year 1923. This was the end of a long process carefully controlled and manipulated by Mustafa Kemal. In the development of the process there found a set of different motivations sometimes related with the conjunctural political life. Approaching the matter from this view point someone should dissect the historical background and try to see the other factors affecting the decision of Mustafa Kemal to form a political party named, since the very first day as People's Party. Erich Zürcher, in his book, succinctly shows that the basic factor forcing Mustafa Kemal to end up with a decision concerning the formation of a political party is the movements made by the former cadres of CUP. This needs a quick and chronological survey of the time period between late 1922 and 23 November 1923, the official date for the registration of the founded party.

In about ten days, between August 30, 1922 and September 9, 1922, with a counter move of the Turkish Army, known as Great Offensive, the Greek troops were thrown out of central Anatolia and National Independence War was finished. Following the Great Victory, in November 1, 1922 Sultanate was abolished. In the following days Mustafa Kemal announced his intention to form a political party for the first time in an interview with the representatives of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Yenigün* and

Öğüt newspapers on the December 6, 1922⁵⁴ : "following the stabilisation of the peace⁵⁵ I am intending to organise a political party under the name of People's Party on the Principle of populism."⁵⁶

The group of deputies in the National Assembly, known as the Second Group, tried to renew the elections to obstruct the further developments but their proposal was overruled in the Assembly with Mustafa Kemal's majority.⁵⁷ In the following period Mustafa Kemal embarked a campaign in the Western Anatolia and began expressing his thoughts related with the near future. In January 16, 1923 he made a press conference in İzmir and invited the representatives of newspapers *Tevhidieşkar*, *Vakit*, *Akşam*, *İleri*, *İkdam*, *Tanin*. There, he, again, announced his decision by saying: "to achieve the common good, happiness and well-being of our people it is intended to form a party under the name of People's Party."⁵⁸

⁵⁴This date is given wrongly as September 7, 1922 in Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 26.

⁵⁵With 'peace' he is strictly referring to Lausanne Treaty negotiations which was proceeding those days.

⁵⁶ *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II*, haz., Nermin Unan, ikinci baskı (Ankara: Türk İnkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları: 1, 1959, 46-48. (From now on *ASD, II*). For the interpretations of this interview and references to it see, Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, p. 47; Kili, *CHP'de*, s.47; Bila, *CHP*, 45.

⁵⁷Zürcher, *Opposition* 23.

⁵⁸ *ASD II*, 60. Atatürk's press conference, known as İzmit Press Conference, has a long and interesting history. Atatürk meets the journalists by January 16, 1922 first time. The interview continues for more than six hours. The exact minutes of the meeting are captured by four stenographs of the National Assembly. But later it is decided not to publish these minutes. The following days, journalists submitted their articles to the newspapers staying confident to the decision they should not give any detail. They only appreciated Mustafa Kemal and reflected their impressions that Turkey was about to start a new period of reforms and transformations. By January 20, 1922, in the newspapers appeared a kind of declaration-information under the heading as : "An Important Declaration of Mustafa Kemal Paşa to İstanbul Press." It was sure that this was a text published after control and consent of Mustafa Kemal. The *ASD*

To understand better the urgency of Mustafa Kemal to form a party, it is necessary to know two more points. The first one is, again according to Zürcher, with reference to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Mustafa Kemal, during his stay in İzmit, must have seen Kara Kemal, one of the prominent leaders of CUP, who had returned to the country from his Malta exile, and did two things. First, he told the representatives from Istanbul that "there was room for only one political organisation and that they (the remaining of CUP and the Second Group in the National Assembly) should unite under the banner of the ADNR."⁵⁹ Second, he asked Kara Kemal "about the plans of the Unionists now that the war was over. (Kara) Kemal said that, since the Unionists were dispersed over Anatolia and in Europe he could not answer that question immediately, so Mustafa Kemal suggested that he bring together the most prominent Unionists and see how they felt."⁶⁰

The 'real' answer given to this question and proposal was the last meeting of CUP, held on April 12-13, 1923.⁶¹ The importance of this meeting lies on two

II, text referred here is strictly the mentioned one taken from Gün newspaper of January 20, 1922. Later, the minutes, again after Mustafa Kemal's consent and approval, was published in *Milliyet* between November 26, 1929 to February 7, 1930. Later this text is published by İsmail Arar, referring to this history in the 'Foreword'. See, İsmail Arar, *Atatürk'ün İzmit Basın Toplantısı* (İstanbul: Burçak yayınları, 1969), 5-7. The further and 'developed' publication of this text is found in Arı İnan, *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1982) and in *Atatürk'ün İzmit-eskişehir Konuşması* (İstanbul: kaynak Yayınları, 1988).

⁵⁹Zürcher, *Opposition* 25. ADNR is initials of Zürcher's translation of Association for the Defence of the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 25.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 27.

points. The first is that at the end of the meeting "it accepted Mustafa Kemal's leadership and offered to support the candidates selected by him in the elections."⁶² This was a critical development for, tacitly, in the meantime, it proposed the resurrection of the CUP which had dissolved itself in the last congress of 1918.⁶³ After the decision of dissolving, a new party was founded under the name of Renovation Party (*Teceddüt Fırkası*) which did not participate in the 1918 elections⁶⁴. Mustafa Kemal, after the congress, immediately reacted that he has no involvement in the procedure also accentuating that not only CUP was transformed into Renovation Party but also its members were the members of the SARDR⁶⁵. This was a clear proclamation that his political program and movements would be detached from CUP. The second important point related with the last congress of CUP could not be understood unless the political formations between April 12-13 are analysed.

The first one of this set of political developments is the decision of April 1, 1923⁶⁶ for the renewal of the elections. Mustafa Kemal, after the above mentioned declarations, showing his intention to organise a political party, in the April 8, 1923 released a nine points declaration known as Nine Principles.⁶⁷ This declaration has been signed by Mustafa Kemal as the leader of SARDR. Basically it is the political

⁶²Ibid., 27.

⁶³Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 407-410.

⁶⁴For the discussion of this party see, Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 412-414.

⁶⁵Hakimiyet-i Milliye 15 April 1923 in Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 559-560.

⁶⁶For his speech in the National Assembly for the renewal of the elections see, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I: TBMM ve CHP Kurultaylarında (1919-1938)* (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları:1), 310-311. (From now on *ASD I*).

⁶⁷For a translation of this declaration see, Zürcher, *Opposition*, 118-122.

manifesto of SARDR for the coming elections. In this declaration, apart from the details concerning the political program, the main point was the definitive decision forwarded by the society and Mustafa Kemal that after the elections, People's Party would be founded and the SARDR Group in the Assembly would be transformed into People's Party.⁶⁸

Giritlioğlu, elaborating on this point, concludes that the 'official' declaration that People's Party would be founded was to help the SARDR candidates to be elected as the deputies in all constituencies. In the program, it is also declared that the new party would be formed to accomplish the economic development, to complete the state organisation and to carry the nation to well being.⁶⁹ In other words, the Nine Principles were both the political manifestation of the People's Party to the electorate for the coming elections which was not yet founded and also the political program of this party. Giritlioğlu also stresses this point saying that it has been the basic program of the party until the first program approved in the 1931 Congress of PP⁷⁰. Besides, Giritlioğlu points out that the reason, why not first the party formed but left after the elections, is that Mustafa Kemal wanted the members of the party themselves to prepare the program.⁷¹

There is not any evidence found to support this democratic will. On the contrary Nine Principles were already the framework of a party program which was

⁶⁸Ibid, 118.

⁶⁹Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 30.

⁷⁰Ibid., 31.

⁷¹Ibid., 30.

nearly impossible to be surpassed if Mustafa Kemal's personal prestige in those days is considered. Also it is clear that the Regulations which was approved by September 9, 1923 was prepared by Mustafa Kemal himself⁷². Instead, it seems more relevant to think that Mustafa Kemal, through this process wanted to get rid of the Second Group⁷³ of the First National Assembly and also to transfer the prestige of SARDR to PP.⁷⁴

The elections were realised in the June and July of 1923 and first meeting of NA has been held in August 11, 1923.⁷⁵ But before the NA meeting, in August 7, deputies gathered as the DR Group to approve the already prepared Regulation of PP and the transformation of SARDR into PP.⁷⁶ The Bill of Statutes (*Nizamname*) was approved finally, after the meeting of August 19⁷⁷, in September 9. On the September 11, following the elections Mustafa Kemal elected as the chairman of PP. The

⁷²Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *On Beşinci Yıl Kitabı*, 4.

⁷³This point is clearly discussed in both Zürcher, *Opposition*, 29-30 and Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 53-57.

⁷⁴For the details of the Second Group and its condition in the second NA see, Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet: İkinci Grup* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2. baskı 1995) 571-598.

⁷⁵This date is given in Zürcher as August 9, 1923 Zürcher, *Opposition*, 30 but it is again August 11, in Demirel, *Birinci*, 598.

⁷⁶This date is given as August 8, 1923 in Kili, *CHP'de*, 44; but it is again August 7 both in Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 37 and August 7 in Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi İstanbul İl İdare Kurulu, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Tarihçesi* (İstanbul:Şevket Ünal Matbaası, 1962), 9.

⁷⁷Though in some sources, i.e. *On Beşinci Yıl Kitabı* it is said that the prepared Bill was open to hard debates this is the only known meeting (probably) concerned with this process. Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 37.

secretary general was Recep Peker. The official approval date for the party is October 23, 1923 due to a petition submitted to Ministry of Interior.⁷⁸

In the next period of PP, the most prominent event is the proclamation of republic. The republic is established October 29, 1923 after a long lasting cabinet crises which seems to be a manoeuvre of Mustafa Kemal. After the announcement of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal is elected president of Turkey. As has been argued by Tanör, the valid 1921 Constitution was enabling the president to be active in the politics.⁷⁹ But

"as he is expected to have a regulatory role in the political life of the country his involvement in the party politics was not approved. Under these conditions İsmet İnönü was nominated as the Acting Chairman (*Umumi Reis Vekili*), seemingly practical duties were left to him. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal's title as Chairman has been left to him up until his death."⁸⁰

The critical point here is that even though at the beginning, namely, after the Independence War, when he was asked to stay in distance to political life and continue as a founding figure above the daily politics⁸¹, he himself furiously rejected this idea, saying that he should devote his life to his country⁸². Remembering this approach, it is not clear who has convinced him to transfer his responsibilities to Acting Chairman,

⁷⁸Ibid., 39.

⁷⁹Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk*, 252.

⁸⁰Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 40.

⁸¹Karabekir, *Paşaların Kavgası: Atatürk-Karabekir* (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1991), 138; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *General Ali Fuat Cebesoy'un Siyasi Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1957), 311-312.

⁸²ASD II, 98.

for, again, Giritlioğlu continues, saying that despite 1924 Constitution, which bans political activity to the President, he did not only continue with his present condition but also has been the chairman of 1927, 1931 and 1935 Party Congresses.⁸³

After his election as the Acting Chairman of the PP, İsmet İnönü sent a Circular to SARDR Centres all over the country. This brings out one of the most important developments in the formation of the party and its becoming a para-military organisation.⁸⁴ In the Circular dated November 20, 1923⁸⁵ it is said "SARDR, beginning today(...) will be transformed into PP and all board of governors, will continue working as PP Board of Governors this time for the developments in the peace period."⁸⁶ This is the end of a long process transforming military cadres into a political party. On behalf of the party, later, in the Party Group General Committee meeting, held in November 10, 1924, due to a proposal offered by Recep (Peker), the word Republican is added and this amendment is registered by the Regulations accepted in the Congress of 1935.⁸⁷

2.3. Ideological Foundations of PP in The Foundation Period

2.3.1. Party or Program?

⁸³Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 40.

⁸⁴The structural specifications and characteristic of DRS is analysed at length in Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 28-42 and Tunaya *Siyasi Partiler*, 478-526. They both analyse the military basis of this political organisation.

⁸⁵This date is given as November 19, 1923 in Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 41.

⁸⁶Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 582-583.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 560.

The early definitions of RPP is given by Mustafa Kemal in his speeches in which he accentuated the early idea of founding a political party under this name. The preliminary explanations are concentrated on three points. First, the notion and the function of 'party' is stressed, second, the importance of a program which is usually thought as the functioning body of party is accentuated and, third, the understanding of 'people' and 'populism' is delivered.

In his very much refereed speeches Mustafa Kemal, strictly defines a concept of 'party.' In his first speech in which he exclaims his prospective idea of founding a party, he immediately refers to the parties and party programs of 'the other countries' and says "I have not found them to satisfy the real needs of our people and country."⁸⁸ With his this very specific approach he once more comes to a conclusion that Turkey is different than the other, foreign, countries having specific conditions. This approach has been critical for Mustafa Kemal since the beginning for, even in his speech, dated, December, 1, 1921 about the Proposed Law Concerning the Function and the Authority of the Cabinet of Ministers, he emphasises this point and, referring to the specificity of the Law under the discussion and, he stresses its immunity to any one of the existing systems such as democracy or socialism and says, "we should be proud of not resembling and not trying to be like (any existing system) because we are like us."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ASD II, 47.

⁸⁹Ibid., 197 and Mahmut Goloğlu, *Üçüncü Meşrutiyet* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1970), 244, Yücekök, *100 Soruda Türk Devrim Tarihi* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1984), 59.

Mustafa Kemal, with this consideration, again in his interview with the representatives of Istanbul press, has an interesting debate with one of the journalists, namely, Ahmet Emin Bey. Saying that, "the program of the party will be devoted to the well being and happiness of the whole nation"⁹⁰ and, stressing that "if the nation is left to itself no further step would be taken (...) and the whole nation should be interested in a positive work program"⁹¹ he is asked a question by the mentioned journalist about the party, stressing the importance of the party above the program, Mustafa Kemal answers argues that "the question is the program. We can not cheat anybody with name changes. What we offer should be a program for the nation."⁹²

The reason why Mustafa Kemal insists on the importance of program has also been explained by himself. In the same interview he clearly makes the distinction between the party and the program by saying: "If the program of the party is determined and certified it is not important the party members to follow it or not."⁹³ Not only this explanation but also another one, in the same interview, is given by him which also indicates the basic clue why Mustafa Kemal has seen the program more important than the party itself: "The party will be founded on this program (...) We can not leave the nation without any goal and organisation. Otherwise we loose the nation."⁹⁴

⁹⁰Ismail Arar, *İzmit*, 53.

⁹¹Ibid., 53

⁹²Ibid., 54

⁹³Ibid., 56.

⁹⁴Ibid., 60.

Taken together with the above explanations, it might be assumed that program is rather an ideological and structural framework intended to be put before the nation⁹⁵ rather than a political program. This could be seen more clearly in a late speech he delivered by defining PP as a 'school to give the nation a political education ("*siyasi terbiye*")".⁹⁶ At this point, as has been stressed by Dodd⁹⁷, he has been open to a specific contradiction and tension arising from the clash between the components of his dispersed ideas. Dodd, explains this contradiction by saying: "Atatürk might be seen urging two contradictory lines here. One is that the party must lead, since the people are not trusted. The other is that the party must respond to the people."⁹⁸

2.3.2 *Between Program, Pragmatism and Elites*

Here, evidently, the problematic concept is the notion of 'people.' Dodd, makes a distinction at this point and says,

"what he probably has in mind is a distinction, not always clearly made, between the people in their raw state, so to speak, before they have been liberated by the revolution and the people, really citizens, as they will have become after the revolution."⁹⁹

⁹⁵For a discussion of the concept and notion of '*fırka*' (Party) at length on this basis see, Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 42.

⁹⁶ASD II, 98.

⁹⁷C.H.Dodd, "Atatürk and Political Parties" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Heper and J.M.Landau (London, New York: I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 1991), 24-41.

⁹⁸Ibid., 36.

⁹⁹Ibid., 29.

As Dodd continues, he delineates the mutual relationship between the party and the citizen, putting citizen before the masses: "These latter are the patriotic citizens, those whose aspirations for reform are in line with those of the party, not just the masses."¹⁰⁰ Here, again comes another contradiction for, it is ambiguous either the party, through its program, will create the 'citizen' or the citizens will direct the party. To answer this question it is necessary to look the definition brought by Dodd to the idea of masses. According to Dodd, "the masses are not despised, since in them lies the virtue which the revolution is releasing."¹⁰¹ These approaches might be taken as the early configuration of the party relying on a basis of more eclectic ideology and structure as Karpat observes.¹⁰² Nevertheless, the same understanding of the party concept has placed the PP on a more pragmatic level. This pragmatism has been understood as the 'reality.'

'Reality', in Mustafa Kemal's words are the necessities of the people and the society: "A program should not be a program of any kind or of somebody but, it can only gain its value and respect by containing the ideas and measures which are able to answer the expectations and necessities of the nation and country."¹⁰³ Later on, still in 1937, he continues to stress the same issue by, first, putting the (Republican) PP program as the basic state program then, stressing that "the Principles (of the program) should not be seen as one and the same thing with the dogmas of the sacred books, believed that have been disseminated by revelations."¹⁰⁴ He clears the probable

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 29.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 29.

¹⁰²Kemal Karpat, "The Republican", 15.

¹⁰³SD IV, 95.

¹⁰⁴ASD I, 405.

intersections by saying: "we have derived our inspirations not from the heaven or void but very directly from the life."¹⁰⁵

The clash between the citizen and the raw people is another subject open to debate through the notion of party, introducing the concept of elites. The role and the function of the elites in the foundation of PP and, later in the implementation of the program of the party, has been vital in this period, in line with the framework delineated above and, to the function of party described and attributed by Mustafa Kemal. The elitist structure and the organisation of the PP, let alone the theoretical argumentation, at the initial level, is related with 'from the above' understanding of political and social transformations. In an early speech, Mustafa Kemal clearly configures the trajectory of the social developments as 'from the above.'¹⁰⁶ In this respect, "certain initiators are providing guidance in giving the nations the directions they need to be given. In this way organisation can be built from above downward."¹⁰⁷

Rostow, referring to this argumentation, first of all, replaces Mustafa Kemal as an "elitist by training and often by bearing" but he also describes him as "a populist by political necessity and by ideological conviction."¹⁰⁸ This contradiction is clear in the

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 405

¹⁰⁶ASDII, 1959, 11.

¹⁰⁷Ibid. 11. The translation is taken from, Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution Builder" in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, ed. A. Kazancigil and E. Özbudun (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 74. For an analysis of the speech, see, p.77, footnote 17.

¹⁰⁸Ibid. 12.

formation of PP as well as in his definitions for intellectuals. In one of his speeches he correlates the intellectuals with the saviours of the nation: "After the dark, painful days, the saving of the nation from the death pit has been only possible by the effort of the intellectuals of the nation (*milletin münevverleri*) by enlightening and guiding the people, by directing the people towards the goal."¹⁰⁹ This point is in accordance and reconciliation with his understanding of the party and party programme. For, first, as has been mentioned above, he puts the party as the organ "which is responsible for enlightening and guiding (*tenvir ve delalet*) the whole nation"¹¹⁰ and, second, party program as "incorporating and including the reform will of a powerful mass of patriots."¹¹¹ Emanating from this framework is the priority and the privilege of the intellectuals above the people, as has been stated by Kazancıgil.¹¹²

The question of elites in the making of PP is a crucial one as has provoked a many of argumentation among the students of both Kemalist period politics and the structure of PP. Kazancıgil, tacitly, tackles with the issue by referring to 'from the above' approach: "the process from the above -be it in the form of the *Tanzimat* reforms, the Young Ottomans of the 1860s and 1870s, the Young Turks of 1908, or Kemalism- was the hallmark of political change in Turkey."¹¹³ This 'from the above' structure of the Turkish modernising movements, for Kazancıgil, are all a

¹⁰⁹ASD II, 155.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 224 and Dodd, "Atatürk", 28.

¹¹¹Ibid., 47.

¹¹²Ali Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism" in *Atatürk*, Kazancıgil-Özbudun, eds., 72, 37-57.

¹¹³Ibid., 46. Italics original.

consequence of the lack of interest in the economic approach when the transformation process is designed. Instead, Kazancıgil continues,

The 'inconvertibility' of the economic positions into political power was the basis of the institutionalisation of the Ottoman state. Therefore the strategy, as well as the ideological stances, of every elite group contending for power had to concentrate on the state, neglecting the economy and market forces, which in any case went under almost complete foreign control by the end of the nineteenth century.¹¹⁴

According to Kazancıgil, this complete but structural absence of articulation between the economic and market forces and the reformation processes, first, surpassed in the early twentieth century by the efforts of Committee of Union and Progress to create a kind of peripheral bourgeoisie which ended up by a certain kind of political participation.

The new period starts by a tension between the peripheral elites and the ruling elites which brings not only significant changes amongst the ruling elites but "these changes had a crucial bearing on the emergence of modern Turkish state, for 'in a sense the Kemalist Republic was the culmination of a long process, whereby the Turkish governing elite transformed itself, the state and finally the country.'"¹¹⁵ Kazancıgil, accordingly, suggests that the new peripheral elites, as they were able to take part in the centre in various different ways, first of all, started to use the intermediary institutions, basically the school system, not only to create their secondary and educated literati, in Kazancıgil's words, "the new generation elites", but also, by way of them, to control the political structure

¹¹⁴Ibid., 46.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 47.

"The new generation of elites, trained in the military academy, the school of medicine, the school of administration (*Mülkiye*) and the secular law school, were not exclusively the offspring of the ruling elite. They increasingly came from provincial towns and more modest circles."¹¹⁶

This 'new generation of elites' also included such professions as lawyers and journalists and, in a sense, from the administrative ranks to newspapers there was a wide range of people, "dissatisfied with the inner circles of power, mostly staffed with traditional Ottoman state elites"¹¹⁷, taking an initiative in reforming and restructuring the state. Here, it should be noted that, as has been noted by Şerif Mardin, with reference to Poggi, the journals and journalists have been functional in the formation of a new stratification in the society by founding a structure which plays a role of uniting people which gives birth to an embryonic civil society.¹¹⁸ This might be taken as the first separation between the centre and periphery and reconstitution of a new circle within the centre.¹¹⁹ The second, but which might be considered as playing

¹¹⁶Ibid., 47.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 47.

¹¹⁸Şerif Mardin, "Sivil Toplum", *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, Der.:M.Türküne-T.Önder (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 15. The role of mass media in the 1930s is analysed in Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973), 30-32.

¹¹⁹Nevertheless, the provinces were also under the influence of these new elites even if they were the natives of the specific region. In this context Faik Ahmet Barutçu might be mentioned. As a son of a well known family in Trabzon, which was effective in the regional politics and in the formation of the first Society for the Defence of Right in Trabzon, has been send to İstanbul to study law. Coming back to Trabzon, after completing his education, he has founded the regional newspaper, *İstikbal* (Future) and become the fervent supporter of the Independence Movement, even though appeared occasionally as one of the most controversial critics of Mustafa Kemal. For details see,: Ural Armay, "Faik Ahmet Barutçu Kimdir?", Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar 1939-1954* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977). (Ural Armay is the pseudonym of his

relatively a major role pragmatically, issue is that, as has been observed by a number of scholars, the Young Turk groups were recruited among these new elites.¹²⁰ According to Kazancıgil "most of Kemalist revolutionaries, including Mustafa Kemal himself, belonged to this category of somewhat marginal state elites."¹²¹

This specificity of Kemalist regime and its ties with the early cadres of Young Turks is reflected in the early PP, for, it has been suggested both by Kazancıgil and Özbudun, that this party neither needed a mass mobilisation, because of taking 'from the above' model as its pillar¹²² and, nor it took initiative "to broaden the party's popular base."¹²³ As a consequence, Özbudun defines RPP as "largely a cadre party, an elite organisation, dominated by the official elite and local notables."¹²⁴ PP, having such a significant characteristic, further, determined the transformation of the Kemalist movement into a "military-bureaucratic regime" in Özbudun's words¹²⁵ as it will later be analysed in depth and detail.

Conclusion

son, who was an ambassador. I am grateful to Mete Tunçay for this information.)

¹²⁰Şerif Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlılar, Jön Türkler ve Silahlı Kuvvetler", *Siyasal ve Sosyal Bilimler, Makaleler 2*, der.: M.Türköne, T.Önder (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 120.

¹²¹Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman", 46.

¹²²Ibid., 48.

¹²³Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature", 93.

¹²⁴Ibid., 94.

¹²⁵Ibid., 97.

The process of formation and early ideological considerations of social democracy in Turkey is strictly related with the history of RPP. The historio-political and socio-political development of this party can be divided into two periods. The first period should cover the years between 1919 and 1930 and the second period should focus on the years between 1930 and 1950. This division, as argued in the chapter, in detail, is a consequence of a methodological approach. The relevant literature, when the political history of a political organisation is concerned, usually evolves around two different view points. The historical events and their repercussions are taken as a starting point by some schools and the concepts and their ideological backgrounds are favoured by different schools. In this chapter, it is argued that, up until the 1923 the historical development have determined the basic ideological concerns, whereas after the proclamation of the republic, the concepts are of primary importance. When RPP is analysed with this assumption, it is suggested that, in the first period, it is rather more convenient to define the first period as a party-led state period, for it is first the party formed and than the 'new' state is established. The second period could be defined as a 'state-led party.' and in this respect the second period of RPP is more ideological than the first period.

In the first years, the formation of RPP is more related with the tactical manoeuvres of Mustafa Kemal. In this process the historical thresholds, like Erzurum and Sivas Congress, the moves of the former CUP have been effective. Nevertheless, when the political and ideological concerns of the leader is analysed, it is interesting to see that 'populism' has played the leading role in the formation period. Populism is the key concept which has also determined the basis of the 1924 Constitution which has also brought the early but long time perpetuating split between Mustafa Kemal and his friends. From this differentiation comes out the first and early political formations.

This process also paves the way to the formation of a new political structure which has continued all through the Republican period. This is the evolution of the para-military organisations to RPP. In this process, as shown in the chapter, a chain of formation is followed. The representatives of the Society of Anatolia and Rumelia for the Defence of Rights (SARDR) in the first National Assembly are considered to be the members of the First Group, formed by Mustafa Kemal, then the RPP is formed as a political organ of the First Group and the members of SARDR in the country are transformed into the grassroots of the party.

The second step is the political-ideological direction of the early RPP. When analysed, it is clear that, since the early periods, republicanism, in a convoluted way with populism, has been one of the main concerns of the founding core of the party. Nevertheless, republicanism is more attuned to national sovereignty and populism is more formulated as the elites taking care of the people. With this assumption, the thesis displays that, the early period more focuses on the program than the party and secondly, again in the same period, the party is formed on a basis of a dual structure. This is the pragmatism that appears as the idea behind the program and the elites that would lead both the party and the nation. From this analysis it could be deduced that, the early RPP, even though formed as a break with the former CUP, yet refers to its centralism and this has shaped the epistemological structure of the Republic which is further analysed the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE STATE-LED PARTY: RPP IN THE 1923-1950 PERIOD

3.1. The Aspects of the New State and Regime

After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the steps taken toward the establishment and stabilisation of a state in Turkey are of great importance. Among these are the abolishing of the Caliphate¹ and, adjoining to it, the unification of the education which should be taken as the preliminary attempt to the implementation of a new understanding of society based on the Civil Code, which was issued by the year 1926. Taken together with these two events the demolishing of the Religious Courts (*Şer'ye Mahkemeleri*) also demarcates a further move to the same end². This process

¹A different approach to this issue considering the reaction of Arab world is found in Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 98-103.

²In many sources these developments are considered as the process of secularization. But it should be remembered that up until 1928 and to the amendment of the Constitution in April 10, 1928, with Law Number 1222, the state continued to be attached to Islam, with article number 5 by saying, "the religion of Turkish Republic is Islamic Religion." Even this amendment did not pronounce the concept of laicism. That is settled by another amendment, dated Februray 5, 1937, Law number 3115. See, A.Şeref Gözübüyük, *Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1993), 56 and, M.Tunçay, *Türkiye' Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981), 226. As a consequence of these developments it is more convenient to understand the early reforms as a process of modernisation or 'civil'ization. This, of course does not exclude the tacit and implicit

could be defined as the founding of a specific notion of secularism which should be seen as a mode of 'civil'ization as, in the same year of 1926, there are three more laws translated, issued and put into force in Turkey as, Law of Obligations, Code of Penalty, Code of Commerce. Civil Code and Law of Obligations were taken from Switzerland, Code of Penalty was taken from Italy and the last one was taken from Germany and Italy. In the following years also other laws such as Penal Procedural Law and Civil Procedural Law were adopted.³ But the period is definitely sealed by the 1924 Constitution. To understand the structure and even the 'spirit' of the newly established state, it is necessary to analyse the 1924 Constitution but, it should be noted immediately, that the most dominant political event of the period is the foundation of the Progressive Republican Party (PRP-*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*)) which was the termination of a long lasting opposition movement against the radical wing of PP. The related two other moves are the Law on the Maintenance of Order which signals the nature of the early state and, the demolishing of PRP, as a consequence of the issued and implemented law. In short, the achievements of the 1923-1927 period is more prone to the structuring of a new state which is usually referred as a modernisation and/or, identical in meaning with it, the Westernisation process. In this context it seems more beneficial to discuss and dissect the new state from the view point of modernisation and its institutions as well as referring to the constructive epistemology immanent to this factuality.

3.1.1. Putting State First: Authoritarianism versus Democracy

understanding of secularisation, taken in its largest meaning, with its attributions to modernism which will be discussed further below.

³Tunçay, *Tek Parti*, 172-173.

The arguments concerning this period usually revolves around the concepts of civility and authoritarianism. The arguments of civility, basically, refers to the absence of democracy in the establishing of the state and to the 'from the above' characteristic of the new regime, which has been clearly put by Atatürk himself⁴, usually stated as authoritarianism. In the period started by 1924 both characteristics have played a leading role in the formation of the state and the ideology encircling it. This state of conditions is clear in an official party document.

The point which attracts attention in the party history, registered up to here, is that the phases of the realised reform, have not been developed through the decisions reached in the party congresses...In the period of transition, from peace to reform movements, it was much more convenient to the political and social realities of those days not to write Principles to the program and then putting them into practice but, first, enlightening Turkey's horizons by applications and practices, as lightening following one another, generated through the light of the reform sun, rising in the spirit of Great Leader. The function of the congress in this period was carried by the group formed by the members of the party in the Grand National Assembly."⁵

The centrality of the leader also has been stated tacitly by Atatürk himself when he talks about the proclamation of the republic, showing himself as the basic figure incorporating the idea, since the beginning and, putting the party and the GNA into a secondary plan.⁶ This very condition, apparently, has opened space to many

⁴Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I: T.B.M.M. ve C.H.P. Kurultaylarında (1919-1938), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1961), 11.

⁵Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Onbeşinci Yıl Kitabı* (Ankara, n.p., 1938), 6.

⁶If the '(hi)story' of both the proclamation and establishment of the Republic is followed, the conclusionary remark given in the text might better be understood, for it is Atatürk himself who immediately responded to a political and executive as a crisis, and used it to transform the existing system into a new political regime, showing the inefficiency and inadequacy of the already existing one. Also himself clearly states that this was the possibility to apply the idea he has developed in his mind. To follow the stages of this process see, Atatürk, *Nutuk*, v. II: 1920-1927

arguments and speculations that the early Turkish state was a single-party, authoritarian one. This is a debate growing around the discussions of 'democracy in Turkey.' On the other hand even though the non-democratic, at least one-party dimension and characteristic of the state is accepted, without any reservation, there is one point emphasised by many scholars. That is the natural lack of conditions disabling the regime transforming itself to democracy.⁷ Nevertheless, there are two more points stressed in this context which are worth discussing. The first one is, as has been put by Heper, in return to the absence of democracy, the constitutive

(İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 5. baskı, 1962), 796-815. Another 'official' source, for this way of explaining the developments, as well as to be used in the public service is the *Medeni Bilgiler*. It is a book seemingly prepared and written by A. Afetinan. Nevertheless, Afetinan explains, in the preface she wrote for a recent edition of the book, that all text is written under the strict control of Atatürk. In the chapter, "How the Republic is Established in Turkey" the same emphasis is made and it says: "Mustafa Kemal decided to save country from the hands of rotten people and he did it." A. Afetinan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Elyazıları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1969), 37. Even though Afetinan proclaims that this part is written by help of T. Bıyıklıoğlu, Secretary of Presidency, depending on the above explanation, it could be accepted as Atatürk's personal view. On the other hand, Atatürk's close friend and, a prominent Turkish intellectual and novelist, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, once has developed a completely different view point on this ground. According to Karaosmanoğlu, Atatürk has never thought and expressed anything like republic. He tends that the first one who has declared the concept of republic was İnönü. Karaosmanoğlu also insists on the point that Atatürk has tried to complete a project of 'salvation.' Karaosmanoğlu also emphasizes the point that not only during the Independence War but, also in the process of reforms, Atatürk's sole aim has never been the republic. The reason why he has ended up with it, for Karaosmanoğlu, is the ability of forming governments and bringing solutions to the political impasses that republic bears. The crisis that triggered this problem is the domestic situation arouse in Turkey, just after the Lausanne Treaty, over the prime ministry of Rauf Bey, Fethi Bey and İsmet Paşa. See, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's ideas in Ali Gevgilli (moderator), "Düşünenlerin Forumu", *Milliyet Gazetesi*, (October 28, 1973).

⁷Especially substructural, economic and cultural definitions and their empirical data given for modernity as the carrying structure of democracy and the condition of the country and the state are concern of many analysis, but as an example, see, Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: Free Party and its Aftermath* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 9-35.

principle of the regime and the state which is the 'construction of the people's state' through popular sovereignty.⁸ The historical development of this notion leads the way to the establishment of first the National Assembly and then to the proclamation of the Republic. Secondly, this condition of popular sovereignty is mentioned both in the 1921 and 1924 Constitution and, after 1923, the problematic turned out to be the construction of the ideology of the state. This ideology although has different and divergent openings can best be stated as the 'modernisation' of the state.

Nevertheless, at this point, it should be noted that in the pre-1931 period, even though it is not possible to argue that there is a concrete and watertight isolation between ideology and state construction attempts, yet, there are two points to be mentioned. The first one is that ideology is more a matter of discussion when the secondary institutions founded for cultural matters but, expected to coagulate the ideology of the state by transferring it to the nation-society. Dependent on this argumentation, the early notions used in the establishment of the state are more 'natural' should they use the same concepts such as nationalism, republicanism and secularism. Here, the condition of secularism is helpful in the understanding of the argument which has just been proposed. Secularism, playing the leading role in the construction of the new state, was still like an unknown concept which has never interfered the political life.⁹ This also shows that the pre-1931 period is more related with the notion of civilism or civilisation rather than the construction of a well defined

⁸Metin Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi", in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk* (İstanbul: Dr. Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 222.

⁹This point is clear in a book analysing the early development of laicism. Nuray Mert, *Laiklik Tartışmasına Kavramsal Bir Bakış* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1994).

and closed ideological system as in the case of post-1931 period. What is called civilism, or civility in this sense, is the modernisation of the country.

3.2 Turkish Modernisation: Civility via Authoritarianism

As has just been mentioned, above the process of transforming the Empire and its system into a new and 'modern' one is usually referred as the modernisation process or, identical in meaning, the Westernisation process.¹⁰ This aim has been succinctly put by Atatürk himself saying, "is there any nation who wanted to get civilised but not taken the direction toward West?"¹¹ This is usually conceived as 'the wholesome modernisation' of the country¹². This modernisation is not the restructuring of an already existing state but the formation of a new one, 'a modern state'¹³. This state has a main target of carrying the country to the level of the contemporary civilisation.¹⁴ Modern state includes the implementation of new institutions and, a new understanding which relies on science¹⁵ and on the 'rational thinking'¹⁶. According to Karpat the "ultimate purpose of the reforms was the

¹⁰Enver Ziya Karal, "The Principles of Kemalism" in *Atatürk: Founder of Modern State*, eds. EA.Kazancıgil and E.Özbudun (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 30-32.

¹¹Utkan Kocatürk (ed), *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri* (Ankara: Edebiyat Yayınevi, 1971), 83.

¹²Suna Kili, *1960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nde Gelişmeler* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1976), 50,57.

¹³Heper, "Atatürk'te", 216.

¹⁴Ibid., 224.

¹⁵Ibid., 223.

¹⁶Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Eothen Press, 1985), 64.

modernisation of Turkish society by supplanting its traditionalist, emotional ways and customs with rationalist, modern ideas."¹⁷

In Atatürk's words this framework constitutes the 'Republican ideal'¹⁸ (*Cumhuriyet mefkuresi*). This 'ideal' is a point of contradictory and argumentative approaches, for some scholars refer to the understanding as an 'epistemology', some others insist on the point that it is more a 'weltanschauung'¹⁹ and some others take it as an 'ideology'.²⁰ This notion of ideology can not be taken independent of the 'practicality' of the new state as Karpas puts it. Karpas, considering the 1923-1925 period by nationalism, secularism and populism, says that "nationalism was at the basis of the regime and secularism was its chief means of fulfilling the ultimate goal of a modern national Turkish Republic, based on the sovereignty of the nation."²¹ It is possible to put here another characteristic of the regime, which has also been officially accepted by both the party and the state in time, republicanism, and it is possible to understand the nature of the ideological structure of the regime by referring to very this notion at large which is strictly merged with constitutionalism.

¹⁷Kemal Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 53.

¹⁸Atatürk'ün *Söylev ve Demeçleri II*, yay. haz., Nimet Unan (Ankara: Türk İnkılap İnstitüsü Yayınları, 2. baskı, 1959), 340.

¹⁹Heper, *Tradition*, 65.

²⁰Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u, Vol. 3* (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 1992). For an attempt of situtaing Kemalism in a framework of ideology see, Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime," in *Atatürk*, in Kazancıgil and Özbudun, eds., 79-103.

²¹Karpas, *Turkey's*, 49.

According to Tanör, together with Karpas, the reforms which started by 1922 have been realised under the authoritarian political conditions, lacking of opposition but, taking the legal institutions and methods (i.e. parliament) into consideration. The basics of 'Turkish Revolution' could be scrutinised as 'nationalisation/nationization and establishing a nation state; moving toward universal values, secularisation, democratisation.'²² Situating this framework into the 1924 constitution, Tanör, makes an interesting point and, says that the essence of the 1924 Constitution is political democracy.²³ Accepting the authoritarian character of the regime, still, Tanör, sees the 1924 Constitution as "has been attached to democratic philosophy."²⁴ and Tanör strictly correlates this approach with the notion of national sovereignty.

3.3 Populism as the Basis of Popular Sovereignty

Depending on the aforementioned arguments, it is possible to characterise the pre-1931 state model as an authoritarian one relying on the constitutive idea of national sovereignty, staying loyal to the understanding of modernity which is unseparable from the abstract notion of civilisation. When democracy-modernisation coexistence is taken into consideration, this framework might only be seen as a problematic but a constitutive element and, in this period, all components of civility is identified with the notion of republicanism which is adjacent and adherent to national sovereignty. Under this assumption, national sovereignty could be conceptualised as not only the constitutive idea but also the legitimisation of the state in the establishment period.

²²Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), 321-322.

²³Ibid., 315.

²⁴Ibid., 328.

This point needs a further analysis, for it is also related with "the new individual whom the Republican regime wanted to form."²⁵

In this regard, the 1924 Constitution, as a consequence of a tradition started in the pre-republican era by the 1921 Law on the Fundamental Organisation, confirms that "the sovereignty belongs to the nation without any restriction or reservation."²⁶ This is the only concept that the 1924 constitution rests on. Beyond this, the early republic is free from any ideological or conceptual basis. Heper, taking this point into consideration, prefers tackling with the ramifications of the national sovereignty principle. Here, the source and the origin of the concept is the nation itself and, according to him, Atatürk's continuously describing the new state as the 'people's state' differs it radically from even the late Ottoman model, for the previous one was the state of individuals.²⁷ In this context, Heper points out that the notion of 'people's state' is a state free from the political system and any state of power above it.²⁸ Besides, declaring that the sovereignty belongs to the nation is, indeed, figuring out to whom the sovereignty does not belong²⁹ which might be taken as the early configuration of the concepts which are more pro-political.

This understanding is very much related with the notion of populism which has played an important role in the development of the republican thought. The roots of populism could be found in the *Populism Program* prepared by Atatürk which is

²⁵Karpat, *Turkey's*, 53.

²⁶ Gözübüyük, *Açıklama*, 56.

²⁷ Heper, *Atatürk'te*, 220.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 223.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 226.

considered to be the basis of the 1921 Constitution.³⁰ Beyond this, populism has paved the way to the much argued solidaristic and corporatist structure of Turkish politics and state in the 1930s by rejecting the class notion and social differences and, taking the nation as a whole. Republicanism, in this sense, without relying or founded on the other concepts, in *verbatim*, is denoting the basis of the new regime, merged with such tenets as populism, sovereignty. The political and ideological formulation of these concepts is carried out in the 1927 Congress of the Republican People's Party. The Article 1 of the *Statutes of the Party*, issued by the Congress, defines the party as "a republican, populist and nationalist political organisation."³¹

In the same Congress, also has been issued, the *Declaration of the General Presidency*, which goes further, for it defines the party as "RPP is republican, laic, populist and nationalist"³² as Kili observes.³³ This is the first official document referring to the laicism and, it is again the first step, expanding to the merging of the party ideology and the state, for it says, in the second sentence of the already quoted article that, "this basis is determining for our Party in its policies".³⁴ This framework is completed by the 1931 congress, transforming the state-led party to a party-led state and, also by completing the ideological foundation of the party. The state-party

³⁰İsmail Arar, *Atatürk'ün Halkçılık Programı* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1963).

³¹*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi; 15 Teşrinievvel 1927'de İnikat Eden Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Büyük Kongresinin 22 Teşrinievvel 1927 Tarihli İçtimasında Müzakere ve Kabul Edilmiştir* (Ankara: Zelliç Biraderler Matbaası, 1929), 3.

³²CHP Büyük Konresi, *Umumi Riyasetin Beyannamesi* (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1927), 1.

³³ Kili, *CHP'de*, 59.

³⁴CHP Büyük Kongresi, *Umumi*, 1.

unification is reached its full termination by the 1935 Congress but, the 1931 congress is also important, for it lays the ground for the transformation of the concepts from being pro-political to being pro-ideological.

3.4. Party-Led State: Post-1931 Period

After setting the ground for the political regime by the 1927 Congress, Republican Peoples Party has further developed itself toward a new political structure. This period of post-1927 Congress is marked by various political events. The most striking one, in this context, is the 1929 Crash, which shook the world economy tremendously and, pushed Turkey to construct a new tenet which in time, would be included among the principles of RPP, namely statism. The implementation of this tenet has a long history, for it also encompasses the new cadres of the party and the state-party merging.³⁵ If the first reason in moving to statism is the search for a new political order which would put liberal state understanding into a secondary level, the second, basic reason and motivating force behind this progress is the foundation of *Free Party*.³⁶ The third reason might be the two state centred political regimes confronting with each other on the international political arena, namely the Socialist and the Fascist models. These three factors have gradually affected the new structure of the state and party and, the 1931 Congress, in search of a 'doctrine' that would carry the state-party unification, moves to develop an ideology. This approach has

³⁵The *locus classicus* of the beginning of the history is Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk'te Üç Ay* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945); İlhan Tekeli-Selim İlkin, *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları* (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1977), 197-206.

³⁶Weiker, *Tutelage*.

immediately been accepted and developed by a group of intellectuals united around the journal *Kadro*³⁷, trying to figure out a doctrine for the state.³⁸

In the 1931 Congress, for the first time, RPP has prepared a Party Program³⁹ other than the party statutes. In this program the basic tenets such as republicanism, nationalism, populism and secularism have been enlarged by adding statism and reformism or revolutionism⁴⁰ and, it is a usually accepted view⁴¹ that these Principles have been symbolised as 'Six Arrows' by personal endeavour of Recep Peker, the Secretary General of the party and a fervent supporter of statism, attached to the radical wing of RPP.⁴² 1931 Congress should be considered as a congress of transition and transformation. The transition is toward a party-state model and the transformation is toward the doctrinisation of the basic founding principles, through the establishment of new cultural institutions. As this process has been developed gradually and reached its crux by the 1935 Congress, in the 1931 Program, there is no detailed explanation of the tenets as in the case of 1935 Program. Nevertheless, two points should be emphasised regarding the Congress and Program processes.

³⁷Cem Alpar, *Kadro-Aylık Fikir Mecmuası*, vol.1 (1932)/Tıpkıbasım (Ankara: ALTİA Yayınları, 1978) and for the background history of the movement; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968).

³⁸For a discussion of Kadro movement see, Karpas, *Turkey's*, 70-73.

³⁹CHP, *Program*, (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931).

⁴⁰Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 90; Kili, *CHP'de*, 59; Bila, *CHP*, 85-86.

⁴¹Başar, *Atatürk'le*, 47-48, İlhan Tekeli-Selim İlkin, 1929, 204.

⁴²For an explanation and justification of the Program as well as to follow the views and ideas of Recep Peker see, Recep Peker: *CHP Programının İzahı: Fırka Katibiumumisi B.R.Peker Tarafından 16 Teşrinievvel 1931 tarihinde İstanbul Darülfununu konferans salonunda konferans olarak teşrih edilmiştir.* (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1931).

The first one is the implementation of statism⁴³ which in time would turn out to be a more political and social issue than an economic one with the rejection of liberalism⁴⁴; second, the nature of the state is started to be consolidated by registering in the Program that Turkish people is a classless one.⁴⁵ The society, the program supposes, is a conglomerate, established by the unification of differentiated groups on the basis of division of labour for the good of the individual and social life.⁴⁶ The solidarist but, mainly, corporatist 'spirit' of the state is much argued to be leading the way to the fascistic approach that further developed in the post-1931 period.⁴⁷ The solidaristic and corporatist mentality of the regime, developed after 1931 and reached its peak in the post-1935 era, has been concern of many writers, mostly Atatürk's close friends. Falih Rıfki Atay, a friend of Atatürk, journalist and parliamentarian is an example. In one of his famous books he says: "For the education of the Turkish masses, the mass education methods of Moscow and, for the statist Turkish economy the corporation methods of Fascism should be accepted."⁴⁸ This period is a gateway to the ideological formation of the RPP and the formation of the Republican epistemology which needs a detailed analyses.

⁴³İsmet İnönü, "Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı." *Kadro Dergisi* , vol.22 (1933), 4-6.

⁴⁴"İsmet İnönü'nün Nutku", *Cumhuriyet*, (August 31, 1930).

⁴⁵CİİF, *Program 1931*, 13.

⁴⁶Ibid., 13.

⁴⁷Parla, *Türkiye'de*, 140-145 and Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Korporatizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989).

⁴⁸Falih Rıfki Atay, *Moskova-Roma* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1931), 5. This point is also discussed in Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 313.

3.5. The Culture of the Ideology, the Ideology of the Culture

3.5.1. *The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory, The National Education and Beyond*

Turkish republic, as has been aforementioned is developed on the understanding of an individual relying more on the scientific world view, rather than a metaphysical one, in contrast to the assumed Ottoman Empire model. Atatürk, defining Republic as 'virtue', has tacitly stressed this point but, it turns out to be a clear one when he addresses to the teachers by saying, "Republic asks you to raise students liberated in their thoughts, conscience, (spiritual) culture and knowledge (irfan)." On the other hand, first, in the early 1934, the courses of Turkish Revolution is implemented in the universities⁴⁹ and, in the 1935 Program, states that, "holding the Turkish nation, Assembly and state on a respected level will be doctinated to the whole citizens *as a duty*"⁵⁰

This approach, first started by deciding to dissolve the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths)⁵¹ and the establishment of *Halk Evleri* (Peoples' Houses)⁵². The dissolving of the *Türk Ocakları*, depending on a resolution registered in the Article 40 of the 1927 Statutes of the RPP,⁵³ is taken as a sign by various scholars as the demolishing of a power focus which might be in opposition to the new regime.⁵⁴ The gap created by

⁴⁹Bila, *CHP*, 89.

⁵⁰*CHP Programı* (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1935), 17. Italics added.

⁵¹Fusun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), 321-357.

⁵²Karpat, *Turkey's*, 380-381, Mete Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 295-299.

⁵³*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi (1927)*, 29.

⁵⁴Üstel, *İmparatorluktan*, 321-357.

the demolishing of an ideology production centre is filled by the establishment of People's Houses, in 1931. Atatürk, many times before the establishment of the institution, has demarcated the necessity for the establishment of such institutions for the enlightenment of the people. On the other hand, the dissemination of the RPP ideology and, the ideologization of the society in that context, is not only through People's Houses. In 1931, the same year a new institution, People's Orators (*Halk Hatipleri*) is implemented. In the People's Orators Regulations published⁵⁵ the basic aim set for the orators is the inculcation of the people with the party principles. The framework of duties for the orators is explained in the very detailed way and, interestingly, they are ordered that, attacking the opposing ideas about the principles either should be in a mellow but sometimes a more brutal way.⁵⁶

This ideologically manipulated cultural development is conjugal with the Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) and the Sun-Language (*Güneş-Dil Teorisi*) interventions. The long history of the development of the Turkish history thesis has been analysed by various scholars. The main point is the nationalist-racist approach behind the manipulation. The basic argument that all cultures flourished in Anatolia generated from the Turkic origins⁵⁷ has been one of the main basis on which the 19th century Turkish nationalism founded.⁵⁸ After 1925, this idea has gradually developed in collaboration with the expansion of nationalism. It is also related with the

⁵⁵*Halk Hatipleri Talimatı* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931).

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁷For a polemical discussion of this view see, Halil Berktaş, "Osmanlı Devletinin Yükselişine Kadar Türklerin İktisadi ve Toplumsal Tarihi," in *Kriz, Gelir Dağılımı ve Türkiye'nin Alternatif Sorunu*, *Türkiye Tarihi 1: Osmanlı Devletine Kadar Türkler*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, n.d), 60-64.

⁵⁸Uriel Heyd.

demolishing and dissolving of the Turkish Hearths because, it was this institution as the main source for the development and disseminating of both the Turkish nationalism and pan-Turkist ideas.⁵⁹ As they are closed, it is decided to transfer the historical researches to an independent association.⁶⁰ This is called The Association for the Turkish Historical Research, at the beginning and then transformed into Turkish History Foundation.⁶¹ In the July 1932, all Lycee and secondary school history course teachers are invited to Ankara Peoples' House, for a course designed to teach them the new Turkish History Thesis⁶². This meeting is later entitled as the First Turkish History Congress. Before the congress, the three volumes text books prepared for lycees have been send to various different scholars and are asked to discuss it.⁶³

This might be seen as the climax of a new policy depending on the indoctrination of the youth. This approach is understandable, because in the 1931 Program of the party, the target of teaching all citizens the Turkish history is carefully put: "Our party takes seriously that all citizens should know the deep history of the Turk."⁶⁴ Here, the reason put forward for this process is more crucial: "this knowledge is a sacred essence that reinforces (...) his unbeatable resistance against the

⁵⁹Ileyd, 150.

⁶⁰Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 300.

⁶¹Ibid., 301.

⁶²For a discussion of Turkish History Thesis and other related issues, like the new textbooks prepared for the secondary education see, Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 101-107.

⁶³Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 302.

⁶⁴CHP, *Program* (1931), 28.

movements to damage the national existence."⁶⁵ This main point is also the concern of another article in the Program, however, in this one not only the knowledge of history and its connection with the national existence is stressed, but also the duties and the 'character' of the citizens are defined through the national education: "to bring up strong republican, nationalist and laic citizens is the most precise duty of all levels of education."⁶⁶ In the second part of this article the transition from a state-party to a party-state and, the importance attributed to state is obvious, which brings out the state authority and, as a concept above the society and the citizen:" the peculiarity of respecting and making others respect the Turkish Nation, Turkish Grand National Assembly and the State of Turkey⁶⁷ is considered to be a duty."⁶⁸ In another article, there is a binomial but, one tacit the other outspoken and expressive reference to the nature of the new education: "education, being away from all superstition and all foreign ideas, should be high levelled, national and patriotic."⁶⁹ Here, to develop an education, devoted to the externalisation of superstitions is a reference to the

⁶⁵Ibid., 28.

⁶⁶CHF Program (1931), 26.

⁶⁷It is interesting that in the original text not the usual saying 'Turkish State' but the 'State of Turkey' is used. This might be taken as an indicator of the confusion and merging of different concepts such as nation, people, republic, state which will be discussed later in the part devoted to the analysis of nationalism, populism and statism. Nevertheless, this is my translation but in the 1935 Program's official translation it is again rendered as 'Turkish State.'

⁶⁸CHF, Program, 27. . Also of importance here is that, the 'discourse' of the article, by using the concept of 'peculiarity' (*hassa*), takes for granted the respect directed to the state. The point emphasised here, is the direction reminded: "It should be seen as a 'duty.'"

⁶⁹CHF Program (1931), 27.

positivistic approach of the Republic.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the main ambition is again the construction of the new citizen-student and its character.

3.5.2. Peoples' Houses

These institutions, as has been aforementioned, are established to replace the Turkish Hearths, the basic source of nationalist and pan-Turkist movements and ideas for the first time in February 19, 1932. The first time the will of establishing a new institution to replace the former is expressed by Atatürk.⁷¹ As Tunçay has already shown, referring to the same news-articles, the inspiration for the Peoples' Houses (PH) is from the Fascist party: "The establishing of new youth organisations, resembling the Fascist organisation and, founding branches in all parts of the country is a part of the new principles."⁷² The basic motivation behind the Peoples' Houses is the dissemination of the ideas of RPP, as well as the indoctrination of the youth. According to Karpas, they "assumed the role of agents for the Republican Party."⁷³ This point might further be seen in the Statutes of PH.

In the introduction of the Statutes, after reflecting on the Party Program and, restressing the importance of the articles⁷⁴ embodying the 'national culture', first, the

⁷⁰This positivistic approach is also clear in the construction of the Statutes of Peoples' Houses, dated 1932 which will be analysed in depth below, when it puts the function of the 'Peoples' Courses' as "delivering courses on foreign language and natural sciences." CİİF, *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1932). The point is further discussed by Walter F. Weiker referring to İsmet İnönü and his approach to Peoples' Houses. Walter F. Weiker, *Tutelage*, 172.

⁷¹"Gazi'nin Beyanatı", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Kanunisanı (1931).

⁷² Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 296.

⁷³Karpas, *Turkey's*, 380.

⁷⁴This is a reference to the Article 40 of the Party Program (1931), which was mentioned before.

aim of the Party is stated as: "to bring up strong citizens, sharing the same principles, for the sovereignty of the basic and main principles."⁷⁵ Moving to the aim and the function of the PH, the Statutes declares: "the target of PH is to be houses for gathering and uniting the idealist citizens who would work for such an aim."⁷⁶ According to Weiker, with reference to the article, which appeared in New York Times, the existence of PH was a step taken forward, in the Fascist tendencies of Atatürk and İnönü.⁷⁷ This point is also discussed by Feroz Ahmad. Ahmad, referring especially to the *Kadro* group and their harsh polemics with Italians, in the journal pages, insists that, even though the party and the administrative cadres were affected from two totalitarian regimes, Fascism and Socialism, but emphasised the first one, rather than the other.⁷⁸

The reason why Weiker starts with such a point is that, the importance stressed by both leaders, Atatürk and İnönü, for the creation of a society, through the unification of people, disregarding their cultural, social, economic differences.⁷⁹ The

⁷⁵CHH, *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi*, 3.

⁷⁶Ibid., 3.

⁷⁷Weiker, *Tutelage*, 172.

⁷⁸Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 65-68.

⁷⁹The discussion of similarities and the differences between RPP and Fascism should bear a more vigorous attempt. Though there will be a trial in the following sections when nationalism and populism is analysed here it should be noted that the only known conscious attempt among the ranks of RPP to construct a similar structure belongs to Recep Peker who was dismissed by Atatürk in 1936. Zürcher, without compromising about the totalitarian structure of the monopolized state by the RPP, still insists that the differences are much greater than similarities. Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), 194. Nevertheless an important document is G. Caretto, "1930'larda Kemalizm-Faşizm-Komünizm Üzerine Polemikler", *Tarih ve Toplum*, n. 17+18 (May-June 1985). I am grateful to Mete Tunçay for drawing my attention to the article.

second point raised by Weiker, as well as Karpas, is the party-PH connection.⁸⁰ The 'organic' connection of the party and PH is obvious in the PH Statutes, for it clearly shows the fiscal sources of the establishment as the money supplied by the party administration in the towns and, also clarifies that the PH buildings are supplied and furnished by the RPP administrations.⁸¹ The third point, deliberated by Weiker, is the success of this institution on the basis of indoctrination. Though Weiker accepts the historical condition that "Turkey is not among the emerging states in undertaking either mass political or mass cultural indoctrination," he sees Turkey "unique in trying doggedly to maintain a separation between the two."⁸² In other words, PH functioned as a party instrument for the indoctrination of the large masses. Here, lastly, one capturing issue should be brought into discussion. It was not only the newly established opposition complaining about the RPP-PH connection, an issue usually tried to be overruled and rejected by the RPP administration, it was also the party members protesting the symbiosis. In the 1947 RPP Congress, there were numerous proposals asking for more autonomy for the PH.⁸³ In the end, depending on these discussions, PH was dissolved on November 26, 1951 and they became the property of the Treasury.⁸⁴

⁸⁰Weiker, *Tutelage* 178-183; Kemal Karpas, "The People's-Houses in Turkey, Establishment and Growth." *Middle East Journal*, vol.XVII, n. 1 and 2, (Winter-Spring, 1963).

⁸¹CHP, *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi*, 4.

⁸²Weiker, *Tutelage*, 182-183.

⁸³Ibid., 181. For an implicit approach accepting the criticisms see, *XV.Yıldönümünde Halkeveleri ve Halkodaları* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1947).

⁸⁴Karpas, *Turkey's*, 381.

As a conclusion two points should be restated. The first one is that, two totalitarian approaches of the era, Socialism and Fascism, seems to have played a role in the establishment of these institutions.⁸⁵ As various sources show, at the beginning, Fascism was affective on the decision to establish the PH. However, when, in 1951, the new government of Democrat Party wanted to break the organic links between RPP and PH, they referred to *Narodni Dom* (Peoples Houses) of Soviet Union⁸⁶ which pushes the matter to further analysis. The second point is the aim put before the PH and, in this context, even though for many times the party administration has declared that not the daily politics but the cultural affairs should be the concern of the establishment⁸⁷, the intriguing issue is the implicit togetherness of culture and ideology. Karpát distinguishes this point by describing the situation as "cultural modernisation within the framework of nationalism and populism."⁸⁸ In this sense, the insistence of the party administration is understandable but, it is difficult to find it sufficient, for the ideological interest of the party is structurally cultural. The Turkish History Thesis, the Sun-Language Theory⁸⁹ and the PH are all 'cultural'

⁸⁵Tunçay shows that just before the prepration of the 1931 Program of RPP, the programs of various different parties of different contries had been translated into Turkish and printed. They are kept in GNA Library. Mete Tunçay, *Tek-Parti*, 312.

⁸⁶Karpát, *Turkey's*, 381.

⁸⁷To reach this distinction later the *Halk Odaları* (People's Rooms) are established.

⁸⁸ Karpát, "The Republican," in *Political* , eds., M.Hleper and J.M.Landau, 52.

⁸⁹For a recent discussion of the Sun-Language Theory see, Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent* (London: Hurst & Co,1997), 109-113; Jacob M.Landau, "The First Turkish Language Congress," in *The Earliest Stage of Language Planning:The 'First Congress' Phenomenon*, eds., Joshua A.Fishman (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1993); Geoffery L.Lewis, "Atatürk's Language Reform as an Aspect of Modernisation in the Republic of Turkey" in *Atatürk and the Modernisation of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M.Landau (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984) ; Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in*

steps taken but the function, they are expected to perform, is to support, even to establish the ground for the ideology, namely nationalism⁹⁰. Again in this context the construction of the notion of citizenship, the fortification of the nation state and laicism, the reinforcement of the state authority is the ideological concerns of the era which has reached its peak by the fourth Congress of RPP held in 1935.

3.6. The Authoritarian State Through Party-State

Unification

If Recep Peker's definition for Turkish Republic is accepted, "it is a party-state and the party works together with the state"⁹¹, then it is possible to say that this structure is erected by the fourth congress of RPP, in May 9, 1935.⁹² Atatürk in his opening speech reevaluates the 1931-35 era and his focus is more on statism.⁹³ Statism finds its economic and ideological openings in his speech and, the cultural dimension is also stressed together with the developments in history, language, music. But more emphasis is put on the overwhelming character of the days the congress held. According to Atatürk, implicitly referring to the "effort spent in the construction of a manipulated economic system", again a reminder of statism, the congress is realised "in the period of development."⁹⁴ Atatürk, also prompting the previous

Modern Turkey (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1954); Frank Tachau, "Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform", *Review of Politics*, XXVI, n. 2 (April, 1964), 191-205.

⁹⁰Atatürk himself considers the establishment of PH as an revolution on the cultural and social basis. *ASD II*, 380.

⁹¹Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 102.

⁹²For a survey of the 1935 Congress see, Bila, *CHP*, 91-94; Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 100-112; Kili, *CHP'de*, 61-64, Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 570-573.

⁹³*ASD II*, 379-383.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 380.

congresses, interestingly, defines one by one the characteristics of the periods in which the party conventions are held and, in this sense, he defines the 1931 Congress as corresponding to the "days of the establishment of security and order"⁹⁵. He concludes that the post-1935 is the search period to find the ways of realising this framework and, in this regard, the Party Program prepared and issued in the Congress is of extreme importance.

The post-1935 period for many reasons is the most crucial one in the development of modern political system in Turkey. The establishment and the fortification of the economic statism, in this period, also encompasses and incorporates the social and political realms and constructs an economic-social matrix. As the Western originated word 'party' is inserted into the party's name and it is transformed from '*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*' to '*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*', this framework is concretised as Kemalism in the fourth congress by saying: "all of these Principles, which are the fundamentals of the Party, constitute Kamalism."⁹⁶ and the primordial of the new state model is inherited in the Six Arrows⁹⁷, for the first time explained both in the Party Program and Statutes. In conjunction with the interpretations brought to the Six Arrows, the articles establishing the state-party togetherness is

⁹⁵Ibid. 381.

⁹⁶The Republican Party of the People, *Program: Accepted in the Fourth Grand Congress of the Party* (Ankara: n.p., May, 1935), 3. It is interesting that the 1935 Program has been translated into various foreign languages just after the convention but none of the western writers seems to be aware of it. For example, Feroz Ahmad in his book for a translation of the programme refers to Donald Weber, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia, 1939), 308-309. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 231.

⁹⁷For the official implementation of the principles concerning Six Arrows see, *CHF Bayrak Talimatı* (Ankara: n.p., 1933).

scattered all around the Statutes and this finds its roots in the early state understanding of Recep Peker, the powerful secretary general of the era. Peker, as early as 1932, underlines his comprehension of state by saying "the simple state understanding has been an ancient matter for a long time."⁹⁸ In the same line with this argument, just before the opening of the fourth congress, May 9, 1935, Peker, in a speech he delivered in a radio transmission, on May 8, 1935, immediately rejects the idea of 'liberal state' by saying that "it is passing away all around."⁹⁹ Next and more severely he attacks the notion of 'classical democracy' by saying:

"We prefer a disciplined unity relying on love and belief which causes the development of the citizens' minds instead of the classical democracy, *the enemy of order and unity, introduced by the liberal state model, spoiling the condition and the progress of the state, availing the growth of all bad seeds setting citizens at loggerheads.*"¹⁰⁰

Peker, beginning with such an attempt, replaces the liberal state with 'national state'¹⁰¹ which he does not explain further. But, Peker, with the notion of national state, defeats the idea of class state¹⁰² and, shifts his discussion to democracy. In a much quoted and argued passage¹⁰³, Peker, first, gives a brief definition of

⁹⁸ Peker, *CHP Programının İzahı*, 9.

⁹⁹CHP Genel Sekreteri R. Peker'in Söylevleri: 1-Parti Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayının açılmasından önce, sunulacak işleri aydınlatmak üzere 8 Mayıs 1935 gecesı Ankara Radyosunda (Ankara: n.p., 1935).

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 5-6. Italics added.

¹⁰¹CHP Genel Sekreteri R.Pekerin Söylevleri:Yeni Parti programının konuşulmasına başlanırken prensiplerin ana çizgileri aydınlatmak üzere 13 mayıs 1935 Kurultay toplantısında (Ankara: n.p., 1935), 14.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Peker publicised his ideas through the party newspapers and journals. *Ülkü* was the official journal published by People's Houses as

democracy as "by the people, for the people"¹⁰⁴. Then, Peker, insists that the 'application' of democracy shows varieties in among different nations and countries. Lastly, makes a remark, saying that democracy is not a dogma, not a Koranic word (*ayet*)¹⁰⁵ and, again, underlines the specificity of the conditions that will 'apply' democracy. From this he moves to his 'famous' sentences¹⁰⁶ and, says "we never say we should do the same as it is the way applied in any place or by any nation. We only apply those that are suitable for the country and the nation."¹⁰⁷

The 'coup de grace' in Peker's speech about the democracy crystallised at two points. The first one, according to him, is 'the unification of powers.' Through this we can reach the definition of democracy. It is a non differentiated power whose source is the people. This is the democracy which can be formulated as 'for the people and by the people.' Secondly, according to Peker, instead of a one-tier election system a two-tiered election model is more democratic, for it gives the people the possibility of voting for already selected and nominated candidates.¹⁰⁸ Apart from these, the 'demise' of the liberal state, especially in Turkey, had already been expressed by

aforementioned and, Karpas indicates that, by the year 1933 *Ülkü* had 20.000 readers. Karpas, *Turkey's*, 72.

¹⁰⁴Peker, *İnkılap*, 21.

¹⁰⁵With a drastic mistake, Walter F. Weiker attributes these words to Şükrü Kaya, once Secretary General of the RPP and the predecessor of Recep Peker; see, Walter F. Weiker, *Tutelage* 255. The same mistake is repeated when he refers to his original text in "The Free Party, 1930" in *Political* eds., M. Heper and J.M. Landau, 95 and 98.

¹⁰⁶Recep Peker has also prepared, in his late years, a book to be used as a text book in the universities for the instruction of the history of Turkish Revolution, which started in 1934. Recep Peker, *İnkılap Dersleri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989).

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 23.

Peker by saying "we embody the limits of rights within the authority of the state"¹⁰⁹, as early as 1931. This way of framing democracy and, as Peker continuously stresses, the implementation of the idea of nationalism that "strictly locks Turkey's doors against the outer world, to protect Turkish people"¹¹⁰, reaches a terminal, by referring to the principles of RPP and resituating them as the basic tenets of the state: "the basic characteristic of the program that captures attention is RPP getting more closer to the state which has already worked together with the state."¹¹¹

This model is put into application first by various articles registered in the Statutes of RPP issued in the Convention.¹¹² According to Article 64, the Party could invite the civil administrators to local congresses and, if necessary, these administrators could deliver some explanations.¹¹³ Article 95 and 96 are very important, for they assert two basic issues, uniting the party and the state. Accordingly, the first one declares: "party, conceives itself and the government, which descends from its hearth and, as a single unity complementing each other," whereas the latter affirms that the relation between the party and the government will be, at the centre, through Secretary General and, in the provinces, through the governors and the local chairmen.¹¹⁴ This preliminary attempt is solidified approximately in two years through a set of steps put forward.

¹⁰⁹*CHP Genel Sekreteri R.Peker'in Söylevleri*, (1935), 3.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 10.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 9.

¹¹²Congress also decided to change the word 'congress' into 'convention.'

¹¹³Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 109.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, 109.

First, Recep Peker is dismissed from Secretary General post on June 15, 1936. The reason behind this development is, according to Giritlioğlu, the party-state unification, for the Minister of Interior is appointed also as the Secretary General. Besides, the governors in the provinces are appointed as the local chairmen of the party¹¹⁵. This transformation is declared by Acting Chairman İsmet İnönü, with a decree dated June 18, 1936.¹¹⁶ Second, with the Constitutional amendment, Law number 3115, date February 13, 1937¹¹⁷, the Six Arrows of the RPP has become the constitutional Principles¹¹⁸ and Weiker puts this as : "in one stroke the program of the RPP became the official ideology of the entire nation."¹¹⁹ The consequences of this development is the establishment of a new condition which is defined by Heper's words as the 'bureaucratic transcendentalism.'¹²⁰ This is first criticised by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, a long time friend of Atatürk, when he says that "after leaving the party organisation to the governors it lost all its links with the people and reached a bureaucratic character."¹²¹ It should be remembered that this is only the officialisation

¹¹⁵This point is missing in Bila's book. Bila, loc cit, 94-96.

¹¹⁶For the complete text see, Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 114 and Bila, *CHP*, 94-95.

¹¹⁷Gözübüyük, *Açıklamalı*, 55, 56.

¹¹⁸For a critical discussion of this development by Fahir Giritlioğlu, a former member of RPP group, in the GNA, see, Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 116-118. Giritlioğlu, takes this development as a principle which restricts the differentiation of the political life in Turkey and the same remark is made by Karpas, *Turkey's*, 245-249. Also, see, Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk*, 316.

¹¹⁹Weiker: op. cit, 236.

¹²⁰Heper, *The State*, 67-97.

¹²¹Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969), 62.

of Kemalism. Because, among the intellectuals¹²² and *Kadro* movement there was already a search and an effort for the construction of Kemalism as an ideology.

After 1935, the intellectual search for the development of Kemalism continues, and the later approaches¹²³ also encompass the 'new' historical, linguistic and other cultural developments¹²⁴ as well as relying on a strong and sometimes racially based nationalism¹²⁵. In the late years, also appeared some publications trying to combine Kemalism with a more statist-left understanding.¹²⁶ With these developments, Giritlioğlu insists that the relative autonomy of the part is totally eradicated¹²⁷ and, Tunaya points out that RPP has become a single, authoritarian and totalitarian party.¹²⁸ This remark is consolidated by two different approaches. The first one is that the civil servants could get registered and be a party member, as in the case of governors¹²⁹. The second, Atatürk, in November 1938, in his opening speech read

¹²²The most prominent one was Sadri Ertem, *Türk İnkılabının Karakterleri* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933).

¹²³A relatively late example is M.Saffet Ergin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1946).

¹²⁴Şeref Aykut, *Kemalizm* (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1936).

¹²⁵The most striking example is Tekin Alp, *Kemalizm* (İstanbul: n.p., 1936)

¹²⁶This approach is eminent in the 1960s among the left intellectuals around the journals as *Yön* and *Ant* and this very specific search will be discussed later. Here suffice to give one interesting example as Emin Türk Eliçin, who has personally experienced the *Kadro* movement and the 1930s. Emin Türk Eliçin, *Kemalist Devrim İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1970).

¹²⁷Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 224.

¹²⁸Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 572.

¹²⁹In this context Hilmi Uran's memoirs reflecting Atatürk's approach is important. Atatürk, when he is shown the Law on Civil Servants, banning them to be involved in the politics, interprets the related article in such a

by Celal Bayar in the GNA stressed that by the party-state merging, it is proved that none of them consider any differences among the people.¹³⁰ This might also be deduced remembering the great effort spend all around and using every opportunity to indoctrinate people with the basic ideas.¹³¹

3.7. Towards Democracy

3.7.1. The Early Attempt for a New Ideology

The post-1935 RPP has two important and categorical phases which needs further assessment in order to understand the development of social democracy in Turkey. The first one is the 1935-1950 period and the second one is demarcated by the years 1950 and 1960. Each period has in itself multi-faceted openings. For example the first period can also be divided into sub-categories. With this approach, the first sub-period might be the 1936-38 years, beginning with contradiction among the party cadres and ranks, between the more radical wing of Recep Peker and liberals sometimes addressed as *İş Bankası* group or *Aferists* whose leader is Celal Bayar. In 1936, Atatürk, dismissing Recep Peker from his post, shows his tendency toward the liberal attitude and, this move is also supported by İnönü, even though they both are known for their severe statist approaches. It could be said that although the radical wing is excluded from the administration, there is hardly found any radical change toward liberalism in the period between 1936 and 1938. In the year 1938, Atatürk died

way that it "bans the officers to be engaged in the political life involved in any party but RPP." Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım* (Ankara: n.p., 1959).

¹³⁰ASD II, 405.

¹³¹A practical application of this understanding might be followed in two documents: *1935 Cumhuriyetin İlanı Yıl Dönümünde Kurulacak Halk Kürsüleri Öğreneği* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935) and *1935 Cumhuriyet Yıl Donümü Kutlama Öğreneği* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935).

and İnönü was elected as the second president of the republic. In the extraordinary congress¹³² held, İnönü is also elected as the chairman of RPP¹³³. İnönü period in Turkey might also be divided into two parts. The first one is 1938-1946 period, usually known as the 'National-Leader Period'¹³⁴, whereas the second period covers the 1946 and 1950 years and, ends with the general elections held the very same year putting RPP into opposition and carrying the newly found Democrat Party¹³⁵ into power. The last phase is, no doubt, the 1950-1960 period, ending up with a military coup. The development of the 1960s, which brings a radical transformation in the RPP policies, needs the negligence of the many historical events and, to take only the political ones into consideration. These issues structure and restructure the RPP, and, finally, in the 1960s the party starts transforming itself to 'left of centre' policies. The process could only be deduced by going back to some of the critical turning points, registered in the party programs which are issued by the party congresses.

The early attempt to detach party from the state and government is seen in the 1939 Congress.¹³⁶ The amendments made in the Statutes mark a few important transition toward liberalisation, which might also be taken as the continuation of the liberalisation process. Accordingly, a) party chairmen of the provinces and towns would be cut off from the governors; b) an 'Independent Group' of 21 members of

¹³² Bila, *CIIP*, 112-119; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 572-573.

¹³³Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986), 63-68.

¹³⁴Koçak, *Milli*.

¹³⁵For a comprehensive 'history' of DP see, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, (1946-60)," in *Political* eds., M. Heper and J.M.Landau, 119-133.

¹³⁶Koçak, *Milli*, 227-234.

parliamentary group would be founded; c) civil officers would not be involved in the political life; d) the active party chairman did not need to be the prime minister and, instead, to perpetuate the party-government merger, secretary general would be a member of the cabinet; e) the doctrine of Kemalism needs to be explained.¹³⁷ Tunaya, reflecting on the last point, but in a manner encompassing the others, argues that there is an atmosphere of confusion and transition.¹³⁸ This evolution is also evident in the Second Extraordinary Congress of 1946, when both the Party Program and Statutes is changed and rewritten.¹³⁹ But between the 1943¹⁴⁰ and 1947 congresses, there are a set of political events that forced RPP to reconsider and reassess its centralist structure and character. The first one of these is the opposition movement started in the party that would end up with the founding of Democrat Party in January 7, 1946.¹⁴¹

Before passing on to the analysis of the events characterising the post 1946, through RPP, it seems necessary to discuss one point which might be also speculative to a certain extent. The opposition movement, which gave birth to the DP, might in fact be considered as the liberalisation process fermented in the RPP and, it can be connected to the clash of two wings aforementioned. Here, İnönü's position is challenging, for even though he belongs to the statist and radical side of the party, still, after 1938, during his presidency, he has shown a tender inclination towards the restructuring of Turkish politics. This tendency of İnönü is not clear and sharp enough, but one of his first spectacular political movements to rehabilitate the former

¹³⁷*CHP 5nci Büyük Kurultay Zabıtları* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1939).

¹³⁸Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 574.

¹³⁹*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: Program ve Tüzüğü* (Ankara: n.p., 1947).

¹⁴⁰Koçak, *Milli*, 337-344.

¹⁴¹The period is analysed in Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's*.

structure is his approach to the well known figures of the Independence War with whom once he himself had gone into severe clashes and had them expelled from the party. İnönü has called them back to the party ranks and this move has different connotations.¹⁴² Nevertheless, going back to the origins of the opposition movement and, viewing his approach to it, gives sufficient clues to come up with such a conclusion and, in this sense, the starting point of the opposition shows that in RPP, the centralist hegemony was reaching an end.

The main cause of the opposition was the Land Reform Bill submitted to the Parliament on January 5, 1945 and issued after strong opposition on June 11, 1945.¹⁴³ This event not only starts an organised opposition against RPP within the RPP but, also points out a metamorphosis in structural character of the Turkish politics. To say it with Çağlar Keyder, the aim of Land Reform Law was not initiating a social revolution but observing the growing power of bourgeoisie in the country. This was more an attempt of the bureaucracy for a unity with the poor peasantry.¹⁴⁴ There are also attempts to explain this very event by the centre-periphery confrontation. Going back to Shil's notion of ideology, the RPP is considered to be placed in the centre depending on centralism, bureaucracy and the state elites whereas the periphery, namely first the opposition in RPP then the DP, enforcing the

¹⁴²Bila, speculating on this development demarcates two points, as either İnönü wanted to show that the contradiction was not between him and the others but between Atatürk and the ex-Paşa; second, he could have wanted to suppress the opposition by carrying them into the active political life. Bila, *CHP*, 117.

¹⁴³For a more Marxist attuned but a strong analysis of the law see, Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993), 194-212.

¹⁴⁴Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987), 104-105.

development of a decentralised model founding itself on periphery and local political choices and behaviour.¹⁴⁵

This context and framework has always been crucial for students of Turkish politics. Only two examples might be sufficient. The first one is Samet Ağaoğlu's approach. A former minister of DP cabinets and the son of prominent scholar, politician and intellectual Ahmet Ağaoğlu, a fervent supporter of decentralisation idea in the late Ottoman and early Republican political life, in his book, strictly insists on the condition that DP has been a grassroots movements against the central bureaucratic cadres.¹⁴⁶ Ağaoğlu, to prove his ideas, tries to connect DP movement with all opposition movements of the Republican period. This point has also been accentuated in Timur, when he refers once more to the Land Reform Law. He insists that very this law has isolated RPP, by cutting its ties with the local notables increasing its strong bureaucratic tendencies¹⁴⁷. Igniting his ideas from very this point, İdris Küçükömer, a controversial scholar, is a keen defender of the point that DP and other related movements should be considered as the 'leftist' movements, for their connection with the periphery and their resistance against the bureaucratic state. On the other hand, RPP, according to Küçükömer, could only be a centralist, right wing party.¹⁴⁸ What

¹⁴⁵Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" in *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, eds., E. Akarlı and G.Ben-dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975), 7-32.

¹⁴⁶Samet Ağaoğlu, *Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri: Bir Soru* (N.p.: Baha Matbaası, 1972).

¹⁴⁷Timur, *Sonrası*, 211.

¹⁴⁸İdris Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, 2nd.ed., (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1989), 79.

is more interesting is that Küçükömer's attack on RPP is after RPP's new opening, which is known as the 'left of centre' movement.

In this explanation the concept of bourgeoisie is playing a key role for neither the development of it nor the condition and the situation of it enables us to situate and observe it as an independent class in Turkey bringing out its political openings mostly on the basis of rights and liberties. Nevertheless, the *Proposal of the Four*¹⁴⁹, June 7, 1945 has made the ground for further liberal and democratic transformations in the RPP, as it asks for the enlargement of the limits, as well as the scope of the political and constitutional rights in Turkey.¹⁵⁰ The rejection of the proposal by the Parliamentary Group of the party did not bring an end to the unrest of the opposition but provoked it, as Celal Bayar prepared and submitted a proposal to the GNA, requesting the amendment of the Article 17 and 50 of the Press Law which restricts the freedom of information.¹⁵¹

After the rejection of this request, joining the other three deputies, who were already expelled from the RPP, Bayar resigned first, from the Assembly and then from the RPP,¹⁵² declaring that he and his friends were about to found a new party. Following the foundation of the DP, RPP has held its, aforementioned extraordinary

¹⁴⁹Celal Bayar (İzmir), Refik Koraltan(İçel), Fuat Köprülü (Kars), Adnan Menderes (Aydın).

¹⁵⁰For the complete text see, Bila, *CHP*, 542-544.

¹⁵¹ Karpas, *Turkey's*, 146-147. Interestingly this point is not discussed in Cem Eroğul's book devoted to the study of DP. Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990).

¹⁵²Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1995), 402.

Congress of 1946 and decided to amend its Statutes. This shows a remarkable shift from the previous history of the RPP, according to Karpas in four points:

a)lifting the ban on the formation of associations and political parties based on class interest; b)adoption of direct voting system; c)amendment of the party by laws to nominate and elect the party chairman; d)abolition of the Independent Group and the holding of new elections.¹⁵³

Here, the most crucial point, no doubt, is accepting the class based party model and the direct voting system.

This process of liberalisation, as Karpas rightly observes, has given birth to several important consequences as the government monopoly on the prices of goods is reduced, the emergency work obligation imposed on the villagers was abolished, Article 50 of the Press Law was amended, a partial press amnesty was issued, authority to close a newspaper was lifted from the administration and left to the courts, The Turkish Press Union which controlled the press was disbanded and the journalists were left free to join professional associations, universities were given autonomy in their administration and internal affairs and, lastly, The Law on Associations was amended and grounded on a relatively liberal basis.¹⁵⁴ The 1946 elections, in this context, has brought many contradictory consequences. First of all, Recep Peker, was appointed as the Prime Minister and, this brought again the radical, authoritarian approaches into practice. The first move of the government was the restrictions brought to the press and, the punishment of the newspapers who have given a support

¹⁵³ Karpas, *Turkey's*, 154.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 157, 158, 159.

to the DP.¹⁵⁵ Among these events, DP held its first congress on January 7, 1947 and declared the *Oath Pact* which asks for the realisation of the Principles similar to 'Proposal of the Four.'¹⁵⁶ The government's ignorance of the demands raised in the Charter has been noted as one of the hurdles before the development of the democracy in Turkey.

3.7.2. Opposition and the Transformation of RPP: an Interim Modernisation Period

The RPP, encircled with all these political events, holds its last congress before moving to opposition in 1947, trying to adopt itself to the multi-party system¹⁵⁷ but, this does not prevent it to loose the 1950 elections.¹⁵⁸ The year 1950 designates a turning point in the modern political history of Turkey. Though DP's attempts coming into office is defined by Karpas as a "great mistake" for "the principles of democracy had been only barely touched upon and checks and balances of government's powers had not been properly regulated"¹⁵⁹, these lacking facts were not the fault of DP and, on the other hand, with the amendments made in the Statutes and Program of the RPP, it is observed that democratic system is developed through time but, with the outcome of the similar problems that RPP has faced during its staying in the office.

¹⁵⁵Alpay Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1994), 200-201.

¹⁵⁶For the whole details of the first congress see, Orhan Mete, *Bütün Tafsilat ve Akisleriyle Demokrat Parti'nin 1 inci Büyük Kongresi* (İstanbul: n.p, 1947).

¹⁵⁷CHP Yedinci Kurultay Tutanağı (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1948).

¹⁵⁸Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 575-576.

¹⁵⁹KKarpas, *Turkey's*, 181.

Nevertheless, for example, the Congress of 1951 shows a delicate shift towards the decentralisation of the intra-party practices¹⁶⁰. The new Statutes accepts and approves the view that provincial chairmen should be elected in the local congresses and, even though, it has no responsibility and authority, still, the establishment of a Party Council is allowed, together with the principle, that Secretary General should be elected directly by the Congress and Secretary General's deputies should be elected by the Secretary General. Also, it was the Secretary General's responsibility to organise Youth and Women's' Organisations. With the last condition, it is clear that RPP started to realise that there would be no more a uniform and homogeneous youth created by the indoctrination through the National Education.¹⁶¹ Besides, and what is more important, in the Declaration proclaimed by the Congress, it is asked that juridical security should be fortified and a Supreme Court should be established.¹⁶²

The decentralisation of the RPP's structure was so definitive that in the 1953 congress when the powerful İnönü wanted the Secretary General to be elected by the Executive Committee, he could not achieve it ,for the Congress decided in the diametrically opposite way, together with the Secretary General, Kasım Gülek, who relied on the grassroots politics.¹⁶³ Besides, in the 1953 Program, a totally new social and economic understanding starts to develop, for basically, instead of the

¹⁶⁰*CHP Dokuzuncu Kurultay Beyannamesi ve Rapor* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1951).

¹⁶¹*CHP Tüzük* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1951).

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁶³*Bila, CHP*, 207.

concept of Kemalism, 'Atatürk's Way' is preferred and the first time the 'rule of law' (*Hukuk devleti*) concept is pronounced. This is enlarged to such an extent that even though the separation of powers is not proposed, a constitutional guarantee is demanded to create the checks and balances that would foster the political liberties, as well as the consolidation of election security and the judge independency. Not need be less important than these, in the Article 38, the right to strike for the workers is ratified.¹⁶⁴

This new structure of RPP is reflected in the 1957 elections. The age average of the RPP candidates was 38 and this rejuvenation is also true for the Election Statement, saying that the target is the implementation of a rule of law, founded on the human rights, the freedom of expression, press and meeting, proportional representation, broadcasting and university autonomy, foundation of the Supreme Court, laws to prohibit antidemocratic intra-party movements, the neutrality of the President, the strike and collective negotiation rights for the workers, the right of establishing unions for the public officials, the enlargement of the social security rights and involvement of the workers in the State Economic Enterprises.¹⁶⁵ As a consequence of this movement, in the 1959 Congress, the party proclaims the "Statement of First Goals" (*İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi*). This Statement is not a different one than the Election Statement of 1957 but, it is a more concrete one both on the legislative and social grounds.¹⁶⁶ Besides, İnönü, in this Congress has put the party's target as the achievement of 'workers' rights.'

¹⁶⁴*CHP Programı* (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1953).

¹⁶⁵Giritlioğlu, *Türk*, 451-453.

¹⁶⁶*ibid.*, 453-455.

This shows a noteworthy change in the history of RPP. Through the metamorphosis it has gone under, beginning by the mid-1950s, RPP has moved to a new position and, in this displacement, there are two specific conditions. The first one is the enforcing of the DP, second, the change in the economic and social structure of Turkey. This development might be taken as the initial step for the development of a new political trend which finally ends up with the left-of-centre movement than transforming itself to democratic left ideology. This might be conceptualised as the second modernisation movement. It is founded on a more economic basis and mainly sparked by the urbanisation and immigration. These social events while causing this new structuration, on the other hand, has brought the radical reconfiguration to the Turkish political realm. Beginning by the early 1960s a new social mind started determining the political issues and, as Turkish politics is sharply separated largely into two segments, as left and right, some other issues like the voting behaviour of the people, the location of the political parties on the political map, either as left-right or as centre-periphery distinctions. These conditions taken together starts a new period not only in the history of RPP but also in the new political agenda usually referred as the 'left politics.' The 1960s are the starting decade of this new search, usually seen as a possibility of uniting with the people living in the periphery, on a more ontological level and sometimes seen as a necessary consequence of a gradual development.

Conclusion

In the previous chapter, it has been argued that in the 1919-1923 period, both a party and a new state is formed by the cadres conducted the National Independence War. Although the two formations are convoluted, yet it could be purported that, when the social and political events are analysed, in the early formation years, Turkish republic might be defined as a party-led state. However, in the second period, which covers the years 1923 and 1960, the party is analysed on two different basis. First, in

the 1923 and 1946 period, it becomes a 'state-led party' and beginning by the year 1946, all through the 1950s RPP starts its third period. These have been the basic arguments of this chapter.

The chapter, focusing on the 1930s and 1940s, argues that the 'state-led party' structure is an outcome of the state-party unification. All bureaucratic and administrative cadres of the Republic are, simultaneously, the members of the party. This is due to the gradually increasing effect of statism, which has gained an acceleration, all over Europe, in different forms, after the Great Crash of 1929. However, the Fascism of Italy is balanced by the statism of the Soviets, as long as the central role of the state is concerned and both models have been affective on the political and ideological formation of RPP. Under this influence, RPP, especially in the 1930s and 1940s has developed not only a statist economic order but an ideology which was strictly dependent on the nationalism, secularism and republicanism. The framework of this ideology is constructed through the national education system, which was controlled by the party, and the establishment of two important institutions. These are the Peoples' Houses and the Public Orators. They both are intended to indoctrinate the masses with the Kemalist tenets, which were symbolised by Six Arrows and carried to the Constitution. This ideology, rejecting the existence of classes in the society, has insisted on the formation of a solidarist and corporatist society. The 'liberal state' model and the notion of 'democracy' is also refused in this period, as centralism, under the strict leadership of elites is supported. This is mainly the realisation of the project of modernisation through authoritarianism.

This political and ideological structure, while creating a hegemonic discourse, after the Second World War, started to change gradually. In this new period, bourgeoisie has started a new search to take power back from the control of

bureaucracy in a reconciliation with poor peasantry. This new upsurge has not only been conducive to the formation of political opposition, first in the RPP then as a different party, but also brought the take over of the power by the newly founded Democrat Party. This, period, started by the year 1946, as argued in the chapter, is important in the history of Turkish social democracy. It not only breaks the single-party structure but paves the way for the second modernisation movement in the RPP. RPP, beginning by 1946 and in the 1950s through the amendments of the Party Programs and Statutes, has developed a more 'democratic' and social approach which ends up by the left-of-centre policies of the 1960s and the democratic left ideology of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the ideology developed in the 1930s and 1940s, except the state-RPP unification, has been immune to a radical criticism and change and although the political power has stayed on the centre right, all through the 1950s and 1960s, yet, the basic republican epistemology has stayed indifferent to the transformations. The 1960s and the new period of RPP is analysed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE LONG TRANSITION TO 'LEFT OF CENTRE' AND 'DEMOCRATIC LEFT'

4.1. Towards Renewal: Issues and Conditions

4.1.1. RPP in the 1960-1965 Period

The most important determinant in the post 1960 military coup about RPP is the arduous process of change that began by the second half of the decade and continued in the early 1970s. This course of action which reached its crux with an election success in 1973, has its roots buried in the late 1950s. The direction of the 1960 military intervention and the intellectual support given to it, as Ayata notes, more or less, is a proof that RPP's ideas had found an echo among the intellectuals and bureaucracy¹. According to Ayata the Constitution² prepared by the Constitutive Assembly, in which RPP was directly represented with 49 and indirectly 125 deputies, reflects the reminiscence of the 1958 Program of the

¹Ayşe Güneş Ayata, *CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji)*, trans., B. Tarhan, N.Tarhan (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1995), 92.

²The full text with amendments is found in A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1993).

party.³ Another student of Turkish politics, Frank Tachau, rightly observes in his article that the radical change came to fore in RPP during the 1945-80 era is a "shift from ideological cleavages to functional cleavages."⁴ Tachau in his attempt to explain the structure of change proposes three points:

"First, the party's electoral base began to shift from the old coalition of elites at the centre and periphery to a predominantly class-based alignment, i.e. from a cultural to a functional basis. Second, the party began to assume a more clearly defined ideological position. Finally, the party experienced the second major transition of top leadership in its history, replacing the venerable İsmet İnönü with the more youthful and ideologically inclined Bülent Ecevit."⁵

The change started in the late 1950s as explained in the previous chapter. Depending on the clash between the radical and more moderate wings of the party, as the cadres supporting a more liberal approach parted away and formed the DP, RPP, in search of a new policy to compete with the new political organisation, started to develop a more social and democratic programme. Also backing this new tendency was the populist programme of the DP. The trajectory of the DP programmes and pragmatism also had effects on the renewal of the RPP

³There should be a misprint in this remark for, CHP has never prepared a programme in 1958. What Ayata refers should be the 1957 Statement of Elections; CHP, *CHP Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ankara: Kültür Matbaası, 1957), or more possibly 'The Statement of First Aims' accepted in the Congress of 1958: CHP, *CHP 14. Kurultay İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi* (İstanbul: n.p., 1960).

⁴Frank Tachau, "The Republican People's Party, 1945-80" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds., M.Heper and L.M.Landau (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991), 99.

⁵Ibid., 100-101.

programme. Kasaba, on this ground epitomises the essence of DP in four categories:

The democrats were openly critical of the alliance that had been behind the Ottoman and Turkish reform movement in particular of the state bureaucracy and certain segments of the intelligentsia(...)The second way in which the Democrats were different was how they distanced themselves from the militant secularism of the early republican governments(...)The third main component of the Democratic program was an unqualified support for private initiative and unhindered private enterprise (...) Finally (...) through their discourse the Democrats and their successors elevated the formal procedures of democracy, in particular the act of voting, to a very high level of esteem."⁶

This framework is encompassing the various dichotomies on which the Turkish democracy is founded as bureaucracy-civil elites-military coalition vs. provincial bourgeoisie, secularism vs. folk Islam⁷, statism vs. private entrepreneurship, pluralist democracy vs. authoritarianism. RPP beginning by late 1950s started to cover one of these 'binary dichotomies' and the first period ended up with the coalition governments of the post 1960 military coup with the 1961 elections. Dankwart Rustow, once has suggested that Turkish party history could be analysed on a basis of 'diastole' and 'systole', as expansion and contraction.⁸ In this case, through a process of change, RPP was reaching a systolic period and in

⁶Reşat Kasaba, "Populism and Democracy in Turkey" in *Rules and Rights in the Middle East Democracy, Law and Society*, Ellis Goldberg, R. Kasaba and J.S.Migdal (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1993).

⁷For the analysis of the 'folk Islam' concept, from where we have borrowed the term, see, Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji: Türkiye'de Halk Katındaki Dinsel İnançların Siyasal Eylemi Etkilendirmesine İlişkin Bir Kavramlaştırma Modeli* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 107-116.

⁸Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey" in *Political Parties and Political Development*, eds., J.LaPalombara and M.Weiner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 112-13.

the 1961 elections RPP became the biggest party in the parliament by receiving % 36.7 of the votes. This result, in fact, was reflecting a decrease with respect to the 1957 elections, in which RPP has received the % 40.8, but as the Justice Party (JP), the successor of DP⁹, also showed a loss of votes, RPP even though it did not get the majority, was still the leading party of the GNA.

Between the 1961 and 1965 elections, CHP, under the leadership of İnönü, has formed three coalition governments. It is interesting that these governments have been founded against the will of the party members and grassroots.¹⁰ The reason why İnönü was insistent on constructing the coalition governments was that he conceived himself as the 'security of the democracy'¹¹. He also believed that democracy could only be sustained as long as it works and it was also the only way of healing the wounds opened by the military intervention¹². The program of the coalition governments, not unexpectedly, reflected the various contradictions occurred on the political realm in the 1960s and as Bila puts it, especially the first one of the three governments İnönü formed, has a three partite

⁹ DP did not participate in the 1961 elections for it was banned after the military coup of 1960. Here, when I say JP votes showed a decline I refer to the votes recieved by DP in the 1957 elections. In the unification of JP and DP I refer to Özbudun. Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crisis, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations", in Larry Diamond, J.L. Linz, S. M. Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Pbs., 1995), 231. For a reminder I should note that DP recieved in the 1959 elections the 47.7% of the votes.

¹⁰İlikmet Bila, *CHP*, 26.

¹¹Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları, 1944-1973. Altıncı Kitap. İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı, 1961-1965* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), 119.

¹²Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: Making of a Turkish Stateperson*, (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1998), 282.

structure, i.e. the wealthy provincial bourgeoisie and the landlords, the industrial and small business sectors and the relatively poor social layers.¹³ The governments has triggered the unrest among the party ranks and some youth leaders have resigned from the party.¹⁴ On the other hand, government programs reflect a softened RPP effect. The only point sustained with extreme care is the issues concerning the social security system, the laws regulating the labour market and two important laws, Law of Unions and the Law of Strike, Lock-Out and Collective Bidding¹⁵. These laws issued during İnönü governments not only shows the trajectory of the renewal of the party but also empowers Bülent Ecevit, that time Minister of Labour, towards his destiny as the chairman of RPP. Also, another sign of the new direction that RPP took was the establishment of a new ministry, the Ministry of Village Affairs.¹⁶

Among the party congresses held in the 1961-1965 period the most important one is the 17th congress of 1964 proclaiming a statement called 'Our

¹³Hikmet Bila: *CHP*, 262.

¹⁴The same reaction is observed during the crisis after the military intervention of March 12, 1971. Again, İnönü wanted to be involved in the government whereas Bülent Ecevit, the secretary general of the party reacted and resigned from his post. Although the intra-party crisis of 1960s were settled by İnönü's personal authority and prestige this second crisis ended up with İnönü's resignation from the leadership. Interesting is that, Ecevit, during the process, was successful in uniting and getting the support of the same youth leaders. This might be taken as another indicator of the rejuvenation of RPP that continued all through the 1960s and early 70s.

¹⁵Cahit Talas, *Türkiye'nin Açıklamalı Sosyal Politika Tarihi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), 155-202.

¹⁶There is also another ministry founded in the third İnönü government, which is the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.

Ideal of Advanced Turkey.'(*İleri Türkiye Ülkümüz*)¹⁷. This statement sufficiently reflects the RPP's politics as well as the expectations of Turkey convened not only from the political but also from the social and economic developments. This statement is connected to the 'Statement of First Aims' (*İlk Hedefler Bildirisi*) of the 14th congress, 1959, and to the 'Statement of the Basic Aims' (*Temel Hedefler Bildirisi*) of the 15th congress, 1961, and it is declared that this new statement is put forward as the aims determined in the previous declarations are achieved.¹⁸ There are two important points in the statement. The first one is the emphasis put on the concept of 'social justice' which will play an important role in the following period, paving the way to the concept of 'left of centre.' The second point is that, there is no reminder of the basic issues debated much in the political period as the Petroleum Law, Land Reform and Foreign Investment. As Kili observes the ignorance of the issues has induced the result obtained in the 1965 election which shows a very sharp decline in the percentage of the votes received.¹⁹ RPP in the 1965 elections received 28.7% of the votes. Besides, another issue that effected this outcome is the impression that, RPP not only played an important role and took part in the military intervention against the DP government but, it sustained its unification with the army even after the coup. This very last point has

¹⁷ CHP Genel Sekreterliği Yayın Bürosu, *İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi, Temel Hedefler Beyannamesi, İleri Türkiye Ülkümüz* (Ankara: n.p., 1965).

¹⁸For a fervent support and analysis of these developments, taken as the initial point of transformation that RPP has achieved see, Teflik Çavdar, "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (1950-1980)", in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, V. 8 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, n.d.), 2025-2036.

¹⁹Suna Kili, *CHP'de*, 221.

created much of a criticism against the governments formed under the leadership of İnönü.²⁰

This period, when a chronological order of the events are followed might be taken as the last attempt for RPP to form a coalition between the provincial nobles and the civil and military bureaucracy. Through an effort of keeping the parliamentary open and active, İnönü has not hesitated in sustaining RPP's traditional role as the "guardian of the state"²¹ "as closely identified with the Kemalist state."²² The second issue forcing RPP to realise a metamorphosis might be taken as the social extension of this understanding. In other words, RPP entered the mid-1960s with a look still conceals it with the centre-state demarcated by civil bureaucracy and military whereas the whole society was about to face a metamorphosis much triggered by the socialist parties and activities. The swaying of RPP beginning by the early 1960s and coming to a crux by the declaration of the concept 'left of centre' should be analysed especially referring to this development.

4.1.2. The Impulses for the change: Labour Party of Turkey (TLP) and Other Leading Socialist Groups

²⁰RPP in the process of baffling the criticism directed to itself, published various documents; see *İlökümet Deęişikliği ve CHP'nin Görüşleri* (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1965); CHP Araştırma ve ve Yayın Bürosu, III. *İnönü İlökümetinin İstifası Üzerine CHP Merkez Yönetim Kurulu tarafından Yayınlanan Tebliğ* (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1965).

²¹Frank Tachau, "The Republican", 112.

²²Ibid.

Just after the military coup of 1960, the most important political party situated on the left wing of political dispersion was the Labour Party of Turkey²³ (TLP-*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*). This party, in its complicated history²⁴,

"at first (...) supported full employment, a more equitable distribution of income, the nationalisation of natural resources and respect for private property. In 1964, the TLP's propaganda emphasised wider nationalisation through overall planning and state supervision, along with redistribution of land among the peasants.²⁵ Its anti-American theme also became more pronounced."²⁶

According to Ahmet Samim²⁷, TLP has played a very important role on the left politics of Turkey for it did not only dissolve the various factions by

²³"This party, the first of two unrelated parties bearing the same name is sometimes also referred to as the 'Worker's Party of Turkey; " see, Frank Tachau, *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa*. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishers, 1994).

²⁴This history is explained in various sources; see Mehmet Ali Aybar, *TİP Tarihi* (3 Cilt) (İstanbul: BDS, 1988); Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları* (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınları, 1992); Behice Boran, *İki Açıdan Türkiye İşçi Partisi Davası* (İstanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1975); Sadun Aren, *TİP Olayı, 1961-1971* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1973); Yahya Kanbolat, *Olduğu Gibi Türkiye İşçi Partisi Üzerine Anılar* (Ankara: Akademi Matbaası, 1979). M.Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1974); Kenan Öztürkmen, *Türkiye İşçi Partisinin İcyüzü* (İstanbul: Aydın Yayınları, 1965); Murat Sarıca ve Nurkalp Devrim, *Türkiye İşçi Partisini Tanıyalım* (İstanbul: İz Yayınları, 1968); Ahmet Samim, "Left" in *Turkey in Transition*, Irvin Cemil Schick-E.A.Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 159-188 and for an early evaluation, Kemal Karpas, "Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey." *Middle East Journal*, XXI (2), (Spring 1967), 157-172.

²⁵For the details of these issues see *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı* (İstanbul: n.p., 1961).

²⁶Frank Tachau, *Political*, 608.

²⁷The pen-name of prominent writer Murat Belge.

incorporating them to the body of the party²⁸ but also for linking the arguments of the socialist left with the concrete problems of the masses by organising open, energetic and heterogeneous campaigns.²⁹ According to Aybar, the roots of TLP was deep buried in Kemalism for he defined it as an anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist ideology which is situated on the left even if Atatürk and his friends were not aware of the concept and they did not know where they were standing and what was defended by TLP was nothing but a new social structure grounded on these ideals.³⁰ Nevertheless, the TLP has supported a clear and open idea of socialism pushing RPP an edge to develop a new political trend.³¹

Not only TLP but the condition of Turkish intelligentsia of the early 1960s, just after the referendum of the New Constitution, generally showing a left leaning was also another factor in the reconstitution of RPP.³² *Yön*, a pro-left but more significantly a neo-Kemalist journal trying to deliberate a 'Turkish socialism' grounded on "Kemalism and workers"³³ by way of its statement published in the

²⁸For an analysis of the party structure see Doğu Perinçek, "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Üyelerinin Sınıf Yapısı." *Aydınlık*, n. 3, (January 1969), 205-226; Artun Ünsal, "TLP Yönetim Kurullarının Sınıfsal Yapısı", *Ant*, n. 12, (April 1971), 54-69.

²⁹Ahmet Samim, 168.

³⁰Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Tip Tarihi*, 125-143.

³¹For another analysis on the same line see Murat Belge, "Türkiye İşçi Partisi" in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol.8 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, n.d.), 2120-2131.

³²For an analysis of the left movements of the period see, Murat Belge, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Sosyalizm (1960'tan Sonra)", in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, n.d), 1955-1962.

³³J.M.Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 81.

first issue of the journal³⁴ was the leading movement.³⁵ Yön's basic task was the construction of Turkish socialism which was entirely different than communism. This very notion and model of socialism has been declared as the mere barrier against the development of the communism, a 'spectre that haunted' Turkey in the meantime, and in this context the only way conveying the acclaimed end was the development of neo-statism.³⁶ Landau, in this respect, observes Yön as an intellectual opening whose ideas are inspired by and found in Kadro movement.³⁷ Though the concept of 'Turkish socialism' was ambiguous and even the concept of 'socialism' was used in different contexts³⁸, loaded with different meanings, usually changing from one writer to another, still Yön has performed an important function in the introduction of the idea of socialism to Turkish political realm³⁹ giving birth to more radical journals, *Ant*, being the most important one, after Yön's demise with frustrations for not being able powerful enough to accelerate the

³⁴"Bildirge", Yön, no.1, (December 20, 1961), s.12. This statement has been translated into English Frank Tachau:"...", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, V. XIV, No 3, (March 1963), 75-78.

³⁵For a critical survey of Yön, see Igor P. Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey 1960-1980* (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J.Brill, 1992), 85-108.

³⁶For a lengthy discussion of the ideology of Yön especially from an economic view point see Hikmet Özdemir, *Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı: Yön Hareketi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986), especially pp. 237-263.

³⁷J.M.Landau, *The Radical*, 75.

³⁸Ahmet Samim prefers to describe Yön as a "left-Kemalist substitute", *passim*, 168.

³⁹Kemal Karpaz, "The Turkish Left", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (2): 1966, 173.

reforms proposed and expected in Rustow's words.⁴⁰ Here, as an evidence which shows how RPP was effected from Yön's upsurge is the support letter send by Bülent Ecevit to the journal⁴¹ who at the time was the Minister of Labour.

On the other hand, in *Ant*, a more radical journal published⁴² by the support of intellectuals who were unhappy with the moderate approach of Yön, as mentioned above, ⁴³ started a new search. Although at the beginning the ideas developed by the writers were not so much different than the ones found in Yön, in time, it has become a more radical journal.⁴⁴ It could be said that in the period after 1970 up until 1971 military intervention which banned the publication of the journal, *Ant* began supporting a more radical and practical basis for 'revolution' and the roots of this tendency is found in the journal for the journal itself declared that it was a 'radical leftist' one⁴⁵. On the ground which they believed that would force the political life to develop a more radical approach to the existing problems by way of a new democratic organisation, *Ant* supported i) the detachment of radical DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions) from Türk-İş (a more moderate confederation of workers unions), ii) encouraged the political movements of the 'revolutionary

⁴⁰D.A.Rustow, "Turkey's second try at democracy." *Yale Review*, III, 1962, 531.

⁴¹Yön, n. 2, (December 27, 1962), 8.

⁴²*Ant*, n. 1, (January 3, 1967).

⁴³J.M.Landau, *The Radical*, 107.

⁴⁴An excellent survey of *Ant* is found in Landau, *The Radical*, 95-108.

⁴⁵*Ant*, n. 121, (April 22, 1969), 3.

teachers⁴⁶ and iii) advised the university students not to be afraid of the police terror in the universities; in short it tried to develop a synthesis of revolutionary theory and practice.⁴⁷ With such an approach not the underdevelopment of Turkey is debated much in the journal but the emphasis was more put on the social and political conditions of Turkey affecting the interest groups and the other actors of the political realm.

In this context the difference between various groups is crystallised on the level of statism they defend for. The statism even though is formulated as a method for economic growth and welfare still as an ideology is used as a medium to unite different and scattered powers in order to achieve the already determined task.⁴⁸ This has been one of the most important issues in the determination of the political practices in the 1960s even sometimes ending up with para-military movements and trials for unachieved military interventions as in the case of Talat Aydemir.⁴⁹ The left's relationship with army or at least the factions in the army has been a controversial issue in the realignment of the political structure in Turkey for, the concert of links between the state elites, bureaucracy and military has been the natural support system of the RPP. As RPP has been the initiative force of social

⁴⁶Teachers were organized in TÖS (Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası-Teachers' Syndicate of Turkey).

⁴⁷J.M.Landau, *Radical*, 99.

⁴⁸For a discussion of left dispersions in the 1960s and 1970s including this diversity see Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Soldaki Bölünmeler 1960-1970* (Ankara: Toplum Yayınları, 1970).

⁴⁹For a discussion of Talat Aydemir intervention see Nevin Yurdsever, *Türkiye'de Askeri Darbe Girişimleri, 1960-1964* (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983) and Talat Aydemir, *Talat Aydemir'in Hatıraları* (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1968).

change and modernisation with the cultural epistemology it has created in Turkey, there has been a belief that the further developments and changes should also be through the same coalition of powers. The 1960s in this context has been the battleground of not only the new coalitions on this ground but also of the breaks between the long time allies.⁵⁰

Samim, discussing the relationship between the military and the socialist groups puts the difference between *Yön* and more radical *Türk Solu* by referring to Yön's naive inclination towards the patriotic army officers⁵¹. On the other hand, Türk Solu believed that the militant youth and students would initiate an upsurge and pave the way for the movement of radical army officers which would end up with 'national junta's domination of the state.⁵² This strategy has been defined by Belli as 'National Democratic Revolution.' Samim ties all these developments, which reached a way station, in Haris' words,⁵³ in 1971, to the "deep sense of continuity" and the efforts for the resurrection of national revolutionary tradition demarcated by Kemalism.⁵⁴

⁵⁰Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in *Turkey in Transition, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds., Metin Heper, Ahmet İvin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 137-155, especially p.144.

⁵¹For a critique of this approach see Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, *27 Mayıs ve Yön Hareketinin Sınıfsal Eleştirisi* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1970).

⁵²Mihri Belli, *Milli Demokratik Devrim* (Ankara: Şark Matbaası, 1970).

⁵³George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision-Makers?" in M.Heper, A.Ivin, *State*, 41, 185.

⁵⁴Ahmet Samim, "Left", op. cit, 171. The same opinion is repeated by the same author in Murat Belge, "68 ve Sonrasında Sol Hareket", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 41, (Spring 1988).

This point is a matter of argumentation in the restructuring of Kemalism in the 1960s and in the orientation of the groups existing within the RPP. To Özdemir, in the 1960s the debates arising in the journals and papers show two main categories of left⁵⁵: the first group was supporting the idea that in Turkey it was not easy to sustain a Western type democracy and, consequently, to solve the existing social and economic problems, it was not logical applying the Western models. The second group did not believe that there was a need for deep economic and social reforms to implement democracy and if the continuity of 1950 transformation is sustained, Turkey would go on with its development. The first group was looking for the possibilities of invigorating Young Turks-Committee for Union and Progress-Defence of Rights-RPP line whereas the second group defended the Prince Sabahattin-Liberty and Understanding⁵⁶ (Hürriyet ve İtilaf)-Progressive Republican Party-Free Party-Democrat Party line. The first group united around *Yön* and looked for a radical transformation not through the pluralist democracy and parliamentarism which they called the 'pretty democracy' ('*cici demokrasi*')⁵⁷ and moved toward the coalition with army officers under the general notion of National Democratic Revolution, under the control of Mihri Belli⁵⁸. This trend has

⁵⁵İlhamet Özdemir, "Siyasal Tarih 1960-1980" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, Sina Akşin, ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990), 212.

⁵⁶This is the translation given by Erich Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925* (Leiden, New York: E.J.Brill, 1991). Nevertheless it seems more suitable to change the term 'understanding' with 'reconciliation.'

⁵⁷Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Devrim Üzerine* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971), 55-56; 115-121.

⁵⁸Mihri Belli, *Devrimci Hareketimizin Eleştirisi 1961-1971* (İstanbul: Emekçi Yayınları, 1977) and for a critical assessment of Mihri Belli and his ideas Rasih Nuri, *Mihri Belli Olayı* (İstanbul: Anadolu Yayınları, 1976).

reached its crux by the unsuccessful March 9, 1971 intra-military trial of a radical coupe which was controlled and exterminated by March 12, 1971 Ultimatum.⁵⁹ The March 9 intervention was believed to be Kemalist-socialist in origin whereas the second March 12. was a conservative Kemalist intervention.⁶⁰ This model of transforming the society by the coalition of intelligentsia and military groups is believed to have been inculcated to Turkish intelligentsia by Arab-African socialism which really did find an impact and echo among different political factions.⁶¹

The two models found an echo among the RPP ranks as well. When RPP is approached through this view point Karpaz makes a differentiation among party ranks and factions.⁶² According to author those who had a connection with *Yön* were the strong statist radicals. Radicals were also "nationalists (...) and naturally secularist" and

"in the last analysis ideology of the radical wing in the RPP amounted principally to a typical bureaucratic-intellectual relation to the rise of the entrepreneurial business-oriented class and to the threat of erosion of the traditional statist-elitist values."⁶³

⁵⁹The details of this intervention is analysed in a vast literature but the main sources are İsmail Cem, *Tarih Açısından 12 Mart: Nedenleri, Yapısı, Sonuçları. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2. basım, 2 cilt bir arada, 1980)*; Muhsin Batur, *Anılar ve Görüşler:Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985).

⁶⁰For the details of March 9 trial see Cemal Madanoğlu... and Talat Turan

⁶¹The similarities between models is analyzed in Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of The Modern Middle East* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) and Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

⁶²Kemal Karpaz, "Military Interventions:Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980" in *State*, eds., M.Heper, A.Evin, 142.

⁶³Ibid.

In another part of his article, Karpaz observes that

"the social democratic (statist-socialist) groups in the RPP (...) were no longer interested in rebuilding the old ruling coalition on behalf of the ideas of Kemalism and secularism, but wished instead to achieve the political and ideological supremacy of its own cadres in order to carry out schemes for economic development and social welfare."⁶⁴

This framework shows that the restructuring of RPP was bringing the renewal of the ideology but nevertheless it was dependent on the new coalitions among different power groups having an influence on the state. The left of centre was being shaped under these conditions. The development of left of centre was a step toward the victory of the radicals in RPP. Nevertheless, in time, positions are changed and debates developed among groups differentiated from each other on the basis of an abstract notion of state and people. The incorporation of the people into the body of politics in the 1960s did not eradicate the central role and function of state nor the power of Kemalism. The mere change was the breaking of ties between the party and the military which was an early warning to İnönü's position who gave his support to army after the 1960 military coup which meant leaning on the state and replacing the party after the state. A process culminated with a continuous loss of power in the general elections between 1957 and 1973.

This framework designates an interesting condition. Turkish socialism occurred after the 1961 Constitution played an intriguing role in the political

⁶⁴Ibid.,144.

platform as long as its ideological character and the reverberation of RPP to this function is concerned. Socialism in Turkey, even though the most radical movements are examined, was not, in the final analysis, away from the basic constructive ideology already established in the country. As long as the early left movements of the 1960s is concerned all activities are related to statism and has been formulated as a way to social and economic development with a keen attachment to Kemalism as Lipovsky puts it:

"All the adherents of Turkish socialism were agreed that Kemalism was one of their tenets, and that the principles of Kemalism were also the basic principles of Turkish socialism. Their chief task was to apply these principles to contemporary Turkish reality and to impart to them a socialist orientation on the social and economic level."⁶⁵

Not only on the level of economic development but also on the grounds of other ideological tenets of the RPP, with little alterations, the socialist groups were in concert and reconciliation:

"(...) different positions of Marxism became interwoven with Kemalism and with precepts from West European social democracy. The principles of Turkish socialism were a blend of its various ideological sources: an anti-western slant, which the Turkish socialists called 'anti-imperialism', anti-feudalism, statism, anti-capitalism, nationalism, and anti-communism."⁶⁶

The left of centre movement was an eclectic attack constructed on this ground effected from another condition of Turkish socialism, put by Lipovsky as

⁶⁵Igor P. Lipovsky, *The Socialist*, 107.

⁶⁶Ibid.

"Turkish socialism was not a distinctly formulated ideological stream."⁶⁷ This framework forces the emergence of the left of centre not as an ideological stream but as a pragmatic issue relying on the Kemalist tenets. In this context it is not a renewal of the party ideology but a restatement of it with a legitimacy gained from the condition and concerns of the socialist left.

4.2. The Remedy for Survival: "Left of Centre"

4.2.1. İnönü and the Left of Centre

As Ecevit points out later⁶⁸, İnönü uses the concept of 'left of centre' for the first time in the interview he gave to Abdi İpekçi on July 29, 1965. Although the impact of the concept is great, the early definitions made, explanations given and the debates arouse are all buried in an ambiguity. İnönü himself has preferred to explain the concept more relying on Kemalism and the basic tenets of it mostly referring to laicism and statism⁶⁹. With his much quoted words, according to İnönü, "RPP is a statist party by its existence and with this characteristic is a party which has an economic understanding situated on the left of centre."⁷⁰ If his continuing explanation is examined it is observed that the primordial of the new concept is economism and it seems that İnönü is more interested in economic development.⁷¹ Here, the priority is given to economic development through

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸"Ecevit Siyasi Hayatını Anlatıyor", *Cumhuriyet*, (January 22, 1975) also in Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu*, 6th.ed. (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1974), 21.

⁶⁹A recent compilation of articles both from the 1930s, selected from the journal *Kadro* and the recent literature is found in Nevin Coşar,ed., *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1993) .

⁷⁰Abdi İpekçi, "İnönü ile Mülakat", *Milliyet*, (July 29, 1965).

⁷¹*İnönü Ortanın Solunu Anlatıyor: CHP Nedir, ne değildir?* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967).

statism which he finds more provocative, and left of centre is proposed as the concept grounding the real determinant: statism: "As in the destroyed country of 1923 statism was the only, unique remedy of development, without in need of any support, it still is the basic element of our economic life."⁷² At this point Ayata makes an analysis of the concept, tacitly combining it with the very condition of socialism in Turkey, that, it is not an ideology:

"being on the left of centre, at this point did not mean to change the party ideology or program; the existing party views were being redefined with new fashionable concepts of the post 1960 era. There was already existing a program relying on republicanism, democracy, planned economy, statist development, social justice and reformism. İnönü was just defining the location of this program on the spectre of ideologies by 'left of centre.'⁷³

The early consideration for İnönü is to show that left of centre is not the surpassing of the CHP ideology or program nor the six arrows.⁷⁴ On the contrary the left of centre is deliberated as 'limited with RPP programme' and it is a 'progressive attack, a progressive thought movement.'⁷⁵ The development of the notion has an interesting history for, after the first utilisation of the concept, the country, in the year 1965, underwent the general elections. In this election RPP has faced a dramatic drop in the percentage of the votes, receiving only 28.7% with

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ayşe Güneş Ayata, *Örgüt*, 82.

⁷⁴CHP Genel Başkanı İnönü'nün IV. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış Konuşması (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967),7.

⁷⁵Ibid., 6.

respect to the 36.7% of the 1961 elections. This has forced İnönü to abandon the concept in the partial elections for the Senate in 1966.

The second critical issue in the history of the left of centre opening is the repercussions of the quitting of the concept. This condition has not only been abused by the other parties⁷⁶ but also brought a new break out in the party. Being impartial to İnönü's position and condition and especially his attitude, trying to bring an end to the debate on the concept, Bülent Ecevit, Ankara deputy, later the chairman of RPP and the prime minister, has not only continued using and developing the concept consistently among the party grassroots but also tried to provoke the argumentation.

A strong evidence to his position is the publication of his book, named *Ortannın Solu*⁷⁷ and focusing the whole discussions of the XVIII Congress on to the subject-matter.⁷⁸ In other words, the attack of Ecevit is a movement which might be taken as a deliberation even against İnönü⁷⁹, criticising him for his cynical position in the 1966 elections, which will end up, in the short run, defeating the

⁷⁶The reaction to these remarks and the explanation brought by the party group in the GNA is reflected in *XVII ve XVIII C.H.P. Kurultayları arası dönemde C.H.P. T.B.M.M. Gruplarında Yayınlanan Bildiriler* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1966), 26-30.

⁷⁷Bülent Ecevit, *Ortannın*.

⁷⁸18th Congress is the mile stone in the development of the left of centre policy in the RPP. The debates in the congress not only ended up by the Declaration proclaimed by the Congress confirmed that RPP is a party situated on the left of centre but also in a short time brought the most important break up in the party. For the declaration see, *CHP 18. Kurultay Bildirgesi* (Ankara: C.H.P. T.B.M.M. Grupları Yayını, 1966).

⁷⁹Suna Kili, *CHP'de* 227.

party sects against the concept and, in the long run, İnönü himself. The reminiscent of an early criticism and clash is found in his explanations by his insistence on the point that, RPP should perpetuate defending the concept without the fear that it will cause a loss of votes whereas an ambiguity and hesitancy is the basic source of the losses. In this sense the position taken in the 1966 partial elections should be criticised.⁸⁰

4.2.2. Ecevit and Left of Centre: 1965-1971

Ecevit, after the defeat of 1965 elections, has written a book called *Left of Centre* and presented it to the 18th congress, held October 18, 1966. The timing and the ground it was presented is interesting. Because, after the elections, when İnönü showed a tendency of shifting away from the utilisation of the concept, as has been noted before, Ecevit with a sheer passion continued to support it and insisted on the point that if a shift is realised than the party would get disintegrated.⁸¹ In his book Ecevit explains the left of centre by emphasising certain points and underlying various issues related with the social and political environment. In his early explanations, directly or tacitly, Ecevit, together with İnönü, refers to Kemalist tenets at least by reusing and reproducing the Kemalist principals or in general the Kemalist discourse.

In this context according to Ecevit's description, those who situate themselves on the left of centre are for humanism, populism (*halkçılık*), social

⁸⁰Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın*, 96; Kili, *CHP'de*, 228.

⁸¹Bülent Ecevit: *Ortanın*, 81-84, 104-105.

justice and security, progressivity, revolutionism, reformism⁸², statism, planning, their freedom and for social democracy.⁸³ This framework, according to Ecevit has created a tendency in Turkey toward a shift to radical left for various reasons and the only condition to stop this movement is democracy and better the social democracy. In this context, the limits for the left of centre is democracy⁸⁴ and this is not only the basic condition that differs it from the other left developments but also is the only possibility to create a social condition distanced from a state and wealth dictatorship.⁸⁵ In this regard the source of left of centre and more concretely of the social democracy is nothing but the Constitution of 1961 and, left of centre movement should be taken as a constitution movement which, in the final instance, would also be taken as a movement realising the constitution itself.⁸⁶

The tacit and indirect explanation of left of centre which should also be taken as the realisation of the constitutional principles are framed by Ecevit as such:

"Unless principles, condition and rules of our Constitution as accepting the right for property and inheritance but dictating that those rights could not be used against the public good; accepting the right of property on the land but also declaring that the quantity of the land owned by people could be limited for enabling the

⁸²Ecevit, the first time in the long history of Kemalism, brings a clarity to the ambiguity between the concepts of revolutionism and reformism by emphasising them separately whereas the 'classical' Kemalist concept of '*inkılapçılık*', as has been discussed in the previous chapter, has a blurred meaning swinging between reformism and revolutionism.

⁸³Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın* , 32-33.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 32.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 43-51.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 58-59.

everybody who are bound to earth to gain their living; supplying freedom and even security to private ownership but forcing that sector "to move together with the needs of national economy and in accordance with the social goals"; dictating to consider the public good with priority; expecting the wage justice and social welfare for the whole society; laying the opportunity and possibility equality as a condition; assigning the state with the duty of the development of cooperations; asking for the revaluation of the labour in farming; keeping the natural resources and wealth under the control of the state; are realised with an uncompromising and straightforward manner would be no more than a mere document on paper (...)"⁸⁷

If left of centre is the realisation of the Constitution than, the above stated issues are the *modus operandi* of this concept. In developing his argument and explanation as well as his insistence on the realisation of the constitutional principles, Ecevit, refers to two main points. The first one is his belief and observation about the 'left pressure' that Turkey faces. These pressures are of three partite: from the north, the SSCB, from the south, namely from the Arabic countries, Egypt and Syria and from the West, the social democratic movements.⁸⁸ As has been stressed before, if left of centre is accepted as the basic policy for the party and the country, through the reforms it foresees, the social justice and a well regulated society would be constructed which would defeat the danger of radical left and right.⁸⁹ This, by definition, is the social democracy. In using the concept of social democracy, which he will later reject and refrain from utilising and uttering, by making a clear distinction between the 'democratic socialism' and 'social democracy', as will be discussed in the following sections, Ecevit reflects

⁸⁷Ibid., 58-59.

⁸⁸Ibid., 35.

⁸⁹Ibid., 60-61.

on it not taking it with its political connotations but rather preferring to see it through the abstract concept of democracy by saying 'for those on the left of centre the social content of democracy is as important as the formal dimension of it.' Ayata, argues that "social democracy was being utilised in the meaning to encompass the social reforms that would be the premises of a well settled democracy."⁹⁰

For Ecevit, the left of centre is not moving away from the basic history and principles of RPP; on the contrary first, the Turkish revolutionary movement beginning by the Independence War and culminating by the Republic was a left movement⁹¹ and, second, left of centre, in this path, is the apparent characteristic of the RPP program i.e. the program of an already revolutionary and 'avant-garde' party, which has passed through various developmental phases and now, once more crystallised in the existing 'social reform' period. In other words, left of centre is the party's apprehending of its own programme and identity in the field of social reform.⁹² This opening should be in coherence with the reinterpretation, reconceptualisation and restructuring of state and people notions.

The heart of left of centre upsurge is the restitution of RPP's mono-party period. Ecevit, in this endeavour has been the first and the single voice pronouncing the party's condition in the mentioned era. In this context, without any hesitation he proclaims that RPP should develop a new image which would go

⁹⁰Ayşe Güneş Ayata, *Örgüt*, 83.

⁹¹Bülent Ecevit, 36.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 80, 105, 106.

better with its natural character among the people. This should be started by the eradication of an image which incorporates the bureaucratic, repugnant state and party identification as well as a the party image distanced from the people as a characteristic inherited from condition occurred in the late Ottoman Empire as the elite-people duality and dichotomy.⁹³ This process should be completed by RPP's approach to people. This is a critical point for Ecevit. He dwells on the idea that, the weakness of RPP emanated before the multi-party period and this was due to the condition that the RPP ideology, perpetually disseminated every revolutionary idea from centre to periphery, whereas in democracy the situation should be the reversed and be a movement flowing in the opposite direction, from periphery to centre. To achieve this goal reforms should be appropriated by the people.⁹⁴

Taking this framework as the constitutive of left of centre it is possible to say that the early consideration is directly related to a) the construction of a new state understanding more prone to periphery rather than centre, accepting the basic notion of national sovereignty and complete independence of the country; b) a more liberal notion of citizenship which is strictly sustained by the acceptance of private proprietorship and freedom of entrepreneurship controlled by social justice system; c) the vast and vague democracy preference which includes the peoples' will as well as the restructuring of economic and social life believing that the class differences would be dissolved if public dominance is attained.⁹⁵ The left of centre with these assumptions is a blend of various different concepts but the backbone of

⁹³Ibid., 99.

⁹⁴Ibid., 101.

⁹⁵Ibid., 109-117.

the notion is determined by the loose socialist movements manifested themselves in Turkey. In this sense, the left of centre is a double gestured action for on the one hand it was trying to capture the basic social programmatic issues of those movements but on the other hand acclaiming itself as the mere possibility to halt their upsurge. This point has been the issue of a large debate between TLP and RPP.⁹⁶ This asserts that left of centre is more a pragmatic movement of the RPP rather than is a vast ideological shift. Early RPP's definition of 'people' and 'populism', in this sense, might be found at the basis of the movement together with the statist character of the party.

According to an author, the left of centre in the last analysis, is structured on premises as a) it is against the uncontrolled development of capitalist mode of production but in this context as long as some restrictions are considered it is more inclined toward the Western models; b) it is against the social classes and searches for a social equilibrium on behalf of people; c) the will to use the state and the government apparatuses in a controlling and directing way; d) refraining from the centralist/statist tendencies and in this sense might go into a clash with the official ideology; e) together with the state ownership it supports a vast public entrepreneurship ('halk girişimciliği') and in the long run tries to reach a peoples' ownership ('halk mülkiyeti').⁹⁷

4.3. Left of Centre: Structure, Policies, Issues

4.3.1 Left of Centre and Socialism

⁹⁶Igor P. Lipovsky, *The Socialist*, 22-23.

⁹⁷Ali Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 2nd.ed. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), 353-354.

Left of centre is not a concept against Kemalism but what is interesting here is the contradictions between İnönü's and Ecevit's approaches to the concept. As İnönü insists on explaining the concept through Atatürkçülük⁹⁸, Ecevit, especially at the early period, seems not to dwell on the same basis. It is not a notion relying on the Marxist understanding. On the contrary the party administration on various occasions but mainly because of both the intra-party groups and other party enforcements, felt itself obliged to state that 'RPP is not a socialist party.'⁹⁹ This point many times was stressed by the party and Ecevit. Left of centre, let alone to be a socialist movement, has been proposed as the only possibility to block the socialist and communist movements.¹⁰⁰ All the RPP programme issues, leaning on left of centre ideals, are presented as the remedy for a better democracy in which there would be no (need for) socialist movements. The similarities between RPP and TLP have not only been rejected by RPP and Ecevit but also by Aybar and, in this context, Aybar has situated RPP together with centre right Justice Party. Aybar's rejection of togetherness with RPP is because of RPP's rejection of socialism.¹⁰¹ Mehmet Ali Aybar, in this context makes a very important distinction between the two parties.¹⁰² According to him, even after the left of centre opening, RPP is a 'bureaucratic' party. For Aybar the vital point is the togetherness with the

⁹⁸*CHP Genel Başkanı İnönü'nün IV. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış Konuşması* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967), 6-8.

⁹⁹The long and detailed history of this debate is found in Kili, *CHP'de*, p.232-242.

¹⁰⁰Bülent Ecevit, *Ortamn*, 32-33.

¹⁰¹Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Cumhuriyet*, (November 21, 1966). The intra-TLP debate on this issue might be followed from Igor P. Lipovsky, *The Socialist*, 22-23.

¹⁰²"Mehmet Ali Aybar" in Abdi İpekçi, *Liderler Diyor ki* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1969), 140-141.

people and the belief that socialism by way of elections is possible. Otherwise even though such reforms as land reform is realised still this would contribute to nobody but the privileged position of the elites.¹⁰³ And, in this sense, RPP is detached from the people, still perpetuating the traditional from the above reformation notion.¹⁰⁴

4.3.2. Left of Centre, State, People and Economy

4.3.2.1. State and People

This context in Ecevit's explanations has performed an important function. In one of his relatively later efforts to explain the concept of people, he stresses that, merely referring to the concept of proprietorship is less than a sufficient criterium to conceive the term.¹⁰⁵ The concept of people should include all the cleavages and social groups. In Ecevit's understanding this is where mainly the state-people interaction is realised through the changing condition of bureaucracy. According to him, the left of centre, if taken as the denial of the early RPP ideology as a mono-party ideology has exerted an important function on the transformation of bureaucracy. RPP as a mono party has, he believes, relied on the state, ignoring and externalising the people.¹⁰⁶ But as RPP has changed his ideology and moved

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴For a very sharp criticism of left of centre notion see, İdris Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, 2nd.ed. (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1989), 92-134.

¹⁰⁵Bülent Ecevit, *Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar: Bülent Ecevit'in İsmail Cem İpekçi ile 1975 güzünde 'Politika' gazetesi için yaptığı görüşme-Bazı düzeltme ve eklemelerle- ve konuyla ilgili başka metinler* (Ankara, Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, n.d.), 8.

¹⁰⁶The early attack on the mono-party ideology of RPP has not only been the concern of Bülent Ecevit but also of his friends who have played an important role in the construction of the notion of left of centre. See Haluk Ülman, "Başyazı", *Ulus*, (November 10 , 1969).

from centre, namely from the state toward periphery, i.e. the people, bureaucracy has also changed: "what is changing in our country is not our way of interpreting the bureaucracy but the behaviour of bureaucrats and intellectuals. In this transformation our understanding of democratic left has imposed a great effect."¹⁰⁷

This is a double gesture approach for, on the one hand, Ecevit strictly believes in the virtue of statism¹⁰⁸ but in his somewhat a more vast conceiving of state-people relationship, continuously underlying the priority of the latter, tries to place bureaucracy after the people. The way of achieving this task for Ecevit is more an economic condition. If a popular sector is created and if the mechanisms producing the economic power is left to the people then the state would shrink together with the bureaucracy and it would be transformed into a 'child state' serving the people but not more a 'father state' controlling it.¹⁰⁹ This is a framework which Ecevit constructs to show that a) RPP has changed its basic attitude towards state and bureaucracy; b) 'people' is the basic concern of the party. Nevertheless Ecevit by clearly stressing that "this (Turkish) people can not do without the state"¹¹⁰ once more delineates the importance he gives to state.

According to Ecevit, the togetherness of the state and the people could only be achieved through a new economic order. This new understanding of economy

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 18.

¹⁰⁸Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 5. baskı, 1978), 205.

¹⁰⁹Bülent Ecevit, *Demokratik Solda*, 31, 29.

¹¹⁰Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın*, 49.

can not be detached from the populism understanding of Ecevit. Especially at the beginning, the concept of 'people' has such a vast content that Ecevit explains the situation of the party by rejecting the concept of 'mass party,' saying that in Turkey it is not possible any more to be a mass party, for it does not allow the RPP to criticise various cleavages.¹¹¹ In Ecevit's approach this explanation shows the early premises of a differentiation between the party and the social groups. He tacitly implies that the 'old' RPP was a mass party rejecting the class notion and encompassing a corporatist social view. The left of centre RPP, on the other hand, is a party relying only on certain groups. Though RPP and Ecevit continuously refused the class struggles in the process of democratisation still there was a tension between the party and the old interest groups previously giving support to the RPP as the provincial notables usually referred as 'ağa'lar, the feudal landlords.¹¹²

This approach has been the subject matter of a further debate. Bektaş, in his book, in opposition to Ecevit's formulation, situates RPP as a party showing a trend of becoming a mass party after the 1970s¹¹³ and still defines RPP as a 'cadre party'¹¹⁴. This is a contradictory point in the sense that when Ecevit refers to RPP as a 'cadre party' he much relates it to certain social groups, in other words, puts it

¹¹¹ *Milliyet*, (July 6, 1970), Kili, *CHP'de*, 262, Bila, *CHP*, 327.

¹¹² A long polemical approach to this issue is found in Bülent Ecevit, *Düzen*. Also in his book *Ortanın Solu*, Ecevit accepts that RPP has been supported by this cleavage before the implementation of left of center notion and even though a group of them has left the party afterwards, still found some perpetuating their support of the party. Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu*, 86-87.

¹¹³ Arsev Bektaş, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP (1960-1980)* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1993), 49.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 41, 50.

as class party. But Bektaş's analysis shows that though it has a tendency of becoming a mass party in the Duvergerian sense of the concept¹¹⁵, RPP is a small cadre party relying on bureaucratic centre. This centre is encircling the state and bureaucracy elites more than the grassroots politicians.¹¹⁶ This point needs a further analysis and will be done in the following section but before the notion of populism and its relationship to economy should be revisited.

4.3.2.2. The economic model for populism

Ecevit's populism is strictly related with his economic model. This model has a binary structure: the popular sector (*halk sektörü*) and *köykent*. Although it is explained at large in the later years after he had developed the notion of 'democratic left' and he had RPP's first trial in power through its coalition with National Salvation Party (NSP- *Milli Selamet Partisi*) in 1973, still in the early explanations found is the accentuation he put on the popular sector as an economic agent.¹¹⁷ Ecevit, starts his analysis by saying that there would be no power above the people.¹¹⁸ The constitutive condition of this approach is the popular sector. It is defined as the control of the economy by the people.¹¹⁹ The agents of this development are the investments that the peasants realised in cooperation with the capital accumulated by the Turkish workers abroad.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in Modern State* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963).

¹¹⁶Arsev Bektaş, *Liderler*, 106; Ayşe Güneş Ayata, *Örgüt*, 91-96.

¹¹⁷Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen*, 178-183.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, 182-183.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 182.

¹²⁰Bülent Ecevit, *Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar*, 73-77.

These investments, according to Ecevit, should not be controlled by small number of stakeholders but should be supported by cooperative assemblies, unions and social security institutions.¹²¹ They might, preferably in the beginning, be backed by the State Economic Enterprises.¹²² The management of these enterprises should also be democratised.¹²³ What is interesting here is that, Ecevit, as a component of the eclectic structure of this concept, proposes this model to hinder the partition of the working class and to perpetuate the unity of it.¹²⁴ When analysed carefully it is clear that even in a late period the notion and the practicality of the popular sector is not well structured as Ecevit confronts the questions by saying it is not proper to go deep in the details of the model.¹²⁵

Köykent, on the other hand appears as a better defined model. Here, he insists that the crux of the model is not the villages but the villager or the peasants.¹²⁶ Köykent, in a sense, is the unification of various different but closely located villages around a centre which bears the basic substructural investments.¹²⁷ This model would have impacts on the economic, social and political life of the peasants. Economically it can not be detached from the popular sector, i.e. the

¹²¹Ibid., 74.

¹²²Ibid., 75.

¹²³Ibid., 74-75.

¹²⁴Ibid., 75.

¹²⁵Ibid., 76.

¹²⁶Ibid., 62.

¹²⁷Ibid., 62-63.

investments cooperated by peasants and workers abroad. The development of köykent, he believes, would accelerate these investments.¹²⁸

Socially, köyvents would help the peasants to stay in their villages and keep them away from the 'psycho-sociological' problems of a necessary but unwanted immigration. Peasants would reach the comfort of the metropolitans in the rural area. Lastly, the work power in the rural area would be transferred to industrial work power.¹²⁹ Politically, as peasants would shift to a better life condition through unification and a new organisation, this would help them to enhance their democratic consciousness. In the same line with this, as they would also be the owners of these investments as stakeholders they would be liberated not only from the economic and political control of the feudal landlords but also from the repressive approach of the political power.¹³⁰

This model is the unification of peasantry and workmanship through urbanisation. This would eradicate the traditional conservatism of the peasantry and the rural areas as well as the contradictory and reversal existence of the agricultural and industrial development.¹³¹ In the final analysis it could be said that, above given framework is inclusive of some concepts developed in time, especially after 1972 Ecevit's triumph in the RPP replacing İnönü in the chairmanship and the transformation of left of centre notion to democratic left. Nevertheless referring to

¹²⁸Ibid., 66.

¹²⁹Ibid., 66-67.

¹³⁰Ibid., 69.

¹³¹Ibid., 69.

these constitutive elements, left of centre might further be analysed trying to dissect its ideological structure.

4.3.2.3 Left of Centre as a Socio-political Ideology

Left of centre is more a pragmatic opening rather than an ideological deliberation. This development is the result of various exogenous factors, the leading one being the results obtained in the 1965 elections just after the proclamation of the concept. But realising the social transformation in the country, marked by urbanisation and industrialisation giving birth to new classes but, more correctly 'strata', would be the fulcrum of further developments, the party intelligentsia and youthful cadres stayed indifferent to the ever worst results held and continued developing the idea. This was due to the belief that renewing its ideology and getting into concert with the new emerging structure through the notion of left of centre the party would do better, otherwise would loose even its already existing minority condition.

The consequence of this reasoning was that the party could not continue by staying loyal to the bureaucracy which has also and already changed. This assumption has brought the denial of the bureaucratic heritage and past and a move toward workers, more concretely, peasants. Beyond all, this was, as Sunar observes, a kind of 'mathematically based' move, presuming that the majority of peasants could easily replace the betrayed bureaucracy.¹³² Ecevit, did not hesitate on this issue when he insisted that RPP should direct its policies and ideology towards the new and old social groups, namely to the people already voting for the

¹³²Ilkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1974) , 180-181.

conservative Justice Party.¹³³ This basic supposition has created a set of concepts on which left of centre has been constructed. This framework has a two dimensional structure. The first dimension is the continuing togetherness with the RPP and the second is the new ideology in the process of construction. When these two different dimensions are juxtaposed, it is seen that the early left of centre policy has a more eclectic character. This eclecticism is a result of somehow contradicting concept couples. But before passing to the analysis of them it should be noted here that the eclectic character of left of centre is evident to the extent that it, at the same time, develops a concept as the idiosyncrasy of the movement but also being critical of it. For example, left of centre, on the one hand definitely relied on Kemalism but on the other hand did not hesitate to criticise it saying that it realised the superstructural reforms but did not grasp the infrastructural ones as land reform.¹³⁴

This is also obvious in its association with RPP. Staying loyal to it did not obstruct the left of centre group to criticise and even condemn it. Ecevit, rather, reformulated the past practice of the RPP saying, "RPP is a revolutionary party and in this sense it will renew itself"¹³⁵ and it was also Ecevit saying that "we do not conceive the events in Turkey from a bureaucratic intellectual view point; we conceive them from the view point of the people. In RPP the view angle has changed. In RPP the idea of revolutionism has changed. Revolution now means the

¹³³Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu*, 85-91.

¹³⁴This very contradictory position is clear in Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1969).

¹³⁵Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir*, 256.

infrastructural revolution."¹³⁶ Left of centre develops its concepts on this basis of antagonisms.

Left of centre can easily be analysed on three dominating concepts. These are populism, statism and nationalism. This basis of the ideology makes it more prone to traditional RPP ideology. On the other hand, Cem states that the motivating factor behind the ideology is the search for an expanded democracy.¹³⁷ This setting is closely connected with the socio-political essence of the masses which RPP wants to get into an interaction. Though the empiric data is rare on this ground, when Tachau's¹³⁸ and Özbudun's¹³⁹ analyses are taken in conjuncture with the natural shifts, transformations and the changes in the body of voters, Cem's basic assumption is validated; that is "the reconciliation attempt and trial of a party relying on petit-bourgeoisie basis with masses."¹⁴⁰ Left of centre in this process clearly states that it would support the rights of the workers, peasants and even civil servants.¹⁴¹ The nationalism-populism and statism is the framework of grasping this task. This loose-knitted structure of left of centre gives populism a primordial and ambiguous character as Emrealp has observed, because it did not

¹³⁶Bülent İcevit Açıklıyor, *Milliyet*, (July 6, 1970), also in Suna Kili, *CHP'de*, 261.

¹³⁷İsmail Cem, *Soldaki Arayış* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1994), 27.

¹³⁸Frank Tachau with Mary-Jo D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments and Elections" in *Comparative Politics*, (July 1973), 551-573.

¹³⁹Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).

¹⁴⁰İsmail Cem, *Soldaki Arayış*, 27.

¹⁴¹İlkay Sunar, *State*, 176-181.

hold a theoretically determined nature.¹⁴² This point is also stressed by Sunar, saying that "for example populism means socialism to some and a mixed planned economy to others."¹⁴³ The same condition, again as noted by Sunar, is also true for the concept of state.¹⁴⁴

Populism, then, might be put as the crux of the left of centre concept and the other two, nationalism and statism are the tools used to hold the former. This is obvious and crucial when Ecevit says, "what drives me to get involved in the labour issues are primarily the populism and statism."¹⁴⁵ This is, in the process of establishing a coalition with the peasants, as Yücekök states,¹⁴⁶ is also another instrument used for fulfilling the nationalist expectations. Statism is not the nationalisation of all tools of production. Ecevit, stresses this point. In his reasoning when all tools of production is nationalised then the economic power would be monopolised in the state which does not mean that it is the people's power (halk iktidarı). It is more the alienation reached between the state and the people for the state would turn to be a dominating power over the people.¹⁴⁷ Then, statism should have a more populist and nationalistic character. It must be, for

¹⁴²Sadun Emrealp, *Sosyal Demokrasiden 'Sosyal Demokrasi'ye...* (İstanbul: Afa yayınları, 1991), 140.

¹⁴³İlkay Sunar, *State*, 175.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵1962'de CHP'nin Görüşü:İnönü ve C.H.P?'li Bakanların 20-23 Temmuz İl Başkanları Toplantısındaki Konuşmaları (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1962), 86-87.

¹⁴⁶Ahmet Yücekök, *100 Soruda Türk Devrim Tarihi* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1984), 112-115; Sadun Emrealp, *Sosyal*, 184.

¹⁴⁷İrgun Özbakır, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Demokratik Sol Belgeler* (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1977), 239.

example, the nationalisation of petroleum resources, which is a step taken against imperialism and it should include the land reform which is the only cure against the communism danger. This combination of nationalism with populism is epitomised when Ecevit underlines the unsegregated merging of populism and nationalism as "populism in the country is nationalism for the outer world."¹⁴⁸ This is what briefly put by Keyder as, "the developmentalist, nationalist stream within Kemalism has found an echo in the anti-imperialism of the left."¹⁴⁹

The togetherness of these concepts does not inhibit the new epistemology brought by left of centre politics in the Turkish political life in the post 1965 period. The basis of this evolution is the admittance of the class notion.¹⁵⁰ Unlike the traditional RPP and Kemalist approach towards the denial of the existence of the different classes in the society and, the ambition of developing a corporatist state, the left of centre starts by assuming this reality at least through the accentuation of peasantry and labour. This is interpreted as a new coalition not only between peasants and the RPP but also between the organised labour and the RPP. This is understandable as long as the structure of early Republican era is considered. In that period what is dominant in the country is the agricultural, sometimes referred as provincial notables in this thesis, and small business or trade bourgeoisie. This was more or less in accordance with the RPP. But, beginning by the 1950s when the gravity of the social structure is shifted towards industrial bourgeoisie, uniting with the centre right politics in Turkey, the repercussion is the RPP's search for a

¹⁴⁸Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen*, 201.

¹⁴⁹Çağlar Keyder, *The State and Class in Turkey* (London, Verso, 1986), 168.

¹⁵⁰Sadun İmrealp, *Sosyal*, 180; İlkey Sunar, *State*, 176-177.

coalition with the organised labour.¹⁵¹ This is, more than anything else is the introduction of antagonistic politics into the Turkish political agenda.¹⁵² This is also to admit that politics is a hegemonic practice.¹⁵³ Related with this it could also be said that, together with the TLP practice, left of centre has urged the development of class identity and consciousness in Turkey and in this sense it might be suggested that it is a step in the modernisation of the political structure.

4.3.2.4. The Phases and the centralisation of Left of Centre in RPP

The receiving of left of centre as the basis of the party politics in RPP has been a troublesome procedure. The transition to left of centre as a new ideology in RPP is important as it shows the new coalitions and the new cleavages backing RPP. It is also a benchmark exhibiting the breakage of traditional symbiotic relations established in the mono-party period. This procedure also embodies even the elimination of İsmet İnönü from the party chairmanship.¹⁵⁴

The development of the left of centre politics in RPP could be divided into three periods. The first phase is the incorporation of the intra-party power by left of centre politicians. In this process Bülent Ecevit is elected as the secretary general of

¹⁵¹Sadun İmreçalp, *Sosyal*, 190.

¹⁵²Necmi Erdoğan, "Demokratik Sol ve Sosyal Demokratik Portreler", in *Birikim*, n. 44, (December 1992), 27-32.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁵⁴For a discussion of this development see Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü*; Metin Toker, *İsmet Paşa'nın Son Yılları 1965-1973* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993).

RPP in the XVIII. Congress of October 18, 1966.¹⁵⁵ This congress has been the first ground for the clash of the left and right wing, lead by Turhan Feyzioğlu, in RPP.¹⁵⁶ Feyzioğlu, with a group around him, characterised as "liberal and middle-of-the-road group" by Karpas¹⁵⁷, since the beginning, has insisted on the point that left of centre politics is an ideology prone to socialism, a shift from Kemalist tenets and moving away from the six arrows principles of RPP.¹⁵⁸ In the same line with his views Feyzioğlu, has succeeded to convince İnönü to have in the Statement proclaimed by the congress that "RPP is not and will not be a socialist party"¹⁵⁹. Nevertheless in the same statement what once more announced is that RPP is a party on the left of centre.¹⁶⁰ The continuing unrest between the two groups has ended in the Extraordinary Congress of April 28, 1967.¹⁶¹ The congress has decided to dismiss Feyzioğlu and his other close seven friends from the party. But

¹⁵⁵The background of Ecevit's election, in a sense, nomination, by prestigious chairman İnönü, in the party council, which was already controlled by Ecevit, as a success reached in the congress, is found "Ecevit Siyasal Hayatını Anlatıyor", *Cumhuriyet*, (January 25, 1975).

¹⁵⁶Suna Kili, *CHP'de*, 229-237.

¹⁵⁷Kemal Karpas, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980" in *State*, eds., M. Heper and A. Evin, 145.

¹⁵⁸Turhan Feyzioğlu et. al., *CHP Parti Meclisine Sunulan Önerge: Huzursuzluğun Sebepleri ve Giderilme Yolları* (Ankara: Doğu Matbaacılık ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti. Matbaası, 1967).

¹⁵⁹*CHP XVIII. Kurultayı Bildirisi* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1966).

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁶¹For the details of this congress see *CHP Genel Başkanı İnönü'nün IV. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış Konuşması* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967); *CHP Genel Başkanı İsmet İnönü'nün Partiiçi Sorunları İnceleme Komisyonuna Sunduğu Rapor* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967); *IV. Olağanüstü CHP Kurultayı Bildirisi* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967).

Feyzioğlu with his 48 friends resigned from the party.¹⁶² The impact of Feyzioğlu and his friends movement on the left of centre politics has been interesting. As an answer to their unending reaction against this concept, especially İnönü has felt himself obliged to situate the notion between a real left and Atatürkism.¹⁶³ It is possible to say that criticisms concerning the content of left of centre¹⁶⁴ has emanated basically from this condition.¹⁶⁵ But with the purge of Feyzioğlu group, the left of centre movement has started its second period which lasted up until 1972. Before an analysis, it should be noted that this eradication shows that RPP has moved away from its traditional coalition with the bureaucratic elite as well as from the provincial notables in the process of "encouraging the mass participation in politics"¹⁶⁶

The second period is a product of an eminent issue. It is the 12 March military intervention via an ultimatum addressed to the parliament and Ecevit's resignation from the post he was holding in the party as reaction to the following events. According to Karpas, "the take-over of March, 1971 drew its impetus from the old tradition of the army's association with the statist-elitists and the RPP."¹⁶⁷

¹⁶²Feroz Bedia Turgay Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi 1945-1971* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), 326-327.

¹⁶³İnönü *Ortanın Solu'nu Anlatıyor. CHP Nedir, Ne Değildir?* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967).

¹⁶⁴Celal Bozkurt, *Siyaset Tarihimizde C.H.P.: Dünü, Bugünü, İdeolojisi, Siyaset İlmi Açısından Bir İnceleme* (n.p:n.p, n.d), 184-187.

¹⁶⁵Suna Kili, *CHP'de*, 241.

¹⁶⁶İlkay Sunar, *State*, 177-178.

¹⁶⁷Kemal Karpas, "Military Interventions", 147.

Karpat finds the reason for military's parting away from the RPP is the party's reliance on left of centre politics. According to the author, "RPP gradually discarded Kemalism as an ideology and took a position opposed totally to the basic tenets of the republican regime."¹⁶⁸ The first part of this proposition might be accepted that beginning by mid 1960s there occurred a tension between the army and the RPP especially with the radical statist part of the military. This has reached its crux with İnönü's non compromising intervention against the Talat Aydemir attempt. Besides, among RPP the party members who had a kind of affiliation with Aydemir junta, like Avni Doğan, has been expelled from the party.¹⁶⁹

Karpat's second argument is open to debate. It is clear that RPP has tried to enlarge the limits of Atatürkist tenets and Ecevit, at the beginning, was holding a more critical situation about those principles also criticising the mono-party ideology and structure of RPP as explained before. But, RPP, cannot be said that has given away or moved away from those tenets. Yet, Karpat defines Ecevit and his followers using the most overwhelming and determining ideas among the military as 'secularist-statist-elitist.'¹⁷⁰ The 1971 ultimatum in fact reflects a more confused character. The ultimatum not only condemns tacitly the existing

¹⁶⁸Ibid., 147.

¹⁶⁹Avni Doğan has been dismissed from the party, December 11, 1962 together with other two very prominent members, Kasım Gülek, Nihat İrim, for one year. The reason for this dismissal was the relation of these members with the army. Nevertheless this allegation has never been pronounced officially and only Avni Doğan has been criticised on this ground. For these details CHP Yayın Bürosu, *CHP Bünyesindeki Gelişmeler* (Ankara: Rüzgarlı Matbaa, 1962). Later Talat Aydemir, in his memories mentions that not only Doğan but also other members have been involved in the preparation of 21 May attempt. Talat Aydemir, *Talat Aydemir Konuşuyor* (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1966), 193-194.

¹⁷⁰Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions", 148.

government and asks the formation of a new one which would, with an Atatürkist view, implement the reforms envisaged by the Constitution.¹⁷¹ This demand brings the contradiction of reception concerning the concept of 'constitutional reforms'.¹⁷² According to Ecevit, the 12 March ultimatum was against him and the left of centre politics.¹⁷³ He thinks that all efforts they have exerted for democracy have been ruined and the gist of the ultimatum is to stop the democratic mechanism.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand in spite of the ultimatum pronounces the constitutional reform, in time, proving Ecevit's approach, the new Nihat Erim government has amended the constitution in the opposite direction, in accordance and in coalition with Demirel's Justice Party, saying that the existing one was close to socialism and was a luxury for a country which is in need of rapid development.¹⁷⁵ In fact the amendment was Demirel's demand since the beginning in search of a more strong executive.

The crisis that 12 March Ultimatum gave birth in RPP came into view when İnönü decided to support the Erim government.¹⁷⁶ This abstract will for the backing

¹⁷¹For the original text of the ultimatum see Kurtul Altuğ, *12 Mart ve Nihat Erim Olayı*; in the translation I benefited from Feroz Ahmad, *The Making*, 148.

¹⁷²Nevertheless it is interesting that the 1961 Constitution has been amended by the military junta in the direction that has been fervently supported by the conservative Justice Party. See, Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), 364-381.

¹⁷³"Ecevit 12 Mart ve Sonrasını Anlatıyor", *Cumhuriyet*, (February 11, 1975).

¹⁷⁴*Ulus*, (March 22, 1971).

¹⁷⁵İsmail Cem, *Tarih Açısından 12 Mart: Nedenleri, Yapısı, Sonuçları* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1980).

¹⁷⁶"İnönü'nün Parti Grubu Konuşması", *Milliyet*, (March 16, 1971).

of a military controlled government has been concretised when Nihat Erim, a member of RPP parliamentary group nominated as the prime minister.¹⁷⁷ The same day, 21 March 1971, Ecevit not participating the party council meeting which would decide to give confidence vote for Erim government, resigned from the position of secretary general.¹⁷⁸ In the following years Ecevit insisted that 12 March is a plot against not only to him but also to RPP because the left of centre politics of the party would be dissolved in a above-party bureaucratic-technocratic government¹⁷⁹ and İnönü's support was enabling this procedure.¹⁸⁰

Ecevit, after his resignation, has continued his activities in the provincial congresses.¹⁸¹ Besides, İnönü frequently declared his discomfort with the party council backing Ecevit.¹⁸² Kemal Satır, a prominent party member, and his group in the party against Ecevit, backing and backed by İnönü according to Party Regulation called for an extraordinary congress to defeat Ecevit and his friends.¹⁸³ The congress is held May 6, 1972.¹⁸⁴ After the speeches delivered by Satır and

¹⁷⁷*Milliyet*, (March 22, 1971).

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹*Ulus*, (March 22, 1971).

¹⁸⁰Bülent Ecevit, *Perdeyi Kaldırıyorum* (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1972), 14.

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁸²*Milliyet*, (February 6, 1972).

¹⁸³Hikmet Bila, *CHP*, 351-352.

¹⁸⁴The official date for the congress is May 5, 1972. But that very day due to İnönü's sickness the congress is postponed to the May 6, 1972.

Ecevit¹⁸⁵, the leaders of two clashing groups, the next day in the voting procedure the party council reached the confidence and by the May 8, 1972, İnönü resigned from the chairmanship of RPP¹⁸⁶. Also Kemal Satır and his friends resigned from the party.¹⁸⁷ The congress to elect the chairman of the party was held May 14, 1972 and Ecevit became the leader. This is left of centre's taking power in the RPP and closing of the second phase of it, started by 1965. That politics shortly after this development is changed into democratic left politics.

The 12 March ultimatum among the Turkish intellectuals has been based on four issues. First of all, it was regarded as the last attempt of the 'petit bourgeois (in the) 'from the above' radicalism.'¹⁸⁸ Here, the concept 'radicalism' signs the traditional Kemalist attitudes. In fact, the first Erim government is called 'brain trust' and embodies former army officers and technocrats. The government, as explained before, was established to carry out the reforms. Here, reforms, should be conceived as some measures taken to stop the unrest developed in the country through some socio-economic transformations, mainly the land reform.¹⁸⁹ Second, it is a futile attempt for a coalition between the commercial provincial bourgeoisie and industrial bourgeoisie as the former felt itself in danger thinking that Justice Party governments had shifted towards the latter.¹⁹⁰ Third characteristic that paved

¹⁸⁵Bülent Ecevit, *Kurultaylar ve Sonrası* (Ankara: Şark Matbaası, 1972).

¹⁸⁶Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü*, 129.

¹⁸⁷Hikmet Bila, *CHP*, 370-372.

¹⁸⁸Ali Gevgilli, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 2nd.ed. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), 521-581.

¹⁸⁹For the Erim Government Program see Kurtul Altuğ, *12 Mart*, 36-37.

¹⁹⁰İsmail Cem, *Tarih Açısından*, 364.

the way to the Ultimatum is the resistance of state elites-civil bureaucracy-military coalition to democracy¹⁹¹. The last point is the last attempt to complete the Westernisation project through the above mentioned coalition.¹⁹²

RPP, seen as a peer resisting to these developments, with Ecevit's movement, in the same period has tried to constitute a new structure. This procedure includes various issues as such. i) RPP tried to stay out of the state elites-military coalition and break its links with it¹⁹³ but it does not ignore the importance of the civil bureaucracy as might be deduced from the composition of the parliamentary group after the 1973 elections. ii) RPP supported the existing Constitution and resisted against its amendments as it believed that only the complete framework of the constitution enables the state to develop the reforms, like land reform. iii) Left of centre politics in the split between the industrial bourgeoisie and the new emerging working class did not ignore the private sector but run for the latter. This is not a divisive and high tensioned approach; instead, the party tried to convince the bourgeoisie that only the social rights supplied to labour class would keep it away from radical movements.¹⁹⁴ iv) Left of centre,

¹⁹¹Ibid., 365-376.

¹⁹²Ibid., 396-405.

¹⁹³On the other hand Sunar and Sayarı thinks that it is not the party driving away from the military but the military, who is staying indiffrenet to the political developments, due to the growing radicalization of the RPP. İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects", in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whithead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 118.

¹⁹⁴This point has been critized sharply by Marxist left; as an example see: Sungur Savran, "CHP ve Sosyal Demokrasi: Bir İlişkinin Anatomisi ", in *11. Tez*, 4, 1986, 78-106.

without denying the Kemalist tenets, followed a more populist policy including the search for a new economic structure. It is interesting that, in this context, left of centre did not follow a remarkable new distribution policy as expected. It, instead, as seen, tried to provoke the investment gathered in foreign countries. v) Last, left of centre RPP was not against centralism and statism but slightly tried to reverse the Westernisation side of the modernisation. The second period of modernisation in Turkey will be discussed in the following section but before it needs to discuss the transition from left of centre to democratic left concept which is the third phase of RPP history before its closure by the 1980 intervention.

4.4. From Left of Centre to Democratic Left

4.4.1. The Development and the Meaning of the Concept

The 'official' transition to democratic left and quitting the utilisation of left of centre concept as the party ideology is realised with the change of Statutes in the congress held for this purpose by June 28, 1974.¹⁹⁵ But, as Bila observes rightly, the concept first time has been introduced in the 'First Forum of Democratic Left Thought' in November 20-22, 1970.¹⁹⁶ The change, reached in the mentioned congress, carries the concept to the second article of the RPP Statutes.¹⁹⁷ This change reflects a sheer transition in the basic ideological understanding of the party. The first article, grounds the basic principles of the party and brings a relatively new interpretation to the traditional principles of the party by saying: "Republican

¹⁹⁵İlhamet Bila, *CHP*, 395; Suna Kili, *CHP'de*, 425-428.

¹⁹⁶İlhamet Bila, *CHP*, 405.

¹⁹⁷*CHP Tüzük* (İstanbul: Şevket Ünal Matbaası, 1974), 7.

People's Party is, *with its nature explained in the Program*, a republican, nationalist, populist, laic and revolutionary political establishment."¹⁹⁸ This is the formalising and concrete end of a process started by the left of centre.

In the beginning, Ecevit seems to be more moderate in using the term as democratic left in lieu with social democracy. He is aware of the coincidence as well as resemblance between the two terms. For Ecevit they are essentially one and the same concept. The reason why democratic left for is preferred is the belief that it reflects their task and aims better. Second, democratic left is a self-explanatory term.¹⁹⁹ Ecevit, in his analysis carefully situates democratic left diametrically opposite to Marxism. He characterises the crucial difference by saying that while democratic left encompasses the peasants scientific materialism excludes them.²⁰⁰ But when he talks about the democratic left-labour relations, on another platform, he uses once more the social democracy as identical with the former.²⁰¹

The shift to democratic left idea in various resources has been explained by Ecevit as an attempt of opening the party to the people.²⁰² Although in his later explanations he declares that 'democratic left' concept has been chosen to show its difference from the Marxist originated 'social democracy'²⁰³, in an earlier speech

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 6, emphasis added.

¹⁹⁹*Demokratik Sol Düşünce Forumu* (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1974), 6.

²⁰⁰Ibid., 3.

²⁰¹*Demokratik Sol Düşünce Forumu*, 4 Cilt (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1976), 24.

²⁰²Bülent Ecevit, "CHP Tüzük Kurultayını Açış Konuşması", *Milliyet*, (June 29, 1974).

²⁰³Bülent Ecevit, *Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar*, 52.

he delivered, Ecevit, concludes that democratic left is a left attitude relying on liberal democracy, an idea merging national sovereignty concept with public power (halk iktidarı) putting people above all classes. This needs the reinforcing the economic capability of the people. Nevertheless public power does not mean the total nationalisation of the production tools, even though up to a certain extent it is necessary. The boundaries of the process will be determined by the limits of liberal democracy. Democratic left is also to unite the economic and political power. Democratic left is not a from the above but a from the below leftism.²⁰⁴ The democratic left concept of RPP has been officialised second time with the 'Democratic Left Statement' proclaimed by the XXII Congress, held December 14, 1974.²⁰⁵

4.4.2. Left of Centre and Democratic Left Politics: A Modernising Project

As has been noted before, Tachau views the transformation of the RPP from a cultural cleavage to functional cleavage. This point is also discussed by Heper.²⁰⁶ Heper, in discussing the political structure of 1980s refers once more to the concept of functional and cultural cleavage and makes a distinction between the notions. According to him, "democratic elites and the military (or the state) elites may be said to primarily represent a 'cultural cleavage'" whereas "the functional

²⁰⁴ *CHP Genel Başkanı Bülent Ecevit'in CHP XXII. Kurultayı Açış Konuşması* (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık T.A.Ş., 1975), 32,34.

²⁰⁵ *CHP Genel Başkanı Bülent Ecevit'in CHP XXII. Kurultayını Açış Konuşması*, 38-40. This Statement should be taken together with the Statement for the 1973 General Elections: *Akgünlere: CHP 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi* (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1973).

²⁰⁶ Metin Heper, "Conclusion", in *State*, 256.

cleavage may move the regime towards moderate instrumentalism."²⁰⁷ This comment also encompasses the possibilities of creating a civil society in Turkey. On the other hand, Gevgilili, tackling with the repercussions of left of centre, makes another suggestion. According to him,

"left of centre, in practice, is an effort to combine the statist/populist/centralist ideology of Ziya Gökalp with the yearnings of Kara Kemal or in general of the Ahi/Lonca tradition, creating a wide private/social ownership against the modern socialist and Marxist openings."²⁰⁸

Gevgilli, attuned to Küçükömer's view point, makes another remark which situates the left of centre into its socio-political context with a comment as such: "the left of centre might be the last metaclass model produced by westernist petit bourgeoisie, which might also be relatively acentralist (*merkez dışı'cı*) with its tendencies."²⁰⁹ Whether this remark is true or not is a matter of further analysis and, a research made by Heper²¹⁰ might be helpful to understand the connection between the bureaucratic elites and Atatürk reforms backed by the bureaucratic elite since the beginning. When a group of bureaucratic elites were questioned to reflect on the idea that

Table 1. "One of Turkey's most distinguished needs is well educated, experienced people to be active in the policy making process of government"

²⁰⁷Ibid.

²⁰⁸Ali Gevgilli, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 354.

²⁰⁹Ibid., 354.

²¹⁰Metin Heper, *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyet Gelişmesi ve Niteliği* (Ankara: Ogun Kardeşler Matbaası, 1974).

I strongly support this view	20
I agree with this view	12
I don't agree	1
I totally reject this view	1
no certain view	1

Source, Metin Hepar, *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği*, 154.

Another question with the answers obtained was

Table 2. "Point out the two issues as 'the first' and 'the second' among the others as you have considered the most important issue all through your office-life

	First	Second
Settlement of democracy in Turkey	6	8
Protection of Atatürk reforms	18	5
Economic development of Turkey	8	12
To find solutions to the problems of economic development and social transformation	2	9

Source, Metin Heper, *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği*, 153; Ahmet Yücekök, *100 Soruda*, 114-115.

This analysis shows that there is a strong coalition between the bureaucratic elites and the Kemalist tenets and ideals. But this relation is more obvious in the answers given to another question.

Table 3. "To save Turkish political life out from some of the basic troubles it might be compromised from some of Atatürkist principles as laicism, nationalism and revolutionism

I strongly support this view	0
I agree with this view	0
I don't agree	15
I totally reject this view	21
No certain opinion	0

Source, Metin Heper, *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği*, 154.

Another question enlightens that even in a clash between Atatürkist and scientific approach the former is overwhelming the latter.²¹¹

²¹¹ Ibid., 154.

In this sense, any party supporting the Kemalist ideals and staying close to them would be preferred by this group. The second evidence might be the election results. When the RPP vote composition is analysed not only the shifts but also the explanation for the intra-party struggle might be understood. As Tachau observes with a reference to Feroz Ahmad, the left of centre was a kind of in-between maxim. It was too progressive for the *status quo* supporters and disillusionary for the radicals.²¹² The reflection of this situation on the votes would better be understood if it is compared with the 1950 election results. According to Tachau in this historical defeat,

"traditional elites continued to dominate the politics of less developed areas; that these elites continued to support the RPP as they had since the formation of the republic; and that they controlled the votes of their clients, the peasants. By contrast, the society and politics of the more highly developed parts of the country were considerably more complex (...) Moreover, rural peasants in these more modern parts of the country were more likely to enjoy greater autonomy and prosperity, and thus to support DP-sponsored departures from the state centred policies traditionally favoured by the RPP."²¹³

This condition might be linked to the modernising character of the left of centre politics. If Gevgilili's view point is taken into consideration than, in the 1969 elections, after long lasted struggles within the RPP, around the left of centre concept, the party with respect to 1965 elections, still witnessed a drop in the votes given. The %28.7 of 1965 elections now reduced to %27.4. This is interesting for two reasons. The first analysis should bear the composition of the votes taken together with the drop. For Tachau, the most significant issue in the composition of

²¹²Feroz Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1970* (London: C.Hurst, 1977), 251; Frank Tachau, "Republican", 108.

²¹³Frank Tachau with Mary-Jo D. Good, , "The Anatomy", 570.

the votes are observed when regional support of the party is discussed.²¹⁴ Before the 1965 elections, Tachau observes that, RPP has traditionally been strong in the less developed Eastern region of Turkey. This is due to the party-local notables connection. As local notables had a direct effect on the clients and directed them to vote for RPP, the region became the most important ally of the party.²¹⁵ But beginning by left of centre politics as the party rejected this alliance, especially as this break and loss of enthusiasm became apparent when one-third of the RPP left it and founded the Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*), in 1967²¹⁶, especially in the following elections of 1969 the regions supporting the RPP showed a remarkable change:

"in 1950 the party drew its largest proportion of votes in the least developed eastern regions and made its worst showing in the most highly developed Marmara region. In 1965 and 1969, the party obviously suffered bruising setbacks, losing strength in all regions. In terms of relative performance, however, *the party recorded an increase in the proportion of votes it received in the more developed regions from 1965 to 1969*, while it continued to lose strength in other areas, especially the least developed Southeast. *Thus the region in which the RPP was weakest in 1950 was the region of its greatest strength in 1969, and vice versa.*"²¹⁷

Not as the only reason but this condition might be taken as an indicator that left of centre politics, even though it is strictly related with lower classes, in time became a policy rooted in the urban environment. This is due to two reasons. The first one is the changing character of the urban life. After 1950 as studies have

²¹⁴Ibid., 571-572.

²¹⁵Ibid., 571.

²¹⁶The long process of this debate is found in Feroz Ahmad, *The Making*, 144; Suna Kili, *CHP'de*, 222-242.

²¹⁷Tachau, 563-564; emphasis added.

shown metropolitan areas are loaded with working class. It is presumed that RPP in this region is backed by this new emerging force. Second, when the backgrounds of members of parliament is analysed by party, significant results are achieved sustaining this hypothesis. Tachau's study shows that as party policy moves towards left of centre, especially in the 1965 and 1969 periods, the social backgrounds of the party parliament group members show interesting characteristics. In comparison with DP and JP three qualifications display the below results.²¹⁸

Table 4. The social characteristics of the members of parliamentary in the 1950-1969 period

	1950		1965		1969	
	RPP	DP	RPP	JP	RPP	JP
	%		%		%	
Occupation						
official	35	19	30	25	30	36
free professional	35	46	53	46	51	46
Education						
university level, including military	79	73	91	74	74	69
university level excluding military			78	69	66	65
Political experience						
previous parliamentary experience	56	17	61	48	36	52

Source, After, Frank Tachau with Mary-Jo D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change", 557.

²¹⁸Ibid., 557; table modified.

When these figures are compared with the results of a later analysis it is seen that the condition has not changed remarkably after the 1973 elections in which RPP declared itself as a democratic left party and introduced a more radical program with respect to other parties.

Table 5. Social characteristics of the members of the parliamentary in the post-1973 period

	RPP	JP	NSP
	%	%	%
occupation			
bureaucratic	26.4	24.4	12.2
free proffes.	48.5	37.9	44.0
education			
univ. level	70.6	64.0	65.3

Source, Frank Tachau and with Mary-Jo D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change", 554.

As seen, higher education percentage rises from 79 to 91 between 1950 and 1965. Besides, political experience is always ahead of centre right parties and the same increase is observable also for the free professionals. Both qualifications might be taken as the indicators of the effect of urban life as well of higher classes in the RPP structuring. This very condition is related with two more issues. The first one is still the left of centre politics is a part of the 'from the above modernisation' yet it accentuates a populist policy. Second, the social transformation proposed by left of centre RPP, especially in the 1969 elections, by the publication of a program called 'RPP's Transformation Program'²¹⁹ lists fifteen issues in need of transformation. These are, 1. transformation regarding the

²¹⁹*İnsanca Bir Düzen Kurmak İçin Halktan Yetki İstiyoruz: CHP'nin Düzen Değişikliği Programı* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1969).

peasants; 2. transition to independent industrial society; 3. a humanitarian forest order; 4. contemporary and populist education order; 5. national foreign policy and national defence policy; 6. new and populist order in the eastern region; 7. national order in the natural resources; 8. principals and tasks of an efficient and just economic order; 9. a humanitarian labour order; 10. social security order; 11. social dwelling, land and urbanisation order; 12. populist and revolutionary law order; 13. administrative transformation²²⁰; 14. constitutional changes as a new constitutional order is established; 15. Towards the new order: amnesty."²²¹ These, all together have changed not only the character of RPP but also the structure of rural area political participation²²² as well as the urban environment political behaviour.

Some of these principles might be reserved as a project of modernisation in coincidence with Ecevit's presumption that Kemalist reformation was inadequate to transform the substructure, i.e. the society.²²³ What is interesting here is that this setting is based on the data obtained through a survey. It has been carried out among the provincial leaders of the party and the results reflect the complaints of the province. They are in general, agricultural, land, inadequate economic order problems like banking and credit issues. The educational problems are still related with the economic shortcomings. The other insufficiencies are related to health

²²⁰I have translated '*düzen değişikliği*' as 'transformation' but it could also be translated as 'change of order.'

²²¹*CHP'nin Düzen Değişikliği Programı*, 135.

²²²Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change*, 118-126 and 152-182.

²²³Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*.

system, disorganised state administration and other bureaucratic defects and partisanship.²²⁴ They all reflect the problems of pre-modernity.

Conclusion

Depending on these parameters and variables the left of centre politics might be epitomised as a part of the traditional RPP politics regarding the transformation of the society. with a 'revolution from the above.'²²⁵ Here the coalition the party constructs shows a shift substituting the traditional and structural state elites and military with intelligentsia emerging as a new cleavage in the society and petit bourgeoisie. Together with the socialist left, the left of centre politics has introduced the class consciousness and class based politics into the political agenda. Politics, for the first time, however tacitly, conceived as a hegemonic practice. The pressure imposed by the radical left has from time to time pushed left of centre policy to declare that it is not socialism and the only possibility to hinder it. On the other hand, the same politics would stand for the land occupations by the peasants. This eclectic structure has ended up with the transformation of left of centre politics to democratic left and the change in the party leadership. The democratic left politics is a definitive decision reached that it is completely different and distanced from the universal Marxist background. Democratic left has always been formulated as a politics detached from social democracy. Both left of centre and democratic left politics is the last attempt to continue with the traditional methodology of the

²²⁴CHP XX. Kurultayı Parti Meclisi Raporu (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1970), 163-164.

²²⁵E.K. Trimberger, *Revolution From the Above* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).

modernisation, i.e. from the above reforms developed under the control of the elites. It is, in short, a new method developed to keep the new emerging classes under the control and the tone of 'people' added to the party discourse should be conceived in this framework.

In this context, it could be said that both left of centre and democratic left politics fit in the traditional republican ideal of modernisation. The early modernisation movement was the construction of the nation state, the national identity and the early introduction of modern institutions even if with much deficiency. In the second period of modernisation, through the new approaches RPP has developed, Turkey is presented the construction of political identity, the increasing of political participation and the acceptance of class notion. This is the surpassing of a corporatist state model and the implementation of class based, ideology oriented and polarisation grounded politics.²²⁶ In this sense, there are also some shortcomings of RPP's 'new deal.' The first one is the importance given to populism which disabled the party to move towards a more libertarian politics. Second, the left politics of RPP with its populist character also kept the party away from a more radical and 'real' left or social democratic policy. The party, in the final analysis stayed loyal to the expectations of the state elites and military coalition. The basic shortcoming and the constraint of left of centre and democratic left politics is that, over the introduction and accentuation of new concepts, in the effort of encompassing new developing social strata in the society, the party epistemology tried to find a middle of the road policy which was a combination of basic, traditional Kemalist tenets with the new vocabulary and catch the control of

²²⁶Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey", in *Comparative Politics*, 16;1, (October 1983), 24.

the new developments. It was an attempt to continue with the organic society and from the above modernisation by inculcating the new concepts into Kemalism or reading Kemalism with the new vocabulary.²²⁷ This contradictions emanating from the eclectic character of the new politics might be seen as the most determining factors in the difficulties Turkish social democracy meets in the post 1980 period.

²²⁷This is a condition of 'discourse.' Aziz-el Azmah has shown that Islam has been read with the vocabulary of Western positivist thinking. What has happened within the boundaries of left of centre and democratic left politics is not different than this development. The analysis of what Aziz el Azmeh has said will be done in Chapter VIII, when Islam-Kemalism and modernisation is discussed.

CHAPTER V

1980s AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: THE NEW SEARCH FOR MODERNISM

5.1. The Dissection and the Anatomy of the 1980s

5.1.1. Military Intervention and its Aftermaths

1980s started in Turkey with a military coup. This was the third attempt of the army to hold office in the last twenty years. The period anticipating the military intervention, which was more furious and radical than the first two, was marked by the political polarization and ambiguity terrorist activities that ended up with political unrest giving birth to political assassinations.¹ Other than those, it is demarcated that "the crisis which spawned the 1980 military intervention in Turkey was multifaceted, including economic breakdown, civil violence, and open challenges to such highly symbolic values as secularist nationalism."² On the other hand, according to later explanations what played the leading role in the pre-intervention political life was the inability of the political parties, belonging to different ideological wings, to form

¹Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey." *Comparative Politics* (October 1983): 17-33.

²Ibid., 25.

coalitions in the parliament.³ Especially the unending and inefficient, as well as blocked, process of trials to elect the president in the parliament soon pushed the army to intervene.⁴

Even though the military intervention is considered as a non-democratic takeover of the army, still a many of the writers were apt to see it as the only possible remedy to dissolve the set of blockages. This is also true for the politicians. As Hale observes, when, after the coup, Bülent Ecevit, the former leader of RPP resigned from his post and started publishing a weekly magazine *Arayış* (Search), though he criticized "the aspects of the new regime he did not openly attack the necessity for the 12 September coup."⁵ The only critical point was the scheduling of the intervention. At this point there has been critical assumptions having a consecutive conclusion: it has been argued that the waiting of the army to intervene has caused the increasing of the blood shed in the civil violence and, as everything is baffled the very day the coup has been realised, it is taken as a sign indicating that the political unrest was already under the control of the army before the move. This point has usually been supported by the pre-intervention period politicians and especially by Süleyman Demirel, then the prime minister. As there was already a declared martial law in some parts of the

³A lengthy inventory of the events that were taken as the evidences of the position which was qualified as the '*cul-de-sac*' and, also as events indicating that nothing more could be done but the military intervention, is found, from the view point of the army, in General Secretariat of the National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey: Before and After* (Ankara: Ogun Kardeşler Matbaası, 1982).

⁴Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları*, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990).

⁵William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Government in Turkey," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds., Metin Heper and Ahmet İvin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 168-169.

country and as, according to his explanations, especially in the National Security Council meetings, the military has been offered and supplied by any thing they would be in need of, the perpetuation of the political unrest might be taken as an indicator of their unwillingness to solve the problem in the democratic regime.⁶

Not exactly this but a relatively similar point, i.e. the reasons for the over-careful approach of the army to intervene has been analysed by Taschau and Heper with two major presumption. The first, "the half-hearted nature and relatively indifferent results of the 1971 intervention" and the second, "the fear that a new intervention would exacerbate the politicization and factionalization of the army itself."⁷ In this context the authors sum up the '*raison d'etre*' of the intervention on two points: the loss of the complete erosion of the governmental authority and political polarization and uneasiness to form coalitions.⁸ Here, the first point is of importance for, it does not only indicate the army's distrust to the 1961 Constitution but also determines the nature of the intervention. Beginning by the latter, it is possible to say, together with Ahmad, that the early explanations by Kenan Evren, chief of general staff and the spokesman of the military junta, showed "that the army was there for the long haul."⁹ The first issue mentioned above, on the other hand, is clearly put by Zürcher as:

⁶This point is reiterated by Karpas due to an interview with Süleyman Demirel, Kemal Karpas, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds., Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 149, 150.

⁷Taschau and Heper, "The State", 25.

⁸Ibid., 25-26.

⁹Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 182.

"in many ways, the changes they wrought consisted of undoing the work of their predecessors, the perpetrators of the coup of 27 May 1960."¹⁰

Again this point is stressed by Ahmad as a 'counter-revolution whose aim was nothing short of revoking all the political and socio-economic gains made by the country since 1960."¹¹ This was obvious in the measures taken just after the intervention when the National Security Council

issued decrees which suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, closed down the political parties, detained their leaders, and suspended virtually all professional associations and confederations of trade unions.¹²

This makes a point certain that, the intervention "was not envisaged as a permanent military regime but aimed toward the eventual re-establishment of civilian parliamentary rule."¹³ Also, another challenging point in this context is what Karpas insists as

quite unlike its predecessors, the military seem to have determined in detail the basic constitutional principles that would be enacted, the type of institutions that would be established...and the sort of mechanisms that would be needed to ensure smooth functioning after the return to civilian rule.¹⁴

¹⁰Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, New York: I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 1993), 292.

¹¹Ahmad, *The Making*, 182.

¹²*Ibid.*, 182.

¹³Karpas, "Military," 148.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 149.

This ambitious task is reduced to four points by Hale as

firstly, to suppress terrorism; secondly, to restore economic growth and stability; thirdly, to introduce a new Constitution and legal arrangements which it was hoped would prevent another lapse into anarchy; fourthly, to work out effective arrangements with the civilian politicians¹⁵

In this context, the military regime first banned all activities of the existing political leaders, then dissolved the political parties and later promulgated the new Political Parties Law in May 1983. This last attempt can be taken as one of the milestones in the reconstruction of the new political era and as an annex to the new Constitution, together with other reorganisations concerning the higher education and other cultural institutions.

Before passing to the short analysis of the 1982 Constitution, here, the essence of the 1980 military coup could be defined on the basis of military's state understanding. It could be said that the 1980 intervention, though shows some remarkable differences with regard to the previous attempts of 1960 and 1971¹⁶, still underlines some common points which goes back to the structure and the mentality of the military, as well as its place in the political realm, together with the function it has realised since the beginning. Apart from the differences between the various endeavours and ventures, the revealing points might be summarised as, "firstly its

¹⁵William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey," in *State*, ed. Heper and Evin, 166.

¹⁶Karpat, "Military," 149; Hale, "Transition," 162-166.

political inheritance from the Atatürk and earlier periods; secondly, Turkey's international situation."¹⁷ Both of the conditions are directly and strictly related with the 'guardian role of the officers...deeply rooted in Turkey's past, until after the abolition of the Janniserics and the institutional reforms of the Tanzimat, '¹⁸ which is "reestablished by the patriotic service of the army during the struggle for independence under Atatürk."¹⁹

Sequential to these remarks, it might be argued, as has been discussed by Tachau and Heper, with reference to Eric Nordlinger, that Turkish army has acted as a guardian army and in this sense it was the guardian of 'governmental authority, national unity and Atatürkism.'²⁰ Added to these is the point discussed by Evin as, "the chief concern of the military in undertaking all three interventions was to protect the state by reducing its vulnerability in the face of intra-elite conflict."²¹ These points, when taken as a whole, determine the central position of the army as well as the legitimacy basis for the interventions it has performed. But, Sakallıoğlu, after relating the military's position once again with Kemalism, makes an interesting remark and says, "historically, not the Turkish military's attitude and discourse, but its

¹⁷Hale, "Transition," 160.

¹⁸ George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey," in *State*, ed. Heper and Evin, 180.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 180.

²⁰Tachau and Heper, "The State."

²¹Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980," in *The State*, ed. Heper and Evin, 204.

strategic position/front within the political realm has determined the parameters of its political involvement."²²

In the 1980 intervention, the military has been dependent on these variables in differing proportions. Nevertheless the 'guardianism' notion and concept might be taken as the premise when military enacts its task. However, this concept is strictly intertwined with the state structure of Turkey in the post 1960 period. From this view point, as has been argued by Heper, the axis on which the military's activities are crystallised is the interaction between the military and the state-civil bureaucratic elites.²³ The history of the military in this context, including the interventions, might be put as its isolation from the society due to its vanguard role together with the civilian bureaucracy. This, naturally, gives birth to a twofold consequence. The first is the army's identification with the state, whereas the second is its back and forth relation with the civilian cleavages usually staying aloof from the society.²⁴ The last point that could be bound to this approach is its relation with Kemalism and modernisation which has been the crux of the 1980 intervention.

As has been observed by Karpaz, one of the basic motivations of the intervention was the condition of Kemalism in the anticipating period. He succinctly observes that "on the eve of the 1980 takeover, Kemalism as a state philosophy had no longer a formal, organized representation."²⁵ Karpaz, rightly connects this situation to

²²Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics* (January, 1997), 151-166.

²³Heper, "State and Society in Turkish Political Experience," in *The State*, eds., Heper and Evin, 7-9.

²⁴Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy," 155.

²⁵Karpaz, "Military," 149.

the ideology that RPP derived beginning by the late 1960s. The new direction that RPP has undertaken as the 'left of centre' was not the rejection of the Atatürkist tenets but coincidentally, a move to renew the ideological framework of the party without much reference to the basic and already existing ideological concepts with a more pragmatic tone and touch. This was, more or less, the first crack observed in the traditional coalition between the army-the state/bureaucratic elites-RPP²⁶. The last stress on the 'sacred pact'²⁷ has been the RPP's backing the 1960 coup. Nevertheless, as has been analysed in the previous chapter, when the 1971 intervention via communique was realised RPP has already moved away from its basic and historical split. Bülent Ecevit, through his opposition against the intervention, surpassed not only İsmet İnönü, but also the traditional understanding that army should be supported and not be left alone.²⁸

1971 intervention, in the recent political history of Turkey, has been the only move by the civilians to reject the agenda imposed on them by the army in a two year process. When the plot of having Faruk Gürler, the chief of staff hastily resigned from his post, elected as the president of the republic by the parliament, was declined with a coalition of parties²⁹, this block has been shattered into pieces even though it was disguised for a long period of time with a continuous stress of the good relations between the governments and the military. But, it is clear that up until 1980, army has

²⁶Ibid., 144.

²⁷Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Ecevit, Ordu ve Laiklik İşği," *Radikal*, (June 6, 1998), 16.

²⁸Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Stateperson* (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1998), 221-245.

²⁹Ahmad, *The Making*, 155; Harris, "The Role", 190; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 274.

lost its not only political allies with respect to the pre-1960 period but also has witnessed the fading away of its ideological basis. Since then, the basic trajectory of the army has been threefold. The first one, the renewal of the ideology, second, the construction of a new political ally and, third, the method of involvement in the political realm. The 1980 military coup has been the landmark for all these issues.

After the coup the measures taken to renew the political agenda and the realm in Turkey has been through a set of legal reorganisations. The striking one among the others has been the dissolving of the existing political parties just before the first meeting of the Consultative Assembly³⁰, October 23, 1981, by the decree dated October 16, 1981, one year after the banning of the political activities of the parties with the decree dated October 27, 1980³¹. Even though the basic reason behind this development was the political condition of the pre-1980 coup period and the unwillingness of the political parties and politicians in agreeing to stay away from the political life, according to General Evren's explanations³², still, more important than that, this step, as Karpas rightly observes, "ended the phase of modernization that had begun with the founding of the Union and Progress Party during the Young Turk era."³³ This point has been stressed also by Heper referring not only to 1980 but also to the other interventions:

³⁰For an analysis of the structure of the Constituent Assembly see Aynur Soydan, "Danışma Meclisi'nde Üye Kompozisyonu," in *Edip Çelik'e Armağan: Değişen Dünyada İnsan, Hukuk, Devlet* (İstanbul: Engin Yayıncılık, 1995).

³¹Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, "12 Eylül Rejimi," *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.14 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996) 974-998.

³²Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları*, Vol. IV (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 68.

³³Karpas, "Military Interventions," 157.

"The 1960-1961 and 1971-1973 military interventions were conducted basically because the political elites had drifted from Atatürkism and had, therefore, lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the intellectual-bureaucratic and, particularly, military elites."³⁴

Not only the links with RPP has been broken in this period but also the traditional ties with the civilian bureaucracy have also been weakened, for in the Government Programme of the Uluşu cabinet, constituted just after the intervention, it has been acclaimed that the civilian bureaucracy is the obstacle before the economic development. In the void occurred by the fading away of Atatürkist ideology, as a measure, the military under the regime of 12 September, started a new procedure of the reconstruction of it, using the centennial of Kemal Atatürk. The ideology developed in this period reflected once more the corporatist conceiving of state and of the organic society, more than the others, relying on the nationalism, a concept which is inscribed in the 1982 Constitution.³⁵ The other attempt was once more towards the renewal of the transcendental state under the assumption that the state elites' detachment and aloofness from the society would reiterate and ignite the modernisation. It is in this context that the 1982 Constitution incorporates the notion of strong executive and, taken as a whole, the 12 September regime rejects the civil society.

³⁴Metin İleper, "Transition to Democracy in Turkey: Toward a New Pattern," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, ed. Metin İleper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1994), 19.

³⁵Metin İleper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverly: The Eothen Press, 1985), 144.

The second task that the military has set for itself, after the 1980 coup, has been the constitution of a political ally to replace the RPP which has already been deleted from the political realm. This is a crucial point which can not be detached from the military's traditional way of getting involved in the political life. As Sakallıoğlu puts, Turkish army's dealing with the political life, if interventions are taken as special cases, has not been direct but indirect: "ever since the inception of the republic the military has tended to be politicized in an antipolitical, rather than above-political direction."³⁶ Even, according to the author, "the transition to competitive democracy in 1983 provides evidence of indirect influence."³⁷ Sakallıoğlu connects this development to military's exclusion from the political realm in the early republican period and concludes that "in the course of Turkish political development it was necessary for the military to constitute a political front which *claimed to be* antipolitical."³⁸ Nevertheless this condition should not be accepted as military's inaptness in the socio-political developments. Evidently the reality is the other way round. "Military (...) can include not only direct but also indirect influences on the government"³⁹ and "since 1983 the military has used legal/constitutional, historic/cultural, and structural reasons and mechanisms to retain its privileged position in issuing demands, policy suggestions, and warnings on political matter."⁴⁰ Here, according to the author what differs Turkish military

³⁶Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy," 156.

³⁷Ibid., 153.

³⁸Ibid., 156; emphasis added.

³⁹Ibid., 153.

⁴⁰Ibid.

"from armies elsewhere in the Third World is its acceptance of the legitimacy of both democracy and civilian rule...It is not praetorian; it has not tried to undermine democracy or usurp civilian authority. The Turkish military has not destroyed civilian-military boundaries."⁴¹

Here, interesting is that, in this model, although the military has refrained from direct involvement "they choose to wield influence in the structuring and vetoing of political initiatives from a position outside the civilian authorities' constitutional control."⁴² Heper, contributes to this point by saying that the army has taken an active but indirect role in the political realm through above-party cabinets.⁴³

This framework of analysis is important for two main reasons. The first is that, as also has been stressed by Sakallıoğlu, the military has enhanced its vetoing power more after each intervention and, second, for army defines itself as devoted to the solidaristic and corporatist national interest and as it carefully keeps itself away from the direct involvement in controlling the system their influence lasts continuously on the system, no matter it is implemented and incorporated through an indirect way. This very last point is also supported again by the condition that because the political system happens to be seemingly democratic and as the military seems not intervening it, the transformation of the system to a more democratic one is delayed due to the difficulty of perception. It is at this point that the army needs a political ally to perpetuate its existence in the political environment with the tacit acclaim that through the political tool control over the system could be regulated. The military with this role, in Heper's words, "assumed the function of the state" as all social cleavages,

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Metin Heper, *The State Tradition*, 127.

classes and particular groups interested in its own interests.⁴⁴ It is also remarked by Heper that in the post 1980 military intervention the aim of the reorganisations was to construct a 'transient transcendental state' which, in the final instant would transform the state into an instrumental regime.⁴⁵

Although this claim embodies a contradiction for, it is strictly connected with, let alone the impossibility, the difficulty of the transformation of a transcendental state into an instrumental polity. Nevertheless this is a common and shared understanding among a group of students of Turkish politics, Dodd being a member: "the Turkish Constitution of 1982 provides a fair enough plan for the creation of a liberal and democratic state."⁴⁶ In this context and after all these assumptions it can now be proclaimed that the 1980 coup in the final instant had a dual function. On the one hand it was an intervention in search of the formation of a political tool to be equipped with the role of a political ally to the army to carry out the unfinished process of modernisation; second, it was again the endeavour undertaken by the military, having the frustration of being left alone by the moving away of the civilian political cadres from the primordial tacit contract, reached between them and the army, and also loss of the trust in them, to restructure the state in such a way that it would be above even the reach of the political parties and other socio-political cleavages. This is the identification of the army with the transcendentality of the state, rather than the

⁴⁴Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats, Politicians and Officers in Turkey: Dilemmas of a New Political Paradigm," in *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*, ed. Ahmet Evin (Opladen: Leske Verlag+Budrich GmbH, 1984), 77.

⁴⁵Heper, *The State Tradition*, 152-153.

⁴⁶C. H. Dodd, "Political Modernization, the State and Democracy: Approaches to the Study of Politics in Turkey," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 20.

"partially transcendental state", as Heper pronounces.⁴⁷ Karpas attributes to this point as "a substantial number of the army officers...viewed the political parties as either hotbeds of strife and dissension or simply as convenient means of achieving power."⁴⁸ He also indicates that "in 1980 the prestige of the parties was at an all time low." The crucial point is that he defines the position of the political parties in the eyes of the military as they "should be instruments of national unity, order, and stability rather than vehicles for the expression of special interest of social or economic groups or particular regions of the country."⁴⁹ This is receiving the parties behind a doctrine-like ideology, which was nothing but Atatürkism, which was in this sense a state ideology, backing up the transcendentalism of the state.⁵⁰

The path to achieve this task was first the dissolving of the pre-1980 parties and then permitting the political activities with a decree dated 24 April 1983 after the referendum of 6 November 1982. This has been a long process first ignited by the issuing of Law of Political Parties, dated 22 April 1983, code number 2820, Law of Elections, dated 10 June 1983, code number 2839⁵¹ then the permission given for the formation of the new parties. The basic assumption behind these regulations and reorganisations was primarily "to prevent the excessive politicization of citizens and

⁴⁷Metin Heper, *The State Tradition*, 124-148.

⁴⁸Kemal Karpas, "Military Interventions," 152.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., 153.

⁵¹For an excellent elaboration on these laws see İlter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," in *State*, ed. M. Heper and A. Evin, 63-80 and İlter Turan, "Evolution of Electoral Process," in *Politics*, ed. M. Heper and A. Evin, 49-62; also see Taha Parla, "Partiler ve Parti Sistemi Üstüne Bazı Gözlemler," in *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi: 1980-1989* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2nd ed., 1993), 125-131.

groups."⁵² It is in this phase that the military openly exhibited a clear advocacy for a party which would support the basic ideals of the 12 September regime.⁵³ The basic fear for the military after the re-politicization of the regime was the rejuvenation of the pre-1980 period and it is after this reasoning that some leaders and co-leaders of the pre-1980 period parties were subjected to custody in Zincirbozan.⁵⁴ Nevertheless and whatever are the overt allegations about the future of the political regime, the constitutive element of the procedure, to renew the polity structure, depends on another condition which should be searched within the changing body of the modernisation. This point can not be apprehended only with a reference to the conventional ties between the military and the RPP as the fervent supporter of the Kemalist tenets in the pre-mid-1960 period as has been discussed above. The better dominating condition emanates more from the economic model implemented in Turkey just before the military intervention which is known as the 24 January Decisions, issued and applied by the Demirel government.⁵⁵

⁵²İlter Turan, "The Dilemma of Turkish Politics." *Toplum ve Ekonomi*, vol.2 (September 1991), 31-54.

⁵³Metin Heper, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic", 118.

⁵⁴An excellent and interesting survey of the struggle developed by Bülent Ecevit, former leader of RPP before the coup, for democracy and against the regime, just after the military intervention, is found in the book by the renown Arcayürek which owes a lot to Ecevit himself. Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Hapishanede Ecevit* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2nd ed., 1991).

⁵⁵There is a vast literature on this programme, *inter alia*, see Rüşdü Saracoğlu, "Liberalization of the Economy," in *Politics*, ed. M. Heper and A. İvin, 63-75 but one of the main sources remains as Fikret Şenses, ed., *Recent Industrialization Experience of Turkey in a Global Context*, (Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 1994); Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, eds., *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability* (London: Macmillan, 1990); Şevket Pamuk, "24 Ocak Sonrasında İktisat politikaları, Sınıflar ve Gelir Dağılımı," in *Kriz, Gelir Dağılımı ve Türkiye'nin Alternatif Sorunu*, K. Boratav, Ç. Keyder, Ş. Pamuk (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2nd enlarged

5.2. A New Step in the Modernisation Process

5.2.1. The 24 January Decisions

The essence of the 24 January decisions has basically been the shift from the import substitution economy, started mainly by the 1960s, to free market model limiting the state entrepreneurship as well as the state dominance in the economic realm to the minimum.⁵⁶ The commanding position of the state in the economic arena has a long history going back principally to the etatism. Nevertheless statism should not be seen the mere condition determining the economic relations as has been analysed in the previous chapters. Anticipating it is the early attempt initiated by the Committee for Union and Progress to construct an entrepreneurial class, i.e. national bourgeoisie.⁵⁷ Beyond its economic openings, etatism's basic aim and task is to establish a well structured political framework which is filled by the transcendentalism of the state in a period facing the absence of a bourgeoisie.⁵⁸ What makes the import substitution different than the conventional model, although it keeps the state active in the economic process, is the "existence of a sufficiently powerful middle class which could operate hand in hand with the already established, though inefficient State

ed., 1987); Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1980-1985* (İstanbul: Gerçek yayınevi, 1988); Tefik Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm (1860-1990)* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1992).

⁵⁶ Henry Barkey, "Crisis of the Turkish Political Economy: 1960-1980," in *Modern Turkey*, ed., A. Evin, 47-48.

⁵⁷ Feroz Ahmad, "Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policies of the Young Turks 1908-1918," in *Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920)*, eds., Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1980).

⁵⁸ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982), 33-177.

Economic Enterprises."⁵⁹ This might be conceived as the togetherness of the national bourgeoisie and the state where the former still feels itself weak enough to ask the support of the latter and here it could be argued that the main task of the State Planning Organisation has been, after 1961, the regulation and distribution of resources on a basis of mutual consent. As this model predicts and grounds, in Turkey there has been a kind of inter-class alliance in the final analysis which emanates from the corporatist apprehension which shatters down by the 'adjustment' policy ignited by the minority Demirel government in 1980 more prone to the expectations of the bourgeoisie which has by the time reached to a power point where it could feel itself able to be emancipated from the control of the state.⁶⁰ Boratav also formulates the process as the 'counter-attack of the capital.'⁶¹

The 'adjustment policy' not only aims to find a radical solution to the problems created by the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) usually prescribed as the loop of dependency-independency between the domestic and foreign markets, the disequilibrium of balance of payments, the government regulation and control principally on the foreign exchange rates.⁶² But, beyond these configurations which are the common points in the economic policy making, in Turkey's case, what has been of specific importance is the new position defined for the state on class base: Demirel's Justice Party, although it has always been in good relations with the urban

⁵⁹Henry Barkey, "Political Economy," 48.

⁶⁰Korkut Boratav, "Inter-Class and Intra-Class Relations of Distribution Under 'Structural Adjustment': Turkey During the 1980s," in *The Political Economy*, eds., T. Arıcanlı and D. Rodrik, 212.

⁶¹Boratav, *Türkiye*, 119.

⁶²Barkey, 'Political,' 51-52.

bourgeoisie controlling the industrial aggregation, has mainly been in a close coalition with the provincial powers. But in the January 1980, JP has proclaimed its preference on the former.⁶³ Second, this model has ended the conventional authority of the state-bureaucracy elites, in the last phase created by the controlling role of the State Planning Organisation. On the other hand, with the emergence of such political cleavages as National Salvation party of the 1970s and their fervent support of a genuine industrialisation rather than ISI the modernisation model has undergone a radical transformation. This onset, to many students of Turkish economy has been a modest transition to economic liberalism drifting from statism. It is in this framework and context that the military starts its new role.

To such scholars who were dissent to the economic regime of the post 1980 period, it would be impossible to accomplish any result if the military had not intervened. This is somewhat a paradoxical situation. Because, when military has decided as early as the next morning of the intervention to continue with the already existing economic policy, which was nothing but a process of dissolving the state's active role in the economic realm, i.e. statism, also nascent of many repercussions such as the breaking of the imperial power of state elites together with bureaucracy and ending the conventional coalition between military and the others it on the one hand gave support to the success of the existing model and on the other paved the way to a model which was, at least theoretically to hinder its existing role and power. It is on this ground of transition from statism to liberalism lies the shortcomings, bottlenecks

⁶³As a speculative approach, it could be argued that, in this development effective is the power of the urban bourgeoisie which has been expressed and exhibited during the 1977 Ecevit-Government through the declarations publicized by the newspapers. This is believed as one of the major factors that brought the end of the Ecevit government.

and restrictions of the post-1980 period which needs an elaboration on the political structure developed in Turkey in the post 1983 elections period.

5.2.2. A New Hegemony and the Shift of Paradigm: New Right

Not only in Turkey but in America and Europe as well 1980s has witnessed the rapid rise of the new right, a phenomenon stretching and sprawling to create a conglomerate of new but hegemonic attitudes and discourse on social, economic and political matters, usually referred as Thatcher-Reagan decade.⁶⁴ As has already been indicated "Thatcherism represents the practical application of a set of theories, whose proponents are known as the New Right."⁶⁵ Here the problem turns out to be the answer to the question what is/was the New Right? In an attempt to explain the nature of this concept with its implications on the political, social and economic realms, Gray gives a brief account more accentuating the British experience

At the level of policy...New Right sought to dismantle the corporatist institutions built up in Britain in the post-War period, to limit government and at the same time to restrain the power of inordinate organized interests such as the trade unions, to achieve a stable currency to abandon deficit financing and, in general, to engineer a transfer of initiative and resources from government to civil society that was massive and politically irreversible.⁶⁶

⁶⁴For a recent revisiting of the decade see Andrew Adonis and Tim Hames, eds., *A Conservative Revolution? The Thatcher-Reagan Decade in Perspective* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994).

⁶⁵Peter Riddle, *The Thatcher Decade: How Britain has Changed During the 1980s* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 4.

⁶⁶John Gray, "Conservatism, individualism and the political thought of the New Right," in *Post Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought* (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 274.

On the economic level, the repercussions of this

policy orientation expressed itself in measures for the privatization of state-owned industries, in the Medium Term Financial Strategy, tax reduction, a curb on public expenditure, and a variety of supply-side measures deregulating prices, wages, rents and some planning controls.⁶⁷

Last but of course not least, the more complicated level of discussion revolving around the New Right is directed to its philosophical setting and Gray in this context claims

The intellectual perspective which infused these (philosophical and theoretical) policies was not that which dominated post-War British conservatism; it came from outside the Conservative Party, from the works of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, and from the free market think-tanks, above all, from the Institute of Economic Affairs. The pedigree of of this perspective on policy and society was classical liberal, not conservative. This is to say that it was strongly and sometimes stridently individualist, it sought to reduce government to an indispensable minimum, and (...) it concerned itself very little with the cultural or social conditions of a stable restoration of market institutions.⁶⁸

Even though it has been asserted by Gray that philosophical and theoretical sides of New Right play a more determining role in the construction and in the analysis of the model, still, in another analysis again with reference to Thatcher decade, it is stressed that New Right did not have a master plan.⁶⁹ Again the same

⁶⁷Ibid., 275.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Riddell, *Thatcher Decade*, 5.

author insists on two points; a) it was "a personal, highly distinctive, approach to politics rather than a coherent set of ideas"⁷⁰ b) the commitments did not represent the deliberate start of an ideological revolution, or rather that of a counter revolution.⁷¹ This point is well defined by Freedman with a sheer attack to those assumptions that Thatcherism does include a radical political manner

The illusion of radicalism was thus simply created by the fervour and scope of Thatcherite reactionary counter-reformism. The idea is a reactive one: not the creation of new institutions or new form of social behaviour, but -in parallel with Marxist argument- the negation of negation.⁷²

Here, the distinction between the neo-liberalism, the new Right and neo-Conservatism should be discussed. As Gray, succinctly puts, the 1980s has been the era of the conquest of conservatism by the ideas and doctrines of the New Right.⁷³ This is, briefly, to say that, there has been a clash between the two concepts because the New Right, especially in England, has been critical of conservatism on the ground that

a generation of conservative practice has led modern Western democratic states into a dead end of corporatist stagnation in which a ratchet-effect operated that moved the political centre steadily leftwards, its theorists

⁷⁰Ibid., 2.

⁷¹Ibid., 8.

⁷²Michael Freedman, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 411.

⁷³Gray, *Post-Liberalism*, 272.

consistently neglected the cultural inheritance which is the matrix of a stable capitalist order.⁷⁴

On the other hand, Giddens, when discusses the differences between the American and European conservatism more refers to the existence of capitalism, where, according to him, the former is aggressively procapitalist.⁷⁵ Still, he tacitly points out the togetherness of market forces and conservatism when he uses the 'generic term New Right,' and by saying 'more often neo-liberalism'⁷⁶ he identifies the two concepts. Also, in another place, he definitely identifies New Right by neo-liberalism saying "the ideas of New Right are better described as neo-liberalism rather than neoconservatism," and again the reason behind this is that, "economic markets play such a large role in them."⁷⁷

Here, two different approaches to the question 'what makes the Thatcherite approach more close to conservatism or neo-liberalism?' might be briefly discussed. Even though, as has been indicated by Gray, in the first years of Thatcherite governments there has been a pedigree of genuine conservatism, yet the leading role in the construction of the model is played by the New Right's criticism of the condition of state, namely trying to create the minimal one. Nevertheless, it could also be said that early Thatcherite governments, as it is clear in the Manifestos proclaimed by the Conservative Party in 1979⁷⁸, 1983⁷⁹, 1987⁸⁰ and 1992⁸¹, but at large

⁷⁴Ibid., 273.

⁷⁵Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 23.

⁷⁶Ibid., 23.

⁷⁷Giddens, *Beyond*, 33.

⁷⁸*The Conservative Manifesto* (London: The Conservative Party, 1979).

Thatcherism, shows a good deal blend of liberalism and conservatism, reflecting an eclectic character. This very point emanates from, once more, Thatcher's comprehension of the state role not only in the economic realm but also in the reconstruction of the neo-liberal individualism. Giddens argues this point with reference to Letwin as below:

Thatcherism ... does not, as laissez-faire liberals do, seek to minimize all state intervention in economic and social life. Rather it distinguishes two senses of intervention, one to be rejected, the other to be regarded positively. A market economy is incompatible with state intervention in the form of overall planning or corporatism; but it actively demands the strong hand of the state in respect of the maintenance of law and order, the fostering of national ideals and the capability for defence.⁸²

Giddens, reaches the coda when he says "Thatcherism was a programme for radical change in many areas but it recognized the importance of tradition in other contexts."⁸³ It is this very point that brings fore the clash between the answers related to Thatcherism's standing with respect to conservatism or liberalism for, Gray, clearly condemns not only Thatcherism but the whole body of neo-liberal New Right for its ignorance of traditions when he goes deep into the discussion of individualism. It is also an answer to Giddens' understanding of neo-liberalism's relation to conservatism

⁷⁹*The Conservative Manifesto 1983* (London: The Conservative Party, 1983).

⁸⁰*The Next Moves Forward: The Conservative Manifesto 1987* (London: n.p., 1987).

⁸¹*The Best Future for Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 1992* (London: Pembroke Press, 1992).

⁸²Giddens, *Beyond*, 39.

⁸³*ibid.*, 40.

as he sees the former 'in a direct line of continuity with the Old Conservatism of the British variety, which has long emphasized the importance of a sturdy moral individualism.⁸⁴

John Gray, on the contrary, argues that the New Right thinkers were more, in the same line with classical liberal philosophy, neglecting the historical and cultural presuppositions especially when civil society is concerned. This, according to Gray, as has also been defended by Scruton⁸⁵, is also the neglectence of the individualism that constructs the common culture of Western civilization.⁸⁶ The absence of this philosophical background, to Gray, purports two specific issues. First, he conceives that

this neglect has disabled the policies of governments animated by the thinking of New Right, in that policy has been concerned almost solely with securing the legal and economic conditions of market competition and thereby of general prosperity and has only rarely and inadequately addressed the cultural conditions that undergird and sustain a stable market order⁸⁷

Second, as New Right raises the idea of 'government as an enterprise association' binds Thatcherite approach to an earlier version of conservatism and, in this sense, it 'has distinguished itself from neo-liberalism and has established its affinities with American neo-conservatism by its reiterated emphasis on the familiar

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Roger Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984).

⁸⁶Gray, *Post-Liberalism*, 274.

⁸⁷Ibid., 274.

and religious values.⁸⁸ Gray is critical of this framework for it is his allegation that a project or utopia of minimal state is useless for the perpetuation and well being of the liberal civil society, which he sees closely linked to nationhood and government, the two foundations for the protection and nurture of civil society.⁸⁹

The condition of the state is crucial in the discussion concerning the New Right and neo-liberalism. As, Bogdanor argues, in the late 1970s, Thatcher believed that the society was already saturated with the 'adversary culture' and the conservative values were lost⁹⁰. To put them back needed a more authoritarian state and government and, what she tried to achieve was to 'restore the authority of the state in a period when the social preconditions for the restoration of authority (were) absent.'⁹¹ This condition, no doubt, provokes a lengthy discussion and argumentation which can not be developed here but if one point needs clarification, it is that, as long as its relation to the understanding of 'strong state' is concerned, the New Right and more neo-liberalism takes a dubious position for it becomes, as in the cases of Reagan and Thatcher models, more apt to conservatism more than liberalism for two reasons.⁹² The first, as such conservatives like Oakeshott believe the market needs the regulation

⁸⁸Ibid., 276.

⁸⁹Ibid., 280.

⁹⁰Margareth Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper and Collins, 1993).

⁹¹Vernon Bogdanor, "The Constitution", in *The Thatcher Effect, A Decade of Change*, eds., Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 141-142.

⁹²Situating New Right's place congruent to liberalism and conservatism see Rodney Barker, *Political Ideas in Modern Britain: In and After the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 2nd and improved edition, 1997 (1978), 233-241.

of a strong state and a government attached to it⁹³, second, as has been mentioned above, the personal preference of Thatcher was the reconsolidation of the strong, more authoritarian, state not only for the market and economic reasons but also for the construction of a new individual related to traditional values, which was again nothing but the situation in the Reagan case.⁹⁴ Here a differentiation and distancing line could be drawn between the Thatcherite and Reaganite forms of New Right and, it would be more convenient if not definitive to situate latter to be situated more in the framework of conservatism for two reasons. The first, as has been pointed out in the relevant literature that American New Right is more capital based and dependent on the religiosity⁹⁵, i.e Christian epistemology and related to other moralistic values attached to it⁹⁶; second, it proposes a more communitarian social structure, whose roots are found deep in the Christian morphology encompassing liberal individualism, free choice, family understanding, ethical and moral perceptions and other liberal American norms in the vacuum created by what is called the hegemonic crisis of American liberalism.⁹⁷

⁹³Michael Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in Politics', in *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (London: Methuen, 1967).

⁹⁴Gillian Peele, "Culture, Religion and Public Morality," in *A Conservative Revolution? The Thatcher -Reagan Decade in Perspective*, eds., Andrew Adonis and Tim Hanes (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994).

⁹⁵Banu Helvacioğlu, "The New Right in the U.S.: A 'Morbidity Symptom' of the Crisis of American Capitalism." Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, 1988), 191-230.

⁹⁶Michael Gillespie and Michael Lienesch, "Religion and the Resurgence of Conservatism," in *The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies*, eds., Barry Cooper, Allan Kornberg, and William Mishler (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988), 425.

⁹⁷Norman Barry, *The New Right* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

This brings out another condition which is usually debated as the hegemonic state of New Right. Gray, determines the upsurging of the New Right ideology as hegemonic in the Gramscian sense, "in that conservative parties, governments and intellectual journals came to be dominated by a discourse and agenda of policy that emanated from thinkers of the New Right."⁹⁸ The notion of hegemony, here developed with reference to Gramsci has also been utilized by Sunic, when he discusses the contradictory position of European New Right with respect to American and English versions.⁹⁹ Sunic, argues that, the New Right, has conceived and unknowingly embodied the basic principle of Gramscian notion of hegemony, seeing the cultural as the basic factor in the determining power of the political.¹⁰⁰ Gramsci, developing the notion of 'organic intellectual' sees the 'literati' as the missionary and the persuasive of the dominating class and the ideology bound to it and the crisis of the hegemony commences when the intelligentsia begins to drift from the power that is embedded in the state.¹⁰¹ In this context, for the emergence of the New Right there comes two slightly different interpretations.

5.3. New Right, Neo-Liberalism and the Crisis of Keynesianism

⁹⁸Gray, *Post-Liberalism*, 272.

⁹⁹Tomislav Sunic, *Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right* (New York, Bern, Frankfurt, Paris: Peter Lang, 1990), 29-32.

¹⁰⁰Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York: International Publishers, 1959) and *Selections From Prison Notebooks*, ed. Q. Oare and G. Newell-Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

¹⁰¹For a discussion of the Gramscian notion of hegemony see E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), 112-122.

Colin Leys argues that the emanation of the New Right movement in England should be seen as a reaction against the social and political movement developed in the society above and beyond the class politics such as women's movement, the student movement, the movement against racism, the gay liberation movement, the ecological movement. This reaction, has 'tapped a larger reservoir of traditional sentiment among ordinary people.'¹⁰² In other words, what the author suggests, together with Sunic and Gray, is that the New Right movement has created its own epistemological discourse and situated and enhanced it as the social and political culture. On the other hand, Helvacioğlu, still departing from Gramsci and his understanding of hegemony, sees the New Right as a consequence of the hegemonic crisis of the liberalism in United States as a derivative of the transition from Fordism to post Fordism.¹⁰³ Helvacioğlu situates the New Right as the counter hegemonic attack that occurred in the ideological, economic and political vacuum and argues that it could be summarized as an offense on "individualism and on the legitimacy of the American political system."¹⁰⁴ The interesting point here is that, it is the New Right answering and facing the crisis of the hegemony of liberalism but not any other political movements. Leys focuses on this issue by saying, "the Labour Party did not respond as positively to these new movements as the Conservative Party responded negatively."¹⁰⁵ Yet, the whole process of transition to New Right politics is a shift from the labourist model and behind this development, there are two different but related determining factors.

¹⁰²Colin Leys, *Politics in Britain: From Labourism to Thatcherism* (London, New York: Verso, 1989), 183.

¹⁰³Helvacioğlu, *New Right*, 101-102.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 113.

¹⁰⁵Leys, *Politics*, 183.

The first one is the inadequacy of Keynesian economic policies and the second its relationship with modernity.

New Right's relation with the concept of 'strong state' is crucial. On the one hand it is believed that 'it sanctions the legal rules that allows markets their necessary free play.'¹⁰⁶ In this sense there has been a close interaction between the New Right's approach and the economism of the classical liberal thought. Nevertheless as has been mentioned above in the Oakeshottian model of conservatism 'market cannot prosper in an autonomous way,'¹⁰⁷ in need of a regulation. They imply norms and mechanisms of trust, which can be protected by law but only to a degree produced by legal formulations. They are not inherent in the economic contract itself.¹⁰⁸ This leads the New Right to its problematic relation with Keynesianism which is usually seen as the model carrying the state intervention to its crux. In the same line with this it is articulated that Keynesianism has also been the source of the economic crisis reached its peak by the late 1970s in the fiscal, debt and employment realms. The crisis of Keynesianism should not only be taken arising as a consequence of the proposed new solutions to the troubles already existing. It is more a crisis derived from the globalization, in Giddens' account whose concrete effects observed in the 1990s after the hegemony of the New Right, neo-liberal politics.

Giddens, in his analysis, considers the influence of internationalization of the capital due to the advances reached in the communications technology and order. In

¹⁰⁶Giddens, *Beyond*, 41.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

this context, according to him, Keynesianism has become ineffective due to its attachment to the national and territorial boundaries causing a corporatist model and totality.¹⁰⁹ The dismantling of this model has also caused the deconstruction of the established social structure, as well as the state model. Through corporatism¹¹⁰ the basic idiosyncrasy of the Keynesian economic order, the function of the state has adhered to three specific conditions as, i) the state, to influence the economic mechanisms must construct a distributional condition; ii) for such a condition to be possible it must perform the orchestration of social consensus; iii) [t]he state must achieve an adequate balance in the distribution of its fiscal resources and its regulatory activities between the national, regional and municipal levels of government.¹¹¹ As the impact of globalisation has started to loosen the established structure of the Keynesianism, this state model turned out to be local authorities of the global system¹¹² more prone to new conceptualisations of citizenship which is an independent variable of modernity as has been argued by Giddens with an interesting appeal once more to Keynesianism through detraditionalization. Giddens supports the idea that globalisation has a direct effect on the process of detraditionalisation in the everyday social activity and it means "an acceleration of the reflexivity of lay

¹⁰⁹For a deep elaboration of the relationship between corporatism and Keynesianism see Peter Lange, *Liberal Corporatism and Union Responsiveness: Exit, Voyage and Wage Regulation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

¹¹⁰Frank L. Wilson, "Neo-Corporatism and the Rise of New Social Movements", in *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*, eds., Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 67-83.

¹¹¹Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 146-147.

¹¹²*ibid.*, 176.

populations."¹¹³ The articulation between Keynesianism and detraditionalism, to Giddens, brings fore the modernisation process for, "Keynesianism worked tolerably well in a world of *simple modernisation*; but it could not survive in a world of *reflexive modernisation*- a world of intensified social reflexivity."^{114,115} Lastly, Giddens formulates Keynesianism-state interaction through citizenship in the context that, the former, with the priority it attributes to the welfare state, "presumes a citizenry with more stable lifestyle habits than are characteristic of a globalized universe of high reflexivity."¹¹⁶

This discussion should be completed with Offe's reflections on the connection between modernity and neo-liberal development. Offe argues that neoconservatism has a dual condition as long as modernism is concerned. The reason is twofold: on the social and cultural levels it is attached to a more reactionary understanding whereas it is rather modernist on the economic, technological and military policy terms. Also included in this dilemma is the traditionalism because the scene that appears in the first half of 1980s is a juxtaposition of traditionalism and modernism.¹¹⁷ Offe, sees the welfare state playing the leading role in the construction of these problems for, he says that it is thought that the interventionist, welfare, Keynesian state, has become too

¹¹³Giddens, *Beyond*, 42.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, 42; emphasis original.

¹¹⁵For the further discussion of the concept of reflexive modernisation see Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

¹¹⁶Giddens, *Beyond*, 42.

¹¹⁷Claus Offe, *Modernity*, 17-20.

heavy a burden on economy and he further develops three points: i. welfare state does not any more stand for a minimal standards of welfare but is counted as a provider of maximum standards of welfare; ii. welfare state due to the limits set by liberalist rule of law and the protection of public sphere is prevented from transgressing the limits of formal-legal entitlements and distribute benefits according to principals of attributed need and this makes it infeasible to make the receipt of benefits on conditions of moral obligation. This situation involves a potential for 'moral hazard;' iii. welfare state programs tend to be more reactive than active or differentiated rather than integrated.¹¹⁸ For Offe, the situation of the welfare state, should these issues are taken into consideration, is under attack and pressure not only from both sides, neo-liberal and pro-welfare, but also ends up in a discussion more concentrated on the moral dimension, in search of a universalist model.¹¹⁹ This framework, also, brings out the neoconservative 'remoralization' approach as the inverse image of left-libertarian critique of the welfare state which could only be ended up with the discussion that is left to democracy-welfare state relation.¹²⁰ Though this discussion necessitates a further elaboration on the liberalism-free market economy relationship, yet in anticipation to that we should more concentrate on the condition that 1980s faces: the modernity as a larger problem than the reconstruction of the state as an end in itself which has been sufficiently argued.¹²¹ Here, if the position taken by Hall is accepted,

¹¹⁸Ibid., 151.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 153.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹David Held, "Power and Legitimacy in Contemporary Britain," in *State and Society in Contemporary Britain*, eds., Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 347-361.

in the 1980s state and its status is more a consequence of post-modernity or rather than the critical approaches to modernity.¹²²

5.4. The 'New' State of the New Right and Neo-Liberalism

The state-free market correlation, is a long debated problem.¹²³ The originality of the New Right, more neo-liberalism is once more calling this interdependency with one specific condition, as has been put by Held. He argues that the success of the neo-liberal politics in the 1980s in Britain has rested i) on the attack they performed against "the claim that the state and government are inextricably linked to the direct creation of expanding economic opportunities and social welfare" and ii) "on the uncoupling or separation of the state, i.e. the state as an instrument for the delivery of goods and services from consideration of the state as a powerful, prestigious and enduring representative of the people or nation."¹²⁴ This liberal context, Held argues, has provided neo-liberalism with the ability to juxtapose the coexistence of minimal state with the strong state, in Thompson's words, 'rolling back the state.'¹²⁵ 'Strong state' in the realm of liberalism, plays a role for "providing a secure basis upon which business, trade and family life will prosper."¹²⁶ This duality, according to Hall,

¹²²Stuart Hall, "The Meaning of New Times," in *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s*, eds. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London: Lawrence and Wishart in association with Marxism Today, 1990 (1989)).

¹²³For a classical assumption see C.P.Macpherson,

¹²⁴David Held, "Power", 348.

¹²⁵Grahame Thompson, "'Rolling Back' the State", in *State and Society*, 274-298.

¹²⁶Held, "Power", 347.

should not be seen as a unique and truly original formulation worked by the New Right. Rather, he argues, New Right and its originality is an outcome of a bunch of changes that has developed in the West upon the demise of Fordism, Taylorism and other related concepts. These changes have not delivered the New Right, but transformation itself was produced by what Hall calls 'the new times'¹²⁷ and it 'refers to social, economic, political and cultural changes.'¹²⁸ It is this set of changes that breeds the debate on modernism. In other words, the question turns out to be as if neo-liberal, New Right movement might be a political agenda in the process of the fading away of modernism and the nascent of what is called postmodernism.

Hall, more focusing on socio-economic aspects of the discussion drives upon nine points encompassing, *inter alia*, the transition. These are i) a shift to new information technologies, ii) more flexible specialised and decentralised form of labour process and work organisation, iii) contracting-out of functions and services hitherto provided 'in house' on a corporate basis, iv) leadign role of consumption, v) decline in the proportion of skilled male, manual working class and the rise of the service and white collarclasses, vi) more flexi-time and part-time working, vii) an economy dominated by the multinationals with their new international division of labour and their greater autonomy of nation state control, viii) globalisation of the new financial markets; ix) emergence of new patterns of social divisions especially between private and public and two,thirds who have rising expectations and the new poor and underclasses of the one-third.¹²⁹ Amid the Jamesonian, Baudriallardian and

¹²⁷Hall, "The Meaning," 116.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Ibid., 118.

Lyotardian definitions proposed for the postmodern unfolding and advances, this framework adequately enough draws out the limits of the structure developed in the 1980s which fostered and fortified by New Right as well as fostering and reinforcing it. It is in this context that Hall says

the longer *duree* of new times, Thatcherism's project can be understood as operating on the ground of longer, deeper, more profound movements of change which *appear* to be going its way. but of which, in reality, it has been only occasionally, and fleetingly, in command over the past decade. We can see Thatcherism as an attempt to hegemonise these deeper tendencies within its project of 'regressive modernisation', to appropriate them to a reactionary political agenda and to harness to them the interest and fortunes of specific and limited social interests¹³⁰

Without going any further, here it could be said that the challenge of New Right should not be seen as a collective and total break with modernity. In fact, with its emphasis on the strong state, the 'transformation' of the social structure, the search for a new political agenda, the concentration on the national, ethnic, racist and sexual issues it is, as has been suggested by Hall a 'regressive modernisation' and its success should be searched on this basis. Other than that, if once again Hall's view point is considered, and if New Right is presumed as a political movement and agenda not only realising but also attaching to the already developed changes, even though with a reactionary and regressive mode, yet with that characteristic it could be situated as a modernist movement and it is at this point that starts the suffering of the left in the 1980s for its inadequacy either for sensing the new appearing changes and proposing solutions for them.

5.5. New Right in Turkey

¹³⁰Ibid., 127.

5.5.1. *The Motherland Party*

Qualifying the post-1980 era as a turning point, Nilüfer Göle further enlarges her opinions rather staying on the changing pattern of the modernizing movement (Westernization) by referring to the development of new cleavages in Turkey, replacing the state elites as technocratic elites as well as excluding the mentioned concept as the leading political paradigm.¹³¹ Accordingly, the consequence of the 'relative autonomization of economic activities, political groups, and cultural identities, an autonomous societal sphere' beginning to develop shifting the focus from the state to society. The last phase in this new process has been, again as a matter of the constitutive power attributed to modernisation, the ceasing of transforming the society from the above. Göle observing the Motherland Party (MP-Anavatan Partisi) as the peer and the pioneer of this transformation, thus draws on the combination of three points: "moderate political discourse, a pragmatic engineering ideology, and conservative social values."¹³²

This framework might be taken as the impact of the New Right-neo-liberal-New Conservative movement in Turkey in the post 1983 era, and MP, the political party in power between 1983-1991 should be considered as the constitutive of the era. Although, in the relevant literature it is much accepted that in the period in which MP

¹³¹Göle discusses this development at length in her book; Nilüfer Göle, *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: (Öncü Devrimcilerden Yenilikçi Seçkinlere)*, tr. E. Levi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1986) also see Nilüfer Göle, "Engineers: 'Technocratic Democracy'," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, eds., Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London, New York: I.B Tauris and Co Ltd, 1993), 199,218.

¹³²Nilüfer Göle, "Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds., Metin Heper and Ahmet İvin (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 213-222.

has played the determinant role the society has undergone an overwhelming transformation still it is not immune to harsh criticism once more drawing the attention to basically the above mentioned three factors.¹³³ Nevertheless, the generally accepted points have always been MP's reliance on a politics of toleration, its affiliation with the New Right hegemonic discourse, as well as its ambition in the transformation process.¹³⁴ The debate more encompasses the tools of the transformation and the results obtained with one specific inquisition, whether MP, as a political party of the post-1980 era, has really been challenging the structure intentioned by the military through the 1982 Constitution, i.e. a party having a definitely 'new' aspects and an ideological framework or a continuation of the political understanding came out in the pre-1980 era.¹³⁵ The answer given to this question has always been negative much referring to the linking MP with to the *Democrat Party* tradition in Turkey with an emphasis first on the periphery then the civil society¹³⁶ by Turgut Özal himself, the founder and leader of the party. Then, the discussion concerning MP's role in the recent political history of Turkey starts revolving around the originality of the MP regarding two specific issues; first the details of the programatic as well as the

¹³³As an example see, Levent Köker, "Anavatan Partisi," in *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ansiklopedisi*, vol.15 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 1253-1257.

¹³⁴Üstün Ergüder: "The Motherland Party," in *Political Parties and democracy in Turkey*, eds., Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 152-169.

¹³⁵Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns?" in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 81-102. This is the slightly revised version of the article first appeared as: "Restoration of Democracy in Turkey? Political Reforms and the Elections of 1983" in *Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends*, ed. Linda Layne (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview, 1987), 19-38.

¹³⁶Ergüder, "The Motherland Party", in *Political Parties*, 162.

ideological approach of MP, second, whether it has been a transient or stable political force in Turkey.

5.5.2. *The Success of the MP*

MP, was founded in 1983, when the elections is forseen by the military, as explained above. The founders of the party were more a group of technocrats either performed in the state or in the private sector.¹³⁷ According to the surveys carried out by Ergüder, even though a group of both the founders and the grassroots politicians had been involved in the pre-1980 right wing political parties still MP was not the reincarnation of a previously existing party.¹³⁸ It was one of the three parties who were allowed to run for the 1983 elections with an interesting characteristic that, it was the only 'autonomous party' while the *Populist Party* (Halkçı Parti) representing the left-wing politics, *National Democracy Party* (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi) was the political organisation apparently supported by the generals.¹³⁹ In the elections held in November 1983, when MP recieved the 45.2 % of the votes it has been regarded as an unexpected success. This success is linked to three conditions.

i) The leadership problem of NDP. The chairperson of the NDP was a former general and he was attaching the party to the image of 'state party' and holding to the power of the military¹⁴⁰, which has usually bounced back in the Turkish politics as

¹³⁷Ibid., 155.

¹³⁸Ergüder and Hofferbert, "The 1983."

¹³⁹Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "1983-1994: Siyasal Parti Topografyası," in *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.15 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 1248-1252.

¹⁴⁰Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in *Politics in Developing Countries*, eds., J.L.Linz, S.M. Lipset (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2nd edition, 1995), 219-261.

has been observed and experienced in the aftermaths of 1960 and 1971 military interventions. In both periods the political organizations challenging the military have gained power. In this case, Göle argues that MP's success was a response to 'the democratic margin permitted by the military.'¹⁴¹

ii) The second reason placing MP in the top ranks of the political eschalon after a long process of resconstructing the Turkish social and political life in the military period is again supported by Ergüder insisting that, like JP has done after the 1960 intervention, MP has not refrained from using the clientalistic politics to fill the political void. The interesting point is that like JP, MP also "forged a coalition of the right which cut across diverse cultural and social cleavages."¹⁴² This point is important for, it explains MP's ambition in persisting that it has mixed and merged the four political tendencies, i.e. liberals, fundamentalists, nationalists, social democrats, the sources of the political polarization before 1980. It is also important for it explains another dimension which has been situated by Göle referring to the 'politics of toleration.'

iii) Göle, speaks of toleration with a remark of the political culture in Turkey established in the republican period. She rightly defines the characteristic of this period on the basis of a) 'single actor syndrom,' b) utopias replacing ideologies giving birth to the authoritarian tendencies; c) catharsis, the consequence of the domination of centrifugal forces ending up in the watershed constituted by the military-state between center-peripherhy, replaced by pluralism, an outcome of the autonomization of the

¹⁴¹Göle, "Toward," 217.

¹⁴²Ergüder, "The Motherland Party," 154.

political structure stretching it towards the importance of civil society in the political life.¹⁴³ As a matter of fact, MP has replaced the more abstract and isolated utopias of the Republican period with more pragmatic ideological approaches, which is better put as the adoption of policy-oriented approach rather than politics-oriented, which also introduced a synthesis between market economy and Islamic values, holding on to a 'conservative progressive' ideology combining Islamic and local values with Westernisation, the dream of the Republican period.¹⁴⁴

5.5.3. MP, the New-Right and the Elements of the Hegemonic Discourse

Under these assumptions MP might be seen a political party emerging in the 1980s, as a prolongation of the search for a more civil oriented politics, started by the 1950s, developing a new discourse by bringing a set of new issues into discussion, which, among others, the decentralization, debureaucratization, destatism being the leading ones.¹⁴⁵ A further elaboration on MP should focus on these issues for they not only signify the expansion of a new discourse in the right wing politics of Turkey but also indicating the crucial points regarding the demise of the Turkish left wing, social democratic policies in the 1980s.

MP can not be detached from the hegemony of the New right politics as aforementioned. This is one reason why its policies are eclectic and stretching beyond the conventional center right politics in Turkey usually relying on the transcendental

¹⁴³Göle, "Toward," 216-219.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 220.

¹⁴⁵Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Özal Dönemini Yeniden Değerlendirirken," in *Sağ, Türkiye ve Partileri* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1995), 201-212.

understanding of the state albeit the covert process of transforming the social and economic structure.¹⁴⁶ This is a dual process tried to be achieved through the dominant role of bourgeoisie. It is possible to say that, in the 1965 elections the main determinant that delivered the power to Justice Party has been the strength of the provincial bourgeoisie, more a component of the trade rather than the industry. Between the 1965 and 1980 the political climate in Turkey has deeply been effected by the momentum created by this class leaning on to conventional and traditional values and feeding a more conservative view point which places the state to the centre. The state-provincial bourgeoisie relationship on this grounds should not be taken as a matter of surprise for, the development of this class, traditionally, is controlled and determined by the state.¹⁴⁷ A bourgeoisie going beyond the state could not have been conceived by that period because, state, on the other hand has been suing for a corporatism foreseeing the adjoining of the social forces as well as denying the social differentiation. The State Planning Organisation, to remind once again, in the 1960s and 1970s has been the central organ not only controlling the central distribution process but also governing the development and the momentum of the social classes, mainly bourgeoisie. Justice Party, in this social structure has conventionally been dependent on the trade forces, the provincial, suburban social elements. In this context, the long march of bourgeoisie between 1960-1980 has not been conducive to decentralization or destatism. Import substitution policies have also backed this framework.

¹⁴⁶Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Türkiye Sağının Değişim Arayışları," in *Sağ*, 273-280.

¹⁴⁷Çağlar Keyder, "The agrarian Background and the Origins of the Turkish Bourgeoisie," in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, eds., Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder, Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994).

1980s, is the period in which under the leadership of MP, the distancing of the state and bourgeoisie is observed on the political, economic and social level. This very peculiarity contributing to both destatization and decentralization, two issues usually taken as the upsurge of liberalism in Turkey. In this context, for the first time, paradoxically in a period when the state is restructured and in Heper's words, 'the resurrection of a partially transcendental state' is observed¹⁴⁸ by the regulations conducted and defined by the military the *raison d'être* as well as the function and dimensions of it has been put under consideration. This is more an attempt whose reflections are found on the economic, social and political environments. The debureaucratization in this context has been the crucial and most debated issue for, according to Heper, what is called debureaucratization should be followed on three bases none of them sufficient enough to demarcate a real debureaucratization process.¹⁴⁹ They are i) the further politicization of the public bureaucracy; ii) the decreasing of the influence of public bureaucracy with the allegation by the prime minister and his entourage that "civil servants could not summon the dynamism their government's policies required"; iii) to bring the autonomous agencies under closer control of the government, Central Bank being a prominent example.¹⁵⁰ These, Heper argues that have put "the public bureaucracy into insignificance"¹⁵¹ where an assumption that debureaucratization has been achieved is totally an illusion. Even though this approach has caught a noteworthy point, still what is important is the

¹⁴⁸Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*.

¹⁴⁹Metin Heper, "The State and Debureaucratization: The Case of Turkey."

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 610-611.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, 612.

macro approach backing it that, state-public bureaucracy is inadequate adopting itself to the new discourse and policy figured out by MP. Actually this should rather be taken as the complaining of the bourgeoisie in need of a better organised bureaucracy to meet its expectations in a period of globalisation.¹⁵² In the same line it is a weighty issue showing the first breaking of the state and the bourgeoisie equipping it with the possibility of establishing its political cultural dominance¹⁵³ using the opportunities supplied by the mass urbanisation and the demising of the rural power gathered in the provinces.

State was brought into discussion also on the level of decentralization which has developed on two levels the earlier attempt being the establishment of what is called two-tiered municipal systems in the urban centres, i.e. a metropolitan municipality and a number of district municipalities.¹⁵⁴ This has again been considered a major step in the differentiation of the state and the localities opening itself to a debate more revolved around the new understandings of democracy which demarcates the second issue in the process. The new understanding of democracy was more prone to the merging of the notion of democracy with civil society putting both the state and the democracy itself to an instrumental position. The civil society debate came out in the 1980s in Turkey, with the emergence of various different social

¹⁵²For a discussion of this relationship see, Korkut Boratav, "Contradictions of 'Structural Adjustment': Capital and the State in Post-1980 Turkey," in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994), 155-176.

¹⁵³Ahmet İnel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 87.

¹⁵⁴Metin Heper, "Motherland Party Governments and Bureaucracy in Turkey, 1983-1988", *Governance*, Vol. 2, n. 4, (October 1989), 460-471.

identities attached to social groups such as ecologists and feminists.¹⁵⁵ These groups were more in search of an identity defined in the private space instead of being imposed on the individuals as a part of the modernising project merged with the nationalism. This was again a detachment from the authoritarian public domination. In the 1980s the basis for all these developments was the neo-liberal economic programme started as early as 1979.

The liberal economic program of Turgut Özal was, resembling the other likewise models developed in Britain and America, foresaw the mass privatization, the minimalization of the state on the economic level, the monetarist policies replacing the finance policies, the establishment of the stock market, and the populist capitalism usually referred as the 'adjustment program'.¹⁵⁶ This bunch of economic policies have brought not only a quasi-liberal political environment but also put the statism under discussion both on the economic and social levels, pulling the state backwards to a certain limit. Even though there has been a much of criticism concerning this last issue, insisting that state, on the contrary, during the 1980s has perpetuated its dominating role on the economic level, still from the political perspective it could be argued that the liberal movement, expressed as 'freedom of enterprise' ('*teşebbüs özgürlüğü*') emerged as a concept giving birth to the role and the importance of both individualism and a democracy notion seen undetachable from this phenomenon. In other words, the democracy defined in Turkey relying on the civil society was, in fact,

¹⁵⁵Göle, "Toward", 218-219.

¹⁵⁶Fikret Şenses, "The Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program and the Process of Turkish Industrialization: Main Policies and their Impact" in *Recent Industrialization Experience of Turkey in a Global Context*, ed., Fikret Şenses (Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press), 51-74.

a democracy understanding, articulating a classical liberal approach. This point needs a careful examination for, in a political and social culture where an individualism has never occurred, contrary to the classical liberal model, it proclaimed the 'separation of economics from politics'.¹⁵⁷ This implies once more the imperative of economics on democracy intending the transition to market economy via state control and from the above.

More important than that, the destatism in Turkey, in spite of all inadequacies during the 1980s has contributed to and fostered the liberal development of the Turkish right wing politics. The right wing politics, assumed naturally to be founded on a liberal basis, buttressing the individualism, minimalising the state and encouraging the development of the civil society, on the contrary has been a state oriented, corporatist, collectivist one. In the 1980s the new approach especially with the amendment of the Penal Law, with reference to its articles banning the foundation of political parties on class and religion basis, the call for a more populist cultural understanding compromising 'the people' stimulating the cultural agenda known as 'arabesque', enabling the broadcasting of private television channels challenging the monopoly of the state channels has not only contributed to the conservative politics but also put the left politics into a crucial position pushing it to an impasse, provoking the society to ask for new but alternative policies of the left. This phenomenon has brought the great void especially faced by the left as a politics which has rested on the state and the regulatory economic policies and the 'grand narrative' of modernising project depending on the state elites and military, nationalism and secularism being its two pillars. Through the development of the new understanding of identity, more used to express the cultural, religious, ethnic identities, 1980s has witnessed the state

¹⁵⁷ Göle, "Toward," 218.

deflating and diminishing on the public realm. This framework has contributed to the crisis of the left politics as well as to the crisis of the republican epistemology which will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.

Even though there is a commonality between the crisis faced in the West and in Turkey which is the shortcomings of modernity, this strait has a dual effect in Turkey with respect to the Western democracies. It is obvious that the Western left, at large, has also faced a catastrophic condition due to the development of the new social and political demands culminating after what is known as the New Social and Political Movements, together with the new theories constructed by the poststructuralist searches. In Turkey, it is difficult to say that, this framework has a direct affected on the political left because this bulk of new epistemology has exerted a determining force first on the foundational republican epistemology which is identical with the modernity project. Left has been impressed by what has been achieved indirectly due to its symbiotic relationship with the state and its constitutive ideology. In short, what has taken place on the social and political level in Turkey in the 1980s should be seen as a crisis of a specific project of modernity which has always aimed putting the state into the center.

Conclusion

The 1980s not only in Turkey but also in the West witnessed the emergence of the New Right policies. The early debates around this concept have aimed to analyse the structural aspects of it to see whether it is a new version of traditional liberal policies and philosophy or of conservatism, even though there is a hidden relationship between the two concepts. Although there are major differences between the American

and English models of New Right, neo-liberal policies, there are a set of similarities as well. The major one is the direct effect of the economic policies applied. Economic policies have not only been related with the realm of economy but rather intended to change the overall structure of the social body. In this respect, the overwhelming condition has been the search for and the process of constructing the minimal state. This period has been backed by the remarkable changes that appeared on the social theoretical level. In the transition to a new epistemology, under the influence of feminist and ecologist movements, the modernity project is put under severe criticism. The demise and the dismantling of the state might be taken as a consequence of this development which brings the rejection of the centralised model of economic development. The left, under these circumstances, has not only faced a radical breakdown but the New Right political and social discourse has turned out to be a hegemonic one.

In Turkey, the New right policies have also, in the 1980s, played a groundbreaking role. The functioning of the New Right policies in Turkey has been through the economic policies first designed by the last pre-1980 Demirel government and later reached its climax with the basic preferences of Motherland Party governments. MP, in developing its hegemonic discourse for the first time in the Republican period Turkish politics has tried to seize the determining role of the state. This condition was a new step put forward in the long process of modernisation for two reasons. First, the project has foreseen the creation of the bourgeoisie and with this attempt it has become clear that bourgeoisies could be detached from the state. Second, should modernity be conceived as the development of the individual less relying on the controlling power of the state this condition is fulfilled giving birth to the critic of modernity in Turkey through the discussion of such conditions as national

identity and citizenship. The Turkish left, with these determining factors has deepened its crisis. This crisis might be determined as an inevitable one and in this aspect determining is the left's symbiotic relationship with the state. Usually attached to the post-War Keynesian left models, relying on the regulatory economies, Turkish left faced the problem of not being able to develop alternatives to the demise of statist, corporatist policies. Usually defining itself as the possessor of the modernity project, Turkish left in this period has deeply been effected by the debureaucratization process.

CHAPTER VI

IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY: 1980s AND THE LEFT IN TURKEY

6.1 The Reconstruction of the Politics

6.1.1. Early Attempts and Foundational Issues

The crisis of the left is first felt when MP achieved an unexpected success in the elections held in 1983. The left entered the contest in a catastrophic condition. When the National Security Council decided to hold the elections, the first party founded on the left, depending on the consent of the Council was the Populist Party (PP-*Halkçı Parti*).¹ Populist Party was founded by Necdet Calp, a former cabinet secretary of İsmet İnönü. The party after it was established and achieved the ratification of the Council started a furious debate on the left, especially among the politicians who had taken places on the ranks of Republican Peoples' Party before it was dissolved by the military junta, with the argument that a party which has admitted

¹For a brief survey of PP see Hikmet Bila, *Sosyal Demokrat Süreç İçinde CHP ve Sonrası* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 2nd ed., 1987), 502-503. Also see *Halkçı Parti Programı* (Ankara: Halkçı Parti Yayınları, n.d.); Halkçı Parti, *Tüzük* (Ankara: Halkçı Parti Yayınları, n.d.).

the conditions set by the military regime can not be democratic and cannot represent the left.²

The incentive of the search for a new party was not only emanating from the existence of PP but more from the blurred condition of RPP for two reasons. The first one was that, RPP was dissolved by the NSC due to the Law number 2533, dated October 16, 1983. In this condition there was not a party existing any more but the more confusing circumstance was the process started before that when the former leader of the party Bülent Ecevit resigned from his post with a declaration by the 29 October 1980.³ Though Ecevit in his proclamation draws the attention to the constraints to fulfill the responsibility of party leadership due to NSC's decision, banning any political activity especially for Süleyman Demirel and himself, after their custody following the military coup, his basic intention was to continue with the political activity. Though later he was accused of leaving the party in a turmoil by his resignation⁴ he immediately realised the publication of the journal *Arayış* (The Search) in the February 1981 which was also banned by the Headquarters of Martial Law and tried to establish a foundation called *Beyaz Güvercin* (White Dove) which was intended

²Yavuz Gökalp Yıldız, "SHİP-CHP" in *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, V. 15 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 1268.

³For the text of this declaration see Bila, *CHP*, 482-483.

⁴Cezmi Kartay, *11 Eylül 1980'den Günümüze Siyasal Anılar ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Öyküsü* (Ankara: Sanem Matbaacılık AŞ, n. d (1997 (?)), 82.

to be transformed into a party in time.⁵ Consequently Ecevit began continuously and strictly to be followed by the Martial Law Courts and sentenced to imprisonment.⁶

Besides, Ecevit, after his release, kept a distance from the former ranks of RPP, arguing that "RPP had already completed its mission for it was a bourgeois party."⁷ After receiving a definite rejection and refusal from Ecevit both for the reformation of RPP or leading a new party with the unexpected allegation that the social democracy in Turkey is in need of a new organisation method which might even last for thirty years and could not even be lived by the existing cadres, the former politicians induced their search vigorously⁸ declaring that the mission of RPP has not yet completed.⁹ The same day it was announced that PP has been founded, Erdal İnönü, later the leader of Social Democracy Party (SDP-*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi*) and Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP-*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*), announced that he was involved in the founding process of a party and later the party was established by June 6, 1983¹⁰ embodying the important politicians, cadres and grassroots activists of former RPP. After PP, SDP was the second party on the left but the crucial point was that due to the vetos of the NSC it was obstructed from

⁵Yalçın Doğan, *Dar Sokakta Siyaset, 1980-1983*, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1985), 113-117.

⁶The long procedure of these courts and Ecevit's struggle is found in detail in Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Hapishanedeki Ecevit* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2nd pr., 1986).

⁷Doğan, *Dar*, 147.

⁸The different attempts on this basis is explained in Kartay, *Siyasal*.

⁹Doğan, *Dar*.

¹⁰The full text of the petition given to Ministry of Interiors is in Kartay, *Siyasal*, 144-147.

running for the 1983 elections. Nevertheless in this election PP, as the only party on the left received a well 30.5 % of the votes with respect to the 45.2% of MP and 23.3% of the NDP.¹¹

6.1.2. Two Parties on the Left: SDPP and DLP

The most important phenomenon up until the merging of the two parties has been the local elections of March 25, 1984. In this rally SDP has come in the second by receiving the 23.4% of the votes after MP who has received the 41.3%. The crucial issue was not only the third position of the PP but the difference between the vote percentages as it could only gained the 8.3%.¹² This weak condition of the party on the left wing politics has started a set of unrest in the party, commencing with the harsh criticism directed to the leader Calp and then ending up with his defeat in the party congress, June 29, 1985, Aydın Güven Gürkan replacing him.¹³ The new period on the left wing politics just started after this event has developed in two major steps. i) The merging of the two parties, SDP and PP, was realised in November 3, 1985¹⁴ under the name of Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP-*Sosyal Demokrat*

¹¹For an analysis of this election with a retrospective approach, comparing the percentage of votes obtained by PP and other parties with the pre-1983 parties of left and right see, Ahmet Karam and Sezgin Tüzün, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kutuplaşmalar ve Seçmen Davranışları* (Ankara: Veri Araştırma, 1998), 55.

¹²Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crisis, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," in Larry Diamond, J.L.King, S.M. Lipset (eds.), *Politics in Developing Countries* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Pbs, 2nd ed., 1995), 243.

¹³Hikmet Bila, *CHP*, 509.

¹⁴The long process could be followed in Süleyman Coşkun, *SHP: Bir Oluşumun Perde Arkası* (Ankara: Esen Yayınları, n.d.). The insider information is found in Kartay, *Siyasal*, 295-318.

Halkçı Parti) and, ii) by the November 14, 1985 again another party on the left, Democratic Left Party (DLP-*Demokratik Sol Parti*) was founded by Bülent Ecevit and his friends.¹⁵

The merging of the two parties, PP and SDP, has not been an easy task. On the contrary not only related to the days of merging but even in the later years this has been a subject of discussion among the social democrats in Turkey.¹⁶ The main opposition has concentrated on the point that PP, since the beginning, has been a party of no concrete backbone which means its grassroots cadres were not known in the public realm and was well beyond an organisation showing a real political character.¹⁷ In this process, according to the Protocol signed by the two chairpersons of the two parties, in the first congress of SDP, held in July 6-8, 1984, the proposal for the merging is submitted to the approval of the Party Council.¹⁸ In the first extraordinary party congress, November 2-3, 1985, the decision of the Party Council is ratified by the delegates and Aydın Güven Gürkan was elected as the first chairperson of the

¹⁵Nazmi Hanoğlu, "Demokratik Sol Parti," in *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, V.15 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 1272-1275.

¹⁶For an opposing view for the merging see, Cezmi Kartay, *Siyasal Anılar*, 295-318; Erdal İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler 2* (İstanbul: Yorum Kitapları, 1998).

¹⁷Ertuğrul Günay, *Speech delivered in the Conference: The New Searches for Social Democracy*. Harb-İş Salonu, June 24, 1992. The present author's notes (Ertuğrul Günay was the chairperson of SDP Ankara Town Unit (Ankara İl Başkanlığı). See also Ertuğrul Günay, "Bu yapılarla sol politika olmaz," *Yeni Gündem*, no. 66, 1987, 24-25.

¹⁸HP-SODEP Bütünleşme Protokolü ve İmza Töreninde İnönü'nün Konuşması (Ankara: SODEP Genel Sekreterliği, n.d.), 5-12. Also see Süleyman Ateş, *SHP: Bir Oluşumun perde Arkası* (Ankara: İsen yayınları, n.d.), 171-176.

Social Democratic Populist Party.¹⁹ In the second extraordinary congress of May 30-31, 1986, Gürkan was replaced by İnönü, another item of the Protocol, who would keep this post up until September 12, 1993, fourth Congress.

The appearance of two parties on the left, the first one being SDPP incorporating well organised grassroots activists, relying on the political tradition of RPP, having deep relations with the intelligentsia, and looking for the urban support,²⁰ the other one depending only on the charisma and the rhetoric of Bülent Ecevit²¹, apparently calling for a more populist policy and seeking power in the provincial and suburbanal regions²², insisting on a 'national left' model²³ started a debate on the meaning and the insight of social democracy in Turkey and the whole 1980s has been the battle ground for these two different approaches one supported by SDPP and the other by DLP. This debate has been of no practical use for three reasons; first, the whole 1980s up until 1991 has been under the rule of MP, center right politics; second, there has been no further momentum acquired either regarding

¹⁹Ibid., 188-207.

²⁰Andrew Mango, "The Social Democratic Populist Party, 1983-1989", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds., Metin Heper and Jacop M. Landau (London, New York: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1991), 170-187.

²¹Early intentions and opinions of Bülent Ecevit, in the process of founding the party is found in Bülent Ecevit, "Siyasette herkes kendini tasfiye eder," *Yeni Gündem*, no.11, (1986), 14-15; and Bülent Ecevit, "Sol Tekelciler Şantaj Yapıyor," *Yeni Gündem*, no. 24, (1986), 22-23.

²²For the organisation model which evoked a harsh debate on the left wing politics with the allegation that Ecevit was following a path depending on exclusion of the former cadres, politicians and especially intellectuals, see the explanations given by one of the early prominent names of the party, Seyfettin Gürsel, "Örgütlenmeden başkan sorumlu", *Yeni Gündem*, no. 56, (1987), 29.

²³Nazmi Hanoğlu, "Demokratik," 275.

the merger of the two parties, which has always been a hot project for all the decade, even further, in the 1990s, or the compromising of any one of the parties for the views accentuated by the other; third, as DLP being a 'one-man party'²⁴ continued in the 1990s²⁵ keeping loyal to its political views which have been fervently criticised for being more prone to center right, sometimes conservatism²⁶. On the other side, though SDPP after merging with reformed RPP in 1995, gave up some of its arguments concerning a more Western-type social democracy notion and became a more conservative party continued with the same accusation directed to DLP on the same basis.

This framework needs a deeper analysis of the two parties with a specific reference to their programmes and attitudes. But without going further, here, it should be noted that the recent history of the Turkish social democracy in the post-1983 period might be categorised as such, i) 1983-1989: the preparatory period including the come-back of the pre-1980 RPP top level politicians and Deniz Baykal's election as the Secretary General in SDPP; ii) 1989-1991: power in the local administrations; iii) 1991-1995: power in the central administration. This periodisation, no doubt brings

²⁴This very much debated issue might be followed through a published diary, with much insider information about the post-1983 period, to understand better İncevit's position and approach in his struggle for a new party Engin Ünsal, *İncevit'ten İncevit'e... (1977-1987 Yılları Arasında Sosyal Demokratların Çöküşünü Belgeleyen Anılar)*, (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, n.d).

²⁵Seyfettin Gürsel, who was also one of the ideologues of DLP together with the prominent professor of economics Asaf Savaş Akat, left the party soon after publishing a book on DLP programme and giving the aforementioned interview, criticising Bülent Ecevit of being anti-democratic in the intra-party policies: "DSP'den iki 'beyin' SHP'de," *Yeni Gündem*, no. 86, 1987, 22-23.

²⁶Hasan Bülent Kahraman, " DSP...Sağ mı Sol mu?" in *Sosyal Demokrasi, Türkiye ve Partileri* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993), 198-201.

SDPP and later (after 1995 merger) RPP fore. For DLP this time period is clearly divided into two halves: as 1985-1995: the opposition years and beginning by 1997 years of power. In this discussion a short and overall view of SDPP will be given and DLP will only be referred to delineate a different social democratic approach in Turkey.

After the forming of the party, the major event has been the come-back of the former RPP top rank cadres to SDPP. Deniz Baykal²⁷, the pre-1980 RPP deputy, minister and Deputy Secretary General a very well known politician in the intra-party conflicts as a leader of a faction, has been elected as the Secretary General in the Party Congress held in 1988.²⁸ Baykal's election started a debate in the party, which lasted for a long period of time and gave birth to the organisation of many factions. One of the first critical milestones in this debate, apart from the other intra-party and inter-faction debates was the expulsion of the Kurdish deputies from the party. The main point of contradiction between the factions was the alleged exclusionary approach of Baykal and his friends. Beyond the other political and ideological contradictions the Principle debate was concentrated on the point that Baykal and the central administration in the party was trying to control all the organisation and grassroots with an anti-democratic understanding.²⁹ This claim further supported by the faction

²⁷For a subtle and impressionistic biography of Deniz Baykal with absence of a critical methodological approach see Ahmet Kahraman, *Karanlıklar Prensi* (Ankara: Verso Yayınları, 1990).

²⁸For the social, political and economic background of the congress period see, Erdal İnönü, *Erdal İnönü'nün 2. Olağan Kurultayı Açış Konuşması* (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, mimeograph, n.d.).

²⁹During the 1980s there was a series of extraordinary congresses held in the party against the will of the central administration controlled by Baykal and friends coalescing with Erdal İnönü. Most of the congresses were to discuss the amendments realised in the Party Regulations. The allegation was that Baykal and his group was trying to hold and centralise all the control in the party. For these arguments see *Örgütten Parti İçin Demokrasiye, Sosyal Demokrasiye, Demokrasiye Saygı Çağrısı* (Ankara:

called *Reformists* (Yenilikçiler) when they applied the courts for the cancellation of the amendments in the Statutes which had been implemented by the Party Council. The Party Council was under the control of Baykal faction and the amendments aimed at the further centralisation of authority in the party to control the party organisation.³⁰

After an unsuccessful result reached in a local election in the year 1990, the inter-factions conflict suddenly turned out to be a clash between the Chairman and the Secretary General. In this round the latter was accused by Erdal İnönü of trying to get the full control of the party sidelining the existing Chairman in the leadership and the Party Congress was held by the September 29, 1990 to discuss the allegations and

n.p., 1990); *Yitik Tüzük-Kırık Demokrasi , Dönüm Kurultayı* (Ankara (?): n.p., 1990). Both prepared for the June 4, 1989, Fourth Extraordinary Congress. For İnönü's approach see SHP, *Genel Başkan Erdal İnönü'nün 4. Olağanüstü Kurultay Açış Konuşması* (Ankara: n.p, 1989).

³⁰It is worth consideration that though there are only two amendments of the Programme in SDPP there are five Regulations between 1985-1995. SHP, *Tüzük , 2 Kasım 1985 günü yapılan 1. Olağanüstü Kurultayca kabul edilmiştir* (Ankara: n.p., 1985); SHP, *Tüzük, Üçüncü Olağanüstü Kurultay, Haziran 1987* (Ankara: n.p., 1987); SHP, *Tüzük, Son değişikliklerle* (Ankara: n.p., 1989); SHP, *Tüzük, V. Olağanüstü Kurultaya kadar olan değişiklikler işlenmiştir, ocak 1990* (Ankara: N.p., 1990); SHP, *Tüzük, 3-4 Nisan 1993 günleri toplanan SHP 'Tüzük ve Program Kurultayı'nda kabul edilmiştir* (Ankara: n.p., 1993). This point might be taken as one of the evidences showing that during the 1980s, as well as in the 1990s, the social democratic politics is more controlled by the intra-party conflicts evoked by party cleavages with a definitive will of central control. This point is also acclaimed by Bülent Ecevit, saying that more than the programme, the regulations and the structure of the party is important for a left party; see, Bülent Ecevit: "Siyasette", 14. This view is harshly criticised by various scholars; see Sarah Benton: "The Decline of the Party," in *New Times: The Challenging Face of Politics in the 1990s*, eds., Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London: Lawrence and Wishart in association with Marxism Today, reprinted 1990, first edition published 1989); Perry Anderson, "Introduction," in *Mapping the West European Left*, eds., Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller (London, New York: Verso, 1994), 12-13.

to re-elect the chairperson.³¹ The reluctant Baykal was forced by İnönü to be the candidate for the chairpersonship and the contest would be between the two politicians. The congress elected Erdal İnönü as the chairman of the SDPP but this conflict between the two groups lasted for two more rounds and reached a new turning point when Baykal and his friends left the SDPP to reestablish the RPP.

These later events are the issues of 1990s and will be analysed in the following chapter. Here a more theoretical approach to the social democratic developments of the 1980s will be proceeded with a special emphasis put on the ideological openings and their roots. Here, an important point should be brought into discussion. As will be further analysed when the ideological aspects of Turkish social democracy in the 1980s is discussed, in the mentioned decade, there are a few but important achievements obtained by this political ideology. This is, first of all, due to the condition that, in the 1980s Turkey has faced a radically new discourse on the political realm raised by the New Right as has been analysed at length in the previous chapter. The transformation that Turkey has undergone in this period, as has also been analysed, sparked a certain support for especially SDPP, after the Populist Party success of 1983 elections. This was mainly due to the fear ignited by the rapid changes and expressed by the relatively conservative social classes remaining loyal to the already existing norms and conditions. Nevertheless this framework could only be further analysed by reviewing the election results of the 1980 decade.

6.1.3. Elections and the Social Democracy in the 1980s

³¹For the details of the background of the congress as well as the allegations by Erdal İnönü see (Erdal İnönü), *'Parti İçi Demokrasi İçin Atılım!' Kurultayı* (Mimeograph).

Having already analysed the 1983 elections and not once more going deep into the details of it, here, this relatively brief survey of the elections held in the 1980s should be started by the unexpected success of 1984 local elections which has been mentioned above. The next general elections was in 1987. The country has undergone this election in a more tense medium emanating from various issues. These were, as described by Turan, first, the reinvigoration of the opposition parties questioning the legitimacy of the MP governments when corruption debates were dominant in the social-political agenda. Second, the representative power and legitimacy of MP was under disputation regarding the conditions and the determining power of the National Security Council during the 1983 elections. This very last issue was also backed by the debates concerning the lifting of the bans on former political leaders. MP in this debate running for the perpetuation of the bans once more faced the criticisms regarding the legitimacy and democracy understanding of the party. One another vital question was the continuously rising inflation which seriously weakened MP's position especially among the middle classes which was the central axis for the political power of this party.³²

On the other hand MP realising its weakening political situation did not hesitate in changing the existing electoral system to reinforce the majoritarian aspects. These changes were clearly against the smaller parties whereas "the stronger was favoured more than the looser."³³ The raised district level threshold, the introduction of the district-level candidate system all backed MP's reinforcing its majority in the

³²İlter Turan, "Evolution of the Electoral Process," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 52-53.

³³Ibid., 55.

parliament. In the elections as MP hold the 297 seats clearly more than the 211 seats of the 1983 elections by getting only 36.3% of the votes as compared to 45.6% of the 1983 elections. On the other hand SDPP reached the 24.7% of all the votes. This was more than the 23.4% of the 1984 local elections which was the first and unexpected success of this party. Besides, DLP of Bülent Ecevit, in the 1987 elections, got only the 8.5%, a figure which did not let this party pass the national threshold of 10%. The total vote percentage of the left was 33.2 %, a figure still below the center right but staying loyal to the 'traditional' center-left bloc figures of the 1970s which was approximately 30%.³⁴ Yet, according to Kardam-Tüzün analysis which concentrates on the voting behaviour of the mob that refuses going to the polls, the 1987 elections is the third elections in which the traditional center-left bloc has raised its percentage by successfully receiving a support from those protestors in the post 1950 period.³⁵

The last elections which also attested an apparent victory for the center-left were the local elections of March 26, 1989. In the elections with respect to the 1987 general elections results, SDPP has come in the first party by receiving the 28.7% of the votes. DLP, in these elections with a very small increase in the vote percentage received only 9.0 % of all votes. Whereas, True Path Party under the leadership of charismatic Süleyman Demirel has reached 25.1% and become the second party. MP was only able to get 21.8% and to be third party in the ranking.³⁶ The sharp drop in MP votes is explained by various scholars referring to some different variables. According to Özbudun, the main reason behind this ebbing is the high inflation rates

³⁴Ahmet Kardam, Sezgin Tüzün, *Türkiye'de*, 56.

³⁵The other two elections was the 1973 and 1977 elections. Ibid., 56.

³⁶Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey", 241.

and the rumours of political corruption.³⁷ On the other hand, Kardam and Tüzün gives a more technical explanation and prefers, contrary to the common opinion which takes the results as the success of SDPP, to see the situation as the punishment of MP by its voters and supporters by not going to the polls.³⁸ This approach is also supported by Sabuncu and Şeker.³⁹ The critical consequence of this election has been the power captured by SDPP in the local administrations, especially in the municipalities.

This outcome has raised various debates in and out of party. First of all, as has been put by İnönü, the chairman of SDPP, the percentage achieved by the party is less than the summation of votes received separately by SDP and PP in the 1984 elections. In the previous elections the totality of the votes was 33.2% and this dropped to 28.7% in the 1989 elections where SDPP was the unification of the two parties. Nevertheless İnönü, underlining this specific condition, explains it as the "increase in the political power rather than the electoral power"⁴⁰ for, with respect to the 380 municipalities controlled by two centre-right parties totally having more votes, SDPP gained power in 650 local administrations.

As a conclusion, in this context, it could be said that, social democracy in Turkey, in the post-1983 era, has shown a relatively successful development. Its votes

³⁷Ibid., 243.

³⁸Ahmet Kardam, Sezgin Tüzün, *Türkiye'de*, 56.

³⁹Yavuz Sabuncu, Murat Şeker, "Seçimler", in *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, V.14 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 1148.

⁴⁰İrdal İnönü, *Genel Başkan İrdal İnönü'nün 4. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış Konuşması* (Ankara: SHP, 1989), 17.

has continuously increased but the crucial point is that, to put it once more, this upwards mobilising tendency in the votes is not due to the policies proposed or pragmatized by RPP but more is a consequence of the volatility of the center-right votes. Besides, two points could also be alleged. First, the volatility of the center-right votes, though effects the election results of a single party situated on this political wing individually, yet does not change the overall vote volume of that political ideology.⁴¹ Second, as a consequence of the point mentioned above, social democratic ideology, if the votes gained from the protestors in the 1987 elections are omitted for a while, has never gained any gradually increasing vote mass from center right.⁴² This is related with the ideological as well as political insufficiency of the social democracy which needs a brief survey and which will be developed further below.

Here it should be accentuated that soon after SDPP's coming into power in the local administrations, the votes showed a sharp decrease which might be taken as a concrete evidence of the inadequacy of this ideology. This point is clearly indicated in the SDPP survey concerning the 1991 election results by Secretary General of SDPP saying "ours should be a party producing ideology and programme...our municipalities should start a new period of attack in accordance with the social

⁴¹This point is emphasized by SDPP survey of 1991 elections with an accent on the stability of the MP vote volume. Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, *20 Ekim Genel Seçimi: Araştırma ve Değerlendirmeler* (Ankara(?): n.p., n.d), 8.

⁴²This point is more complicated in the elections held in the 1990s. Nevertheless the volume of the votes moving from centre left to centre right is more than the reversed direction in the 1989-1994 period. For details see Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal tabanı* (Ankara: n.p., 1995) 32-41.

democratic ideology."⁴³ This situation, to a certain extent is similar to the Spanish Socialist Workers Party's (PSOE) condition in Spain in the early 1980s. Contrary to many of the socialist parties suffering serious problems in the 1980s, PSOE well enjoyed a power experience. Nevertheless, as has been analysed by left-conservative Share, "by mid-1987, the PSOE was not in danger of losing power but...five years of PSOE government had indicated the severity of the ideological crisis of Spanish socialism."⁴⁴

What is interesting in this process is that, PSOE has undergone a series of crisis due to the transformation it has realised in the opposite direction, in Share's words, "by 1987 the *Cambio* (Change) advocated by the PSOE 1982 had been all but forgotten and had been replaced with the term 'modernisation.'"⁴⁵ Here, modernisation encompasses a more liberal prone economic understanding. Although Share uses the concept in a cynical approach it is confronted by other scholars who support the approach and take it with an affirmative approach linking the success of PSOE to the modernisation programme is found on certain analysis.⁴⁶ The policy is criticised by Share, but election results show that, though PSOE faced a problem of

⁴³Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, 20 *Ekim*, 6. The survey in another section especially tackles with this issue. See 57-58 and 83-84.

⁴⁴Donald Share, *The Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The Spanish Workers Party in the 1980s* (New York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1989), 9.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Patrick Camillier, "Spain: The Survival of Socialism?", in *Mapping the West European Left*, ed. Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller (London, New York: Verso, 1994), 233-266; Paul Kennedy, "The PSOE: Modernization and the Welfare State," in *Looking Left*, ed. Donald Sassoon (London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers in association with The Gramsci Foundation, Rome), 88-108.

unemployment, it has reached a long lasting success in the political arena. Kennedy, in this context, prefers to count the other social issues, such as womens' position, contributing to the victories of PSOE together with its 'distinctive record on privatization.'⁴⁷ Yet, Camilleri insists that the neo-liberal economic features 'overlooks several aspects of socialist policy which deserves greater attention.'⁴⁸ The impasse of Turkish social democracy occurring for not realising this opening will be discussed in the following section.

6.2. The Epistemological Roots of the Identity Search

6.2.1. The Necessity of the Renewal

This framework of analysis constructed above is conducive to a specific consequence. As could be deduced from the related literature, in the social democratic or centre-left reorientation in the post-anti-democratic periods, as mostly observed in the South European and Mediterranean countries, namely Spain, Portugal and Greece, the main concern has always been the democratic stabilization.⁴⁹ One another process which unfolds Simultaneously with this condition is always the ideological transformation of the socialist or social democratic parties.⁵⁰ This difficult task of recreating the party ideology and a programme synchronically is an issue started first

⁴⁷Patrick Camilleri, "Spain," 89.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Gianfranco Pasquino, "Party elites and Democratic Consolidation: Cross-National Comparision of Southern European Experience," in *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*, ed., Geoffrey Pridham (London and New York: Routledge, reprinted 1993), 42-61.

⁵⁰Richard Gillespie, "Regime Consolidation in Spain: Party, State and Society," in *Securing Democracy*, ed., Geoffrey Pridham, 126-146.

by the Bad Godesberg movement in the SPD, German Social Democratic Party, in 1959.⁵¹

The Bad Godesberg movement proverbially refers in general to all new but radical amendments of ideology and programme and this is observed in all centre left parties in the post-1980 period as a reaction to and as well as through the impetus gained from the uprising of New Right policies.⁵² The success of the centre left politics in the West European countries is an aftereffect of this process⁵³ and usually the centre left takeover of the power, in the post-1980 period, is after the New Right or neo-liberal governments. The pattern of change followed by the centre-left parties is of crucial debates and it is usually a blend of new models proposed by New Right and the inspirations of the conventional paradigm.⁵⁴

In Turkey, what is interesting is that in the 1980s, as the election results show, concerning the party ideology and the concept of social democracy, there was not any radical ideological or programmatic change or transformation observed in the centre left politics. Rather, as early as the 1983 elections, the single party situated on the left was running for the conventional statist model challenging the MP on the

⁵¹Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (New York: The New Press, 1996), 242.

⁵²Anthony Butler, *The Transformative Politics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 110-129.

⁵³Especially the concept of 'Bad Godesberg' is debated in British Labour Party movement in the 1990s and mainly in the Blairite era depending on the dissolving of the Clause IV of the party regulation. See, *inter alia*, *The Changing Labour Party*, eds., Martin J. Smith and Joanna Spear (London: Routledge, 1992).

⁵⁴As an exemplary study and survey see, Donald Share, *Dilemmas*, 35-97.

privatisation process and the early successes is bound to this upheaval. On this ground PP has debated the regulation of the markets through the state control.⁵⁵ Staying akin to this claim it could be purported that the social democratic politics in 1980s in Turkey is more cultural than ideological and programmatic and more tactical than strategic. The social democratic policies pronounced were more responsive to democratisation process and on the economic and social level it was only responding to an incentive started by neo-liberalism using a more negative discourse. Yet, the demands for a more deep transformation especially in the SDPP were confronted with refusal which will be analysed in the following section. As a conclusion, here it suffices to say that in the 1980s what was determining for the social democracy was the praxis put before the ideology. This very condition, naturally to a certain extent, was incapable of surpassing the existing level of practical issues. This could only be understood by analysing the ideological dimensions of the social democracy in Turkey in the 1980s with a reference to its historical legacy.

6.2.2. The Constraint for Change: State, Legacy and Post-1983 Social Democracy

The history of social democracy in Turkey in the post-1983 era is more a discussion of intra-party factions emanating from a search for a new definition of social democracy going beyond the limits of the historical legacy set by RPP and symbolised by the Six Arrows. This discussion is more induced by the New Right policies implemented in Turkey looking for a more liberal understanding of state and

⁵⁵Halkçı Parti, *Program* (Ankara, n.p., 183), 5-6.

being more attentive to the new concepts derived from the New Social and Political Movements came out in the Western countries as a critique of the modernity.⁵⁶

Here, it should be noted that the search of the 1980s on the social democratic realm has not been a reevaluation or revisiting of a practical legacy reached by the end of a political experience gathered at the end of a certain practice in the power. Rather, if a short and a very unsuccessful period spend in power between 1977-1979 is exempted, the left wing politics in Turkey has not found the chance and the opportunity of testing its ideology and policies in practice. This condition has confronted the centre-left search in Turkey in the early 1980s with a shortcoming. The new founded party, after Ecevit's 'rejection of the heritage', has felt itself obliged to suspend on the RPP tradition and establish itself based on that culture.

This condition was important for a few reasons. The first one is that, primarily SDP then SDPP, instead of looking for a 'real', Western type social democratic culture rather relied on the classical RPP tradition with no concrete social democratic basis and understanding. In this context, as has been argued in the preceeding chapters, the new social democratic parties right in the start began with all the fetters that kept them away from a new opening. The traditional RPP has always been conceptualised in Turkey as a 'party of the state,' albeit all the transformations it undertook beginning by the late 1950s and especially in the 1970s.

The state tradition in Turkey is perceived as a reality suspended between the tyrannic and the authoritarian ruling but not democratic and liberal, always generating

⁵⁶For an analysis of the relationship between socialism and the new Social Movements see, Lawrence Wilde, *Modern European Socialism* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), 98-114.

a fear and reserve. This tradition, in the Republican era, has been backed up by the military and the state elites. RPP, compatible with that, has never been immune to this tradition if not it has been thought as a undethacable component of this structure. When SDP started its performance this unwilling phenomenon is once more provoked in the society by attaching to the RPP tradition. As a result the 1980s has been the decade, for the social democracy a soul-searching process probing into the traditional and, if it might be said, normative basis.

Second, as at the inital phase the party has been situated on the existing tradition and formed without regarding the new emerging social, political and cultural cleaveges in the society as well as the developments on the outside world, both SDP and SDPP suffered a lot by not being able to take initiative in the policy making processes but rather stayed as an opposition to the center right dominated political climate. When center-right, through MP, started the implementation of a set of new policies and brought some concepts fore which were formerly alien to the political realm, SDPP, by opposing them, has not gained any momentum but perceived more as a conservative party especially when MP accelerated the process of unification with the outer world, using the motto of 'skipping to a new age' (çağ atlamak) all through the 1980s. Behind this development found is the condition that

the new social democratic parties and above all SDP, were founded by a group of intellectuals and bureaucrats who were close to the educated middle classes in the big cities but were quite remote from the grass-roots activists of the RPP.⁵⁷

⁵⁷Ayşe Ayata, "Ideology, Social Bases and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980 Political Parties," in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, eds., Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yeşilada (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1993), 43.

The historical structure of RPP has never been other than very this characteristic even the grass-roots activists have always been put into the same framework. This condition in the post-1983 political era conduced to two important developments. The first one is the social democracy's immediate situation regarding its relationship with the state, the second being the constraints this party has faced in the 1980s due to very this relationship.

Andrew Mango after emphasising that "SDPP is the party of the old establishment," continues with two important remarks. Mango, first, rightly argues that the social democratic roots in Turkey have always been supported by the 'enlightened' and 'laïque' sects, since the early years of the Republic. The role of intelligentsia in this tradition has always been a condition distinguishing this political approach from its European similars. According to him,

the social identity- in Marxist terms, the class basis- of the SDPP is uncertain, but its cultural identity, like that of the RPP, is clear: it is perceived to be the party of the 'progressives', of the 'enlightened', of free-thinkers in the nineteenth-century sense of the term.⁵⁸

The second point is that, the social democratic or in general the parties of ideology have always sought for capturing the state in order 'to realize their vision of just society,'⁵⁹ a concept deriving from the 'first left'⁶⁰ going back to the French

⁵⁸Mango, "The Social Democratic Party," 172.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 173.

⁶⁰For the discussion of the concept see Jan Otto Anderson, "Fundamental Values for a Third Left", *New Left Review*, no.216 (March-April 1996), 66-78.

Revolution. In Turkey, as Mango argues and as it has already been discussed in the previous chapters,

the RPP, the parent of SDPP, could dispense with this preliminary task since it was from its inception the party of the state. With the support of the state it could devote itself to social engineering, and although much of this engineering has proved solid, it was not popular.⁶¹

The most important consequence of this reasoning is not RPP's failure in getting the majority of the votes in the post-1980 era, as the author puts, but what is accentuated in his conclusion as, "SDPP is not the party of the *existing state* but it is implicitly the party of the *strong state*."⁶² It is determiningly this condition that has brought the ultimate crisis of the democratic socialism in Turkey when the New Right policies started arguing and surpassing the existing state. Social democracy has stayed in a paralysed situation more reposing on a state utopia. This point has also been emphasized by a party-administrator who has been involved later in civil society organizations as "for the power of social democracy the structure of the state is the best basis." The explanation of this view comes from the 'reality' and 'specificity' of Turkey that, center-right parties, according to the party-executive has always applied socialdemocratic policies. Again, the Secretary General of the party, on the same grounds, when SDPP is criticised because of holding on a 'passé' state model and utopia, did not hesitate in responding immediately saying 'we are cowards (in changing the state-hbk) and we are *status quo* holders.'⁶³

⁶¹Mango, "The Social", 173.

⁶²Ibid., 174; emphasis mine.

⁶³Teoman İrgül, *Sosyaldemokraside Ayrışma Yılları (1980-1985) (Sosyaldemokratların On Yılı)* . V.1 (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1995) 258.

Here another interesting point is that, as Göle shows, when social actors tend to be detached from the society they are adrift to identify themselves with utopias. For the left, this is a non-existent future whereas for the right it is the past.⁶⁴ This detachment also fails them in distinguishing between the ideology and utopia as the latter is "informed by reality, utopia by imagination."⁶⁵ This very condition of being detached from the social, because of its symbiotic relationship even not with the existing but with a concept of strong state, has brought two distinctive characteristics to Turkish social democracy in the period which is under discussion. As a matter of fact, because of the yearning for a strong state, an issue of the past, it might be speculated that Turkish social democracy has fallen short of i) developing an ideology and, ii) having a socialist-futuristic mind set and has become a right-utopia based political movement.

6.2.3. Ideology or Culture? Social Democracy as a Constitutive Element

These structural aspects of Turkish social democracy in the 1980s has generated a specific condition. The social democracy of the 1980s tends to be a political phenomenon more inclined to attach itself to a certain kind of political culture rather than to a political ideology.⁶⁶ The political culture that demarcated the

⁶⁴Nilüfer Göle, "Toward," 216.

⁶⁵Ibid., 216.

⁶⁶Göran Therborn, in his provoking article, states that socialism is a culture and it is related with identity expressed by a set of symbols. Nevertheless this culture, as long as the West European socialism is considered is also linked with a continuous process of ideology construction. Göran Therborn, "The Life and Times of Socialism," *New Left Review*, no. 194, (1992), 17-32. For a critique of this article see Nicos

epistemological horizons of Turkish social democracy has never surpassed the romanticist, 19th century understanding of Enlightenment tenets resting on a positivist tradition. They incorporate the nation state, national identity, rationalism, secularism. This framework also encompasses a kind of universalism more inspired by a utopianist episteme. The result is a severe clash between a nomothetical approach and an ideographic one.⁶⁷ Turkish social democracy, even in the 1980s, when the Enlightenment principles were put under sharp criticism by post-modern approaches has continued with them and in this way has never transgressed the nineteenth century party model. Yet, postmodernism in Turkey, especially on the left has been denied and refused which might be because of its tendency to eradicate at least to curb the hierarchical alignment between the political and the social as well as rejecting the paradigmatic choices and grand- narratives.

The second issue emanating from this consideration is the big conflict it has undergone on the level of ideology-technology distinction. In the 1980s the watershed between the center right and center left politics started to be demolished on the pragmatic level. The Turkish New Right without much hesitation, quickly asserted the importance and functionality of the operative issues accepted in the capitalist world, privatization being the most critical one. Following the dominance of the neo-capitalist deregulationist economic policies, the difference between these two political camps turned to be more relying on an ideological basis rather than being a technologically oriented one.

Mouzelis, "The Balance Sheet of the Left," *New Left Review*, no. 200, (1993), 182-185. For the answer by Therborn to Mouzelis see, Göran Therborn, "Reply to Mouzelis," *New Left Review*, no. 200, (1993), 185-191.

⁶⁷İlhan Tekeli, *Tarihyazımı Üzerine Düşünmek* (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1998), 12.

It is at this point that the ideological insistence on the refutations of current economic models have become more normative than ideological and, it is especially this condition which was overwhelming in Turkey. Because the Turkish social democracy, again with a former and romanticist-normative understanding of technology, has perpetuated the debate with a more technological intention rather than the ideological one. In this debate it did not have any chance of defeating its rival unless it had revealed the nature of the transformation and as a consequence fell into a dual dilemma. First, although the debate should have been leaned on an ideological basis it was kept on a more technological level; second, on the technological level the positivistic attachment had already lost its viability and its argumentative power. This very condition might be registered as one of the prominent characteristics of Turkish social democracy, i.e. to be more technological rather than ideological.

These aspects of social democracy in the post-1983 era when coincided with the issues of secularism, which has been one of the most crucial debates among the modernising elites and set as the primordial tenet of Kemalism in Turkey, attached to RPP and has never been given up even though the party has passed through various transformations, once more fortify the view that this political ideology has been a movement for a cultural transformation rather than political one. In fact and it is beyond doubt that this understanding has not only started but also enhanced the modernization process in Turkey in the early decades of the twentieth century. Yet, as this model foresees putting the state at the center of the whole process and as it insists on the premises of an already accomplished task it reaches an impasse for two reasons.

The first one is that, it can not carry the political modernisation of the masses through politics because of its exclusionary approach and blocking the political participation on the grassroots level. As a consequence it does not further answer the expectations of the different social groups and actors. Second, there might be a debate encompassing this very situation asking whether this is a crisis of modernity or not. In the 1980s when the postmodern, state-transgressing political understanding reached a culmination any statist model of this kind would easily be criticised for its modernist and state-centered understanding. In other words this model would be defeated as a matter of postmodernity.

This circumstance is a crisis of modernity for it neither provokes and reinforces the political modernisation and it does not create an opening through that incentive which brings the curbing of the pre-modernist, traditional values; nor it enables the development of new methodologies as well as of the new ideologies more prone to what could be defined as postmodern. In this sense social democracy of the 1980s was also insufficient in developing yet a modernist view even though it defined itself as a modernist model. The reflection of this understanding is found in the clashes occurring in the intra-party factions and between DLP and SDPP conflict and the SDPP program changes is a concrete signifier of all these movements

At this point it should briefly be suggested that, the 1980 shortcoming of Turkish social democracy also emanates from its constitutive character. Attached to Kemalism, a grand narrative proposing a structural and total transformation of the country in a modernist direction, Turkish social democracy and its advocates in SDPP did not realise that any constitutive element, by the virtue of definition, is bound to be

utopianist and normative.⁶⁸ Constitutive concepts are more prone to create a meta-real epistemology rather than letting themselves to be situated on a practical-real ground. It is obvious that any meta-real discourse gains a hermeneutical character and expresses itself more with a symbolic, meta-narrative discourse, interwoven with a tradition. This procedure ends up with an orthodoxy loosing the possibility of transforming itself, an end reached only through a practical-ontological methodology. As the consequence of this system is the objectivization of the subject, in Turkish experiment, through the state-led models, especially on the ideological level of nationalism-secularism, what is achieved is very this end. The critique of Kemalism in the 1980s and in the 1990s has definitely been on this ground and beyond that this framework is concretely against the basic epistemological concerns of social democracy for it is more a pragmatic ideology resting on theoretical and practical transformations.

6.3. The Ontology of the Change: Party Programmes and Inter and Intra-Party Contradictions

6.3.1. Social Structure and/of Social Democracy in the 1980s

The post-1983 era from the angle of social democracy is the stage of a set of new relations between different cleavages and this ideology. This is an outcome of the condition analysed by Mango. He succinctly relates this outcome to the abandonment

⁶⁸Here, it is interesting that, even though Turkish social democracy as a modernist and Kemalist political approach, is utopian since the beginning. It did not compete with the centre-right approaches in Turkey in the 1980s who were also developing a utopian understanding. In this sense, SDPP instead of trying to challenge the basic political approach of MP to carry them to an upper step on the ladder, preferred to stay immune and indifferent to what was happening. The only point of contradiction was that SDPP perpetually insisted on calling for the *status quo* and even for the past.

of the social democracy by the state-elites because this ideology's inability to access the power and, consequently, staying away from the office in the post-1950 period. Paradoxically, as the social democracy insisted on a more abstract notion of state as its 'raison d'être', the 'people' continued to distinguish itself from it and when the social democracy, realising this condition, started to draw upon the masses, state and center, with all its bureaucracy and other possibilities, loosened its ties with the RPP and kept an eye on it as an 'unreliable' political ideology. This circumstance once more has bred the alienation between the periphery and the social democratic ideology. The periphery, in Turkey, in the post 1950 period has used to enjoy the interests deriving from the state-political party relationship which was articulated by the center right parties.⁶⁹ This could also be taken as another determinant in SDPP's becoming a party staying on the margin because of its dependency on the educated intelligentsia.

On the other hand, as surveys has shown clearly, SDPP, especially after 1988 when the former politicians were able to participate in the active political life following the lift of the ban by the referendum and, when Deniz Baykal was elected as the Secretary General, has become a party much segmented between urban middle classes and "voters who were mobilised primarily through religious and ethnic affiliations."⁷⁰ This condition which fettered SDPP's merging with the labour and created one of its main shortcomings, as well as blocking its relations with the new social cleavages, has been backed also by the very idiosyncrasy that DLP has developed. DLP has been a party primarily depending on urban lumpens with much of a volatility in their voting behaviours, having more conservative tendencies, more prone to populist policies with

⁶⁹Ayata, 'Ideology,' 45.

⁷⁰Ibid.

no specific socially defined characteristics. A study covering the 1989-1993 period has indicated the below results

Table 6. The Representation Coefficient of voters in center left parties regarding all fields of work

Work Field	Survey	Universe	SDPP	DLP
Blue collars		15.2	0.95	1.55
White collars		5.9	1.16	0.91
state officials		7.4	1.74	0.90
small scale :				
tradesman-				
craftsmen- farmer		14.1	0.96	0.86
private		1.0	0.74	0.90
employer		1.3	1.29	0.94
retired		5.2	0.96	1.72
unemployed		6.4	0.67	1.43
housewife		40.8	0.91	0.76
student		2.6	1.29	0.36
undefined		0.1	-	2.09
Total		100.0	-	-

Source, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı*, Tüses Vakfı-Veri Araştırma A.Ş. (Ankara: n.p., 1995), 43

As the table proves, even in a relatively late period, after some adjustments and alterations have been reached in the parties, due to criticisms, still SDPP is supported by white collar workers, state officers, employers and students whereas the cleavages holding DLP emerge as blue collar workers, retired and unemployed.⁷¹ White collar workers are represented in DLP is 63% more than SDPP. But the more crucial issue

⁷¹This approach, to find out the character differences of the parties, is analysed in Moshe Maor, *Political Parties and Party Systems: Comparative Approaches and the British Experience* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 18-22. Also the relationship between the blue collar workers and the social democratic strategies is discussed at length in Herbert Kittschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 41-47.

is the representation of the state officers in SDPP for the ratio of them in SDPP are beyond and above all other parties even than the parties of center-right. It is also interesting that DLP is supported significantly by the retired and the unemployed.⁷²

Also one another aspect that comes out in the survey is the voter's affiliation to party leader and programme. The research indicates that whereas the SDPP grassroots clearly states that if the leader is changed the affiliation does not affected (% 77.6) this ratio dramatically drops (to %37.8) when DLP is considered. On the other hand for SDPP mass, the attachment to the party programme shows a drastic 58% as this figure for DLP is % 29.1. Nevertheless, when two different issues are taken together ("the affiliation to leader and party") % 16.8 of SDPP is overwhelmed by % 52.3 of DLP⁷³ showing a less political mobilization and a decisive stagnation which might be interpreted as the method followed by DLP leadership in the founding phase of the party.^{74, 75}

This condition has never forced SDPP to develop a new economic and social programme. Rather, contrary to the arguments in the direction of the necessity for the renewal of the programme, the party preferred to continue with the traditional RPP ideology as stated before. Yet, RPP's suggestions in the early 1980s were rather

⁷²Türkiye Sosyal İktisadi Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı* (Ankara: n.p., 1995), 43-44.

⁷³Ibid., 158-160.

⁷⁴The speculative but spectacular history of this condition is found in Ergül, *Sosyaldemokraside*, 223-228.

⁷⁵The reasons that drove İcavit to prefer such a method of exclusion might be followed in Orhan Duru, *İcavit'in Çilesi* (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1995), 118, 123, 126-127.

encompassing a traditional economic understanding trying to merge a kind of statism with the overwhelming market economy. This blend was named as the 'Social Market Economy' in the 1993 Programme⁷⁶. Even this approach foresaw the 'democratic planning' as opposed to the market economy⁷⁷ and to the 'Role of the Popular Sector'⁷⁸. Planning is also defined as 'directed to national targets.'⁷⁹ As has already been mentioned, SDPP also run against the privatisation of Economic State Enterprises. This approach is clear also in putting the industrialisation as the first priority among others in Turkey for it is only through the mandate of state that a real industrialisation could be achieved.

In this sense industrialisation is taken as the "main policy that would secure the other tasks that not only social democracy but also the country runs for such as the basic existence and identity questions which should be conceived as sacred issues."⁸⁰ In this context SDPP even in the later programmes did not try to accept and apply a new economic policy but emphasised the 'social state'⁸¹ concept together with 'social security'⁸² which signifies the welfare state. It is interesting that in the document, 'The

⁷⁶SIIP, *Program*, 32-34.

⁷⁷Ara Seçime Giderken SIIP'den Kamuoyuna Çağrı (Ankara (?): N.p, 1986(?)), 6.

⁷⁸What is called as 'the public sector' should be taken as the 'State' and what is emphasised in the text is nothing but the latter concept. SIIP, *Program*, 29-30.

⁷⁹*İşte Alternatif* (Ankara: N.p., 1988), 11.

⁸⁰Deniz Baykal, *SIIP Genel Sekreteri Deniz Baykal'ın 'Sosyal Demokrasi'de Ekonomi Politikaları' Konulu Uluslararası Konferansta Yaptığı Konuşma* (Ankara(?): N.p., 1989), 11.

⁸¹SIIP, *Seçim Bildirgesi*, 10.

⁸²SIIP, *Kamuoyuna Çağrı*, 17.

Alternative⁸³, one of the most ambitious documents prepared, there is nothing related to either Social Security system or Welfare State. Yet, the 'social state' is understood both as the welfare state and a modern state administration for, in the related section, immediately after dealing with the issues concerning the former, the 'public administration' is argued and analysed.⁸⁴

6.3.2. The Synthesis of the Social Democracy: Party Programmes

The 1980s not only witnessed a clash of two social democratic parties on the basis of 'national left' concept but also the splitting of SDPP into two factions in the early 1990s, as an outcome of the same issue. It is much more convenient to argue that the debate around the RPP legacy, Six Arrows and Kemalism in SDPP has been an unending issues of the 1990s. In the 1980s the clash was first started between DLP and SDPP and, in the second phase turned out to be between SDPP and MP. Beginning with the second, it is possible to assert that, as the official papers published by SDPP are reviewed it is easily observed that, even at the basis of the criticism subjected to MP, regarding its economic policy, still lies a tacit reference to the basic tenets of Kemalism and mainly to nationalism. As early as 1985 SDP declares that the basic principle of the party is an absolute independency and the basis of independence is economic independence.⁸⁵ As a possibility leading to this end, later, SDPP runs for a 'planned economy' in a period when the process of establishing the basic structure

⁸³*İşte Alternatif*, passim.

⁸⁴SIIP, *Program*, (Ankara(?): N.p., 1993), 38-39.

⁸⁵Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, *Ekonomik Durumun Değerlendirilmesi ve Ekonomide Temel İlke ve Öncelikler*, (Ankara(?): n.p, 1985), 57. This point will further be analysed in the following section.

of market economy was in its heyday.⁸⁶ This point is later fortified in the *Application Policies* by opposing the privatization, saying, SDPP would buy back the State Economic Enterprises in case they are sold to private sector.⁸⁷

This model which conceives a nationalist approach is reinforced by directly referring to Atatürkist principles. Again in an early document, it is argued that the owner of Atatürk reforms is SDPP and the path followed is the one which has established the Republic. In this context social democracy is identified with the Six Arrows.⁸⁸ In the 1985 Programme of SDPP the Six Arrows is mentioned as 'The Six Principles to be Followed in Achieving the Tasks.'⁸⁹ SDPP puts these Principles before the tasks concerning the individual and society.⁹⁰ In the programs prepared later by revising the existing one, these issues created such furious intra-party and inter-faction debates in SDPP. The debates also encompasses the definition of social democracy.

Before the 1987, Third Extraordinary Congress, in which the party programme⁹¹ is enriched by a text prepared and published under the heading 'SDPP Programme Application Policies',⁹² a group⁹³ has published a short proposal, called

⁸⁶Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Program*, (Ankara (?): N.p., n.d), 29.

⁸⁷Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Üçüncü Olağanüstü Kurultayda Kabul Edilen Uygulama Politikaları*, 14.

⁸⁸*Ara Seçime Giderken SHP'den Kamuoyuna Çağrı*, Mimeograph, 23.

⁸⁹Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Program*, 13.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, *Program*, (Ankara (?): N.p., n.d).

⁹²Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Üçüncü Olağanüstü Kurultayda Kabul Edilen Uygulama Politikaları* (Ankara (?): N.p., 1987 (?)).

*Basic Principles for a Democratic, Productive, New Turkey.*⁹⁴ In the text there were four basic Principles on which the social democracy understanding built. It was argued that, SDPP is the mass party of labor, of the transformation but not of the establishment, SDPP holds the whole some of all freedoms, defender of the pluralist society.⁹⁵ These arguments, as mentioned above, has provoked an intense intra-party debate. In the views expressed by some of the members of the party executive committee, it was argued that, the Principle put in the proposal as 'the local administrations should be reinforced'⁹⁶, would harm the unitary state.⁹⁷ It is interesting that an approach constructed on the notion of decentralisation and in fervour of a pluralist society curbing the from the above approaches and calling for the

⁹³Especially in the early 1980s, just after the establishment of SDPP, among the intra-party factions, there were some groups, qualifying themselves such as 'Unionists', 'Revolutionary Democrats', Left with Principles' looking for a more radical left party model, organisation and programme. Nevertheless, these factions have never declared or manifested themselves with clear programmes and, it is never obvious who has been involved in these intra-party cleavages. Besides, many of the published material is missing. Yet, for 'Revolutionary Democrats' see *Yeni Gündem*, no.47, (1986), 21 and for 'Unionists', see *Yeni Gündem*, no.50, 26.

⁹⁴The proposal was published by Cahit Angın, Uğur Batmaz, Cüneyt Canver, İsmail Cem, Tefik Çavdar, Hızır Ekşi, Erzan Erzurumluoğlu, Mustafa Gündeşlioğlu, Yakup Kepenek, Ahmet Ketenci, Mehmet Moğoltay, Muzaffer Saraç. Actually, at the beginning it was a kind of 'inter-office memorandum.' Later, when among the party cadres and ranks the proposal, due to the opinions it incorporated, was started to be accused the group decided to publish and publicize it and, this very special condition is mentioned at the beginning of the below pamphlet. *Demokratik, Üretken, Yeni Bir Türkiye İçin Temel İlkeler* (Ankara: Özgür Basın Yayın ve Ticaret A.Ş. Yayınları-1, n.d.).

⁹⁵*Ibid.*

⁹⁶*Ibid.*

⁹⁷The idea belongs to Atila Sav. Serpil Bildirici, "SHP'nin Program Çalışmalarında İdeolojik Kapanma: Daha Önsözde Anlaşamadılar," *Yeni Gündem*, no. 54, (March 1987), 24-25.

civil society organisations and a participatory process is also criticised of being 'prepared according to socialist and communist Principles.'⁹⁸ Next, defining the party as 'a mass party of labour' is also criticised for being aimed to confuse the minds.⁹⁹ Beyond these, the proposal is also questioned, without considering the inclusive arguments, on a single basis by saying "first of all you should clarify whether you accept the RPP or not! You are refusing RPP."¹⁰⁰

One of the main problems that have captured SDPP in the intra-party conflicts has always been the search for situating the party on the basis of the RPP tradition. Many different factions have taken different tactful positions in these debates. It is more convenient to see these conflicts as a search of possibility for the reconstruction of a different social democratic model and understanding other than the one resting on the Kemalist tenets. In the 1980s this debate has emerged not only in the SDPP but also in the clash between SDPP and DLP. A DLP member and the candidate for mayorship in the local elections has clearly indicated that Turkish social democracy has no connection with the conventional European social democracy emanating from a Marxist origin and he also asserted that situating Turkish social democracy on such a basis is of no use. More he recognizes Marxism as 'snobism, from the view point of our history.'¹⁰¹ In the same article, Özdalga condemns SDPP for letting the Marxist originated people and groups penetrating it. This point is also accentuated by another well-known academic, Aydın Aybay, in an article and the author clearly states that

⁹⁸Ibid., 25.

⁹⁹Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁰The argument belongs to Nail Gürman; Ibid., 25.

¹⁰¹Haluk Özdalga, "Marksizmin Hareketimize Faydası Yok," in *Yeni Gündem*, no. 24, (1986), 21.

"SDPP is a non-Marxist party and those who have appropriated Marxism as a political solution cannot be permitted to hold a political post in the party or use SDPP as a tool for their ideology."¹⁰²

Under these assumptions and constraints the ideological framework of SDPP is constructed with back and forth debates all revolving around the origins of Turkish social democracy and the necessity to identify the party with the RPP tradition. In the late 1980s these arguments have been reinvigorated by the debates known as 'Second Republic debate.' This debate which was ignited by various intellectuals¹⁰³ especially just after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought the first clear, public criticism of both Kemalist tenets and the state understanding and model.¹⁰⁴ The debate immediately found echo among the intelligentsia and SDPP. Some of the party factions, especially those who were prone to a different social democratic party understanding departing from European social democratic Principles advocated the basic arguments of pro-Second Republic ideals among the party ranks. These groups were immediately accused of supporting and defending the views first publicized by Turgut Özal¹⁰⁵ and this argument was not without justification for the basic issues had

¹⁰²Aydın Aybay, "SHP'nin Sancıları," in *Yeni Gündem*, no. 51, (1987), 28-29.

¹⁰³Among the pioneers of the debate especially Mehmet Altan, a professor of economics and a senior columnist in the daily, *Sabah*; his brother Ahmet Altan, a novelist and a columnist in *Yeni Yüzyıl*, also a programme-maker in various TV channels, their father Çetin Altan, a renowned journalist and writer should be mentioned. It is surprising that the articles appeared in the dailies, unusual in Turkey, did not get compiled in book forms.

¹⁰⁴For a survey of Second Republic debates, in spite of its important omissions and inadequacies see Metin Sever, *2. Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları* (Ankara: Özgürlük Yayınları, 1996).

¹⁰⁵For a severe and polemicist but Kemalist critique of *2nd Republic*, see Türk Devrim Kurumu (haz.), *Misak-ı Milli, Ulusal Birlik ve Tam*

been built up on the pro-neo-liberal Principles, foreseeing the minimal state and taking the civil society and the individual as the central axis of the proposed system. It is clear that the arguments had been immensely affected by the neo-liberal approaches and the post-communist era views developed in the West. This pattern was also effective especially in the early 1990s in the founding of *New Democracy Movement* (Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi), which started in the spring of 1993, later transformed itself to *New Democracy Party* (Yeni Demokrasi Partisi), in December 1994, and also in the publication of *Democratic Republic Programme* (Demokratik Cumhuriyet Programı), all of which situated on a liberal basis, critical of the existing epistemology.

Under these initiatives the SDPP programme has not undergone a drastic change.¹⁰⁶ The early demand was a clear break with the RPP tradition. On the other hand, Bülent Ecevit and DLP, had already, at the beginning, rejected this past, as mentioned earlier, with the allegation that, RPP tradition was coming from a convention of elitism, refusing the importance of the peasantry in the society and it did not yet transgress the 'single party defects... and for this reason did not create relations with social organisations as much as created by the right wing parties.'¹⁰⁷ It can not be said that these arguments among the party ranks in SDPP found an echo. The programme continued with its attachment to Six Arrows. Nevertheless, it should

Bağımsızlık İçin İkinci Cumhuriyet'e'llayır' (Ankara: TDK Sam yayımları, 1996).

¹⁰⁶On the contrary, the Regulation was exposed to such alterations which culminated severe intra-party conflicts and clashes usually ended up with extraordinary conventions.

¹⁰⁷Bülent Ecevit, "Siyasette herkes kendini tasfiye eder," *Yeni Gündem*, no. 11, (1986), 14.

once more be noted that, as mentioned above, the Six Arrows has taken place in the Programme as the third part, in the section which bears the heading as 'The Basic Point of View of SDPP', as 'The 'Six Principles to be Followed in Achieving the Tasks'. The first two parts of the section are consequently, 'SDPP's Tasks related to Individual', and 'SDPP's Tasks Related to Society.'¹⁰⁸ Leaving the details to the following section, suffice to say here is that in the amendments of 1993, following the above mentioned debates, demands and intra-party conflicts, the programme has surprisingly undergone a change in the opposite direction, once more reinvigorating its relation with the RPP tradition and its ideology.¹⁰⁹

The programme starts by a section called 'Our Historical Piers', and in this sections SDPP's 'ideological basis' is connected to 1919 and 1920s, to the National Independence War, Local Congresses, Erzurum and Sivas Congress and to the RPP.¹¹⁰ The program also supports the etatist tradition of RPP and then, in the second section, even surpassing the 'natural' and 'objective' approach exposed in the 1985 Programme, directly relates the Six Arrows and itself to Atatürk, by naming the chapter as 'Our Six Principles Emanating from Atatürk.'¹¹¹ It is interesting that, contrary to the arguments¹¹², the basic tenets of social democracy are counted and

¹⁰⁸SIIP, *Program*, 13-22.

¹⁰⁹Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Program*, (Ankara (?): N.p., 1993).

¹¹⁰Ibid., 9.

¹¹¹Ibid., 11.

¹¹²In two works, published as a response to these debates and, provoked new argumenets ,this approach was already discussed and criticized. Asaf Savaş Akat, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi* (İstanbul: Armoni, 1991), especially 9-143; Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993), especially 23-151.

discussed in a chapter following the already mentioned ones.¹¹³ With all these idiosyncrasies, SDPP Programme has reflected an eclectic character, in trial of combining a timid liberal approach, and a New Left understanding¹¹⁴, tacitly, with the statist, centralist, modernist RPP ideology.

As a last point, it could be briefly stated that contrary to the arguments that unless a Kemalist position is taken and unless the legacy of RPP is affirmed no electoral gains will be achieved has not been proven after these changes and amendments. After the drastic transformation observed in the party programme, towards Kemalism, the crisis of social democracy in Turkey has become concrete. The election results clearly signify this fall. In the 1991 general elections SDPP has received 20.8% of the votes which is a drastic loss with respect to the 1989 success of 28.7% (and still a loss in comparison to 24.8% of the 1987 general elections). In the 1994 local elections the decline was still perpetuating when RPP got only 13.6% of the votes. In the 1995 elections after the merging of the RPP and SDPP in 1994 the new RPP was able only to get 10.36¹¹⁵. These results might be interpreted as that, Turkish social democracy in the process of renovation should try a new way other than going back to its origins.

Conclusion

¹¹³Ibid., 20.

¹¹⁴This is clear in the program chapters such as, 'Democracy for Humans', 'Economy for Humans', and 'State for Humans.' Ibid., 25-44.

¹¹⁵T.C. Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü *İstatistik Yıllığı* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1996), various tables.

This framework shows that the social democracy in Turkey in the 1980s has more concentrated on the problems of restructuration in which no spectacular success is achieved as long as a break with the traditional RPP ideology is considered. Rather, the party has undergone a series of conflicts more concentrating on the issues such as intra-party democracy and the definitions of social democracy. In this process there are two main determinants. The first one is that the 1980s has once more proved that in Turkey there has never been a social democratic tradition in the West European sense. The Turkish experiment in social democracy rests on the official ideology which has founded the state. The social democratic search of the 1980s, originating from this root, once more, in spite of all struggles, affirms its relation with and connection to this source restressing its symbiotic existence with the state, challenging the liberal movements questioning the conditions of the state. As it is not attached to the left tradition of West Europe which has incorporated various very important processes of revising its relation with the state, Turkish social democracy, in the 1980s has missed the chance of both constructing itself on a new basis and benefiting from the arguments developed in the 1980s reconsidering state-left relationship.

Nevertheless, more or less, as social democracy in Turkey delineated a basis for opposition to the existing hegemonical discourse of the New Right, during the 1980s it was successful enough to confirm its *raison d'être*, for a specific period of time, namely the early 1980s. Here, it should be remembered that, as discussed above, the success of social democracy depends on two conditions. The first one is the volatility of the right wing votes, second, the debate between the center-right and left was concentrated on the economic issues. As in the 1990s the debates took another direction and the effect of globalization increased, with the advent of new concepts on the political agenda, social democracy started its demise. The basic condition in this

process is SDPP's, without realising the transformation in the society and the demands evoked by the new social actors, going back to its origins and once more emphasising its links with the RPP tradition breaking up with the existing political agenda.

This point brings out the second issue. The 1980s has not only witnessed the left-state reconsideration but also revisited the notion of state and society at large as a consequence of neo-liberal and postmodern movements. In this context the notion of civil society, the importance of individual, the speciality of the market economy is reevaluated. This framework is mainly the rearticulation of modernity whose effects are better observed in the post 1989 era. It could be said that Turkish democratic left has also closed itself to these arguments and debates. As will be seen in the next chapter Turkish democratic left found it adequate to defend a position which was rather pro-state against the new outcomes observed in the social and political realm which were more sensitive to the ends of globalisation such as ethnicity, identity, new models and notions of democracy, human rights, new economic order, etc. Significantly, the social democratic left of Turkey in the 1990s preferred going back to the origins after the reestablishment of RPP even by dissolving SDPP and its gains. The condition of social democracy in Turkish politics is more problematic in the 1990s. This is due to the concrete demands raised in the more pluralistic and more complicated social structure in the ambiguous political environment of the late twentieth century demolishing all given social structural conditions. The crisis of Turkish social democracy becomes more clear not only when serial electoral failures in Turkey is observed but when West European social democratic parties' electoral achievements, after getting adjusted to the 'new times' is remembered and these conditions are analysed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII

THE SEARCH FOR RENEWAL SDPP IN THE 1990S: THE 1990-1994 PERIOD

7.1. The 1990-1994 Period

The 1990s, from the view point of Turkish social democracy, can be analysed in two segments. The first one is the body of events that lies in the time period of 1990-1994 and the second one starts right before the 1995 elections, in the September of that year. In September 1995 SDPP is dissolved and merged with the reformed RPP. In the rest of the 1990s Turkish social democracy is represented by this party, the 'new' RPP and DLP of Bülent Ecevit. Beyond all these, the effect of a specific development, which is globalisation is found and globalisation in this sense is considered to be ignited by the fall of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War.

Globalisation, also referred as 'the new world order', together with the fall of the Berlin Wall, brought the radical transformation of not only socialism but all left-inclined politics, at large. The effects of this radical movement in Turkish social democracy can be observed in the 1990-1994 period. This period is demarcated and completed with many intra-party conflicts observed in the SDPP. The arguments put

forward in this period is more related with the renewal of the concept of social democracy in Turkey with a specific attempt to break its ties with the tradition of RPP and Kemalism symbolised by the Six Arrows. However, the crisis of Turkish social democracy which has reached its crux in the second half of the 1990s is a complicated issue which should be analysed on two levels. The first one is that the dissolution of SDPP and its merging with the re-established RPP concretely indicates the abandoning of the arguments attached to globalisation. The second point which is related with this issue is the contradiction that came out in the social democratic politics. That is, whereas the continuing globalisation process provoked and triggered such debates as the demise of the nation-state in Turkey, the reinforcement of RPP was an emphasise put on the traditional epistemological origins of Turkish social democracy, that is, the symbiosis of state-social democracy-RPP.

Here, it might be argued that even the second period is an outcome of globalisation. Because, especially after the shattering of the former Soviet Block into various different nations, in this post-communist era, the emergence of neo-nationalist movements is a matter of observance. But no doubt that the situation in Turkey and especially in the social democratic politics is more complicated. The reason behind this is the reappraisal of the centralised state concept which lies at the basis of the epistemology that constructs the RPP tradition. Approached from this angle, it is clear that this is, at the very first hand, a trial to rejuvenate the Kemalist-Republican ideological roots and to put back into power the nation state model, the intertwined structure and cohabitation of state and the party, which means the ignorance of the bundle of concepts produced by and in the period of globalisation. This is, as will be analysed, mostly observed in the authoritarian discourse the state developed and RPP identified itself with, in the post-1995 period, while tackling with such concepts as

identity, fundamentalism, difference, multiculturalism, pluralism, etc. The early consequence of this movement is the result obtained in the 1995 elections which has been the worst ever achieved in the post-1983 era. It, therefore, would be logical to start first with the analysis of the 1990-1994 period but with a brief and overall review of globalization, to situate the necessity felt in the SDPP for the renewal of the ideological structure.

7.2. The Impact of Globalisation in the 1990-1994 Period

7.2.1. The Framework of Globalisation

Even though Albrow's suggestion is a radical one yet "globalisation is the most significant development and theme in contemporary life and social theory to emerge since the collapse of Marxist systems."¹ This definition, if Marxism is taken as one of the summits of modernity², tacitly implies that globalization already marks the end or the finishing line of modernity. In this sense it is rather more convenient to discuss the primary conditions that brought the end of modernity. Again this point could be elaborated *a contrario* going to another explanation brought by Albrow both to give the definition of globalization and the vanishing points of modernity:

The global, or the abstract quality, globality, both transcends and intrudes on the national in territorial terms; it replaces the time aspect of the modern with a spatial reference, which however is indeterminate. Globalism operates to temper the particularism of nationalism, while decentring values from human to material referents. It counters the abstract nature of modernism. For both rationalism and the value placed

¹Martin Albrow, *The Global Age : State and Society Beyond Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 89.

²For a discussion on this ground see, Marshall Bermann, *All that is Solid* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986).

on novelty it substitutes open and pragmatic communication between people and peoples and interaction with nature.³

The definition given for globalisation by Albrow, even though is not free from criticism yet encircles many of the issues under discussion. Among these comes at the first hand the concept of nationalism; others are the facts such as time-space relationship, the condition and ramifications of locality and, intertwined with that, the notion of territoriality. Other than this approach, one another important issue is the introduction of the existing condition of capitalism usually characterised with the 'end of Fordism'.⁴ After this introductory remarks, it is possible to elaborate on two points. First, although there is a radical transformation in the modes of production due to radical changes occurred as a consequence of either the 'time-space compression'⁵ or "time-space distinction"⁶ and the transformations came out in capitalism⁷ it is not such an easy task to argue that modernism is finished. Second, as Albrow puts it, "the crisis of nation-state society has frequently been represented as the culmination of modernity, as a stage towards a new modernity."⁸ This modernity is what Beck et al calls the 'reflexive modernity'⁹ and in this context Albrow says that

³Ibid., 81.

⁴Scott Lash and John Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987)

⁵David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

⁶Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

⁷Alain Lipietz, *Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and Democracy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

⁸Albrow, *Global Age*, 67.

⁹Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

"the expansion of rationality appears as a reflexive modernisation, modernity with a rationalisation in its principles. But this linkage of reflexivity and modernity conceals the indeterminacy of rationality as an organising principle.¹⁰

The critical issue is that Albrow relates reflexive modernity to the crisis of nation-state society by saying that the crisis is "frequently been represented as the culmination of modernity, as a stage towards a new modernity."¹¹ What is at stake here is that, he argues, "reflexive modernity is no more capable of providing foundations than simple rationality" and continues by arguing, with an implicit reference to Ulrich Beck's concept of 'risk society'¹², that, this framework is far away from supplying the necessary ontological security to the individuals for the modernisation's "nation-state did that by associating rationality with its own expansion and equating society with its own structure."¹³ In this context, Beck, in a later text, redefines the 'reflexive modernisation' giving the clues for the transition to globalization, such as ,

1. reflexive modernisation disembeds and re-embeds the cultural prerequisites of social classes with forms of the *individualisation* (emphasis original) of social inequality. That means, on the one hand, that the disappearance of social classes and the abolition of social inequality no longer coincide. Instead, the blurring of social classes runs in tandem with an exacerbation of social inequality, which now does not

¹⁰Albrow, *Global Age*, 67.

¹¹Ibid., 67.

¹²Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992).

¹³Albrow, *Global Age*, 68.

follow large identifiable groups in the lifeworld, but is instead fragmented across (life) phases, space and time. On the other hand it is no longer possible to extrapolate the ways of life, life situations and lifestyles of people from their (vocational) position in the process of labour and production...2. The question of functional differentiation are replaced by the questions of *functional coordination*, (emphasis original) cross-linkings, harmonization, synthesis and so on...Differentiation itself is becoming a social problem...3. The concept of linearly increasing rationality has the double significance of a *descriptive* and a *normative* (emphasis original) model.¹⁴

The emergence of 'individualisation, functional differentiation and linearly increasing rationality' is a specific breakaway with the 'simple modernisation' which has started the process of nation state according to Elias¹⁵ and which is inseparable from the centralisation of state power which commences from the sixteenth century.¹⁶ It is at this point Giddens suggests that modern world is shaped through the intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state system.¹⁷ On the other hand, Keyman succinctly summarises Giddens' further arguments which situates the emergence of globalization together with the crisis of nation state through the concept of 'discontinuity.'¹⁸ But, Keyman also refers to another text by Jessop which articulates Giddens' account of the nation state. In this context, state is embodied on

¹⁴Ulrich Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order*, tr. Mark Ritter, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 26-28.

¹⁵Norbert Elias, *State and Civilization*, vol. 2 of *The Civilizing Process* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).

¹⁶For a critique of Elias' approach in the context of globalisation see, Roland Robertson, "'Civilization' and the Civilizing Process: Elias, Globalization and Analytic Synthesis", in Mike Featherstone (ed), *Cultural Theory and Cultural Change* (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 211-228.

¹⁷Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 4-8.

¹⁸Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), 69.

territorial centrality, an international context and other techniques employed by the nation state to reproduce its national and territorially organised social formation.¹⁹ When, a transformation comes out, effective on any one of the issues clarified above, the structure starts either to dismantling or alteration.

In the late modern times this metamorphosis is initiated by, first, as has already been suggested, the problematization of time-space relationship which should be seen as an outcome of technological improvement. This, no doubt, has produced results on the spatial, territorial sovereignty of the state-nation as states started to be isolated unites, even though connected with each other in a net of international relations, and as Poggi suggests that "it is the very nature of the modern state that there should be many states"²⁰ unique, self-referential, or as Keyman suggests, 'coherent self' organisations.²¹ This condition derives the 'society-centric models' which comes as an alternative to the shortcomings of state-centric models.²² In this transition what is determining is, again argued by Keyman with reference to Held, the discrepancy between "the sovereign state and the complex nature of international relations."²³

Held, in this context underlines five issues which might be taken as the overall structure of the late modern times or globalization. These are, "i) world economy; ii) hegemonic power and power blocs, iii) international organisations, iv) international

¹⁹Ibid., 71.

²⁰Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 13.

²¹Ibid., 75.

²²For the details see, Keyman, Ibid., 75-77.

²³Ibid., 78.

law, v) the end of domestic policy."²⁴ Globalization, then, might be argued that, is a transition from the international relations to supraterritorial relations²⁵ as an outcome of capitalism which culminates in the "transnational practices of corporate economic actors²⁶, the developments in the telecommunications realm²⁷, mostly observed in capital transactions immigrations²⁸ and this shift has repercussions on the already established structures of nation-state defined on the basis of a homogeneous society encircled with the citizens. The identity issue at large, enclosing the rebirth of the civil society and the discussions of fundamentalism is another determining issue in this period. This framework, to some authors, is the 'emancipation' brought by globalization together with a new ontology.²⁹

This new ontology is not to be differentiated from the notion of universal/particular dichotomy for, the international-supraterritoriality antagonisma³⁰

²⁴ Ibid., 78.

²⁵For the debate of the concept see, Jan Aart Scholte, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization", in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, eds., Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (London: Pinter, 1996), 46.

²⁶Saskia Sassen, "The Spatial Organization of Information Industries: Implications for the Role of the State", in *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, ed., James H. Mittelman (Boulder, London: Yynne Reinner Publications, 1997), 46.

²⁷For an excellent overview of this specific situation see, Gerhard Fuchs and Andrew M. Koch, "The Globalization of telecommunications and the Issue of Regulatory Reform", in *Globalization*, ed. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, 163- 174.

²⁸Ahmet İcduygu, "Citizenship at the Crossroads: Immigration and the Nation-State," in *Globalization*, E. Kofman and G. Youngs, 150-162.

²⁹Jan Aart Scholte, "Towards", 53-55.

³⁰This notion is discussed by Taylor as "inter stateness and trans-stateness." For details see, Peter J. Taylor, "The Modern Multiplicity of States", in *Globalization*, ed. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, 99-108.

is embedded in this understanding if Robertson's well known formulation which defines globalization as the "universalisation of the particular and the particularisation of the universal."³¹ In this context it could be argued once more that globalisation might be taken as an epistemology, replacing the ideology of modernity, inclusive of all concepts developed by the latter on condition that a restitution is contemplative as a consequence of the discussion concerning the nation state and state sovereignty.

7.2.2. (Nation) State and Globalisation

Even though there are attempts, nevertheless it is difficult to say abruptly that the demise of state sovereignty is perceptible in the existing world order.³² What has undergone a series of change in the late 90s is the concept of centre. In the process of globalization, which lies in the same time period, namely in the 1990s, the concept of 'universalist solution'³³, mostly attributed to a state model created beginning by the 16th century as the modernisation project, is put under a critical questioning and in this context it is possible to argue that modernity itself is the implementation of a central and centralising state structure which, in the second phase, would be conducive to the construction of other concepts related with it, like the notion of citizenship, developmentalism, homogenisation of the society, etc. In other words, globalisation is the ramification of a process initiated by post-modernist and post-structuralist

³¹Roland Robertson, *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1994); Roland Robertson, "Globalisation or Glocalisation," *Journal of International Communication*, no. 1, (1994), 33-52.

³²On the contrary there is a call for the new reinforced state model. Leo Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State", James H. Mittelman, *Globalization*, 83-116.

³³Richard J. Harknett, "Territoriality in the Nuclear Era", in *Globalization*, Eleonore Kofman and G. Youngs, 141.

arguments³⁴ questioning the 'essentialist view of the state as a coherent self' not only concentrating on the ontological existence of the state but going deep into the analysis of the discourse attached to it and derivating a hidden epistemology³⁵.

This is where the hegemonic power of the state as well as the sovereignty of the state over the nation and the existence of the individual is dismantled through the process of reconstruction of the civil society.³⁶ In fact, putting civil society against the state, as Keyman states correctly, is not a sustainable argument for "viewed historically, it can be seen that the state and civil society are so interpenetrated that they can not be conceived of as analytically distant spaces."³⁷ Still, "an analytical or abstract theory, because it detaches itself from time and space cannot account for the interpenetration between the state and civil society. For this reason, theory should always be time-space bound and be contingent on historicity."³⁸ It is this framework and comprehension that enables the development of the argumentation which situates civil society as a contingent power conveying to the dismantling of the sovereignty of state in the 1990s.³⁹ The possibility created by the civil society in this process is the

³⁴In this context for valuable contributions see, Peter Beilharz, Gillian Robinson and John Rundell (ed), *Between Totalitarianism and Postmodernity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London England: The MIT Press, 1992).

³⁵For an excellent discussion of this framework see, E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization*, 54-192.

³⁶Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, "Civil Society and Social Theory", P.Beilharz, G. Robinson, J. Rundell, *Between*, 199-219.

³⁷ Ibid., 114.

³⁸Ibid., 114.

³⁹In this regard two different articles might be analysed. Eric Hobsbawm, "The Nation and Globalization", *Constellations* (1998), V.5, no. 1, 1-9; and Robert Fine, "Civil Society Theory, Enlightenment and Critique, " *Democratization* (Spring 1997), v.4, no. 1, 7-28.

"local participation and decentralisation."⁴⁰ This process should be taken as the determining fact in the distinction of globalisation from modernity and it needs an elaboration on the notion of hegemony.

The concept of hegemony is very well discussed by Keyman and it is him to suggest three fundamental problems concerning this notion which not only determines the state condition in the international realm but also the existential condition of the individual in the society. Accordingly, the hegemony concept can be used to overcome

"first, the problem of economic reductionism that results from the base-superstructure metaphor...Second, it helps overcome the problem of political reductionism...Third, the concept of hegemony permits the recognition of the importance of the limiting and constraining aspects of structures without requiring the reification of the concept of totality."⁴¹

Keyman's arguments for the hegemony concept with an elaboration on Gramsci gives the necessary clues for transgressing the limits of the hegemony, a notion itself reduced to basic metaphors, and opens to a new dimension enabling the articulation of the ideology as a reproductory concept as long as the state-hegemony relation is concerned. In this context Keyman first argues that hegemony "consists of both coercion and consent, material capabilities, political and discursive practices and the creation of a consensual politics."⁴² This framework for a very specific reason brings out the inevitability of the implementation of the 'universal language:'

⁴⁰Giles Mohan, "Globalization and Governance: Sub-Saharan Africa", in *Globalization*, eds., Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, 290.

⁴¹E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization*, 117.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 117.

"A hegemonic ideology helps the system reproduce itself...In the course of creating and manufacturing 'consent' a hegemonic ideology implements a universal language (norms and ideas), according to which the interests and demands of the constitutive elements of the existing system are formulated...Since the ideological formation of hegemony is necessary for the creation of 'consent,' the reproduction of hegemony is dependent more upon its ability to operate as a universal language than...the material capabilities that the hegemonic power possesses."⁴³

Even though this understanding of hegemony is more convincing for the international relations still it might be used for the state-society-individual context for two reasons. First, it interrelates the concept with the notion of "false consciousness"; second it demarcates its function as a constitutive factor of intersubjectivity: "The crucial point here is that...hegemony does not remain external to, but instead becomes an integral element of the constitution of subject"⁴⁴ which means that, the modern state, indeed, uses hegemony to produce ideology in order to sustain the 'order' necessitating the development of the civil society as the only possibility of emancipation. This is where the break from modernity comes out as a concrete constitutive agency of the present day world order not only allowing but also facilitating the construction of new discourses, i.e. discourses of identity, at large, as, in Gills's words, "transnational counter-hegemonic blocs."⁴⁵

This framework is first shattered by the plural existence of various different attacks directed to the modernity as it is considered as a hegemony and in this regard

⁴³Ibid., 117.

⁴⁴Ibid., 121.

⁴⁵Ibid., 122.

following Keyman's approach, the poststructuralism with its ramifications such as discursivity and genealogy, textuality and deconstructionism ends up with the culmination of postmodernism.⁴⁶ All of the attempts start by the basic incentive of the dismantling of the modernist rhetoric which aims the construction of a hegemonic ideology dependent on logocentrism, externalising the ontological existence of the self, i.e. subject, centralisation of the knowledge interrelated with the reinforcement of power. The final achievement in this trajectory with no intuition of a progressive understanding in the deconstruction of modernist hegemonic discourse and textuality is postmodernism, acknowledging the end of grand narratives.⁴⁷ The distinction from the Foucaultian notion of modernity which dwells on the construction and the hegemony of one identity over the other, plurality of identities, after a series of attempts, is surpassed by the constitution of the counter-hegemonic discourses which should be dependent on "the recognition of marginalized identities. In other words it should be pluralistic, in order to be open to a number of voices and to their specific resistance to the discourse of modernity."⁴⁸ The postmodern alternative here comes out involving,

"i) the rejection of such modernist concepts as totality, universality, the autonomous character of epistemology, the rationally acting subject; ii) the promotion of such concepts as the discursive and textual construction of reality, meaning, identity, historicity, and the power/knowledge

⁴⁶Axel Honneth, "Pluralization and Recognition: On the Self Misunderstanding of Postmodern Social Theorists", P. Beilharz, G. Robinson, J. Rundell, *Between*, 163-172.

⁴⁷Jean François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, (tr. R. Durand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Doubtless, the other 'models' of postmodernity are not intervened here.

⁴⁸E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization*, 140.

relationship; iii) the privileging of critical social movements as the new agents of social change."⁴⁹

The point that needs a further elaboration is that, after the postmodern set-out which puts the state as a constitutive agent of modernity under pressure is the culmination of globalization; in other words, in discussing the difference between the globalization and the postmodernity it is possible to situate the premise that the latter is the institutionalisation of the former. Even though it is possible to take globalization as an entity with its relation to modernity, as Keyman succinctly does⁵⁰, still the disconnection occurs when globalization is considered as the phenomenon, mentioned above, which unites the particular with the universal due to the transformations achieved on the arena of communications and capitalism with exceptionally effective outcomes of time-space compressions and distinctions simultaneously.

Even though globalisation is a certain kind of involvement with modernity, yet, in the final instance, modernity is the sum total of all criticisms directed to it. In the late modern period, it might be argued that the postmodern period's achievements are immanent in the existing modernist discourse which is the integration of the nation states with the world economy together inclusive of the shift from monolithic understanding of identity to difference and other; from the state of monism to pluralism.⁵¹ This very last point is the institutionalisation of postmodern discourse

⁴⁹Ibid., 140.

⁵⁰Ibid., 16-17.

⁵¹For an excellent discussion of this condition see, William E. Connolly, "Pluralism, multiculturalism and the nation-state: rethinking the connections", *Journal of Political Ideologies* (1996), v.1, no. 1, 53-73.

through the concept of radical democracy⁵² via secondary associations calling for an associative democracy⁵³. In other words, it is the new notions and dimensions of democracy that concretises the globalization. Those concepts such as recognition of difference, pluralism, multiculturalism, etc. follow this condition without disjecting the constitutive elements of modernity critics, feminism playing the leading role.

Turkey, in the 1990s has started to build up relatively a new social discourse. The initiative behind it is the neo-liberal and the New Right developments. This framework tacitly includes the critique of modernity but is rather an attempt to get out of the existing statist discourse. The re-formation or the incentive taken by the civil society has been determining in this process. Also it is worth to mention that the new social structure is very much effected by the post Cold War period. The emergence of new nation states and especially the establishment of the Turkic Republics in the former Soviet Union relying on the ethnic identity has introduced the consciousness of ethnicity to Turkey, a notion much forgotten after the construction of national identity in the Republican period.

This initiation has triggered the second phase of secularisation still attached to the notion of identity. In this context, the Kurdish issue has played a formative role as well as the new developing feminist discourse which has been critical of the citizenship. In short, it could be argued that the 1990s, from various sides, has

⁵²For various aspects of the concept see, Chantal Mouffe (ed), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* (London: Verso, 1992).

⁵³For an excellent survey and deliberation see, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance", in Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (ed), *Associations and Democracy* (London: Verso, 1995), 7-100.

brought basically the critique of the national discourse dwelled on the notion of citizenship as an agent in the process of the construction of national identity. The statist discourse, symbolised by the Six Arrows, in need of being surpassed, at least alteration, has forced the SDPP to run for a change in the constitutive ideology and the 1990-1994 period is the battleground of this process giving birth to many intra-party factions and clashes.

7.3 SDPP in the 1990-1994 Period

7.3.1. The Intra-Party Conflicts

The demolishing of the Berlin Wall might be taken as an iconic development in the history of socialism due to its immense effects on the fall of the Soviet System and on the birth of a new period usually referred as globalisation. Globalisation, with its complex character and much debated arguments has not only influenced the macro level, national politics in Turkey but mainly encouraged to bring fore some of the tensions long time kept silent in the centre-left politics. The displaying of this among the social democratic ranks and cadres has been through the intra-party conflicts of SDPP. Although in the decade of 1980 there has been a set of extraordinary congresses which also indicates the similar conflicts and, even though in those clashes found some arguments resembling the 1990 arguments, the nature of the latter unrest is more a radical one. It might be taken as a search for the renewal of the concept of social democracy with an interest in breaking with the pattern that has prepared it rather than a search for the methods to implement the already accepted and established principles of Turkish social democracy, attached to RPP tradition. This was a diffident probe for an answer to the policies developed by the New Right both internationally and domestically, as well as a looking for the ways of merging the

arguments developed in the post Berlin Wall period with the existing social democracy in Turkey.

In this regard two group movements should briefly be analysed. The first is the one known as the *Yenilikçiler* (Pro-Reformation) which started to develop its arguments by declaring its establishment in March 25, 1989⁵⁴. The group embodied such prestigious names as Ercan Karakaş, Ertuğrul Günay, İsmail Cem and Asaf Savaş Akat. Although this group has been active and impressive in the last years of 1980s, beginning by the fourth Small Congress of 1988 and in the Fourth Extraordinary Congress of 1989 as well as Fifth Small Congress of 1989, against the party administration which was then controlled by Deniz Baykal and his friends. It has published its first Manifesto in 1991 after the first clash between Baykal and İnönü.

The main arguments of *Yenilikçiler* has been more concerning with the structural issues of social democracy in Turkey more than its established values. Here, it should be noted that the basic constituting concept of social democracy has been considered as Kemalism, as has been shown in the previous chapters, among the politicians and in the party programmes. Up until the clash between Baykal and İnönü, which first became overt in the sixth extraordinary congress of September 29, 1990, the criticism directed to this fact has been of secondary importance even not observable. It could also be argued that the main event that provoked this movement has been the fall of authoritarian regimes and the centralised state understanding exemplified by Soviet system countries and the minimal state search of the neo-liberal politics. In Turkey, as has been shown in the previous chapter, though tacitly, the first criticism to Kemalism is not directed from the left but from the right under the

⁵⁴*Cumhuriyet*, (March 26, 1989).

leadership of Turgut Özel due to his critique of central strong state. In this context, the main group developing the main arguments of this debate is the one called pro- Second Republic (*İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler*).

The left, on this ground and principally because the early criticism has been raised by the centre-right cadres, at the beginning, has preferred to refrain from this approach. The choice of the *Yenilikçiler* was rather to tackle with the leadership, intra party democracy and in general the party technologies questions, such as membership, education, participation, etc.⁵⁵ The criticism they developed which aimed at the basic tenets of SDPP Programme, namely the traditional Six Arrows, is later. Let alone the criticism, one of the prominent members of the group, Ertuğrul Gönay, was a former member of the parliamentary group of RPP after the 1977 elections and a supporter of the line that starts by the late 19th century Unity and Progress Party and reaches to RPP. In this context, as well as emphasising this chain of development in many of his speeches he delivered⁵⁶ in the congresses, when he began to manifest the arguments of the *Yenilikçiler* as an unofficial spokesman of the group he took an itinerary identical with the route of Kemal Atatürk when he first set out for the National

⁵⁵A good example of these arguments might be found in Asaf Savaş Akat's book, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi* (İstanbul: Armoni Yayıncılık, 1991). The articles compiled here are first published in the journal which served as the official organ of Yenilikçiler, *Sosyal Demokrat*. Their names are good indicators of the axis of search: "Örgütte Yenilik ve Parti İçi Demokrasi (Renewal of the Grassroots and Intra-Party Democracy); "Parti içi Eğitim ve Örgütlenme" (Intro-Part Training and Organization), "Teknoloji ve Parti İçi Demokrasi" (Technology and Intra Party Democracy), "Sosyal Demokraside Lider ve Kadro" (Leader and Cadre in Social Democracy). Here, it might be observed that there is an emphasis on the 'intra-part democracy' concept, which was a direct and indirect discussion and critique of Baykal administration.

⁵⁶The notes of the present author who has long time been together with the group.

Independence War.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, especially Ercan Karakaş, was continuously underlining the discrepancies between the Turkish social democracy and the West European model.⁵⁸ Karakaş's claim was that Turkish social democracy, beyond coming from a statist, centralist, anti-democratic origin, was impotent of renewing itself due to the absence of ideological probation.⁵⁹

7.3.2. Baykalcılar: The Yenilikçiler ('New Left')

Depending on a dispute just before the local elections for the district of Bayrampaza and in the aftermaths of loosing it, the chairman of SDPP, Erdal İnönü, immediately called for an extraordinary congress. The aim of İnönü was to force Deniz Baykal to be a candidate for the chairmanship of the party. Believing that he would be reelected in the congress İnönü was trying to defeat Baykal and his team and to exclude them from the party administration. According to the speech he delivered in the congress, he believed that Baykal, together with his 'group of friends', was looking for the weak moment of İnönü to defeat him while fortifying his position in the party organisation and among the grassroots politicians.⁶⁰ Deniz Baykal, accepting the challenge, declared his candidateship. In the period anticipating the congress the Yenilikçiler formed a coalition with İnönü group against Baykal. The interesting development appeared in the same period was the decision of İsmail Cem, to join Baykal. He was a prestigious name and ideologue who had acted together with

⁵⁷Ertuğrul Günay, interview by the author, Ankara, July 1998.

⁵⁸Ercan Karakaş, "Sosyal Demokrasi de 'Bize Özgü' mü Olmalı" in *Gelecek Sosyal Demokrasidir* (İstanbul: Sosyal Demokrasi Yayınları, 1992), 21-24.

⁵⁹Ercan Karakaş, "Sosyalizm Bizim İçin Hep Somut Bir Ütopya", Ruşen Çakır, Hıdır Göktaş, *Resmî Tarih Sivil Arayış: Sosyal Demokratlarda İdeoloji ve Politika* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1991), 133-147.

⁶⁰Erdal İnönü, "'Parti İç Demokrasisi İçin Atılım!' Kurultayı", *Mimeo*, 14.

Yenilikçiler against Baykal administration. His existence in the group together with Baykal's decision to accept the contest for leadership brought the first radical criticism to and, the demand to change, the SDPP ideology.

In the 1990 congress Baykal and his group, due to the time shortage and the unexpected move of İnönü could not declare a well prepared programme, resting on a well grounded ideology. Besides, the legitimacy of such a declaration was questionable for Baykal was the secretary general of the party just before the congress who was resisting to accept the demands raised by *Yenilikçiler*. As a consequence the small article he published before the congress has an eclectic character.⁶¹ The manifesto on the one hand was criticising the pro-status-quo situation of the Turkish social democracy and linking it once more to its traditional past and on the other hand he was clearly proposing to the party "to leave the past to the past."⁶² However, the group, after loosing the election, immediately started to renew itself to surpass the criticism of 'factionism' directed to it since the beginning, from the years when Baykal was a member of the RPP parliamentary group before the 1980 military coup and in a non declared way running for the leadership of the party against Ecevit, to construct an ideological framework under the name of *Yeni Sol* (The New Left) for the next congress, the third Congress, July 27-28, 1991.⁶³

⁶¹Deniz Baykal, "SHİP'nin Kendini ve Türkiye'yi Yenileştirmesi", in Deniz Baykal, İsmail Cem, *Yeni Sol* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992).

⁶²Ibid., 12.

⁶³In an interview before the congress Baykal accepts the criticisms and defines the process of constructing the groups. Deniz Baykal, "Değişim, Yenileşme ve SHİP Kurultayı," interview with Ümit Aslanbay, *Cumhuriyet*, (July 23, 1991), 1.

The concept of 'New Left'⁶⁴, actually goes all the way back to the late 1960s. It is a concept first developed by various different authors and intellectuals in the effort to distinguish the 'existing real socialism' from the state and to restructure it on a more civil basis.⁶⁵ One of the most important themes of the New Left was to revisit Marxism and draw out a new understanding of socialism encompassing a more humanitarian approach.⁶⁶ This was, in a way inevitable, for the basic concepts of the New Left were developed first, after and in reaction to the Soviet intervention to Prague. New Left, as a conceptual start, stretched into a search for various synthesis surpassing its political constraints and has been the benchmark for the reintroduction of Marxism as well as the merging of Marxism with various different discourses. In this sense, the New Left organised by Baykal did not have any commonalities with the 'New Left' of the West European socialist-Marxist tradition.

7.3.2.1. The Six Arrows Debate: Turkish Social Democracy and the Constituting Ideology

Before the congress, the New Left (NL) group published a set of documents.⁶⁷ The aim was to situate the New Left on an ideological basis, a process immediately started as soon as Cem decided to join the Baykal group just before the

⁶⁴The evolution of the term 'New Left' is explained in detail in Maurice Isserman, *If I had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

⁶⁵For a recent discussion of the New Left with new developments on the left in general see, Richard J. Ellis, "Romancing the Oppressed: The New Left and the Left Out," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 158, No. 1, (Winter 1996), 109-153.

⁶⁶For various different approaches on this ground see, Priscilla Long (ed.), *The New Left: A Collection of Essays* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969).

⁶⁷Deniz Baykal, İsmail Cem, *SHP'de 'Yeni Sol'un Türkiye Programı*, "Değişim," Mimeograph.

early speech, he develops a critical approach to the notion of 'minimal state' which later the New Left would take a different position.⁷² Here he supports the idea of 'organised market economy' with an accent on the third sector which includes the cooperatives, non profit organisations.⁷³ The method of achieving these is, refraining from 'from the above' solutions. Lastly, Baykal stresses the point that the absence of democracy does not only generate the social problems but also contributes to the problems of labour.⁷⁴

Even though by the end of the article it is pointed out that the preparatory material of the French Socialist Party for the 1990 Congress is used, still the discourse is ambiguous and hesitant with no clear distinctions between the 'old' and the 'new' definitions of social democracy. These points are discussed more by İsmail Cem, sometimes even continuing with a more populist and polemicised tone but, touching the most crucial and critical points like the renewal of the 'parochial' social democracy by moving away from its 'regional' and 'historical' origins⁷⁵. In this regard, Cem, first, analysis the development of RPP reminding the success it reached in the 1970s. He states that the successes was achieved because the party acted as a 'disclaimer of inheritance', i.e. disjuncting to be a state party even facing the reaction of the

⁷²Deniz Baykal, in another speech, for example, leaving aside the concept of 'organised market economy' insists that "the starting point of the future economic structuring is market economy." Deniz Baykal, "Sorunlar ve Çözüm", 62.

⁷³Ibid., 30.

⁷⁴Ibid., 34.

⁷⁵İsmail Cem, "Sosyal Demokrasi Nasıl 'En Büyük' Olur?", in Deniz Baykal, İsmail Cem, *Yeni Sol*,

conservatives.⁷⁶ Cem, on this ground takes another but a very risky step in an article he published just before the second round in Baykal-İnönü clash which took place in the third Congress, July, 27,28, 1991. Accordingly, Cem, insists that no political movement can gain a success if it does not get into accounts with its past. In this context,

The social democracy of Turkey has not get in into accounts with the past of *historical reformative movement* ⁷⁷ (tarihsel yenileştirici hareket), in others with its own past. Has not questioned its faults. For not questioning it, on the contrary, has exaggeratedly exalted it and transformed it into a taboo. For this very condition it has stuck with the values of the past..⁷⁸

Cem, after criticising Turkish social democracy for not being democrat because of not having tackled with the problems of 'Independence Courts' (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*) and the 'Yassıada Trials'.⁷⁹ More interestingly, Cem states that it is the movements appearing as the origins of social democracy that has prohibited the labour organisations and the intellectual freedom in Turkey and, if not the confrontation is proceeded, even though the articles banning these activities in the Penal Law are dissolved, still "they would continue to live in the subconscious of the left and the left parties fortifying the habits of single party period."⁸⁰ After these claims, Cem comes to a very important point and argues that Turkish social democracy is totally different than the Western models. The difference between the two versions, according to Cem

⁷⁶Ibid., 135.

⁷⁷Italics in the original.

⁷⁸Ibid., 43.

⁷⁹Ibid., 43.

⁸⁰Ibid., 44.

is that while the Western social democracy has derived from the transformation of Marxist movements and has always been dependent of this basis, Turkish models neither have emanated from the parties choosing the 'pluralist democracy' nor originating from a Marxist point. Rather, they are parties generating from an "over-centralised, bureaucratic, elitist ideology and derivated from the tradition of 'single party', 'state party'.⁸¹ Further, Cem, definitely denies the Kemalist roots when he clearly rejects the coexistence of such concepts as 'statism' and 'nationalism'.⁸²

On the other hand, Ertuğrul Günay, now in opposition to Cem, once an ideological ally, was taking a different position⁸³. He emphasised two conditions concerning the Six Arrows they, it both constructs the historical past of the social democracy in Turkey and, it has been modified, improved, developed and enriched in time by the inculcation of some new concepts to the party programmes like, liberty, equality, solidarity, etc. According to Günay, Six Arrows is neither a taboo nor needs completely to be rejected.⁸⁴ On the other hand, Taha Parla, who has developed an earlier criticism of Kemalism takes a similar position by stressing that not all components of Six Arrows should be rejected and a more precise criticism should be developed.⁸⁵ Interesting is that, the *Yenilikçiler*, in a sense the former supporters of

⁸¹Ibid., 42.

⁸²İsmail Cem, "SHP'de 'Yeni Sol'un Türkiye Programı", in *SHP'de Yeni Sol'un Türkiye Programı*, Mimeograph, Deniz Baykal, İsmail Cem (The manifesto presented to the Third Congress, 1991), 5.

⁸³Ertuğrul Günay, "Halka rağmen halk hareketi değiliz," in *Resmi Tarih* ed., Ruşen Çakır, Hıdır Göktaş, 187-204.

⁸⁴Ibid., 190.

⁸⁵Taha Parla, "Asıl hayret edilecek şey yetmiş yıl sürebilmiş olması," in *Resmi Tarih*, ed., Ruşen Çakır, Hıdır Göktaş, 48-49.

the similar ideas, in this debate and in the congresses, preferred to act together with İnönü group which was against the arguments proposed by New Left and showed an adherence to Kemalist tenets and to the RPP origins⁸⁶ to capture the intra-party power. Another critical point here is that, even Erdal İnönü, for the sake of compromise, argued that, Six Arrows did not take place in the programme of SDP and in the 1985 Programme of the SDPP. There are found tenets other than the Six Arrows, like liberty, equality to construct similarities with Western social democratic parties. İnönü also stresses that the delegates of the party do not anymore comprehend the classical tenets in their meanings of the 1930s and 1940s.⁸⁷

7.3.2.2. *Repercussions of the Debate*

These theses, which were refused and criticised by Baykal in the party when first raised by *Yenilikçiler* in a very modest way, especially by Asaf Savaş Akat⁸⁸,

⁸⁶Another interesting thing observed during this process, showing the ideological confusion, was that, in the Third Congress, even though Deniz Baykal was defending the ideas of Asaf Savaş Akat, by referring to him in his speech he delivered in the congress, Akat, together with the other members of *Yenilikçiler*, supported Erdal İnönü who was, to repeat once more, backing the traditional past values. See, Asaf Savaş Akat, "Kongre İzlenimleri", *Hürriyet*, (July 26 1991), 1. Akat was also contributing to the highly popular daily, *Hürriyet*, by writing articles that were published in the first page of the newspaper, supporting İnönü. Later, he, told the author that his position was wrong and was astonished to see that his ideas found echo among the Baykal supporters.

⁸⁷Erdal İnönü, 27-28 Temmuz 1991, 3. Olağan Kurultay Açış Konuşması, Mimeograph, 16.

⁸⁸This criticism, at the beginning is more concentrating on the critic of the Party Programme, which is nothing but the references to the Six Arrows. For this see, Asaf Savaş Akat, *Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi*, 22-32. The criticism directed to Kemalism is in the second period and for this see, Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır, *Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1991) and, for the criticism of social democracy originating from Kemalism see, İhsan Bülent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1993), 23-81.

have provoked severe criticism not only in the SDPP but also outside the party. The debate in SDPP started spreading out and effecting the Turkish intelligentsia. The *Cumhuriyet*, a Kemalist daily, who used to have an important effect on the grassroots of the centre-left parties in Turkey because of its past,⁸⁹ has undergone a severe unrest and a group has left the newspaper and resigned from the administration by November, 6, 1991.⁹⁰ The group embodied some of the prominent names on the Kemalist-left intelligentsia like İlhan Selçuk, and the unrest, defined as the 'punch of Liberals against the Kemalists',⁹¹ continued up until April 23, 1992 as the 'liberals' left the administration, resigned from *Cumhuriyet* and the 'Kemalists' moved back to power defeating the previous cadre⁹². The come-back first declared by April 10, 1992, and İlhan Selçuk started again writing his column by April 11, 1992.⁹³ The difference between the groups have been explained in various articles appearing both in *Cumhuriyet*⁹⁴ and in the other newspapers. Although it has never been put succinctly what the differences are, still it was clear that, the 'new' group, as explained by Hasan Cemal⁹⁵, the editor, was more liberal with respect to the others'

⁸⁹*Cumhuriyet* was founded by Yunus Nadi a journalist and a member of Union and Progress was one of Atatürk's close friends and started the newspaper during the Independence War in Ankara. For the history of the newspaper see, Emin Karaca, *Cumhuriyet Olayı* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1996).

⁹⁰*Cumhuriyet*, (November 6, 1991).

⁹¹Emin Karaca, *Cumhuriyet*, 199-234.

⁹²*Cumhuriyet*, (10 April, 1992).

⁹³*Cumhuriyet*, (11 April, 1992).

⁹⁴Okay Gönensin, in his weekly articles, usually tried to delineate the basic issues concerning the clash. İlhan Selçuk replied some of these arguments in *Hürriyet*.

⁹⁵Hasan Cemal, "Nadir Nadi'ye Mektuplar-1, 2, 3, 4", *Cumhuriyet*, 7-8-9-10 Kasım, 1991.

conservative approaches. The new writers, in the daily articles, have taken a position much critical about the traditional left in Turkey, as well as Kemalism, and proposed a more liberal left model, at least by arguing the recent developments and concepts that have appeared in the post-communist era.⁹⁶

One of the most challenging dynamics behind this debate is not directly linked with social democracy. As has already been noted, in the debate some intellectuals have insisted on the point that Kemalism, especially with its progressive and reformist character and its modernist epistemology,⁹⁷ could be taken as an epiphenomenon in the construction of social democracy if the latter is conceived as a movement attached to the Enlightenment tradition as well as an attempt to gain and reinforce the basic liberal rights.⁹⁸ The ambiguous point which triggered the debate is whether social democracy might be a dependent variable of Kemalism or not. Against the argument of Kemalist writers, gathered in *Cumhuriyet*, purporting that a left in Turkey can not be conceptualised and conceived unless this condition is satisfied⁹⁹, this point has been rejected by the others considering the militarist, centralist, positivist but mainly the Jacobinist aspects of Kemalism.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶The new columnists included such names as, Şahin Alpay, İlder Turan, Seyfettin Gürsel, İlkay Sunar, Murat Belge, Çağlar Keyder, all prominent intellectuals and academics.

⁹⁷This context is especially analysed in Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yeni*, 55-80.

⁹⁸This notion of social democracy is analysed before with reference to Jan Otto Andersson, "Fundamental Values for a Third Left", *New Left Review*, no. 216, (March-April 1996), 66-78.

⁹⁹Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Atatürk'ü Eleştirmenin Dayanılmaz Hafifliği* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993).

¹⁰⁰Ahmet İnsel, "Sosyalist Olduğum için Anti-Kemalistim," in Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır, *Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor*, 194-207.

In time, the debate has turned to encompass the argument more probing the structural aspects of 'the left.' Here, Kemalism and a left generating from it is criticised because of its structural similarities with Leninism, a model which has also aimed at the modernist ambitions. It is underlined that after the fall of the Leninist state and party model, it is difficult to support and defend the Kemalist model, both 'sharing the same fate.'¹⁰¹ Insel also says that "the space filled by Bolshevism in Russia is filled by Kemalism in Turkey which relies on a notion that the development of Kemalism will convey to the development of the left."¹⁰² Further, it has been emphasised that, while social democracy might be encircling Kemalism, because of its republican epistemology, its will to transite the society from a community based structure to nation-state, and it has endured the construction of a modernist understanding of citizenship,¹⁰³ the reverse would never be possible.¹⁰⁴

The numerous factors stimulating this debate and forcing Turkish social democracy to search for a new ideological basis can easily be counted but, the

¹⁰¹Metin Çulhaoğlu, "Kemalizm ve Sosyalizm Yıllar Sonra Aynı Kaderi Paylaşıyor," in Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır, *Sol*, 157-174.

¹⁰²Ahmet Insel, "Sosyalist", in Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır (ed), 197.

¹⁰³There is a vast literature at this point usually relying on more a polemicist rhetoric. One interesting example is developed by Attila İlhan who considers himself a Marxist and tries to identify Kemalism with its connections with Enlightenment ideology and concepts. Attila İlhan, *Hangi Atatürk* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2. basım, 1982).

¹⁰⁴It is also interesting that Attila İlhan, although a devoted Kemalist, declines the idea that there is a uncompromised and natural connection between Turkish social democracy and the former whereas the others underline the togetherness. Attila İlhan, *Sosyalizm Asıl Şimdi* (İstanbul: BDS Yayınları, 1991).

common denominator of these variables might be epitomised as the debate of modernisation. Modernisation debate here, is ambitiously bound to the concept of the state. The modern state, taken together with such phenomenon as 'the nation' and in general, with the 'project of modernisation' run by the nation-state, in a period of globalisation which displays all these issues to discussion and criticism, inevitably and indirectly is also exposed to criticism.¹⁰⁵ In this sense, Kemalism is also criticised because of its coexistence with the state, for as it is suggested by an author, in Turkey it is more a 'state-nation' rather than a 'nation-state'.¹⁰⁶

In other words, the criticism of Kemalism is the reassessment of the state and the issues of modernism. This very condition is also satisfied when the debate enrolls into the debate of democracy at large. Here the concept of democracy is more related to such notions as identity, the issues of classical democracy and in this context, especially two issues, the Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish question, have a massive effect on the debate for, it is believed that, especially the Kurdish matter brought the early ruptures in the Kemalist structure.¹⁰⁷ That is why Kemalism-social democracy interrelation should be analysed first on the basis of modernisation, than the Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish question to understand its position and crisis in the 1990s. Nevertheless as this will be analysed further in the next chapter here it is more convenient to discuss the re-establishment of the RPP and the situation of SDPP.

¹⁰⁵For a theoretical framework see, Johann Arnason, "The Theory of Modernity and the Problematic of Democracy", in P Beilharz, G. Robinson and J. Rundell, *Between*, 32-53 and Peter Murphy, "Socialism and Democracy", in, op. cit, 12-31.

¹⁰⁶Kürşat Bumin, "Yalnız başına bağımsızlıkla demokrasi kurulamaz," in, Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır (ed.), 66.

¹⁰⁷Aydın Çubukçu, "Türk solu kendi kimliğiyle Kemalizmle asla hesaplaşmadı", in Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır (ed), *Sol*, 216.

7.4. The Re-establishment of the RPP

7.4.1. The 1991 Elections and the Last Congress of Clash

The clash between Baykal and İnönü has ended when the group left the party after the third defeat in the Congress held in January 1992. The third confrontation of the groups was just after the October 20, 1991 elections. SDPP in the elections has come up as the third party after Süleyman Demirel's TPP (27.0%) and MP (24.0%) by getting the 20.8 % of the votes.¹⁰⁸ This was another fall in the vote volume in the post 1983 era. In comparison with the 33.2% of the 1983¹⁰⁹ and 24.7% of the 1987, this result was alarming a drastic decline.

The 1991 election, if the post 1983 circumstances are remembered, was an interesting one. The crux of the election was the clash between TPP and the MP on the right. The gist of the debate was the concern about the position of the President of Turkey. Both TPP and SDPP declared that depending on the election results, the Constitution would be amended and the President would be re-elected¹¹⁰. Beyond this, TPP run in the elections to gain once more the votes of the suburban area, which meant an opposition to the 'liberal-urban based' policies of the MP, holding to a relatively conservative economic policy. Together with SDPP, TPP in this election also run for a demand 'for more democracy'. Süleyman Demirel, all through the

¹⁰⁸ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Genel Müdürlüğü: *Resmî Seçim Sonuçları*, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1992).

¹⁰⁹The total votes of Populist Party and Social Democratic Party.

¹¹⁰For this hefty debate see, Metin Heper, "Turgut Özal's Presidency: Crisis and the Glimmerings of Consensus," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds., Metin Heper, Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 187-198.

campaign insisted on a condition that Turkey should have "police stations with glass walls."

In this context, SDPP prepared for the elections dwelling its campaign on two issues, democratisation and a new economic policy.¹¹¹ But , it is difficult to find any concrete policy declaration concerning both issues in the Manifesto published at the beginning of the campaign.¹¹² While on the ideological level, social democracy is explained going all the way back to the National Independence War days and cadres, there is a tacit nationalist accentuation in the Manifesto as well.¹¹³ The Manifesto, apart from this, without going deep and detailed analysis of the social strata and leaving ambiguous to which social classes the call is addressed, due to the lack of bringing a new conceptualisation of the social democracy in accordance with a new policy understanding, consists of two main parts.

On the first part, it is said that the party, in the future will construct 'a respected, healthy, wealthy Turkey.'¹¹⁴ In the second part, the targets are set and described and these are the construction of

'liberal, laic, pluralist, democratic Turkey to bring love and peace to the country; a respected Turkey which has opened itself to the world but has not left its development, security and defence to other nations; of a rapidly developing economy, being able to open itself to competition by using high technology and operating in social market rules; that would

¹¹¹SHP, *Yeni Bir Türkiye İçin İlk Hedefler: SHP Seçim Bildirgesi 1991* (Ankara (?): n.p., n.d.).

¹¹²Ibid., 3-38.

¹¹³Ibid., 5.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 4-13.

come over the sickness found in the social life by realistic, consistent social policies."¹¹⁵

The social classes that SDPP directly addresses in this context are, the workers, farmers, women and the youth.¹¹⁶

Even though the whole campaign is focused and concentrated on the democratisation in Turkey, interestingly, in the Manifesto, the main concern of the period, the South East question is only mentioned in two simple paragraphs which do not declare a specific policy. It is said that "the state will be send to the region not only as a security force but also as a power creating employment and bringing welfare and wealth."¹¹⁷ In this paragraph, contrary to the ongoing arguments, it is accepted that the state acts in the region with a human face, without differentiating people according to their languages, races, religious sects.¹¹⁸ The second paragraph deals with a more unrealistic and utopic approach saying that in the region the emergency rule (*Olağanüstü Hal*) will be ended, the village guards troops (*Köy Korucuları*) will be dissolved and the security tasks will be allocated in the suburbia to new and professionally educated troops.¹¹⁹ In the Manifesto there is no further discussion of the regional conditions.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 15-26.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 28-36.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 12.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 12.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 13.

On the other hand, the 1991 elections is remarkable for SDPP because it entered the contest forming a coalition with Democracy Party¹²⁰ (*DP-Demokrasi Partisi*); a party, running mainly in the South-East region of Turkey and for the Kurdish votes. The result obtained caused severe criticism and unrest in the party. The early reaction was the demand of an extraordinary congress by the *Baykalcılar*. On the other hand, the important development just after the elections was the decision reached between Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü to form a coalition government. The three factors effecting the construction of the decision was i) the debates concerning the condition of Turgut Özal as the president for, the two parties had already decided that he should be replaced by someone else arguing that his election was not democratic;¹²¹ ii) the will of Erdal İnönü to reinforce his position in the party as the Baykal group was already moved for an extraordinary congress and iii) to restructure the democracy formed first by the military coup of 1980 and then by the MP governments¹²².

This framework, though helpful in the construction of the coalition government, was not able to settle the unrest in the party and the third clash between İnönü and Baykal bursted out in the extraordinary congress of January 24-25, 1992. Both groups supported their previous positions and the familiar arguments. Baykal analysed the election results depending on the conclusions reached by a report

¹²⁰DEP was the only party running in the elections for the South-East votes. The problems between this party and SDPP, as well as the history of the party is to be discussed in the next chapter.

¹²¹Hürriyet, "Demirel-İnönü Anlaştı", (November 4, 1991); 49. *Cumhuriyet Hükümeti Programı* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1991), 26.

¹²²Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Dördüncü Olağan Kurultay: Parti Meclisi Çalışma Raporu, 11-12 Eylül 1993* (Ankara(?): n.p., n.d), 25.

prepared and already published by his group.¹²³ Arguing that SDPP is in a decline, he, as has been stated in the report, constructed his analysis on i) the lack of ideology; ii) SDPP appearing as a party of the past; iii) not reconstructing the party identity on the new concepts.¹²⁴ The future programme proposed by Baykal was insisting on the ideological renewal which depends on certain issues as, i) transition from the state party to a social party; ii) transition from the ideology of poverty to the ideology of welfare¹²⁵; iii) looking for a wide and participatory democracy; iv) to put the individual at the centre of the political life.¹²⁶

To achieve these goals, Baykal also developed a programmatic model which rested on, "i) the reconstruction of the politics; ii) the reconstruction of the administrative structure¹²⁷; iii) a radical legal reformation; iv) re-programming the equality; v) re-programming the economic development; vi) programming the social peace¹²⁸; vii) restructuring the party organisation."^{129,130} Another interesting point in this discussion is the approach concerning the concept of left. Here, two points are

¹²³*Tıkanan Parti ve Çıkış Yolu: 20 Ekim 1991 Seçiminin Değerlendirilmesi ve Geleceğe Dönük Öneriler* (İstanbul: Filiz Yayıncılık, 1991).

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 7-32.

¹²⁵Interestingly this wording is changed when the programme is re-published as a part of the book by Baykal and Cem, as, "Aiming at the Welfare Society." Deniz Baykal, İsmail Cem, *Yeni Sol*, 221.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 34-36.

¹²⁷In the book, there is a new paragraphe added, as 'New Order for Municipalities.' Deniz Baykal, İsmail Cem, *Yeni Sol*, 223-224.

¹²⁸ This part is totally omitted in the above mentioned book.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 37-45.

¹³⁰This part is totally omitted in the above mentioned book.

stressed; "i) to get rid of the bureaucratic understanding; ii) getting rid of the 'centralist state leftism.'" In this context the report underlines two strategic issues, under the heading of 'protecting our party against right and left deviations.' These are "i) the ideological ground of political struggle; ii) new social democratic synthesis."¹³¹ Nevertheless, although İnönü and his group did not suggest any programmatic or ideological model and only accentuated that carrying the party to the government is a successful achievement¹³², in the elections for the party leadership Baykal lost the contest with 24 votes.

7.4.2. Looking for a New Politics: The Coalition Government and SDPP

It is clear that these concepts have been formed under the influence of recent developments observed in the international political scene. Even though in the intra-party politics these arguments have been turned over and refused, yet in the Programme of the 49th Republican Government, an inspiration emanating from the international political scene is obvious. The programme rests on the notion of democracy with a reference to Paris Charter, the Maastrich Treaty and the Process of European Security and Cooperation Conference.¹³³ In this context the reminiscent of the legal structure constructed by the 1980 military regime is aimed to be totally changed and the necessity for a new constitution is stressed.¹³⁴ Especially in the

¹³¹Ibid., 44.

¹³²İrdal İnönü, "SHP 7. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Açış Konuşması", in *Kurultay Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998), 353-374.

¹³³49. *Cumhuriyet Hükümeti Programı* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1991).

¹³⁴Ibid., 11.

Appendix 1 to the Government Programme, it is stated that "Turkey even though has foreseen the construction of the contemporary state as a target is very retarded in the process for the achievements of the task."¹³⁵

This rationale conveys to the critique of the different dimensions of '12 September regime' encompassing a whole framework stretching from Law of Elections and Political Parties to other 19 laws each one clearly counted in the programme.¹³⁶ Another important point in the programme is the Appendix 3 which concentrates on the 'South East' which has been a problem all through the 1980s. The programme, when taken together with the concepts developed in the section devoted to Culture, foresees a more multicultural structure and a pluralistic society, refers to the notion of 'democratic law state' and accepts that the language, culture, origin, belief differences are natural and, for a unitary state, these are not a condition of weakness. Even in a unitary state, it is argued that, various ethnic, cultural, linguistic differences might freely be expressed and this would fortify the unification of state and society.¹³⁷ These issues are also expressed in the second coalition government programme formed in June 24, 1993 with a similar verbatim.¹³⁸

The other principle on which the government was constructed reflected a specific understanding that has occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which might

¹³⁵Ibid., 26.

¹³⁶Ibid., 28-31.

¹³⁷Ibid., 41.

¹³⁸For an overview of these coalition governments, see, Kemali Saybaşılı, *DYP-SHP Koalisyonunun Üç Yılı* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995).

be defined as the 'end of the ideologies.' It was believed that by the end of the Cold War the sharp distinctions between centre left and right reached an end. Actually this has been one of the main arguments put forward in the Özal era to construct and reinforce the hegemonic discourse of the New Right. The formation of the coalition government tacitly referred to this argument stressing such notions as 'democratic maturity' and 'tolerance.' This is clear in İnönü's explanations.¹³⁹ This argument has provoked various debates for it is believed that the coming together of the two parties in a coalition government would help to accelerate the development of the radical politics.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand this notion of politics is even characterised by some scholars as the end of politics.¹⁴¹ SDPP, in the first half of the 1990s, especially during the clash between İnönü and Baykal, even though tended to take this understanding into consideration, due to the pragmatic accounts, lost the chance of renewing its ideological structure and undertook the responsibility of a coalition with a centre-right party for more pragmatic reasons.

It could be said that, the process of renewal of the existing ideological structure¹⁴² was actually an answer to such understandings as 'the end of ideologies is reached'. Even after the last clash and when the Baykal group was out of SDPP for

¹³⁹Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Dördüncü* , 5.

¹⁴⁰To get the theoretical background of this argument as well as the mechanism see, Chantal Mouffee, "The End of Politics and the Rise of the Radical Right," *Dissent*, Fall 1995, 498-502.

¹⁴¹Geof Mulligan, *Politics in an Antipolitical Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 124-129.

¹⁴²For a debate relying on the notion of 'ideology after the collapse of communism' started first by Kenneth Minogue and followed by Alex Callinicos see, Aleksandras Sthromas, *The End of 'Isms'?* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994).

they moved to the re-established RPP, in the *Party Council Report* submitted to the Fourth Congress, the section on the 'Evaluation of the International Situation' includes such concepts as 'getting out of the Cold War, The Deposition of USSR to the History, New World Order and the Developments in the International Milieu, Fragmentation, Regionalisation, Micro Nationalism, Transgression of the Nation-State and Integration, New Dimensions of Imperialism, The Rise of Fascism, The Problems of Democratic Socialism, Rising International Law Debate.'¹⁴³ When the positions taken by the party administration controlled by İnönü, during the 1990-1992 period, all through the congresses, is remembered, this might easily be considered as a relatively radical step taken by the SDPP.

This position has two important openings. The first one is that it conduces to the intra-party developments as the resignation of Erdal İnönü from leadership and Murat Karayalçın's election as the chairperson of the SDPP, and, second, the reestablishment of the RPP. This has also two more important openings; i) RPP re-established with an ambiguous and more blurred ideological position swinging between the abandonment of the traditional ideology and the reinvigoration of it. Nevertheless, after the assassination of Uğur Mumcu in January 24, 1993 due to the upsurge of the traditional Kemalist ideology any slightest concern for a break with the traditional past is completely under estimated; ii) merging of SDPP with RPP and party's taking a pro-state-ideology position after the general elections of 1995 especially in response to such problems of fundamentalism and Kurdish issues¹⁴⁴.

¹⁴³Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Parti Meclisi*, 13-23.

¹⁴⁴The discussion and analysis of these issues are also left to the next chapter.

7.5. Between Past and Present: The New RPP

7.5.1. The Re-established RPP

According to the Law regulating the conditions of the parties dissolved by the military junta after 1980 coupe, the general congresses of the parties had to be held to decide whether they would get reformed or would once more dissolved.¹⁴⁵ In the Congress September 9, 1992 the RPP delegates voted for the reestablishment of the party.¹⁴⁶ As the last chairperson of RPP, Bülent Ecevit, had already resigned from the leadership of the party after the military coup, there was the need of electing a new chairperson and there were two names in the contest, Erol Tuncer and Deniz Baykal. They were taking two different positions. Tuncer was already involved in the reestablishment process of RPP with the other members of the last General Administrative Board (*Genel İdare Kurulu*) and had published a declaration.¹⁴⁷ The opinions later supported by Tuncer was first publicised in this document. He was insistent on two points that i) RPP should be re-established; ii) then SDPP would merge with RPP under the name of the latter and then the party would be the shelter for the unification of the other centre-left parties, specifically DLP.¹⁴⁸

This was also the plan and the intention of SDPP and İnönü. As Bülent Ecevit was putting forward approaches totally different than Tuncer and his friends, the debate in time turned to the unification of SDPP and reformed RPP. Deniz Baykal, as the second candidate and rejecting this tendency ambitiously defended another

¹⁴⁵Law was issued in June 19, 1992, law number 3821 especially by the efforts of SDPP parliamentary group. *Resmi Gazete*, (July 3, 1992).

¹⁴⁶*Cumhuriyet*, (September 10, 1992).

¹⁴⁷*Milliyet*, (May 4, 1992).

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 11.

position. According to him 'historical RPP' should be re-formed, become a strong party by creating its parliamentary group and form a focus of attraction for the other centre-left parties rejecting beforehand the idea of merging of SDPP and RPP.¹⁴⁹ In the congress Baykal was elected as the fourth chairperson of RPP after Atatürk, İnönü and Ecevit. Just after the re-formation Baykal and his 22 friends resigned from SDPP and formed the parliamentary group of RPP.

7.5.2. The New RPP and Its Search for an Ideology

The 'new' RPP from the very first day of its re-establishment was under the control of Baykal and his friends who had previously defended the renewal of the traditional ideological structure of Turkish social democracy. In this sense, they were, as analysed before, critical of the epistemology that has constructed it. Not only the methodology that has created the republican modernist movement was under attack but the hermeneutic discourse of the traditional RPP was also criticised. The Six Arrows, with its symbolic and cultural content, was the focus of this criticism. It was a dilemma that the same group was ambitious in re-establishing and getting the control of the party once they were disapproving. The publicum and the interested reference groups were inquisitive on these grounds. This expectations could not be satisfied by effacing the symbols, discourse and the party structure of RPP for, the strategy in the whole process of reestablishment was dwelled on the accentuation and emphasis put on the importance and meaning of RPP. This eclectic structure was easily observable in the 1976 Programme, the 'valid' programme when the party was re-established for it was the existing programme before the dissolution and came once more to the fore when the programme tended to be changed and renewed.

¹⁴⁹*Milliyet*, (September 10, 1992).

The programme submitted to the ratification of the Congress of September 9, 1994 was prepared by İsmail Cem and it reflects some of the ideas previously advocated by Baykal and his friends¹⁵⁰. It, inevitably refers both the historical and traditional past and the recent changes both lived in the world and found an echo in Turkey.¹⁵¹ The first part of the programme, more reflecting an emotional rhetoric bears the heading as "Our Ideological Essence and Basic Choices."¹⁵² The Programme, defining RPP as "change in continuity" and "the power of the change"¹⁵³ gives a brief historical background of the transformations in RPP programmes.¹⁵⁴ It is interesting that there is a twofold contradiction at this point. On the one hand immediately reflecting on the "new conditions-renovated RPP"¹⁵⁵ with a tacit intention of getting out of the traditional framework, on the other hand, even when the programmatic changes are analysed there is no critique of the past which was one of the main arguments of the *Yeni Sol* who re-established the RPP. On the contrary the Six Arrows one by one explained.

The four of the Six Arrows, usually considered the most crucial ones, namely, 'nationalism, populism, statism, laicism' are explained by trying to be filled a contemporary content yet perpetuating the already mentioned eclectic discourse. Here, the 'nationalism' tenet is explained by reminding the 'process of nationalisation' and

¹⁵⁰CHP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı: Yeni Hedefler Yeni Türkiye*, 15 Aralık 1993 tarihinde Parti Meclisince Benimsenen Tasarı.

¹⁵¹Ibid., 19-24.

¹⁵²Ibid., 11.

¹⁵³Ibid., 20.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 15.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 19.

saying that the meaning of this concept does not have a racial connotation and it is not a movement for separation but for unification.¹⁵⁶ Populism, is explained with a more rhetorical approach rather than taking either a pragmatic or an ideological position. The crucial approach here is that, the Programme, with an implicit recalling for 'corporatism' confirms that, "populism is the transgression of individuality to reach the wholeness when necessary."¹⁵⁷ Statism, gives a bizarre definition of state as "a security brought for the healthy construction of the balance between the private interests and social interests."¹⁵⁸ In this context, the Programme, takes a diffident position between privatisation and Statism referring to the principles of Socialist International.¹⁵⁹

This framework encompasses an interesting definition brought for social democracy. Identified with democratic socialism¹⁶⁰ this notion is defined as "the indivisibility of the ideals of equality and liberty."¹⁶¹ Inferred from this approach is the implicit reference to the ex-Soviet system with an emphasis that what has been proven in the dawn of the 21st century is the reality and the rightfulness of this understanding. Continuing, the programme reflects on two points, first, RPP is "a party situated on the left", and although it declares a preference for the labour sector, it sets the social democracy for the entire society. Second, it emphasises the connection

¹⁵⁶Ibid., 16.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 16.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 17.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 17.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., 12.

¹⁶¹Ibid., 12.

between the will for modernisation in the society and RPP.¹⁶² These last two points needs a brief ideological analysis on two basis. The first is even though the programme mentions the importance of the 'new times', still it does not bring any radical approach to either the notion of labour or the already established framework of social democracy. Second, it, in the same chapter, immediately and once more, starts to elaborate on the importance of the coexistence of the labour and capital, insisting that the party does not set an agenda for an antagonism between these two sectors.

Here, it can be said that the two points together delineates a party understanding which is more a reflection of the traditional RPP with an epistemology constructed on a political cultural basis having a hermeneutically and ideologically set discourse.¹⁶³ This is, indeed, to say it with Kitschelt a "semantic universe" which sets the limits and boundaries of the epistemology encompassing even the ideology which is in this context unsurpassable.¹⁶⁴ The definitions given here embed both a traditional elitist-centralist party notion integrated with the will for modernisation and transformation, which is the main characteristic of the traditional RPP, and outlining a concentric and convoluted party and society notion which means a society for the

¹⁶²Ibid., 13.

¹⁶³The connection and the relationship between language, discourse and ideology is much a matter of deliberation and an enormous literature. In this context, especially in outlining the integrity between the constituting epistemology of Kemalism which is embedded in the ideology of RPP I more draw on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (London and New York: Verso, 1991) and see, both for an interesting analysis of this work as well as for a different approach to the notion of ideology see, Slavoj Zizek, "Beyond Discourse Analysis", in Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London, New York: Verso, 1990).

¹⁶⁴Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press), 260.

party and an undifferentiated society continuing with the parallelism of interests which recalls an implicit corporatism.¹⁶⁵ This is also clear in the two following sections of the Programme as it is argued that the aim of RPP is the transformation of the society in the direction of the 'tradition of transformation' and the history of the RPP and the Republic of Turkey are common.¹⁶⁶

The last point to be mentioned in this process of renewal is that there are two missing points in the Programme. The first is, although the text reflects on the recent developments of the social, economic and political fields in the decade of 1980 with a confirmative and affirmative discourse¹⁶⁷ there is no reference to liberalism and no attempt of renewal of the traditional ideology on this basis which has been one of the main components in the same procedure observed in the West European socialist parties.¹⁶⁸ The second point might be extrapolated after Kitschelt's analysis of the social democracy.

¹⁶⁵To argue the residue of corporatism in the latest development observed in the socialist parties see, Wilde, Lawrence, *Modern European Socialism* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), 54-69.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁶⁸For various different analysis of the relationship between left and liberalism on a more abstract level see, Peter Osborne, *Liberalism and the Limits of Socialism* for the attempts on the party basis see, Perry Anderson and Patric Camiller, *Mapping the West European Left* (London, New York: Verso, 1994). On the other hand the main discussion on this subject matter emanates from the situation and the ideological transformation of the British Labour Party. In this context see, Martin J. Smith, "Continuity and Change in Labour Party", in Martin J. Smith and Joanna Spear, *The Changing Labour Party* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 217-229.

In discussing the pattern of development and change in the European social democracy Kitschelt touches three mainstream and after setting the first two periods as i) transformation of a minority communitarian strand into anarcho-syndicalist ideology "that stressed direct industrial action and workers' self-organisation without the intermediating role of parties and state bureaucracies,"¹⁶⁹ ii) a Marxist understanding, on the contrary, emphasising the importance and the role of hierarchically organised agents like state and party in the regulation of the redistribution of scarce goods, he comes to the third period.¹⁷⁰ It is the "third social democratic variant of the labour movement" that has "diluted socialist thinking by accepting elements of political and economic liberalism and calls for a combination of centralised coordination and markets."¹⁷¹ Here, there are two points to be discussed taking RPP into consideration. First, RPP, once more it is obvious that, as a social democratic party, has got nothing in common with the universal social democratic basis, roots and ideology as long as the first two periods is concerned. Second, the third period is also disclusive in the search purported by the reformed RPP even though it could have been a chance to be used.¹⁷² Interestingly, RPP in its 'new' programme mentions neither the first two periods nor the third and, in this context, situates itself on a more regional and local basis, abstracting itself from the universal context and it is clear that this movement would necessarily and naturally conducive to the further crisis.

¹⁶⁹Kitschelt, *Transformation*, 259.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 259.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 259.

¹⁷² The transition to a new understanding of party politics is analysed in Saran Benton, "The Decline of the Party," in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, reprinted 1990), 333-346.

Here, it should not be remembered that, the 1993 Programme of SDPP, as has been analysed in the previous chapter, is a reaction to RPP programme and a lost chance of renovation of the ideology. Because it was obvious that RPP was the 'genuine' owner of the traditional social democratic heritage in Turkey with all its symbolic and semantic cult leaving that traditional accumulation out and renovating the party ideology could be a movement beyond a mere speculation.¹⁷³ Instead what has been adopted by the SDPP administration was going back to Kemalism even moving away from the previous programme. Second, when the programmes of the two parties are compared, the SDPP programme seems to be the imitation of the RPP programme even in the structuring and the outlines.¹⁷⁴ This is more obvious when the second part of the programme called '*Priority Targets*' is reviewed.¹⁷⁵ It is a reference to the second and the third parts of the RPP programme giving out the contours of the economic and social policies. This framework, which figures out the lost chances of ideological renewal, embedding the two parties, bring out the necessary reasons behind the crisis of the two parties faced in the second half of the 1990s.

7.6. Second Urge for Renewal in SDPP: The Karayalçın Period

7.6.1. The '*Social Transformation Project*'

¹⁷³The Manifesto published in the journal *Sosyal Demokrat* and signed by a group of intellectuals and politicians who were active in the SDPP shows that there was already a tendency and accumulation in the party that would support such a movement. "Yeniden Sosyal Demokrasi İçin Çağrı," *Sosyal Demokrat*, no. 74 (June 1994), 4-7.

¹⁷⁴SIHP, *Program*, (April 1973).

¹⁷⁵Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, *Öncelikli Hedefler*.

After Erdal İnönü's declaration that in the fourth congress he would not run for the leadership of SDPP¹⁷⁶ there were two candidates, Murat Karayalçın and Aydın Güven Gürkan. Murat Karayalçın, Mayor of Greater Ankara Municipality was a prestigious figure in the centre left politics as well as Gürkan being one of the most prominent politicians in SDPP, was the first leader of Populist Party who endeavoured the merging of it with SDP and then became the first chairperson of SDPP. Gürkan was considered to hold a more conservative position in the contest being backed mostly by the Kurdish and Alevite delegates.

On the other hand Karayalçın in order to prove his position as someone who is open to the new developments on the universal social democratic realm started to work on a Manifesto that would be presented to the congress.¹⁷⁷ The Manifesto carried the name 'Social Transformation Project' with the subtitle 'Agenda total democracy; solution social democracy.'¹⁷⁸ The reference to the concepts of 'total democracy' and 'social democracy', also a consequence of working together with a group including names critical about the traditional roots of social democracy in Turkey, created the impression that, the Manifesto is a document for setting the effects of globalization and the residues of the searches for a new definition of social democracy in the SDPP.

¹⁷⁶*Hürriyet*, "Erdal İnönü Çekiliyor," (June 7, 1993), 11-18.

¹⁷⁷The manifesto was prepared by a group. At the beginning the group included Karayalçın's advisors in the Ankara Municipality. These were some prominent academics, bureaucrats and intellectuals. İlhan Tekeli, Yiğit Gülöksüz, Erol Tuncer, Necat Erder, Ilurşit Güneş, Yakup Kepenek, Aydın Köymen and the present author was in the core team. Later the manifesto written by Necat Erder, Kürşat Bumin, Aydın Köymen and the present author.

¹⁷⁸Murat Karayalçın, *Toplumsal Dönüşüm Projesi*. Mimeograph.

Indeed, the published Manifesto is a signifier of this approach as it starts with a remark that social democracy should carry out an auto critique.¹⁷⁹

The Manifesto is rather a detailed programme proposed for Turkey rather than being merely a social democracy debate. In this context it emphasises that the need in Turkey is not a 'change' but a 'transformation,' recalling and referring to the famous *motto* of Turgut Özal¹⁸⁰ but with a keen intention that, it could only be grasped through the renovated social democratic policies if the traditional understanding is left out. , Taken together, both issues open the Manifesto towards a positivistic and better a technologist-positivist as well as a progressive-modernist understanding of social democracy. To get rid of this constraint, the Manifesto goes back to the notions of 'democracy, liberty, localisation, peace', saying that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall even though the world has not been successful in achieving these goals, still they have developed a potential of ideology.¹⁸¹ With a notion of social democracy relying on these concepts, the Manifesto announces three targets as, "democratisation of the society and implementation of a total democracy, economic growth, just income distribution."¹⁸²

The Manifesto in this context first refers to 1989 Stockholm Manifesto of Principles of the Socialist International. The Stockholm Manifesto clearly states that neither the private ownership nor the state ownership has an isolated and self

¹⁷⁹Murat Karayağcı, *Toplumsal*, n.p.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, 5.

derivating meaning as long as the productivity and social justice is concerned. Starting from this statement, *The Social Transformation Project* foresees a National Planning Institution, which would coincide the state and the society.¹⁸³ In the Manifesto, as the notion of democracy is taken as the primordial concept, the administrative procedure is also seen through this concept and localisation is raised as one of the most important concepts. The two reasons backing this are reinvigoration of the lost efficiency of the central administration through a renovation process and the democratisation of the administration in general.¹⁸⁴ Related with this is the proposal for a new legal system.

This part, tacitly brings a deep critique of the legal system of the Republican period. It first delineates that a legal system trusted by the citizens has not yet been established in the Republican era for it has always been controlled by the political, realm because, as a consequence of positivist approach, law and legal structure has been taken as one and the same thing.¹⁸⁵ One another reason is that, none of the Constitutions has been developed by a social reconciliation and the Constitutions have always been made to secure the power and the existence of the state. The social democratic mission in this context should be the liberation of the legal system from the domination of the state.¹⁸⁶ This understanding of the legal system conduces to the notion of civil society or in general civility which is emphasised in the Manifesto.¹⁸⁷ This notion of civility has an impact on two different but important issues, which have

¹⁸³Ibid., 12.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 16.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., 17.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 18.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 28, 40.

always been a problem in the social democratic ideology in Turkey: laicism and the Kurdish problem, especially when its traditional past and origins are considered. In the approach developed for these issues the Manifesto foresees a pluralistic social model.¹⁸⁸ Laicism is considered a concept reinforcing the pluralistic dimension found in the democracy whereas pluralism is comprehended as the vital component in the solution of the Kurdish question together with recognition of the difference.¹⁸⁹

In the Manifesto, a special importance is given to two more concepts; the necessity for the ideological framework and the 'new' understanding of politics.¹⁹⁰ Unlike the New Right approach trying to detach politics from the sociality¹⁹¹ this consideration proposes a return to the politics with the decision that the society could only be changed if the political realm is given a privilege.¹⁹² Also, the 'transformation' is linked to the transformation reached in the political arena. This is definitely an ideological deliberation and as long as social democracy is regarded the Manifesto draws the attention to the changing nature of the working class and going beyond the Programmes prepared by the RPP and SDPP.¹⁹³ It is for the first time the Manifesto reveals in Turkey that, those who vote for the social democratic parties should be reexamined and reconsidered due to two reasons; first, the shifts observed in the nature of the working class and in the social stratification, as well as in the urban

¹⁸⁸Ibid., 20-21.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 21-22.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., 36.

¹⁹¹John Gray, *Beyond the New Right* (London: Routledge, 1994), 94.

¹⁹²Ibid., 36.

¹⁹³Ibid., 40.

life, has been expected to bring new emerging social groups to social democracy but this did not work because the parties situated on this ideological map did not perceive the new movements and only developed strategies for the 'old' labour related classes; second, as the ideology of the party is not clear and does not encompass the new developments the voter has difficulty in defining himself and situating his political behaviour.¹⁹⁴ As a consequence the Manifesto states that the social democratic parties should refrain from constructing unbroken and unchangeable relations with social reference groups.¹⁹⁵ The Manifesto ends by going back to the concept of transformation, describing it on four levels as, world, Turkey, party leadership and individual.¹⁹⁶

7.6.2 Gürkan and the Reaction to Transformation

On the other hand, Gürkan, also submitted a Manifesto to the Congress delegates which is more a humble declaration relying on the tacit critique of the Karayalçın's Manifesto and approach.¹⁹⁷ Gürkan, although at the beginning of his declaration states that Turkey is passing through the most severe conditions ever faced in its history, he suggests that the only way out to this circumstance is the construction of a 'clean society.'¹⁹⁸ This notion, though loose and ambiguous in the text, conveys more to a utopic reconstruction of the society mainly by amending the Constitution.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁴Ibid., 40.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 44.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., 45.

¹⁹⁷Prof. Dr. Aydın Güven Gürkan, *Temiz Siyaset Temiz Parti Temiz Toplum*, Mimeo.

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 17-18.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., 19-20.

Here found is the contradiction of the declaration for, Gürkan, severely but without mentioning any name, criticises Karayalçın's approach by saying that it is not convenient and democratic to propose a new programme that would go beyond the existing party programme. Rather he purports that the strategy should be activating the principles set in the programme.²⁰⁰ Gürkan's point is that the programmes prepared by teams leads the party to a 'managerial party' structure which is contradictory with the social democratic comprehension of participation.²⁰¹ After setting this as a primordial principle, Gürkan, taking a more conservative position, says that such concepts as 'change' and 'transformation' would conduce the party to 'mutation' and 'alienation.'²⁰²

The purpose behind the calls for transformation, according to Gürkan is, "to create a mind and value confusion in the society" when the society is in need of a 'mind integrity.'²⁰³ If this is lost, to Gürkan this is the second step in the set up of proposing a change, the society, namely Turkey, would be prepared and ready to fall into the lap of 'the new world order.' He states this understanding clearly: "The 'new world order' looks for the weakening of the national and social wills and it is not based on the reconciliation and adjustment reached between different and free national wills but is raised on the single, powerful and dominating will base."²⁰⁴ In this condition, by the process of change Turkey would be weakened and put under the

²⁰⁰Ibid., 15.

²⁰¹Ibid., 12-14.

²⁰²Ibid., 10.

²⁰³Ibid., 11.

²⁰⁴Ibid., 12.

control of the domineering power. Gürkan, at the end of his declaration claims that the transformation is indeed a mutation and if this task is achieved, in a period when the social democracy has already been pulled away from its roots, the society would loose its basic resistance against the ill-drives.²⁰⁵

On the contrary, a policy should be constructed on such concepts as 'moral principles, coherency and consistency, integrity and permanency.'²⁰⁶ The last point that should be discussed considering the declaration is that, even though Gürkan states that social democrat parties are the political structures and a kind of sheltering for the minorities of a society²⁰⁷ and, in the contest he was the candidate more backed by the Kurdish and Aleviate delegation²⁰⁸, the text does not account any specific and overt consideration of either the Kurdish or the South East issue.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵Ibid., 24.

²⁰⁶Ibid., 12.

²⁰⁷Ibid., 4.

²⁰⁸There is a critical and crucial point in this context. Both RPP and the SDPP traditionally have been the parties backed by the Alevis in Turkey. In the process of controlling the power of this group among the delegates, Karayalçın, before the congress gained the support of Mustafa Timisi, a renowned politician who was in the 1970s the chairperson of the *Türkiye Birlik Partisi* (The Unity Party of Turkey) which was clearly a party rested on the Alevis in Turkey. Nevertheless, when, after the Congress Council's decision that only one delegate should speak from each camp, Timisi delivered a speech as the representative of the Karayalçın group, he attracted the fury of the Alevi delegates. He later explained his behaviour to the present author as an attempt to fetter the polarization of the party. He states that he was already conscious that it was a move with much of trouble for him and his political life, knowing that a majority of Alevis were together with Gürkan. For *Unity Party* and Timisi see, *Political Parties of the Middle East*, 603-604.

²⁰⁹For a wider scope to understand this traditional tendency among the Kurds and Alevis in a 'globalizing period' see, Günter Seufert, "Between Religion and Ethnicity: a Kurdish-Alevi Tribe in Globalizing Istanbul", in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland (ed),

Regarding Gürkan's approach it can be said that Karayalçın's Manifesto even though has provoked a debate and been criticised by various groups as a shift towards right in the party, doubtless, goes beyond the existing party programme, especially with its first part, accepted and ratified in the Extraordinary Congress held in April, 3-4, 1993.²¹⁰ As this first part analysed and discussed deeply in the previous chapter here suffice is to say that it tries to move the party back to its origins and link it with its traditional epistemology. On the other hand, the Karayalçın Manifesto shows a will, as has been mentioned before, under the influence of globalisation, of shift to a new basis on which social democracy, as an ideology is situated with a more liberal mentality, together with the ambition of breaking its bureaucratic, centralist, elitist and statist structural aspects. It should also be stated that this Manifesto might be taken as the second step, after Baykal's movement in the party, in the line of renovating the ideology. Nevertheless, the two developments, reestablishment of RPP and the neo-nationalist movement seen both on the centre right and left politics in the 1995 elections, have brought this opening to a halt with the *coupe de grace* : the merging of SDPP with RPP, which will be analysed in the next chapter.

7.6.3 Aftermath of the Congress and transition to 1995-1998 Period

Although in the election Karayalçın became the chairperson of SDPP defeating Gürkan, his position was far from a comfort in the party. As he was not a member of the parliamentary, after being elected as the chairperson he could not become the head

Space, Culture and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities (London: Zed Books, 1997), 157-176.

²¹⁰SHİP, *Program- Nisan 1993* (Ankara: n.p., 1993).

of the parliament group of the party. Gürkan, his rival was elected to this post for, also in the party council the pro-Gürkan members were enrolled to a significant number.²¹¹ On the other hand, the centre-left was occupied by three parties, the DLP of Ecevit, the re-established RPP and SDPP. This condition, creating a kind of distrust and ambiguity among the electorates gave birth to a devastating consequence in the local elections of 1994. In the elections held by October 27, 1994, SDPP got only the 13.6% of the votes which showed a sharp decline even when compared to the already declined 20.8% of the 1991 general elections.²¹²

The explanations to this negative condition are, i) the existence of three different parties addressing the same group of electorates, ii) the corruption problem that had been raised especially in the local administrations controlled by the SDPP politicians. This condition was of a vital importance for the SDPP candidates. In Istanbul, the candidate for the Greater Municipality of Istanbul, Zülfü Livaneli, a renown pop music singer, even asked the resignation of the Istanbul Town Chairperson of SDPP, with the allegation that his name is involved in the corruption debate, which caused much of a trouble in the party.²¹³ Especially in Istanbul this circumstance clearly helped the WP candidate to win the elections which, together with

²¹¹This was due to Karayalçın's decision to make the Party Council list together with Gürkan, in the second day of the Congress. As a result some supporters of Gürkan, were elected as the members of the Party Council. This has been considered, since the beginning, as a leading mistake. For a severe critique see, Cezmi Kartay, *Siyasal*, 374.

²¹²Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *27 Ekim 1994 Yerel Seçim Sonuçları* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1995).

²¹³Although the Chairperson, Yüksel Çengel first resisted to this demand, and than took a leave of absance, in the end, resigned from his post. "Zülfü'nün Deddiği Oldu", *Milliyet*, (March 14, 1993), 14.

the similar result obtained in Ankara, brought a new dimension to the Turkish political life.

Here, especially corruption could be taken as one of the most intriguing issues giving another descriptive characteristic of Turkish social democracy. The basic reason behind the condition is usually determined as the clientalistic structure of the party politics.²¹⁴ Beyond the other phenomenal reasons, it could be said that the main condition feeding the corruptive structure of politics in the SDPP in the 1989-1994 period depends on a few constitutive elements which might also be taken as the issues both determining the macro policies of this political wing as well as imposing the necessary preconditions of failure in the process of ideological renewal.

The reasons might be presented as i) the centre-periphery relations,²¹⁵ ii) the development of the sociological structure in the urban space,²¹⁶ iii) the strength and power of the central government in Turkey, iv) the structural aspects of the party politics in Turkey. These conditions in the first half of the 1990s has a twofold effect on SDPP. The first shows the new structural peculiarities of the party, shifting from an elitist model to an uncontrolled grassroots dominance usually backed by the delegate system used in the intra-party conflicts; second, the inadequacy of the party in reshaping and controlling this evolution which is also another indicator of how the

²¹⁴Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey," in Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (ed), *Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 60.

²¹⁵*Ibid.*, 49-52.

²¹⁶This condition is of importance not only for the ignorance of the social democratic parties but also in discussing the development of the political Islam in Turkey. Among the vast literature see, Sema Erder, *Ümraniye: İstanbul'a Bir Kent Kondu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997).

party politics failed in perceiving the social transformation. With all these features the aftermath of the 1994 elections is the dissolving of the SDPP and merging with RPP. The results obtained in the 1995 elections shows both the end of the process of ideological renovation and, the end of the first period of the impact of globalization in Turkey. This second condition is identified by the reaction of social democracy in Turkey to the concepts raised by the parties of the periphery at large.

Conclusion

As might have been observed from the analysis of the three different approaches there was a keen tendency in the first half of the 1990s for the reconstruction of a new social democratic framework and agenda and this was due to nothing but the transformation that was lived in the late 1990s. However the effort did not surpass the given limits, boundaries and constraints of existing social democratic epistemology in Turkey. This might be followed from the decline in the vote percentages obtained in the elections which was another *raison d'être* for the initiation of this unachieved search. In this context the problem turns to the questioning of the inadequacy and the shortcomings of these approaches.

One of the basic assumptions related with this negative condition has already been set as all programmes' attachment to Kemalism as an ideal. This is a boundary which encompasses various different concepts none of them enabling Turkish social democracy to draw out a transformation profile for it immediately recalls for a cognitive structure based on tradition, idealism and a notion of transformative

politics.²¹⁷ The intrinsic line of transformative politics stretching between Marx and Weber not only intervene and demarcate the limits of politics of modernity but also bring out the necessary conditions for transformative politics. This notion, as Butler argues, stems basically from the tension that comes out as a consequence of deliberation on the condition of human kind situated between the notions of causality and necessity.²¹⁸ As a matter of fact, one another consequence of this circumstance is the unilateral human condition as being the object of the external world. Human being as an object of transformation, i.e. object of the external world recognises him as a dependent variable on condition that the transformation of the outer world is capable of transforming the human being. A belief embedded in modernity of which socialism is a part.²¹⁹

Butler, making an important remark suggests that "socialist practice...has most commonly been characterised by transformative politics, taking both external and internal subjective perspectives to their limits and then juxtaposing them."²²⁰ But he also affirms that "socialism is just one kind of transformative politics."²²¹ In this context, Butler proposes that,

²¹⁷For a discussion of transformative politics in general Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory: Culture, History and the Challenge of Difference* (Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1995).

²¹⁸Anthony Butler, *Transformative Politics: The Future of Socialism in Western Europe* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 6-15.

²¹⁹Peter Murphy, "Socialism and Democracy", in P. Beilharz, G. Robinson and J. Rundall, *Between*, 12-31; Peter Beilharz, "The Life and Times of Social Democracy", in op. cit., 54-68.

²²⁰Butler, *Transformative*, 9.

²²¹*Ibid.*, 9.

a conception of transformative agency involves at least the following features. Firstly, it requires a deliberative depiction of our present social setting in a detached and distanced manner: it claims 'objectivity' in its portrayal of the social order as a state of affairs or course of events...Secondly, transformative agency implies acting to change this pre-existing state of affairs or course of events.²²²

This foundation hides two important aspects of the transformative politics. The first one is the importance of ideology in its most wide abstract meaning, more attuned to a Marxist discourse and the second, the agents of transformation whether it be the state, the classes and the objective conditions at large.²²³ It is at this intersection that appears the constraints of the Turkish social democracy. It is possible to say that there are a few basic conditions paving the way to this end. The first one is, as both Karayalçın approach and RPP intention delimits, the modernist understanding of politics *per se*. This is reducing politics to a kind of functionalism, which is nothing but the instrumentalisation of the politics. This condition disables the Turkish social democracy to develop an ideological framework for when politics is instrumentalised the necessity of surpassing the given boundaries of the existing ideology is not conceived. The second, even though there is still the loose-knitted will of a transformative politics as long as the construction of the policies is considered yet an important component of this understanding is lacking, i. e the social agents to be relied upon. The third, none of the programmes acclaim an identified ideological framework other than the mainstream approach of modernity indirectly imposing both the epistemological and the methodological limits of social democratic politics.

²²²Ibid., 9-10.

²²³Kenneth Minogue, "Ideology After the Collapse of Communism," in Aleksandras Shtromas, *The End*, 10.

This very last point together with the first one might be taken as the basic element in discussing the crisis of Turkish social democracy for, it, primordially, starts by the acceptance of the existing conditions in the Turkish political realm, to state a few, the centralisation of the state and the objectivization of the individual in an age when the globalization and the post-modernist calls for fragmentation and the redefinition of the identity.²²⁴ This condition is an outcome of the contrary position taken against the hypothesis supplemented by Butler. According to him "the relation between a posited position agent and its setting is a cognitive and cultural construction, not a given ontological fact."²²⁵ Whereas all shortcomings of Turkish social democracy originates from the precondition set by the existing tradition which is also as an ontological fact which fetters going further, as long as Turkish social democracy is considered.

²²⁴Jonathan Friedman, "Global Systems, Globalization and the Parameters of Modernity", in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson (ed), *Global Modernities* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 69-90.

²²⁵Butler, *Transformative*, 143.

CHAPTER VIII

RETURNING TO THE ORIGINS SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE 1994-1998 PERIOD

8.1. The Practice of the Late 1990s

8.1.1 The Foundation of the Crisis

The late 1990s is the period in which the crisis of Turkish social democracy has reached its peak. In the 1995 general elections the re-established RPP after its merging a short while ago with SDPP was able to get only 10.7 % of the votes. This was a result which gave the RPP the narrow chance of passing the national threshold of 10 %, being the worst result ever achieved in the history of any party identifying itself with social democracy.¹ This result was also of a considerable importance because it had been achieved after SDPP's merging with the RPP and RPP going back to its traditional ideology with its discourse and symbols. In a sense it was the reaction of the electorate to the ideology.

¹DLP of Bülent Ecevit had obtained worse results before. Nevertheless Ecevit clearly defined his party as a 'democratic left' party, distancing and isolating it from social democracy.

The reestablishment of the RPP, the dissolving of SDPP and the merger with RPP, the rejuvenation of the traditional origins clearly demarcates a break with the attempts of renovating the existing social democratic ideology under the influence of developments such as post modernism and globalization. Whereas the gist of these new developments lies on the problematization of the relationship between the subject, the society and the state, with a specific reflection on the conditions of the local and the international, with a keen consideration on capital and technology, on the contrary, in Turkey, the time period under discussion is characterised with an emphasis put on the 'strong state', the refusal of the demands raised as a consequence of new politics of identity, ethnicity and diversity. Indeed this framework might be conceived as the ignorance of the new comprehension of democracy build up on the concept of difference at large and, it is at this point that the Turkish social democracy takes once more a *sui generis* position before the new advancements.

The Turkish social democracy, when its origins and its initial intuition is remembered might be taken as the constitutive incentive of modernisation. In this context, the Turkish social democratic crisis which reached an upheaval in the late 1990s could also be conceived as a clash between the insistence on the conservation of the structured aspects of modernisation, specifically together with its national, statist and secular components and the deconstruction of this framework. Included in this process is the notion of republic. Republic, in Turkey could be defined as the sovereignty of the state over the society. In a period when endeavours are directed toward the reconstitution of a civil society and governance, the surpassing of the organised centralist state, this very notion and practice of republic has also been exposed to criticism. In this procedure included is the call for democracy which intends to embed the liberalisation of the republican epistemology as well. No doubt

that this frame of reference is backed by the new developments observed in the social and economic structure of Turkey. This new foundation has initiated new social reference groups if not new social classes and, both the traditional understanding and configuration of the labour class has undergone a deep transformation.

Turkish social democracy, not aware of these new elements of change, has entered the second half of the 1990s with the dissolving of SDPP in RPP and the 1995 general election has been the significant indicator displaying the disconnection between the 'new times', 'new politics' and the social democracy. This outline is also connected with another specificity of Turkish social democracy which might be formulated as the disjuncture. Turkish social democracy, mainly because of not having been emanated from the tradition of West European socialism, has always been a self-closed system and has never been aware of the changes coming out in that realm. In this context the current movements came fore in the European social democracy after 1968, the formation of New Left and Eurocommunism, has completely no effect on the Turkish social democracy either as an ontological reality or an epistemological-ideological opening.

In the same line with the previous experience, it could be said that, this political movement, as could be deduced from the analysis of the results obtained in the elections, has lost the chance of ideological renovation founded on the new understanding of politics as a consequence of globalisation in the 1990s. The 1995 election shows clearly the unresponsiveness of RPP to the new expectations. This is mainly the epistemological constraint of social democracy in Turkey crystallised in the politics of RPP. With this regard two points might be accentuated; the first, the dissolving of SDPP in the RPP is due to the domineering power of the constitutive

ideology of republicanism convoluted with the nation state, as the foundation of Turkish political modernity, second, the crisis of the RPP in the 1995 elections is actually the crisis of the state-ideology, i.e. the crisis of Turkish modernity, whose ramifications are still observable.

Under these assumptions the paralysing crisis of the 1990s is the legitimacy crisis of the nation-state in which social democracy was a dependent variable but could not get out of it due to its ideological inadequacy as well as its symbiotic relationship with the state. This framework needs a further analysis focused on the nation-state problem. The other components but especially those identified with the upsurge of political Islam should also be analysed with a specific attempt. However, in order to understand the aspects and the structure of the crisis first a brief survey of the merging of the two parties is necessary. This should be taken as a basis that would enable us to concentrate on the issues qualitatively coexisting with what has been characterised as the crisis of the nation-state.

8.2. Merger of SDPP and RPP

The process of the merging of the SDPP and the RPP has been a long and tiresome process. The will to unite the parties involved in the social democratic politics has been one of the leading issues observed on all platforms in the early 1990s. During the process of reestablishment of the RPP the basic argument of both sides were nothing but to unite all parties situated on the left wing politics. Nevertheless the model proposed by Baykal and Tuncer, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, was different from each other. Baykal's insistence was to have a "strong and powerful RPP" that would create a center of attraction whereas the other camp was suggesting that RPP should dissolve itself in the SDPP but the latter get the name of the first.

In the period when Baykal gained the leadership of the RPP, the loaded agenda of Turkey's political life, including the death of Özal and Demirel's election as the president of Turkey, TPP's choosing Tansu Çiller as the chairperson, İnönü's declaration of not going to be a candidate for the leadership of the SDPP and, last, Karayalçın's becoming the head of the SDPP, did not let any one of the parties to raise and discuss the issue in depth. Immediately after Karayalçın's election, SDPP Party Council declared that it has reached the final decision of 'unification on the left.'² This was followed by Baykal's letter to Karayalçın defining the necessary conditions and criteria for the merger.³ Karayalçın's answer to this letter was more concentrating on the technical aspects of the process.⁴

When this process and other declarations of the spokesmen of the two parties are considered, it might be concluded that SDPP was more reluctant for the merger or unification. Nevertheless two significant issues have forced the SDPP to move towards the RPP. The first reason behind this development is the economic policy package that was first introduced by the April 5. 1994.⁵ After the corruption problems that were faced by the party, this policy package, because of its hard to digest content, especially for the lower income groups that were believed traditionally supporting the left-wing parties, pushed the SDPP to corner and the party grassroots started feeling itself weakened. The second reason was the approaching interim elections. As Karayalçın was not a member of the parliament and, because this condition was a

²Fatin Dağıstanlı, *Sosyal Demokratlar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998), 249.

³For a complete text of this letter, see Fatin Dağıstanlı, *Sosyal*, 253-257.

⁴Ibid., 257-258.

⁵For the details of this economic crisis see, Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Politikaları: 1980-1994", *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, V. 13, 684-685.

matter of consequential problems, he decided to enter the elections from Adıyaman, thinking that the only condition of being elected is an RPP not entering the elections but backing the SDPP. The process of merger was the best possibility for this plan. In this framework, the two parties by September 30, 1994 signed the Preliminary Unification Protocol.⁶ The Final Protocol is signed by the November 6, 1994.⁷

When the accelerator in the process, the partial elections, was cancelled by the Supreme Court the second phase of the merger started to display an unrest between the parties. In this regard it was once more the SDPP that started to express an unwillingness. It is doubtless that this aversion was due to the already felt power of Baykal. According to the Protocol the two parties would, first, separately held their congresses and ratify the conditions of merger and then, the delegates of both parties coming together, would decide for the party that would dissolve the other. In this regard it was sensed by the SDPP that due to Karayaçın's intra party weak condition some delegates were about to vote for the RPP. With this assumption and fear, by the January 28, 1995, the SDPP held its congress according to the protocol but did not participate in the assumed unified congress of the two parties, creating a political scandal. It should be mentioned here that, before the congress day, both Karayaçın and Baykal had declared themselves as the candidates for the leadership. The next day the two leaders coming together decided to postpone the process to February 18, 1995 and select Hikmet Çetin, a prominent politician, to be the chairman of the united party and run for the contest in the next congress of the party.

⁶Dağıstanlı, *Sosyal*, 271.

⁷Ibid., 272.

During the process of merger, former chairman of SDPP, Erdal İnönü, surprisingly with a declaration called the delegates to vote for the RPP; saying that his party, SDPP, in the post-1980 period was formed on the heritage of the RPP with the basic intention of reestablishing the dissolved party. İnönü also emphasised that "all history of the RPP with its unique summits and inevitable sufferings has been appropriated by the SDPP"⁸ and, if RPP is to become the domineering party this would reflect the achievement of the SDPP in its efforts. This keen devotion to the RPP is similarly accentuated by Baykal as well. It was only Karayalçın to say that "RPP has completed its historical process"⁹. However, Karayalçın did not reinforce his argument. Besides, he felt overwhelmed before his publicum and did not resist the populist upsurge that backed the RPP.

As a consequence, in the congress held by February 18, 1995 as 1003 delegates voted for the RPP, SDPP was supported by only 635 votes. Hikmet Çetin was elected as the chairperson of the RPP. In the September 9, 1995 congress Deniz Baykal has once more been elected as the leader of the RPP defeating Karayalçın. In the his congress speech Baykal displayed a deep devotion to the historical cult of the RPP, whereas Karayalçın repeated¹⁰ his former 'Social Transformation Program' prepared for his campaign for the leadership of the SDPP in 1993. After the merger process is completed Baykal became the Deputy Prime minister but soon after by the September 20, 1995 dissolved the coalition government. The new government was formed as a TPP-RPP coalition which decided to renew the general elections by the

⁸Ibid., 285.

⁹Ibid., 284.

¹⁰Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Kurultay Konuşmalarının Çözümlemesi", *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 10 September, 1995, 1.

December 24, 1995 which has started a totally new period in Turkey's political life. But before discussing it, the above mentioned issues should briefly be analysed.

The first of these is the problem of corruption that had captivated the SDPP, which has already been analysed in the previous section. Beyond this, the allegations of the SDPP leadership, significantly Karayalçın's approach, just after being elected as the leader of the party that he "inherited a perfectly clean and shining party"¹¹ was enhancing the already fragile and even debilitated position of the SDPP. In a period when the society was protesting the corruption with a call for "clean society", Baykal sharply rejected the SDPP past due to its dirtiness and in his congress speech asked for the plea of the society¹². Second issue has been the neo-nationalist wave that started effecting the society after Tansu Çiller's election as the chairperson of the True Path Party.¹³ This condition is further bolstered by the security forces-bureaucracy coalition that was supported by Çiller, whose prominent names were carried to the parliamentary as the deputies of TPP. The reason why Çiller backed such a coalition was the anti-PKK movement and the belief that only a provoked neo-nationalist approach would hinder the development of the Kurdish ethnic nationalist advance.

This understanding has definitely developed a nationalist sensitivity in the society and the RPP as a symbol has been used wisely to match with this responsiveness by Baykal and his team. The last issue is that, even though the SDPP

¹¹"Murat Karayalçın: pırıl pırıl bir parti devraldım", *Milliyet*, 15 Eylül 1993, 1.

¹²This was much of a reason for the discomfort of the RPP cadres. Ertuğrul Günay, the Secretary General of the RPP resigned from his RPP posts and membership after the merger of the two parties saying that unification with such a 'dirty party' cannot be accepted.

¹³For exactly this determination Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Doğru Yol partisi", *Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, v. 15, 1263.

has quantitatively proceeded in the process of ideological renovation, yet the character of the program developed was eclectic with references to the founding ideology. The reason feeding this condition was the reestablishment of the RPP. The belief that if the ideological roots are emphasised the grassroots of the RPP could be motivated for shifting toward SDPP did not allow the party to construct a completely new political ideology and culture, totally detached from the existing structure, on the reverse, prepared a fertile soil for the rejuvenation of the RPP discourse.

8.3. The 1995 General Elections

8.3.1. Review of the elections

Soon after Baykal dissolved the coalition government, by November 15, 1995 the second Çiller cabinet, the coalition between the SDPP and the TPP, is formed and decided to have the general elections by December 24, 1995. The one enfolded in 1995 has been one of the most important elections in the Republican era for a variety of reasons. The basic factor in this context is that, for the first time in the mentioned period, an Islamic party, namely Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), has come up the first in the ranking which has been perceived as a radical threat to one of the constitutive factors of the Republican ideology, secularism, which will specifically be analysed later. Second, the 1995 elections shows an extremely scattered voting pattern¹⁴ when the vote percentages received by the parties are analysed.

Table 7: 1995 General Election Results

¹⁴Yavuz Sabuncu, Murat Şeker, "Seçimler", in *Yüzyıl biterken*, 1163.

Party	Vote (quantity)	Vote (percentage)	Number of Seats
WP	6.012.450	21.4	158
TPP	5.396.009	19.2	135
MP	5.527.288	19.6	132
DLP	4.118.025	14.6	76
RPP	3.011.076	10.7	49
PDP	1.171.623	4.2	-
LP	61.428	0.2	-
NAP	2.301.343	8.2	-
NDM	133.889	0.5	-

Source, Sabuncu and Şeker, 1145.

The third issue emanating from the election results is, as it could be seen, among the parties who did not pass the threshold, two of them are extremely important. The first one is the radical right-wing nationalist National Action Party. Second, even though PDP (Peoples' Democracy Party-Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP), a quasi-Kurdish party which was the most powerful political organisation in the South-East region of Turkey, did not pass the threshold, got well approximately 27% of the votes in the region.¹⁵ The figure for votes gained by this party in the "18 province where more than 15 % of the population declared their mother tongue as Kurdish during the 1965 National Census"¹⁶ amounts to 19.5 %. The other parties' condition in the region is as follows.

¹⁵Y. Sabuncu, M. Şeker, "Seçimler", 1145

¹⁶Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London, Portland, Or: Frank Cass, 1997), 142.

Table 8: Vote distribution in the 18 provinces and in the South East Region of Turkey

Parties	Turkey	18 Provinces S.E.Region (%)	
	(%)	(%)	
MP	19.7	16.3	16.0
RPP	10.7	5.7	4.4
DLP	14.6	3.2	2.3
TPP	19.2	16.2	18.3
PDP	4.2	19.5	27.0
NAP	8.2	5.8	3.8
WP	21.4	27.2	23.0
others	1.6	2.6	
independent	0.5	3.4	

Source: The first two rows are adapted from Kirişçi and Winrow, the last column is after Sabuncu and Şeker.

One important conclusion reached by the analysis of the table is that, both in the 18 provinces and in the region the most powerful party was WP, even surpassing the PDP¹⁷ and, second, the left, both DLP and RPP, was extremely weak, which is another indicator of the crisis faced in the 1995 elections. The issues mentioned are subject to further discussion below. Another issue, among the others, is the condition of NDM (New Democracy Movement-*Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi*). The party which was first formed as a political-intellectual civilian movement, in time transformed itself

¹⁷PDP's condition is also dissected in Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "24 Aralık 1995 Alacakaranlık Kuşağı Seçimleri", in *Birikim*, Ocak 1996, no. 81, 26-30.

to a party and even though it run for a 'landslide' due to its new cadres and specifically its liberal discourse and arguments, yet could only got 0.3% of the votes and dissolved itself after the elections. On the other hand, on the right, the differentiation of the two big parties had a serious effect on the elections. On the national level the votes of the two parties amount approximately to well 40 % which, for many, was the reason behind the political instability in Turkey.¹⁸

8.3.2. Social Democracy and the 1995 Elections

8.3.2.1 General Assumptions

After these analyses concerning the parties relying on ideologies other than social democracy, when referred to the two parties, RPP and DLP, having traditionally the similar grassroots the results show remarkable changes. To understand the change it is convenient to start by comparing the percentage of votes recieved by the RPP and DLP in the last elections, namely the 1991 general, 1994 local and 1995 general elections.

Table 9: 1991-1994-1995 Election results compared

Parties	1991 (%)	1994 (%)	1995(%)
RPP/SDPP	20.8*	18.2**	10.7
DLP	10.8	8.8	14.6
Total	31.6	27.0	25.3

* SDPP's vote

** The total votes of SDPP(13.6 %) and RPP (4.6 %)

Source: Official results of elections, State Institute of Statistics.

¹⁸For a discussion of this argument see, Ibid., 26-28.

To start with, it is necessary to focus on an issue first raised by Kardam and Tüzün to discuss the point whether it is meaningful and correct to comprehend the two parties resting on the same ideological basis. Kardam and Tüzün clearly bring a point into consideration saying that after SDPP's coalition with TPP in 1991 it is not meaningful to think that the traditional center right (symbolised as the Democrat Parti tradition) and center left (the RPP tradition) distinctions are valid and of significant importance.¹⁹ One indicator demarcating the end of this traditional polarization is that, according to the authors, the SDPP has come up in 1991 the third, in 1994 the fourth, in 1995 the fifth party in the ranking as the DLP was the fifth, the fifth and the fourth party in the same period.²⁰ More important than these is the ideological structure of the grassroots supporting the both parties. A field survey carried out in 1995 shows that in the period 1989-1994, 49 % of the voters turned away from the SDPP has moved to center right parties and this ratio is 81 % among the former DLP voters.²¹

For the other part, the voters who shifted to the SDPP in the same period from MP, TPP, WP, NAP cumilate to 7,5 % and the number rolls on to 12-13% when DLP is considered. In another survey, as among the RPP voters, those who prefer DLP as the second choice is the 41 % of the whole body and, on the other hand, the number among the DLP voters for those who consider RPP as the second choice is 13 %.²² The most striking conclusion is that, for the 45 % of the DLP voters, the second choice is the parties such as MP, TPP, RP or NAP, as a loose knitted common

¹⁹Ahmet Kardam, Sezgin Tüzün, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kutuplaşmalar ve Seçmen Davranışları* (Ankara: Veri Araştırma, 1998), 57-59.

²⁰Ibid., 58.

²¹TÜSES, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasi Tabanı* (Ankara: TÜSES, 1995), 32-34; Ibid., 58

²²TÜSES, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve Eğilimleri* (Ankara: Tüses, 1996), 166; Ibid., 58.

denominator, the parties of the right.²³ This data shows that although the RPP characterises itself as a social democratic party, and considers the DLP as a tacit and distant ally on the same political wing, still, proven empirically that, the latter is totally different than the first one. This is consistent with Ecevit's arguments that DLP is a party which is not a 'social democratic' but a 'democratic left' one, having its origins found not in the universal social democracy but in the national past, as analysed previously. This condition might also be understood when the manifesto of the RPP is criticised.

8.3.2.2. The Ideological Approach of the RPP in the 1995 Elections

Before the elections, the RPP published two documents declaring its future policies and giving an overall view of its ideological standing. The first of these is the 'official' Manifesto²⁴ and the second one is a brochure named, "New Left in the World, New RPP in Turkey."²⁵ Whereas the first one is a more policy declaration the second one is an attempt to ground the concept of 'new left' and in this context it is more an ideological document. In both of the documents the emphasis is put on the concept of transformation, i.e. change. Especially in the first document there are 20 goals set by the party to designate the axis of transforming the society.

The rhetoric encapsulating the concrete goals is in coherence with the traditional and modernist notion of change which has been accentuated by the RPP all through its history. In this context there is a continuous reference to its past and what

²³Ibid., 166.

²⁴Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *1995 Seçim Bildirgesi: Türkiye'yi Çağdaş Dünyaya Biz Taşıyacağız*, (Ankara (?), n.p., 1995).

²⁵*Dünyada Yeni Sol, Türkiye'de Yeni CHP*. Pamphlete with n.p, n.d.

it has historically achieved, i.e. the establishment of the Republic, the nationalist will behind it, the process of catching the age, in short situating the RPP as the "pioneer of the change."²⁶ Soon the policy declaration document turns to be a speculation on the differences between the right and the RPP and basically two issues are discussed.

The first one is the fundamentalism, clearly connected with violence²⁷ and the second is the concept of 'dirty society,' the corruption problem.²⁸ The last introductory argument of the document is the 'rightist' policies, without going deep into the details and without purporting a concrete evidence for the criticism developed.²⁹ The goals inserted into this framework might be categorised in two main groups; the first is those issues related with the restructuring of the state and the new understanding of democracy and those issues related with the concept of rights. The second category encircles more practical matters, including the welfare state. Those fall into the first part of the first category have been identified as, the "institutionalization of the democracy and the state of law³⁰, secularism,³¹ the eradication of the dirtiness in politics and administration"³². The second part holding on the rights addresses to equality of men and women³³ and also argues that the party "will bring a democratic solution to ethnic sensibilities and will solve the Kurdish question."³⁴ The welfare state question is debated by saying that it "will be

²⁶1995, p.4, 5, 6.

²⁷Ibid., 4, 7, 8.

²⁸2, 5.

²⁹Ibid., 7.

³⁰Ibid., 11.

³¹Ibid., 16.

³² Ibid., 18.

³³Ibid., 23.

³⁴Ibid., 17.

realised"³⁵, "the work life will be democratized"³⁶ and "everybody will be supplied by a qualified health service."³⁷ The policy matters are explained by saying "an active economic substructure which will produce stability and bring the justice of sharing will be prepared"³⁸. The other issues related with the economic life are more demagogical rather than resting on concrete and detailed basis.³⁹

The second document, more an effort of constructing an ideological framework, seems to be inspired by the developments occurred in various social democratic parties of Western Europe and this point is emphasised by Baykal himself, in the brochure, saying that he personally has observed them.⁴⁰ The pamphlet frames these developments with technological revolution and according to Baykal, the repercussion of this phenomenon is the contradiction between the right and the left. For the left "what is to be done is trying to understand what is happening, trying to control them if not trying to find ways of living with them."⁴¹ However, as long as the necessity for the restructuring of the state is considered, there is no contradiction between the wings, i.e. the left and the right. The clash is on the methodology for, the free market economy is clearly accepted with some minor modifications. They are "i) the democratic state and ii) the active state."⁴² The democratization of the state in Turkey necessitates the protection of the achievements of the Republic and the

³⁵Ibid., 25-26

³⁶Ibid., 19-20

³⁷Ibid., 27-28.

³⁸Ibid., 31.

³⁹These include the "restructuring of the industry and technology", "the realisation of the substructure that will carry Turkey to the 2000s", and the "dissolving of the inequality between the regions."

⁴⁰*Dünyada*, 2.

⁴¹Ibid., 3.

⁴²Ibid., 4.

democracy should rely on "pluralism, participation, accountability."⁴³ In this context the administration as a mechanism needs to be reconsidered and the consequence should be the restructuring from the bottom not from the above which would be conducive to decentralization and the improvement of the local administrations.⁴⁴

This point is of particular importance for, the brochure argues that this type of organisation would solve the basic problems and shortcomings of the democracy. In this context what is emphasised is the polarization provoked in the society between such opposing groups as Turkish-Kurdish, Alevi-Sunni, Muslims-Seculars.⁴⁵ If a more democratic and participative model is established this would stop the shedding of blood in the South East region of Turkey and fulfill the expectations and demands of the Alevis.⁴⁶ It is interesting that, in the brochure this part seems to be argued by Seyfi Oktay, an Alevi leader and who was involved long time in the center left politics. In the same line the localization of democracy and the relations with the civil society organisations is encouraged in the document.⁴⁷

On the other hand, in the second part of this document, which tries to delineate the contours of a new state understanding, the 'active state' concept is argued and it is confirmed that it is not a 'minimal state' but a 'productive and efficient one.'⁴⁸ On this basis it is emphasised for many times that the RPP is not against the privatisation but it runs for the reconceptualisation of it which concentrates on such points as, investing on the sectors producing high technology which can not be achieved through private

⁴³Ibid., 5.

⁴⁴Ibid., 6-7.

⁴⁵Ibid., 8.

⁴⁶Ibid., 8.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁸Ibid., 11.

sector, securing the social rights of the workers, not leaving the health and education facilities to private sector.⁴⁹ In this context the social security system should be perpetuated and the crisis the system faces should be solved.⁵⁰ The most important part of the document is the comparison between the Welfare Party and the RPP.

After restating that the idiosyncrasy of the RPP which brings out its distinction from the other parties is the 'new social model' it proposes it is emphasised that in this line only WP is comparable to the RPP for, even though there are inadequacies found, yet it is only this party that offers a social model as 'Just Order.'⁵¹ In this context RPP replaces itself as diametrically opposite to the WP presenting itself as the only alternative to their model, which, the brochure implicitly expresses that, the society would move towards it due to the lack of any reliable and concrete model.⁵² This framework which brings out the necessary conditions to make a further analysis on i) the correlation between the arguments defended in the documents regarding especially the social grassroots basis of the RPP and the concrete results achieved and, ii) the assumptions regarding the new ideological aspects and their impact on the society.

8.3.2.3. The Structural Aspects of the Elections for the Social Democracy

When the documents published before the elections are analysed a point related with the expectations of the RPP is precisely observed: the RPP has believed that its traditional support groups, mainly the Alevis, the Kurds and the low income groups would support the party. This supposition is further backed and enhanced by the

⁴⁹Ibid., 12.

⁵⁰Ibid., 12.

⁵¹Ibid., 13.

⁵²Ibid., 13.

expectations directed to youth and the women. Nevertheless the results and post-election analysis concerning the RPP grassroots and substructure sometimes show differences with these assumptions which might be taken as one of the leading reasons and the signifiers of the crisis that RPP has faced. This is the question of the changing structure and characteristics of the grassroots politics in Turkey, linked with the emergence of new social groups and the demands bound to them. It is not only the RPP but all center-parties have been effected by these new developments for it provokes the raising of new political practices, such as the politicization of Islam or in general the shift towards radical politics.⁵³

The main reason of the failure then turns to be the inadequacy of the RPP to observe and receive the massive change and to satisfy the needs of the new emerging groups. Whereas the 1977 success of the democratic left politics have been based on the coalescence of the party and the radical expectations in the society crystallised with the motto of 'toward bright days'⁵⁴ together with the call for a 'system's change'⁵⁵, the 1995 elections is marked by the above mentioned condition⁵⁶, i.e. paralyses. Also, as will be shown below, the RPP in the late 1990s turned out to be a marginalised party rather than a mass party rallying to encompass the possible largest segment of the electorates. The question is definitely related with the changing structure of the politics and the social conditions and, has not only been significant for Turkey. The

⁵³The conditions of the radicalization of the politics have already been mentioned in the previous chapter.

⁵⁴As has already been analysed in the previous chapters this motto has also been carried out as the name of the 1973 Election Manifesto of the RPP: *Ak Günlere: CHP 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi* (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1973).

⁵⁵This is also the name of the book by Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1968).

⁵⁶Erdoğan Yıldız, "CHP ve DSP: Sosyal Demokrasinin 'Belirsizlik' Sorunu", in *Birikim*, Ocak 1996, no. 81, 43-45.

changing nature of the social democratic parties and the process of adjustment to the special needs of the period which emerged in the post-Cold-War era has been one of the main issues in the current debates.⁵⁷ The specific conditions of Turkey is further analysed below. But it should be noted that as the first party in the ranking in the 1995 elections has been the WP, the analysis takes this condition into consideration and comparisons are made between these two parties, i.e. RPP and the WP.

According to a survey carried out in the year 1996, the RPP comes the last in the ranking as it has the least amount of suburban based supporters.⁵⁸ The age average of the supporters is 37 and the RPP is again the last in the ranking as the 21-24 age group is considered. This is a diametrically opposite condition with respect to NAP. RPP, having the majority of its supporters on the 25-39 age group is similar to DLP.⁵⁹ As education is considered the WP comes the last according to the period of education as the RPP comes second in the ranking after, interestingly, NAP including the supporters having the longest period of education. Also RPP is the party having the majority of those who has a higher education graduation.⁶⁰ One of the left wing parties, DLP, comes second, after the first ranked NAP by having the least womens' representation (19%) as RPP has only 43.5 % women supporters after the first Anap (59.9%).⁶¹ A more important issue, the ranking of the supporters according to their job groups is given in the below table.

⁵⁷For details of different approaches see Gavin Bowd, "'C'est la lutte initiale': Steps in the Realignment of the French Left", in *New Left Review*, no. 206, 1994, 71-85; Jane Jenson, Rianne Mahon, "Representing Solidarity: Class, Gender and the Crisis in Social Democratic Sweden", in *New Left Review*, no. 201, 1993, 76-100.

⁵⁸Tüses, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve Eğilimleri* (Ankara: n.p., 1996), 106.

⁵⁹Ibid., 108.

⁶⁰Ibid., 110.

⁶¹Ibid., 110-111.

Table 10: Party supporters according to their job groups

Party	Blue collar	white collar	tradesmen	small farmer	business men	house wife	other	total	num. of subject
WP	18.8	2.4	16.4	37.4	2.1	19.9	3.0	100	532
MP	15.1	6.1	12.0	29.8	2.8	31.4	2.8	100	392
TPP	12.1	6.3	9.8	35.2	4.1	30.2	2.2	100	315
DLP	24.4	5.1	14.4	18.6	6.7	29.2	1.6	100	312
RPP	22.1	10.7	16.8	18.3	6.9	23.7	1.5	100	131
NAP	28.7	4.1	23.0	23.8	5.7	7.4	7.4	100	122
PDP	20.4	2.0	10.2	38.8	8.2	14.3	6.1	100	49
other	18.6	4.7	32.6	18.6	11.6	4.7	9.3	100	43
none	14.9	6.1	19.5	21.3	5.5	30.9	1.7	100	343
no answer	15.3	2.5	8.3	41.4	3.2	26.8	2.5	100	157
total	17.9	5.0	15.0	29.3	4.4	25.5	2.8	100	2396

Source, TÜSES, 1996.

The analysis of this table brings some interesting conclusions out. As has already been indicated in the previous chapters RPP comes as the party of white collars, small tradesmen and the businessmen. On the other hand DLP is significantly the party of white collars and small farmers together with the housewives, whereas the WP is also dominated by the small farmers. The second important indicator is the social stratification in the urban space and the table is below.

Table 11: Urban Party Supporters According to Social Stratification

	upper		lower			number of subjects
parties	middle	middle	middle	lower	total	
WP	5.0	22.5	43.8	28.8	100	240
MP	10.8	27.4	40.1	21.7	100	212
TPP	14.1	25.6	41.7	18.6	100	156
DLP	9.4	26.4	42.0	22.2	100	212
RPP	18.4	21.1	38.2	22.4	100	76
NAP	7.9	34.9	39.7	17.5	100	63
PDP	-	38.1	33.3	28.6	100	21
OTHER	27.6	34.5	34.5	3.4	100	29
NONE	17.8	18.3	41.6	22.4	100	219
NO						
ANSWER	5.7	18.6	42.9	32.9	100	70
TOTAL	11.3	24.4	41.3	23.0	100	1298

Source, TÜSES, 1996

The interpretation of this table also presents interesting results and the RPP appears as the party of upper middle classes with least representation of the lower middle and middle classes whereas WP is significantly the party of lower classes together with the DLP. The last issue that would be analysed is the structure of the supporters on the ethnic-religious identities base and only five parties will be taken into consideration for the others do not vary significantly on this condition.

Table 12: Party supporters according to their ethnic-religious identities

Parties	Alevi	Kurdish	Other	Total
WP	3.2	28.8	22.3	22.2
DLP	11.8	6.8	13.8	13.0
RPP	34.4	4.2	4.3	5.5
PDP	3.2	17.4	0.2	1.8

Source, TÜSES, 1996, 117.

It is clear from the above table that RPP comes out as an Alevi party and one interesting condition is that they are not represented remarkably in the PDP; which is an answer to usually alleged condition that some major Kurdish tribes have Alevi origins and show different social behaviour than the others.⁶² Second but most significant point is that WP comes out as the party having the leading majority of the Kurds even surpassing the PDP.⁶³ From the view point of RPP the interesting issue is the representation ratio of Kurds in this party which is apparently small, even falling behind the center right parties, as this figure rolls on to 9.7% for MP and 9.3% for TPP.

This is one of the most important condition that determines the result that RPP obtained in the South East region of Turkey and is further analysed below. It should be noted that DLP represents both of the groups with lower rates as compared to the three parties. This framework conveys us to conclude that the profile of RPP, according to the results, is that, it is the party, of i) upper middle class and middle

⁶²Ş. Beysanoglu, *Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler* (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınları, 1992).

⁶³This condition needs analysis which is left to the following sections.

class; ii) urban space; iii) white collars, iv) Alevis and v) middle aged groups. On the other hand the other democratic left party is a party for i) lower middle class; ii) urban space iii) blue collars and housewives; iv) middle age and upper middle age groups. The ideological structure of the social democracy is dwelled on these categories.

8.3.2.4. Some More Ideological Aspects of Social Democracy around the 1995 Elections

The ideological aspects that determine the grassroots behaviour have also been analysed in various surveys and one of the most interesting results obtained is that in both of the center-left parties a well percentage of the sympathisers (in RPP 22.1% and in DLP 29.8%) define themselves neither leftist nor rightist which might be conceived as an ideological ambiguity if not an ideological vacuum.⁶⁴ On the other hand in RPP 62.6 % qualifies themselves as leftist but in DLP this figure drops to 47.4% and approximately 10 % of the grassroots define themselves as rightist. One another indicator which links especially the social democratic party supporters to their parties is the notion of 'exploitation and oppression' which is believed a concept having a traditional function and articulation power for the centre-left parties. On this basis the survey determines interesting results as below.

Table 13: Who are the exploited and oppressed?

wage earners	62.2 %
workers	52.3
state officers	30.6
other	7.1

⁶⁴TÜSES, *Türkiye'de*, 118.

peasants	23.8
poors,middle class, people	22.0
unemployed	6.0
small tradesmen	5.7
kurds	0.9
women	0.6
Alevis	0.1
other	3.5
total	124.8
number of subjects	2164

Source, TÜSES, 1996, 63.

The table clarifies that the exploited and oppressed sectors are identified with wage earners and peasants but women, Kurds and Alevis do not bring out a figure which is worth discussing. This is a situation negating the belief of the social democratic parties. One another question which tries to understand who sees whom as the oppressed and exploited gives out a meaningful result. Those who define themselves as 'leftist' with 74.2% considers that this group includes the wage earners. But this figure is 57.7 % among the 'rightists', which is a condition showing that workers and state officers has a gravity on the grassroots of all parties. On the other hand, when surveyed, it becomes clear that supporters of a good number of parties do not believe that there are parties to solve the problems of 'exploited and oppressed.'

Table 14: Are there any parties to defend the rights of exploited and oppressed?

Supported Parties

	Yes	No	No idea
WP	41	41.8	17.2
DLP	43.4	41.8	14.8
RPP	43.4	47.3	9.3
PDP	77.3	22.7	-

Source, TÜSES, 1996, 127.

From the answers given to another question it is understood that the leftist party grassroots have more faith in their parties in the process of solving the problems of the above mentioned group. 47.3% of the subjects identified left more prone to the achievement of the task with respect to 11.6 % of those on the right. Those who presume left would defend the rights show an interesting outcome when the group is dissected in itself. Only 12.5 % determines the RPP while DLP is nominated by 33.1 % of the subjects.⁶⁵

One of the questions tries to determine the most important public problem. The answers given to this question have changed over years. When in the survey of 1993⁶⁶ the subjects are asked a question on how do they see Turkey's position with respect to three year ago an overwhelming majority of the SDPP (59.0 %), DLP (74.1%) and RPP (67.3) gave negative answers clarifying that it is worse. In this context, in the same survey, the most important problem is qualified as the South-East issue and terrorism again by the overwhelming majority of SDPP (44.8%), DLP

⁶⁵Ibid., 129.

⁶⁶TÜSES, 1995 62

(41.7%), and RPP (38.0%).⁶⁷ The second issue is determined as inflation and the question of democratic rights and liberties are issued about 1 to 1.5% by the subjects.⁶⁸ Yet, the origin of South-East issue is absolutely determined as terrorism between 50-65% of the subjects.⁶⁹ The last interesting issue is that as only the 29.4% of the all SDPP supporters believed their party could solve this problem this figure is 24.7% for the RPP nominating RPP and 35.3% for DLP whereas 57.8% of WP have faith in their parties.⁷⁰

In the 1996 survey the figures are slightly changed.⁷¹ Still 82.4% of the RPP, 83.3% of the DLP believed that Turkey's conditions are worse in the last years. This answer is critical, for, the survey is realised in the March 1996, just after the long lasting DYP-SDPP/RPP coalition governments. It reflects that the party supporters' impression about the government in which their party involved for a long period of time. The most important problem is issued as inflation by 82.9% of the subjects and, in this survey, second comes the state administration by 20.2% whereas terrorism is in the fourth rank by 11.0%.⁷² When the subjects are interviewed whether they believe their parties could solve Turkey's problems, it is only the RPP that has been supported by the minority of the supporters.⁷³ The interesting point is that those subjects who think that these problems are unsolvable are qualitatively high on the center-left in comparison to centre-right.⁷⁴

⁶⁷Ibid., 64.

⁶⁸Ibid., 64.

⁶⁹Ibid., 65

⁷⁰Ibid., 71.

⁷¹TÜSİS, 1996, 122.

⁷²Ibid., 123.

⁷³Ibid., 125-126.

⁷⁴Ibid., 126.

One another issue that might be helpful in determining the ideological situation of the centre-left is how social democratic grassroots conceive the state.⁷⁵ When the subjects are asked the question whether they see if the state can do anything about the unemployment, 68% of the workers, 80% of the state officers, 74% of the small tradesman who identify themselves as social democrat answered positively. When the methodology is asked the below results are achieved.

Table 15: The precautions that the state should take

Precaution	Worker	State officials	small tradesman
interventionist	66.2	70.6	67.6
private sector	5.1	9.4	10.8
regulatory	23.5	17.5	16.9

Source: TÜSES, 1995, 111

As it is clear from the table a majority of the grassroots prefer the interventionist approach with a small minority taking a regulatory position. This idiosyncrasy illuminates a characteristic that, the social democracy in Turkey have faith in statism and this is clear when approximately the whole of the subjects acclaimed that state should find and create jobs for the unemployed.⁷⁶ This figure is repeated by those who state that tuition fees in education creates inequality.⁷⁷

These results might be interpreted on two levels. The first one defines the structural and ideological aspects and contours of the social democratic parties in

⁷⁵TÜSES, 1995, 110-114,

⁷⁶ibid., 113.

⁷⁷ibid., 114.

Turkey and, with implicit and explicit answers given to questions, a 'new' conclusion might be proceeded. In this respect it is clear that social democracy in Turkey, in the late 1990s have not yet surpassed the statist position and epistemology and, it still relies on a cosmopolitan grassroots. Taking these points into consideration it might be argued that especially the RPP by concentrating on the issues of democracy and not being concrete on the economic matters falls short of satisfying the expectations of the voters. One another but very important conclusion is that especially RPP is a kind of Alevi party whereas it is totally abandoned by the Kurds.

On the other hand this brings out another inconsistency for, the majority of the subjects have identified wage earners as exploited and oppressed but such a small percentage included Alevis and Kurds in this category. The last issues that are worth discussing are that even though there is a common critical approach and disbelief in the politics, still this is devastating as long as the RPP is considered. Under these assumptions and empirical conclusions, the second issue that emanates from this survey is that the result RPP achieved in the 1995 elections is not strange and surprising and is in consistence with the profile dissected above. One last assumption in this context is again related with the ideological allegations of the RPP.

RPP, especially in the 1995 elections have tried to attract the voters who would vote for a party other than the WP with the claim that, RPP is the only party that could fetter the upsurge of fundamentalism in Turkey. But when the voter behaviour is analysed it seems that only 0.07% of the voters decided on the RPP sustaining this assumption⁷⁸ which shows a major defect in the ideological configuration of the party. On the other hand when a survey is realised after the 1995 elections to figure out the

⁷⁸TÜSİS, 1996, 147.

voting behaviour, it becomes clear that, even though the RPP seems more stronger in the urban space yet those who would vote for DLP is 15.8% whereas the RPP is the choice of 6.3 % in the same space. The figures for the suburban is 9.0% for DLP and 4.1% for the RPP⁷⁹, showing that there is a major change in the structure of social democracy in Turkey that should be carefully analysed because, as has already been mentioned, for the 41 % of the RPP voters the second choice is DLP but this ration drops to 13.5 when DLP's approach to the RPP is considered.⁸⁰

The second choice of the DLP is absolutely (34%) the centre-right parties. On the other hand, the last issue is that, 40.7% of those who characterise themselves as 'leftist' vote for DLP and only 22.6% of this group votes for RPP⁸¹ which means i) it is not any more the RPP representing the social democracy in Turkey on an empirical level but it is DLP and ii) this party does consider itself not a social democrat but a democratic left party meaning that the classical understanding of the social democracy in Turkey adhering to traditional RPP ideology finds a problematic reflection in the political realm. This contradiction is also clear in the debates developed in the second half of the 1990s in Turkey which are also an indicator of how RPP is drifting away from both the ideological and pragmatic realm.

Conclusion

In this chapter the condition of the social democratic parties in Turkey in the late 1995 is analysed. The analysis is carried out on two levels. On the ideological level the major developments regarding the SDPP and RPP is dissected and on the practical level the 1995 general elections is concerned. The 1995 general elections is

⁷⁹Ibid., 152.

⁸⁰Ibid., 166.

⁸¹Ibid., 161.

important for two reasons. The first is, when the pre and the post election periods are empirically analysed the crisis that Turkish social democracy but especially SDPP and later RPP faced is clearly understood. Second this empirical date gives out the basic clues and the insight into the ideological shortcomings and constraints of the same political practice.

The late 1990s in Turkey, as long as the social democratic politics is concerned, gives birth to a major change which is the unification of the SDPP and the RPP. This is an important as well as a problematic decision. It has some major contradictions in itself. First of all, as has been shown in the chapter, the decision is a direct reflection of the basic and defining epistemological structure of Turkish social democracy. It is the RPP tradition much attached to the Republican values; i.e. the secularism, nationalism and statism. After a long process of trying to surpass this determining ideology, in the end, due to the neo-nationalist movement revived in turkey, SDPP grassroots decided to merge with the RPP. The RPP, with its new administration, did not hesitate in reinvigorating the traditional notion and ideology of RPP in Turkey. In a period when globalisation has reached to its peak, a process questioning the existence and domination of the centralised nation-state this process, as a consequence of its contradiction with the existing situation, has been defeated in the 1995 elections.

As, in the late 1990s, in the West-European countries the socialist and social democratic parties have gone through a drastic transformation the approach has found an echo on one specific wing of Turkish social democracy, namely the RPP. Although in the Manifesto published just before the 1995 elections RPP argued that the issues

conducting to transformation should be carried and incorporated into Turkish social democracy, this intention has never been realised by a practical approach.

The main argument of the chapter is that, all of these constraints are due to the changing grassroots structure of the Turkish social democracy. When empirical data is analysed it becomes clear that the traditional supporters of the RPP have moved away from this party. On the other hand, it is more the DLP, representing the Turkish social democracy. Nevertheless the basic arguments and ideological framework of the DLP is as problematic as RPP. DLP, although, surpassed the RPP, in the 1995 elections when the structure of grassroots is dissected, it is understood that, this party is backed by a group which is more prone to centre-right. This very point, the condition of DLP, being the major party on the Turkish social democratic politics shows that this ideology is still in need of an acute change and the possibilities of such an attempt is analysed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IX

THE IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE LATE

1990s AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY CRISIS

9.1 The Framework

In the previous chapter we argued that the late 1990s has witnessed the drastic crisis of social democracy in Turkey. This crisis is demarcated by the results achieved in the 1995 general elections. This very concrete condition and conclusion is an outcome of various different reasons. One of them is that, in the late 1990s Turkey, when taken as a whole regarding its social, cultural and economic conditions has developed a new structure. This new formation has paved the way for the new social interest groups. This might be interpreted as a consequence of a process that has started by the early 1980s. From the view point of social democratic politics, the importance of this formation is that, the traditional support groups, due to their structural transformations, started moving away from this ideology. Actually this has been a case faced by socialism in the West-European political arena in the same time period and the mentioned political practice has regained power by getting adopted to the situation after a long and hardsome process. Turkish social democracy, not

realising the depth of the crisis, has continued with the traditional ideological and practical approach. The reinvigoration of the RPP in the late 1990s and its attachment to its traditional ideology has been answered back by the electorates.

In this context, in the previous chapter, after a long and detailed empirical analysis it has been argued that in Turkey, along with the shift of the interest groups which have traditionally backed social democratic politics, there is a new development. It is the situation of the DLP of Bülent Ecevit. According to the 1995 results it is more this party representing the traditional social democratic grassroots but however, DLP refrains from declaring itself as a social democratic party. It calls itself a democratic socialist party and totally rejects the universal values and history of social democracy. In this sense it is more a conservative party as well as being a parochial one. Interestingly, it should be noted here that, DLP, although it stays respectful to Kemalism and the constitutive ideology, nevertheless, refrains also from accentuating it. It situates itself in a context where it runs for the traditional and popular interests and values of the electorate.

The third point when the late 1990s is considered is the role played by the WP in the political scene. WP with its main arguments which bring a radical critique of the establishment has had a great impact on the Turkish political life in the late 1990s. At the beginning, it was believed that, the criticism developed by the WP covers the basic ideological discourse and brings an assesment of the democratic understanding in Turkey. It is also believed that, as a part and parcel of the search in Turkey, considering the development of the civil society, the reevaluation of the public sphere, the position of WP would sustain an opening in the democratization process in Turkey. This dual approach, both by the one formulated by the WP and its reception

by the intellectual publicum, was not distant to the criticism of Kemalism in Turkey as the constitutive ideology. However, in the relatively long run, as will be argued in this chapter, not only the ideology of WP perceived as a discourse attached to Kemalism but also the ideological approach of the party started to display itself as a counter position against the established basics of democracy.

This framework, from both the view point of social democracy and WP, in general the approach developed by the representation of the Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey needs a revisiting of Kemalism in Turkey for two reasons. First of all, the late 1990s has definitely been marked by this debate and, second, in the relevant and recent literature, the links established between WP and Kemalism display two important results. First, the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and Kemalism brings out some important conclusions which are important in the reevaluation of Kemalism, second the crisis of social democracy in Turkey in the mentioned time period is considered to be an outcome of the crisis of Kemalism as a project of modernity. Especially from this angle and both Kemalism's and Islamic fundamentalism's approach to modernity gives the basic clues that could be used in the revisiting of the social democratic crisis in Turkey in the late 1990s.¹ If modernity is taken as a concept convoluted with secularism, mainly, the criticism of Kemalism and the debate concerning secularism becomes highly important. Because, this is not only related with such new concepts, as identity, pluralism, private-public contradiction, but also shows, to some authors the problematic situation of Kemalism in the late 1990s,

¹The notion of 'Islamic fundamentalism' has been a matter of discussion in Turkey. For an analysis of a more abstract notion of fundamentalism see, Bhikhu Parekh, "The Concept of Fundamentalism", in Aleksandras Sthromas (ed.), *The End of 'Isms?' Reflections on the Fate of Ideological Politics After Communism's Collapse* (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1994), 106-125; and Carla Pasquinelli, "Fundamentalisms", *Constellations* (1998), v.5, no. 1, 17.

which is another indicator and reason, which needs an analysis, for the critical position of the social democracy attached to these values. The last point is that, beyond others, if in the late 1990s a political position which is critical of Kemalism gains power in the political arena and one another, the significant conjugate of that ideology, since the beginning, loses power this point doubtless needs an evaluation. This chapter will focus on these issues and this will also be a complementary part of the analysis started in the previous chapter concentrating on the ideological elements.

9.2 Kemalism in the 1990s

9.2.1 Kemalism as a Modernity Project

The late 1990s in Turkey is dominated with debates concentrated mainly on two subject-matters, i) Kemalism, and ii) fundamentalism which is mainly an outcome of the concept of identity. In this sense, identity should be considered as a concept encompassing pluralism and, the search for a new definition and structuring of the public-private contradiction by asking the question whether it is possible to reach a more liberal state by transforming the existing one. This framework is definitely related with the reevaluation of the existing state of democracy in Turkey and an outcome of results of the 1995 elections. This is, to a certain extent, natural. Because, the Welfare Party was the first party in the ranking which was comprehended as the most concrete threat and menace for the Republican system. On the other hand the arguments put forward by this party were rather for a new social order and the critique of Turkish modernity which was symbolised and represented by secularism. In this context the debate on secularism has been a questioning of Turkish modernity stretching to those concepts such as identity, the restructuring of the order with the specific accentuation of the notion of subject, a new understanding of ethics, the formation of a new concept of private space. The analysis of this approach and re-

placing of Turkish social democracy in Turkish political realm needs a brief and overall view of Welfare Party and Islamic upsurge by reconsidering the crisis of Turkish modernity.

Turkish modernity by many students of Turkish politics has been defined as a project which has four unseparable components; secularism, nationalism, modernization, westernization.² With this understanding, Said claims that this framework is what should be conceived as Kemalism. More interestingly, for the first time, the author makes an attempt to carry Kemalism out of its boundaries. It is not any more, according to Said, a model of modernisation for a specific country but an epistemology and accepted by various countries and cultures as a model in their modernisation processes. In this context what makes the crux of Kemalism and brings it to the fore as a model for other countries, namely the former Islamic states of the Middle East, is its relation to Islam. Said explains this by saying

when I use the term Kemalism I refer not to the specific discursive practices of Mustafa Kemal, but rather to a more general discourse founded upon the perspective opened by Kemal and sharing many of Kemal's key assumptions. In other words, Kemalism describes a hegemonic political discourse in the muslim world, within which Islam was no longer a master signifier of the political order.³

Said, at this point, makes another attempt and coalasces Kemalism with its approach to Islam; in other words, the Kemalist project of modernisation, for him, comes as a 'geneological and teleological'⁴ trial to surpass Islam with Westernisation.

²Bobby S Said, *The Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London and New York, 1997), 63-69.

³ibid, 70.

⁴ibid, 66.

Modernisation, is not any more a technique, as in the case of late Ottoman modernisers but a project, "from being just a means to an end to bring an end in itself."⁵ This project, according to Keyman is a "will to civilization."⁶ This will is realised through nationalism whose aim was again modernization, in the name of people.⁷ What Keyman suggest is that, in the implementation of the project two main methods are used, the first one 'from the above imposition' and the incentive of the elites.⁸ More important than these, as is indicated clearly by Keyman, is the role played by economy; a concept into which Kemalist elite's political power was not reducible but interrelated with it and second, the articulation of Reason with capital(ism) and economy at large.⁹

This framework enables us to conceptualize the Kemalist modernisation project as a Durkheimian construction of an 'organic state.' This state model, is interrelated with one of the most important concepts in the construction of Kemalism, the 'sovereignty.' Even though on the rhetorical level it is acclaimed that 'sovereignty belongs to the people', it is evident that, Kemalism is the "reconstruction of the idea of sovereignty as a national, rather than popular"¹⁰ concept. Keyman, from this extrapolates that, "the state was not the liberal but the organic state acting in the name

⁵ibid, 67.

⁶E. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Fall 1995, no. 13, 93-120.

⁷ibid, 103.

⁸ibid, 104.

⁹Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Kemalist İdeolojide Modernleşmenin Anlamı: Sosyo-İkonomik Bir Çözümleme Denemesi", in Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (eds.) (İstanbul: Beta Basın Yayın Dağıtım Aş, 1986), 189-204.

¹⁰ibid, 103.

of the people, insofar as its functions, while independent of the general will, were assumed to correspond to that will"¹¹ and, "what the organic state did was to create and activate the general will in a way to present itself as a cohesive factor of social formation."¹²

What might be referred as the national identity in Turkey is again the reconstruction of Kemalism, a concept "to concretize populism and its appeal to organic unity into the identity of the individual subject."¹³ Here, it should be noted that, as a nationalist movement, Kemalism's appeal to the construction of an identity is not genealogical, for, as has been stated by Anderson, all identity construction is a matter of 'imagination.'¹⁴ Nevertheless what gains the legitimacy to this formation process is the negation and subjugation of the Islamic identity which was dominant in the Ottoman society. In other words, the modernisation process of Kemalism is by all means the continuous struggle with the Islam as an epistemology and a social and political order, the way of living generated by Islam and the identity imposed by Islam. In this sense, Islam plays a dual role in the construction of the national-Kemalist identity. First, as both Keyman and Said suggests, it is, to say it with a Derridaen concept, the 'constitutive outside' of Kemalism; second, in a mutual interaction both Kemalism has developed its rhetoric and epistemology through Islam and vice versa. Said explains this process as below:

¹¹ibid, 103-104.

¹²ibid, 104.

¹³ibid, 105.

¹⁴Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*(London, New York: Verso, seventh impression, 1996).

The Kemalist drive to secularization followed a number of strategies with regard to Islam. First it advocated that Islam should be simply a code of private ethics. Underlying this was a second strategy which tried to restrict the significance of Islam by actively adopting a hostile policy towards it...The third strategy was the policy of trying *to use Islam as the antagonistic other of Kemalism. Islam was continually being described in terms which made it the 'constitutive outside' of the discourse of Kemalism.*¹⁵

The national identity, on the one hand, is a radical break with the Islamic identity, and, second, a step in the construction of a Westernised self. This procedure, not only constitutes the second component of the Kemalist identity but also brings out the second idiosyncrasy of Kemalism, namely its problematic relationship with 'Orientalism.' This concept, defined in depth by Edward Said in his influential book¹⁶, focuses on the conceiving of the Orient by the West as a matter of foundationalism and essentialism. The groundbreaking importance of the concept is that, as Said shows, the production of the Orient is West's attempt to legitimise itself by defining its Other.

Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularised (or Orientalized) writing, vision and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient...The Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire.¹⁷

When Said analyses how Kemalism tacitly used Orientalism to construct its identity he refers to Westernisation, saying that

¹⁵Said, *Fundamental*, 65; italics not in the original.

¹⁶Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

¹⁷*ibid*, 202-203.

"the very nature of westernization implied the necessity of orientalizing since you can only westernize what is not western, that is what is oriental. Thus to westernize you had first to orientalize: one had to represent the oriental, before one could postulate westernization as an antidote."¹⁸

Depending on this explanation, the tacit Orientalisation logic of Kemalism could be issued here¹⁹, for Said defines two forms of Orientalism, the manifest and latent²⁰. In this context, using Westernisation, nationalism and secularism, Kemalism has created an identity as a consequence of modernisation project but the critical point is that Kemalism has developed two more characteristics depending on these issues. The first one is that, Kemalism, even when taken as a radical attempt for the construction of a new epistemology, still, lies within the epistemological limits of the previously existing system, namely the Ottoman-Islamic discourse; second, Kemalism has transformed itself into a culture, rather than into a political ideology, as has already been argued in the thesis, by constructing a hegemonic identity. To understand the crisis of Kemalist project of modernisation one has to focus briefly on these two points.

According to Oktay, there is an implicit relationship between the Turkish political tradition of "unified power practice" and the Islamist political practice which culminates in the 'non-appearance' of the civil society. This model is further characterised by the missionary position of the political center and the inadequacy of

¹⁸Said, *Fundamental*, 68.

¹⁹For a discussion of the relationship between Kemalism and Orientalism see Hasan Bülent Kahraman and E. Fuat Keyman, "Kemalizm, Oryantalizm ve Modernite." *Doğu Batı*. 2(1998), 63-77.

²⁰Said, *Orientalism*, 206.

the will to limit the political power.²¹ This structure, is a consequence of political rhetoric of the Islam and this might be epitomised by various different outcomes, the most important ones being, first, the configuration of the ideal state which is described by Arkoun in a laconic way by saying that it is interrelated with the idea of 'order' which denotes not the way conducive to that but more the idea itself.²² Second, the fundamental axis that enables the organization of the political rhetoric of Islam around the idea of perfect order is the understanding of monism which is nothing but the notion of *umma*. In this context, Oktay, confirms that *umma* is not only a religious unity but a *unity* (italics added) having political, social and economic dimensions. It is clear that this notion might be taken as the preliminary sketch of the notion of an organic society.

The third idiosyncrasy of this structure is related to the condition of authority and, in this sense, legal authority in Islam is unified and undivisible.²³ Oktay accentuates that a notion of authorized intermediary power is alien to Islam. Another important fact in this structure is that, in a notion of 'ideal cite', which is not conducive to the differentiation of civil and the political, the political realm will not create its own legal system. The problem of legitimacy will be solved through the notion of 'science' which also brings fore the transition from power-power to authority-power.²⁴ The last concept in this framework is the condition of the

²¹Cemil Oktay, "Yargı Açısından Kuvvetler Ayrılığı ve Siyasal Kültür", in Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (eds.), *Türkiye'de Siyaset: Süreklilik ve Değişim* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, n.y.), 413-434.

²²*ibid*, 425.

²³*ibid*, 426.

²⁴*ibid*, 427.

individual. In Islamic political rhetoric, the individual gains both its legitimacy and honour as being a member of the community not in an attempt to delineate a civil and private boundary for itself.²⁵ Depending on these remarks, Oktay, concludes that, it is this epistemology and structural characteristics that shapes the existing political-social structure and in this sense, the Republican period can not be considered as an attempt successful in eliminating the existing culture and implementing a new one.²⁶

In fact this approach should be accepted if Partha Chatterjee's concept of 'derivative discourse' is recalled. Chatterjee, in developing his concept draws on the notion of Orientalism and suggests that the resistance to colonialism, in other words, nationalism, is a reversed Orientalism and has its roots in the intellectual epistemology of it.²⁷ In this context, according to Chatterjee, the nationalist upheaval, on the one hand inherits the discourse of the former socio-political condition and on the other hand incorporates the nation into the state in the process of nation-building.²⁸ In this context, it might be argued that, in Turkey, as there has never been a period of colonialism, when the Kemalist attempt starts to construct a nationalist discourse it also starts to become the post-colonial period by acclaiming the former structure as the colonialist one.²⁹ This means, as Oktay argues, Kemalist nationalist discourse has inherited the discourse of the former social-political structure as a cultural code.

²⁵ibid, 428.

²⁶ibid, 429-430.

²⁷Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World : A Derivative Discourse* (London, New York: Zed Books, 1986).

²⁸ibid, 160-170.

²⁹The details of this formation is argued in Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1991).

The importance of this articulation is that, when the crisis of the Kemalist modernization project comes to the fore, the filling of the gap by the political or the politicization of Islam should not be seen as a surprise. On the contrary as an outcome of the same logic it might be argued that both Islamic discourse inherits the Kemalist discourse and *vice versa* , each one being the derivative discourse of the other and also each one being the constitutive outside of the other. Behind this, it is also possible to see that the incorporation of the other as a constitutive outside has been a more simple procedure as long as Kemalism is taken as a hegemonic discourse by forming a tradition as Keyman argues.³⁰ Keyman, after discussing the three 'meanings' of Kemalism as a nation-building project, a modernity project and a social engineering project, ³¹ proposes two hypotheses as nation-state being the domineering subject of the modernity project and the creation of an organic society as the objective of the Kemalist elites³².

Keyman, at this point in an attempt to answer the question what gives the ability to Kemalism to re-produce itself as a hegemonic discourse proposes that the key notion is the 'tradition' and the Kemalism-tradition relationship.³³ According to Keyman, Kemalist tradition, as all traditions have, has four different levels; the hermeneutic, the normatic, the legitimacy and identity levels.³⁴ Keyman, further,

³⁰Fuat Keyman, "Kemalizm, Modernlik ve Gelenek", *Toplum ve Bilim* 72, Bahar 1997, 84-101.

³¹*ibid*, 87.

³²*ibid*, 89.

³³*ibid*, 89.

³⁴*ibid*, 90-91.

argues that, in contrast with its appearance as a tradition-breaking moment, Kemalism is not against it, yet itself is a tradition on the hermenautic level.³⁵

"The active domineering subject of this political understanding is state, its object but at the same time its peer the citizenship 'which is defined as a cultural identity and limited with the national identity' and its discourse realm is the sovereignty discourse that activates the 'self-other relationship'."³⁶

The importance of this framework is Keyman's argument that, the Islamic modernity understanding has never produced an alternative to Kemalist tradition on the normative and identity levels; Islamic modernity is the re-production of the Kemalist discourse with a rhetoric whose terminology is different.³⁷ This argument acts as a point of articulation between the crisis of Kemalist hegemonic modernity discourse and the birth of political Islam as an alternative to it.

9.2.2. The Crisis of Kemalist Certainty: From Unity to Differentiation

The crisis of Kemalist modernity project is a widely accepted condition. According to Keyder, what feeds this outcome is the fall of the notion of national development understanding.³⁸ On the other hand Keyder argues that the impression that Turkish modernity is facing a crisis which emanates from the identification of modernity with Westernisation and as the former runs a crisis it is believed that the

³⁵ibid, 91.

³⁶ibid, 92.

³⁷ibid, 95.

³⁸Çağlar Keyder, *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1993).

project in Turkey also runs a bankruptcy.³⁹ Likewise, Kasaba also draws the attention to the new circumstances that 'Kemalist certainty' has started to face 'modern ambiguities'.⁴⁰ What is worth mentioning in this context is that, Kasaba puts Kemalist certainties, which is considered to be a consequence of modernity, into a contradiction with modern ambiguities.

Even he himself in his article continues with explaining the details of this 'modernization' and the methodology of it.⁴¹ What makes the Kemalist condition interesting in this sense, according to Kasaba is that, after the process Turkey has not come up with a "rational and universally progressive middle-class society."⁴² On the contrary, what modernity has produced in Turkey is "an economically polarized, politically contentious, and ethnically divided people."⁴³ Kasaba demarcates this context as the climate of the 1980s and 1990s, a time period, which, according to Köker, brings out the 'transition from identity crisis to legitimation crisis'.⁴⁴ What causes this transition and the new situation, Levent Köker argues, is the birth of a new political agenda in Turkey resting on the notion of 'reactionary modernism'.⁴⁵

³⁹Çağlar Keyder, "Whiter the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s", in Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds.), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), 37-51.

⁴⁰Reşat Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities", S.Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds.), *Rethinking*, 15-36.

⁴¹ibid, 23-30.

⁴²ibid, 31.

⁴³ibid, 31.

⁴⁴Levent Köker, "Kimlik Krizinden Meşruluk Krizine: Kemalizm ve Sonrası", in *Toplum ve Bilim* 71, Kış 1997, 150-165.

Köker, claims that, Kemalism, since the beginning, with its tacit and hidden references to the 19th century modernisation processes has developed an identity which already embodies certain paradoxes. The most intriguing one among them is Kemalism's problematic relationship with nationalism and religion. Kemalism, while constructing the new social being has excluded the religion as a component of the (national) identity but on the other hand it did not reject the religion as a social phenomenon.⁴⁶ The clash between Kemalism and Islam was more attuned to a specific practice of the Islam and, as Islam, a religion which has never separated the sacred and the secular from each other⁴⁷, is not kept out of the structure this very condition caused the contradiction of Kemalist secularism⁴⁸. Kemalism, in time, has become a religion in itself⁴⁹ both to fill the gap created by the exclusion of Islam from the public domain and through the cult(ure) it has created developing and using, to say it with Featherstone, symbolic hierarchies.⁵⁰ This is in a way inevitable for,

national cultures have usually emerged alongside state formation processes in which cultural specialists reinvented traditions and reshaped

⁴⁵ibid, 160.

⁴⁶The basis for this condition is found in Atatürk's approach to Islam. For a brief review of his ideas see Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 97-100, 169-170.

⁴⁷For the various dimensions of this much referred condition see Aziz Al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities* (London, New York: Verso, second edition, 1996)

⁴⁸Köker, "Kimlik", 160.

⁴⁹Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 81-91.

⁵⁰Mike Featherstone, *Undoing Culture: Globalism, Postmodernism and Identity* (London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 88.

and refurnished the ethnic core of the people. As nation-states became increasingly drawn together in a tighter figuration of competing nations, they faced strong pressures to develop a coherent cultural identity. The process of homogenization of culture, the project of creating a common culture, must be understood as a process in the unification of culture of the need to ignore, or at best refine, synthesize and blend, local differences.⁵¹

The new condition defined for Islam, which is giving it the secondary importance in the formation of the new social and political system, might be taken as a step in the context of creating a homogenized culture.⁵² This is, to some authors is the process of the "Turkification of Islam"⁵³ derivated from the understanding of secularism, which is usually defined as the state control over the religious affairs.⁵⁴ This was a part of creating a discourse relying absolutely on the Western ideals as Serif Mardin puts it; but, on the other hand, the symbolism of the Republican culture was "too shallow and lacking in aesthetic richness to 'take.'"⁵⁵ The rest was a sheer dependence on the Western and, namely, the Enlightenment ideals and filling the gap considering and purporting Kemalism as the one and the only possibility to get rid of

⁵¹ibid, 89.

⁵²On the other hand, culture itself, for some authors, is a product of Western modernity. Jonathan Friedman, "Cultural Logics of the Global System", *Theory, Culture & Society*, 5 (2/3), 447-460.

⁵³According to Poulton this is a perpetuating process observed even in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the post-coup period through the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat*, 179-180.

⁵⁴For a survey of the process of the construction of an identity which also encompasses the Islam see, Ayşe Saktanber, "Muslim Identity in Children's Picture-Books", in Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 171-188.

⁵⁵Şerif Mardin, 'Religion in Modern Turkey', *International Social Science Journal*, 19, 2, 1977, 279.

every absence.⁵⁶ This is a circumstance once more introducing the definitive paradox of Kemalism: taking Western ideals as the possibility of defeating the Western insult on the country and using the nationalist identity emanating from the Kemalist discourse with an absolutist and religious accentuation to surpass the religious consciousness.⁵⁷ In this context Kemalism is the reformulation and the reutilization of the existing different hegemonic discourses and in time itself becoming a hegemonic discourse.

This very characteristic of the Kemalist discourse has a dual contradiction. On the one hand it used the 'other' discourses as a 'constitutive outside' with which it was having a contradictory relation and synchronically Kemalism itself was used as the 'constitutive outside' of the other opposing discourses, political Islam being the most important one.⁵⁸ This might be considered, in a way, an attempt in the construction of 'civil religion' in the Rousseauian sense of the concept, that is as Wilson suggests, "a belief in a higher abstract principle of justice transcending the moral claims and ethical particularities of each separate religious denomination."⁵⁹

This state of affairs might be elaborated once more going back to the crisis of Kemalist modernity in Turkey and briefly two remarks might be mentioned here. The

⁵⁶This paradigm is more related with a Third-World developmentism, as Glalp correctly points. Haldun Glalp, 'Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey', in S.BozdoĖan and R. Kasaba, *Rethinking*, 61.

⁵⁷Bryan S. Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 87.

⁵⁸Boby S Said, *Fundamental*, 72-73; E. Fuat Keyman, "Kemalizm", 95.

⁵⁹Bryan Wilson, "Religious Toleration, Pluralism, and Privatization", in Pal Repstad (ed.), *Religion and Modernity* (Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oxford, Boston: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), 19.

first one is, as has already been acknowledged, the legitimacy crisis, which is more prone to the democratic-political dimensions of the Kemalist discourse.⁶⁰ Second is more cultural and is more focused on the world-view of Kemalism, including especially the identity question. Doubtless, the two realms are not water-tight. On the contrary, the political and cultural are intertwined and this framework conceals the issues of citizenship, difference and, in general, the problem of public and private and it should be taken as an issue of interconnectedness.⁶¹ This notion, in the nationalist-modernist sense, brings the transformation of the difference into essence⁶² which is also referred as subjectivization.⁶³ The notion of subjectivization is more related with the concept of citizenship. It is possible to say that not only in Turkey, but also in the West, during the 1990s, as a consequence of the developments related with globalisation and the search for a new structure for democracy, the question of citizenship has been one of the most referred debates.

This debate immediately encircles the notion of subjectivization, which is understood as a concept which is indifferent to the difference in the society⁶⁴. The

⁶⁰Levent Köker's analysis is more related with this framework, discussing the legitimacy crisis together with the non-existing conditions of a liberal democratic structure.

⁶¹For the discussion of the concept see Anthony D. King, "The Times and Spaces of Modernity (Or Who Needs Postmodernism?)", in M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds.), *Global Modernities* (London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 118.

⁶²Jonathan Friedman, "Global System, Globalization and the Parameters of Modernity", in M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds.), *Global*, 80.

⁶³Jacques Ranciere, "Politics, Identification and Subjectivization", in John Rajchman (ed.), *The Identity in Question* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 63-72.

⁶⁴For a radical discussion of this relationship see William Connolly, *Identity/Difference* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)

subjectivization, in this sense, as Ranciere puts it, is related with a tacit notion of 'equality'.⁶⁵ From this Ranciere moves to a more concrete definition and discusses subjectivization as below: "It is the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation of a self to an other."⁶⁶ One last concern about subjectivization, again brought by Ranciere, is that "(political subjectivization)...is a crossing of identities, relying on a crossing of names"⁶⁷ and the nationalisation, on this ground, is considered as a system construction contrary to multiculturalism.⁶⁸ It is also a 'tradition' started by the colonial period which also has links with the modernization process.⁶⁹

In Turkey, within the boundaries of modernization project, nationalism constructed an identity not only trying to surpass all differences but also in such a way that the citizen must have a sheer loyalty to the state, through the notions of 'equality' which denied every condition of difference, by referring to corporatism, where the dissent to that is considered as a threat to the unity of the state.⁷⁰ On the other hand, Turkish understanding of citizenship, excludes the differentiation of the public-private realms, including the latter in the former. The third phenomenon is that, in the national citizenship understanding, the Kantian notion of Enlightenment and the concept of subject emanating from that situation is both degraded and exaggerated and

⁶⁵Jacques Ranciere, "Politics", 66.

⁶⁶ibid, 66.

⁶⁷ibid, 67.

⁶⁸Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition'* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 66-67.

⁶⁹Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, tr. Charles Lamb Markmann, (New York: Grou Wiedenfeld, 1967), 121-122.

⁷⁰Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 33, Mart-Nisan 1995, 91-101

in the meantime merged and replaced with the Platonic state considerations.⁷¹ The structure constructed, in the final analysis, is a republicanist model more attuned to the French model, in which the system is developed on the dominant existence of the public realm and with a 'from the above' understanding bringing the passivity of the subject.⁷² Nevertheless, Kadioğlu argues that Turkish citizenship is a delicate blend of French and German models on the basis of having cultural and civilization dimensions⁷³, which in the long run ends up with the 'conflation of state and nation'.⁷⁴

This is what Alfonsi calls the dualism contained in the civic and the genealogical or ethnic models of nation.⁷⁵ In this regard, the question turns into another one, such as, whether the modernist attempt to construct a national identity has reached its limits. The answer to this question, as has been rightly observed by Alfonsi, confronts Smith and Habermas, whereas the former believes that the unification model is the only condition that would be vital for the old Continent whereas the latter stresses that "the national identity is not yet completely absorbed ar

⁷¹Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Sorunlu Zorunluluk: Kemalist Cumhuriyetçilik, Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi İlişkisi Üstüne", *Varlık*, 1069, İkım 1996, 2-8.

⁷²Bryan S. Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", in Bryan S. Turner (ed.), *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 55.

⁷³Kadioğlu, "Milletini", 98.

⁷⁴T. K. Oomen, "Conceptualizing the Linkage Between Citizenship and National Identity", in T. K. Oomen (ed.), *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism* (New Delhi, London: Sage Publications, 1997), 13.

⁷⁵Alfonso Alfonsi, "The Citizenship and National Identity: The Emerging Stirrings in Western Europe", in T. K. Oomen (ed.), *Citizenship*, 71.

overcome by citizenship and thus is still intrinsically present in the ethnic consciousness."⁷⁶ This contradiction is thought to be surpassed by the development of a new understanding of democracy, which is flexible enough to include the differences to appear on the public realm, together with underlining their idiosyncrisms, namely the radical democracy⁷⁷, a further project of liberal democracy.⁷⁸ In this context it could be said that starting by the question of citizenship, the notion of identity and the subjectivization of the self created the first step in the problematic condition of the Turkish modernity project and from this emerges the political Islam.

9.3. Political Islam in the 1990s

9.3.1. Political Islam: A Component of Kemalism?

Behind the development of political Islam in Turkey, which is taken as an indicator of the crisis of Kemalist project of modernity to which Turkish social democracy is bound, also found its problematic relation with Kemalism as a hegemonic discourse. As Kemalism relies both on the Western epistemology and Islam as its constitutive outside, here, it might be argued that, with a reference to the relevant literature, the discourse of political Islam in Turkey is a consequence of Kemalism and, in this case Kemalism has been taken as the constitutive outside.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ibid, 70.

⁷⁷İ. Fuat Keyman, *Radikal Demokrasi Kuramları ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Bağlam yayınevi, 1998).

⁷⁸Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic politics and the Question of Identity", in John Rajchman (ed.), *Identity*, 33-46.

⁷⁹Boby S Said, not only accepts this view as special to Turkey but develops this notion and enlarges it to all countries who tried to develop a modernity project after the Second World War. Boby S Said, *Ifundamental*, 73-85.

This point is also underlined by Keyman and others.⁸⁰ The interesting point here is that, the discourse and the epistemology of political Islam not only has intricate relations with Kemalism but has two specific conditions as well.

The first is, even though politicization of Islam observed in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s acts as a new model for modernization, it is considered as a process which has its roots in the process of postmodernity⁸¹ and globalization.⁸² Second, as long as Turkey is considered, the political Islam has two major shortcomings; i) as Keyman observes, although it takes off from Kemalism and uses its constraints, yet, for many reasons, it is arguable to say that, it has developed an alternative to it⁸³, ii) although it seems to be a radical movement in Turkish political realm still it is debated that the political instrument of this epistemology, the former Welfare Party, is not detachable from the establishment.⁸⁴

This argument places the former Welfare Party ideology within the context of modernity. In fact, the relationship between the resurgence of religion in the late 1970s has been analysed on the grounds of globalization and postmodernity, as has been already mentioned. But, on the other hand, there is a vast literature situating this development within the boundaries of modernity, where Ernest Gellner has been one

⁸⁰E. Fuat Keyman, "Kemalizm", 95. For many other articles drawing on the same understanding see *Birikim* 91, Kasım 1996.

⁸¹Akbar Ahmed, *Postmodernism and Islam* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

⁸²Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds.), *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

⁸³Keyman, 'Kemalizm', 95.

⁸⁴Ahmet Insel, "Refah Partisi ve kemalizm", *Birikim*, 91, Kasım 1996, 29-31.

of the leading theoreticians.⁸⁵ Gellner, more than focusing on the notion of religion, prefers dwelling on the notion of fundamentalism.⁸⁶ Turner, on the other hand in a dual effort, to confront Gellner and to explain what he understands from the concept, gives a more interesting definition, reviewing fundamentalism in relation to modernity and postmodernity:

In political terms fundamentalism attempts to create a set of boundaries which will contain political pluralism and the abstract generalization of the citizen on a global scale, but in terms of some notion of community or household. In the cultural arena, fundamentalism is an attempt to impose certain boundaries on modernization, and more particularly on postmodernism and postmodernity. It attempts to reverse the historical process towards a hyper-secular consumerism and pluralism by providing paradoxically a traditional defence of modernity.⁸⁷

Turner, with this approach sees Islamization as "a political movement to combat Westernization using the methods of Western culture, namely a form of Protestantism within Islam itself" and "within this perspective Islamic fundamentalism is a defence of modernization against postmodernism."⁸⁸ Although this approach places Turner in a diametrically opposite position with Aqbar who argues that Islam has links with postmodernity, yet it takes Islam as a reforming power in the society and it is related with the two segments of Islam, as Gellner suggests, the High Islam and the Low or Folk Islam.⁸⁹ Turner, insists that,

⁸⁵For a discussion of this context with references to postmodernity see Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992). A critique of his views is found in Turner, 15-17.

⁸⁶*ibid*, 2-22.

⁸⁷Bryan S. Turner, *Orientalism*, 84.

⁸⁸*ibid*, 93.

⁸⁹Gellner, *Postmodernism*, 19-22.

*the central theme of modernization was, however, legitimized in terms of a return to classical Islam, that is the Islam of ascetic, literary monotheism. Once Islam was liberated from its folk traditions and from foreign accretions, Islam could emerge as a dynamic and progressive component of the reform of society.*⁹⁰

This is a critical point; because, the conceptualization of Islam as a modernising process has two dimensions. The first is what has been suggested by Turner as the power of Islam to propose an alternative to the existing modes of modernity and its strength in organizing the daily life,⁹¹ second, it is again a matter of discourse. Aziz Al-Azmeh, in his book, clearly and in detail supplies the historical turning points of reinterpreting the Islamic texts through the lenses of modernist epistemology.⁹² Al-Azmeh shows how the original script, namely Koran, is read with an effort of finding the institutions of modernity and even nationalism in it, in short with a conscious or even unconscious reference to Enlightenment epistemology.⁹³

Al-Azmeh, in the end, to a certain extent tacitly, argues that the positivistic, naturalist, realist dimensions found in the Islamic discourse, is again a construction realised under the influence of the West and is a matter of semantics and contextuality.⁹⁴ This paradigm is true as long as the Islamic intellectuals in Turkey and

⁹⁰Turner, *Orientalism*, 87; italics added.

⁹¹*ibid*, 89.

⁹²Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Muslim Modernism and the Canonical Text", in *Islams*, 101-127.

⁹³Aziz, Al-Azmeh, "Islamic Studies and the European Imagination", in *Islams*, 184.

⁹⁴*ibid*, 175.

their struggle for the construction of a 'modernist' reading and understanding of Islam is considered, even though they sometimes reflect a problematic relationship.⁹⁵ This condition is also analysed by Toprak from various angles.⁹⁶

The relationship between the modern epistemology and its connections with religion has been a concern for Mardin who tackles with this question in various works and discusses that the secularization process of Kemalism has a past and that segment is found in the late Ottoman Empire. The bureaucratic and educational reforms in the Ottoman period, especially with the positivist teaching practice flourished in the Medical School and School of Engineering, both belonging to the army, has introduced the notion of science to those who had no problem with internalizing and practicing Islam.⁹⁷ The specific condition that Mardin draws attention is that, he defines the Kemalist laicist process as the first trial in the construction process of individuality⁹⁸ but he concludes that in the meantime, this attempt is also limited by the reconstruction of a community spirit, the notion of *Mahalle*.⁹⁹ This concept is important for Mardin, for he stresses that Islam in Turkey is divided into two categories, the categories of High and Folk Islam.¹⁰⁰ Starting with this separation

⁹⁵Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey", in Richard Tapper (ed.), *Islam*, 189-222.

⁹⁶Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals of the 1980s in Turkey", *Current Turkish Thought*, 62, 1987, 1-19.

⁹⁷Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey", in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London: Hurst and Company, second impression, 1997), 191-220.

⁹⁸*ibid*, 212-217.

⁹⁹*ibid*, 214-215.

¹⁰⁰Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 4. baskı, 1990), 107-116.

Mardin argues that, Kemalism, in its ideological construction, did not carry the new ideological schemas deep into the villages in opposition to religious beliefs and the reason and the constraint for this is the notion of community found hidden in the Republican period.¹⁰¹

The consciousness of unity, according to Mardin, a concept that Kemalism spend a great effort to keep alive, contributed to the continuation and development of religion at the 'folk' level with its symbols and discourse in an intertwined way with the new form of living.¹⁰² In this context, Islam, not only acted as a modernizing agent but also an agent for opposing the establishment as well as mediating in the process of reality construction.¹⁰³ It is at this very point that Mardin accentuates i) the crisis of Kemalism emphasising its inadequacies and ii) the importance of folk Islam as a modernizing agent, especially reminding *Nurcu* movement in Turkey. The question why Islam lived a resurgence and presented itself as an alternative to the existing modes of modernity might be extrapolated from here onwards.

9.3.2. Islam as an Agent of Modernity and the Establishment

On elaborating why Islam came out as a motivating political force in Turkey beginning by the 1970s¹⁰⁴, the basic reasons might be divided into two groups; those

¹⁰¹ibid, 111.

¹⁰²For the discussion of how Islamic discourse with its symbols continue living in the modernizing discourse see Şerif Mardin, "A Note on the Transformation of Religious Symbols in Turkey", *Turcica*, V.16, 1984, 115-127.

¹⁰³Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", in James P. Piscaton (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 138-156.

which are related with Kemalism as a modernizing process and the internal problem of modernity. Giddens, focusing on the latter issue, clearly indicates that contrary to the prediction of Durkheim and Weber, religion continued to play a leading role in the modernized societies and in this context "not only religion failed to disappear we see all around us the creation of new forms of religious sensibility and spiritual endeavour."¹⁰⁵ Continuing, Giddens tries to bring a generalised explanation for this condition,

The reasons for this concern quite fundamental features of late modernity. What was due to become social and physical universe subject to increasingly certain knowledge and control instead creates a system in which areas of relative security interlace with radical doubt and with disquieting scenarios of risk. Religion in some part generates the conviction which adherence to tenets of modernity must necessarily suspend: in this regard it is easy to see why religious fundamentalism has a special appeal. But this is not all. New form of religion and spirituality represent in a more basic sense a return to repressed, since they directly address issues of the moral meaning of existence which modern institutions so thoroughly tend to dissolve.¹⁰⁶

This framework tends to suit the case in Turkey as long as above mentioned identity and culture concerns are taken into elaboration. But, on the other hand, as surveys show, the only radical and major difference between the centre-left-right and radical right (fundamentalist) parties appear on the point of culture, concretely the Westernisation.¹⁰⁷ Other than that, there is a coherence and reconcilliation between the groups as long as the 'problems of Turkey' are questioned. Beyond this, the

¹⁰⁴For the early emergence of political İslam see Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de modernleşme, Din ve parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı* (İstanbul, Alan Yayıncılık, 1985).

¹⁰⁵Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 207.

¹⁰⁶*ibid*, 207.

¹⁰⁷ TÜSES, 1995 , 1996.

fundamentalist parties appear on the political scene as the parties to establish a 'just order' to regulate the income distribution, through a community spirit, created by Islam and 'making Turkey again strong.'¹⁰⁸

With this aim the former WP of the 1995 elections have become the only party emphasising the economic matters on a basis of developmentalism.¹⁰⁹ Also, the former party leader Necmettin Erbakan has been known with his insistence on the development and the establishment of heavy industry.¹¹⁰ In this context, RP has developed a certain model for the regulation of the economy which triggered much of a debate.¹¹¹ This framework cannot be said to exclude a modernist understanding on the economic level and might be taken as one of the most important factors affecting the development of the fundamentalism in Turkey, for in the post-1980 period when the regulation policies are abandoned and a sheer market economy is established, giving birth to a devastating income distribution, the WP has been the only political agent, taking an oppositionary position to this condition.¹¹²

Other than this, the real condition in Turkey that determines the development of fundamentalism might be extrapolated on various levels. Keyman, on this basis

¹⁰⁸İhsan D. Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1998), 26-31.

¹⁰⁹Refah Partisi, *24 Aralık 1995 Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi*, (Ankara:, n.p., 1995).

¹¹⁰Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan (ed.), *Erbakan ve Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri* (Ankara: Rehber Yayıncılık, 1996).

¹¹¹Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of Welfare Party in Perspective", *Third World Quarterly*, V.18, no. 4, 1997, 743-766.

¹¹²ibid, 751.

argues that it is the continuing hegemony of Kemalist nationalism that induces the fundamentalist development and there are certain reasons for this:

First, neither liberal nor New Left discourses constituted an alternative to the essentialist posture of Kemalist nationalism towards secular national identity...Second, both liberal and New Left discourses were intrinsically bound with modernity, and in this respect they were by no means a challenge to the Kemalist will to civilization. Both accepted the validity of the Kemalist notion of the state as the privileged agent of rationality...The liberal critique of Kemalism was only partial...Thirdly, although etatism was subjected to serious criticism, import-substituting industrialization remained the motor of industrialization after the transition to multi-party system.¹¹³

Of course, a fourth condition might be suggested here, which is the indoctrination of the masses with the Kemalist discourse, especially through the well organized national education system.¹¹⁴ This is to say that, the alternative to Kemalist discourse has not come out of the probable alternatives and in this regard, it is possible to propose that only a new discourse, deviating from the existing one, using the parameters of the establishment would be a quasi-alternative and it is only the Islamic discourse attacking the inadequacies of Kemalism and the ambiguities of modernity. This has given the Islamic discourse the chance of being an alternative to the existing establishment for all other political parties and ideologies have been a derivation of Kemalism.¹¹⁵ Şerif Mardin, together with his already mentioned suggestion that

¹¹³E. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation", 108-110.

¹¹⁴As an example, how this system runs for the reinforcement of the cult of establishment, see Foti Benlisoy, "'Milli Tarih, 'Milli Çizgi Roman: 'Savulun Bre Palikaryalar!'", *Virgöl*, no. 12, Ekim 1998, 2-5.

¹¹⁵To see how even the radical left movements have been influenced and attached to Kemalism see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "1960 Türk Solunda Kemalist Söylem Sorunsalı", Unpublished Paper Submitted to the International Conference Organised by TÜBA.

Kemalism has failed in constructing a deep culture, argues that it has depended on three peers in the construction of a new ideology.

These are, i) the *heerschaft* direction; ii) the values of a society of status; iii) the separation of the intellectual culture and the popular culture. Mardin, arguing that these factors have also been eminent in the Ottoman structure, includes to this frame the continuation with the culture of *umma* on the level of elites.¹¹⁶ Beyond this, Mardin argues that Kemalism did not permit the development of ideologies challenging the religion¹¹⁷ and in this context, the 'small' culture, in the long run has started to scavage the 'big' culture and placed itself into the 'big' one which means the high culture continuing with the symbols and discourse of the low culture.¹¹⁸

This framework proposes that the Islamic discourse in Turkey is a product of Kemalist discourse, relying on the parameters of the latter if the 'derivative discourse' concept is remembered. Here, the nationalist notion of unification, the total rejection of the past, the dependence on the binary dichotomies are all inherited from Kemalism. Further, the fundamentalist search for a new status for Turkey also draws on the 'anti-imperialist' discourse, similar to the one existing in the Kemalist discourse.¹¹⁹ In this regard it is possible to argue that fundamentalism, or better, the politicization of Islam in Turkey is determined by Kemalism and Toprak reflects on this point as,

¹¹⁶Şerif mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, 107.

¹¹⁷ibid, 111.

¹¹⁸ibid, 115.

¹¹⁹Menderes Çınar, "Türkiye'yi Refahlaştırmak: Postmodern Zamanların Kemalist Projesi", *Birikim*, 91, Kasım 1996, 32-38.

Kemalism not only made a differentiation between state and society but also reversed the order of importance between the sacred and the political realms. Secularization as state policy, therefore, has built-in tendency to envisage oppositional politicization of Islam.¹²⁰

In this context the main conditions that enhance the resurgence of political Islam in Turkey might be epitomized as the Kemalist epistemology, mainly its notionalist and secularist components. While the secularist understanding develops the positivist dimension in the Islamic discourse, the nationalist approach fortifies the 'unity' factor, that plays one of the key roles in the reformulation of the social order from the Islamic view point. Kemalism, acting as the constitutive outside of Islamic discourse, in the final instance, influences Islam not as an ideological element but rather situating it on a cultural basis.¹²¹

In this regard, Islam, like Kemalism, has tended to develop a 'grand narrative' encompassing various contradictory factors but, on the other hand, formulating a totalistic world view. This condition enables Islam to act as a modernising as well as counter modernising political view. The modernisation process that started by Kemalism, in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s has ended up with a new phase. Islam, with this assumption might be taken as an element that contributes to the

¹²⁰Binnaz Toprak, "Politicization of Islam in a Secular State: The National Salvation Party in Turkey", in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 121.

¹²¹Not necessarily in this sense but for the relation between Islam, modernity and democracy with a reference to turkey see, Jean-François Bayart, "Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: a Tocquevillian Reading," in Ghassam Salame, *Democracy Without Democrats* (London and New York: 1994), 282-299.

modernization process, especially to its secular-individualist dimension. This is more related with the pluralist and identity issues of the republican ideology.

At this point walks into the stage the 'veil' issue that has caused much debate and trouble in Turkey, in the last ten years. The republican understanding strictly bans the use of veils and Islam, with this symbol is considered to be a challenge to the secular state. Nevertheless various analysis have shown that the similar demands might take a different stance for, it is the first time that on the public domain some expectations come out as an indicator of individuality and even secularization.¹²² The gist of the debate is that, the emancipation of women through Kemalism in the early Republican period, in the second step, brought the enslaving of them through the understanding of devoted citizenship. This is a notion of citizenship which does not argue the state and the given conditions. In this context the Islamic sacred is transformed into another one, namely the secular state defined as a sacred and transcendental entity.¹²³

In fact, this has been considered as one of the shortcomings and the contradictions of the republican processes started under the influence of Enlightenment philosophy.¹²⁴Islam, with its new discourse and especially its opposition to the establishment, even though does not bring a radical break with the existing modernist,

¹²²Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Woman's Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the Vein", *Middle East Journal*, 48/4, Fall 1994, 645-660.

¹²³Deniz Kandiyoti, "Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on Turkish Case", *Feminist Studies*, 13/2, Summer 1987, 317-339.

¹²⁴Joan B. Landes, "The Performance of Citizenship: Democracy, Gender and Difference in the French Revolution", in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 295-313.

centralist structure, still might contribute to the 'real' secularization of the system, calling for the identity and difference issues.¹²⁵ Islamic revival in Turkey, especially referring to very this condition, in the 1980s and 1990s, in some circles, has been taken as a step in the transition to a (more) liberal status. Keyman, for example, argues that "Islam appeared to be one of the (indeed significant) articulating elements of difference by which to construct an alternative subjectivity to the unifying vision of national identity."¹²⁶ Nevertheless, even though the subjectivity concept is accepted, the assumption that this criteria might be conducive to liberalism is severely criticised.¹²⁷

After situating Islamic revival within a cultural context rather than into an ideological one, arguing that it shares the same political discourse with Kemalism, claiming that it acts as a mediator between the modernity and the post-modern condition, having no problem in adopting the vocabulary of modernity the question then becomes why in the 1995 elections not the other parties but the WP came out the first. The answer to this question might be found in the previous explanations emphasising the continuing importance and influence of Islam among the 'folk.' In other words, the traditional contradiction between the center and periphery in Turkey, once more, beyond other reasons, such as the ambiguity of the identity, the existential problems of self due to the mass immigration from the rural to the urban environment, the search for a new and more egalitarian economic system, has played an important

¹²⁵Nilüfer Göle, *Modern Mahrem* (İstanbul: Mites Yayınları, 1992).

¹²⁶E. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation", 113.

¹²⁷Levent Köker, "Hangi Demokrasi, hangi Refah?", *Birikim* 91, Kasım 1996, 48-53.

role in the outcome.¹²⁸ It might be argued that, the continuous back and forth contradiction between the center and periphery in Turkey, since 1950 once more culminated in the victory of the periphery. This is an important point which needs a further elaboration on a more empirical level. Here one another point might be added. That is, it is possible to argue that, Kemalism, if taken as the constitutive outside of the political Islam, has also found a response among the 'folk.' This is mainly due to its attachment to technological and economic modernization. On this ground it is possible to say that, likewise Islam has continued among the folk with a specific content and deliberation, Kemalism has also turned out to develop its folk version as a cultural component. Now, it is both a high culture version as well as a folk version and in this context it is convoluted with Islam as long as the modernist common denominator is concerned. Now, the centre-periphery condition might further be argued.

The Kardam-Tüzün survey has shown that it is the 'right' block backing up WP in the 1995 elections, as well as in the post-election period, and it is more a relative gain that the WP reached in the elections rather than an absolute one due to the opposition votes of those who do not go to voting.¹²⁹ Besides, the shift to the segment who are against the WP from that group of voters who were formerly indifferent to WP is more found in the urban sector.¹³⁰ In this sense those who belong to the RPP tradition is not affected by the RP uprise in the positive sense. But the DP

¹²⁸To see how religion in two levels continue functioning in the rural area see Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper, "Religion, Education and Continuity in a Provincial Town", in Richard Tapper, *Islam*, 56-83.

¹²⁹Ahmet Kardam, Sezgin Tüzün, "*Türkiye'de*", 61-75.

¹³⁰ibid, 69

tradition is directly affected by that and RP gains votes from the grassroots of the centre-right parties.¹³¹ The support supplied for this party in the rural and urban area is clearly seen in the survey covering the June 1995-April 1996 period. As those who are shifted to support the WP from the center right segment is 15.3 % in the rural area and 5.4% in the urban area, in the same time period the shift from the RPP tradition is, in the rural area - 0.3 % and in the urban area only 0.6 %.¹³² This is, according to Kardam and Tuzun due to the ambiguous position of the centre-right parties before the WP.¹³³

This very last point is important as long as the state's condition is concerned. In the post 1995 period, after the coalition government is formed between the WP and the TPP, during the February 28, 1997, meeting, the government is severely criticised by the National Security Council and this started a new process which ended by the resignation of the government. This period is backed by the RPP with the argument that the secularization is under attack. The following events are considered as a hidden military intervention. Kardam and Tüzün, depending on the data achieved, argues that this state intervention is a consequence of the ambiguity created by the DP tradition parties, namely TPP and MP.¹³⁴ The researchers also claim that the polarization between DP and WP is not ascertained. As long as there is no evident opposition from the state, the shift might continue to develop, but whenever there is a criticism the support will be loosened.¹³⁵

¹³¹ *ibid*, 71.

¹³² *ibid*, 71.

¹³³ *ibid*, 73.

¹³⁴ *ibid*, 73.

This framework shows that, in Turkey, in the late 1990s, the crisis of Kemalism has reached a peak. Nevertheless it should not be taken as a superficial and simple crisis. It is rather a complicated one and more intertwined with the hidden agenda of democracy and convoluted with the need for the liberalisation of the state, reflecting on the citizenship condition, at large. The notion of citizenship in Turkey is strictly bound with the nationalist and secularist tenets of Kemalism. A demand for a new social contract foreseeing the restructuring of the public domain which has a more liberal approach to differences and being less ambitious in the suppressing of the selves has helped the rise of political Islam. However, the upsurge of the fundamentalist movement in Turkey is not yet an alternative to the Kemalist hegemonic discourse; rather it is effected by it.

Also, it could be noted that, it is not the political Islam that caused the crisis of Kemalism but the political Islam emerges from the crisis of Kemalism. In this sense, political Islam may not be a radical alternative to Kemalism but it could only implement itself in the political consciousness as long as it uses the components of the Kemalist discourse.¹³⁶ This prediction is to suggest that in Turkey still the political realm is captured by the process of modernity and not only the shortcomings of the Turkish social democracy but also the constraints of the Turkish political agenda is effected from this stance. In this sense, any political ideology or discourse which is prone to the utilization of this crisis and trying to enlarge the limits of the hegemonic discourse is apt to gain a potential as well as acceleration.

¹³⁵ibid, 73.

¹³⁶This point is discussed tacitly in a recent book Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey* (Yale University Press, 1998), 194-211.

This is a condition which has been proved in the post 1995 elections period due to the political events which is explained below. The real weakness and defect of Turkish social democracy is its insistence on a more traditional, generic Kemalist, modernist hegemonic discourse and its inadequacy in comprehending the essence of the condition. This is in a way inevitable because the origins of Turkish social democracy, as suggested and argued before, is rooted to say it with Rawls, not in the political but in the metaphysical.

9.4. Islam in Power and its Aftermath

As WP was the first party in the ranking of votes received in the 1995 elections, the mission of constructing the government was presented to the chairperson of the party, Necmettin Erbakan, January 9, 1996.¹³⁷ Because the first party in the ranking did not gain the majority in the parliament Erbakan could only form a coalition government with one of the centre-right parties, either MP or TPP. In the pre-election period the TPP and Tansu Çiller, the chairperson, had constructed the whole campaign on two issues; first, secularism defined as the most vital issue for Turkey and second, integration of Turkey with Europe. Çiller framed the first issue, secularism, with the concept of women and she continuously underlined what they have achieved from secularism. The second issue, Europe and Turkey's relations with it, was a confused argument, the Westernisation-modernization concepts forming the weak point of the debate, when TPP grassroots is considered.

The ambiguity of the concept was due to the condition that, TPP was not only stressing the Europeanization of Turkey but also trying to merge it with conservatism

¹³⁷ "Görev Erbakan'da", *Cumhuriyet*, 10 Ocak 1996.

('muhafazakarlık') by mentioning that to be European does not necessitate to break up with tradition.¹³⁸ In this context the 'tradition' encircles the 'unity and togetherness of the society', the nationalism, the paternalist state understanding formulated as 'father state' ('devlet baba').¹³⁹ This framework has been interwoven with the personality of Çiller, who has declared herself as the 'daughter of the Republic' ('cumhuriyet kızı')¹⁴⁰, recalling the secularity. Besides, when Erbakan was given the task Çiller immediately declared that it was impossible to have a coalition between the two parties for they are completely different.¹⁴¹ With this sheer attack against the WP, Erbakan could envisage no chance but trying to search the possibilities of forming a coalition with MP. Soon after seeing that it is impossible to find any possibility of government formation with any one of the parties, Erbakan returned the task to the President, January 19, 1996.¹⁴²

The interpretation concerning this first attempt of carrying the political Islam into power in Turkey is proved to be correct when the second step taken in the process is analysed. The comments regarding the failure of the trial have stressed that the monopolistic capital concentrated in the metropolitan area would not give the

¹³⁸It is interesting that this approach has also been observed in Murat Karayalçın's rhetoric for he has continuously stressed, especially in the period when Turkey was proceeding with the Customs Union process by saying that "I will enter the European Union with my mustaches."

¹³⁹For an analysis of the relationship between the centre-right and TPP see Yetivart Danzikyan, "Merkez Sağ-Devlet ve Tansu Çiller", *Birikim*, Ocak-Şubat 1997, 102-108.

¹⁴⁰Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "24 Aralık 1995 Alacakaranlık Kuşağı Seçimleri", *Birikim*, Ocak 1996, no.81, 27.

¹⁴¹"Çiller: Uzlaşmamız İmkansız", *Milliyet*, 11 Ocak 1996.

¹⁴²"Erbakan Görevi İade Etti", *Milliyet*, 20 Ocak, 1996.

provincial capital, which has usually been controlled by the political Islam, the chance of holding the political power.¹⁴³ It is believed that the provincial capital is traditionally divided between the TPP and WP and the urban capital would intervene to fetter i) the shift of political power to WP and ii) unite the center-right. The coalition government between the TPP and MP is taken as an outcome of this endeavour.¹⁴⁴ The happily welcomed coalition protocol, for it was assumed as the will of unification of the centre-right,¹⁴⁵ has foreseen the prime ministry first to be given to MP for a period of six months and than to be transferred to TPP. Nevertheless, before the completion of the process coalition was dissolved, June 6, 1996¹⁴⁶ and in the third

¹⁴³The deputy chairperson of WP Abdullah Gül has emphasised this point before Erbakan's returning the task, saying that the business circles are trying to coalesce TPP and MP. *Milliyet*, 15 Ocak, 1996.

¹⁴⁴In the following period after Erbakan's returning the task, the mission is directed to Çiller, January 19, 1996. When she, without any achievement returned it back to the President, Yılmaz was called for the same duty, February 3, 1996. Might be as a matter of political tactic, the long discussions between MP and WP was about to bring out a coalition government but in the final instance it could not be realized. In this process, more to the impression that the government would be constructed between MP and WP, TPP started to proclaim that they could come together with MP even though there was a sheer contradiction and clash between the chairpeople of the two parties. After the discussions, the government is realized and approved by the President, March 6, 1996. The government received the vote of confidence in the parliamentary by March 12, 1996 as DLP stayed abstaining.

¹⁴⁵As an example for the insistence for the major unifications on the right and left wing politics see Hasan Cemal, "Hayırlı Olsun Ama...", *Sabah*, 31 Temmuz 1998, 25.

¹⁴⁶The dissolving of the government was due to a very harsh debate about Çiller's spending from the hidden treasury when she was the prime minister. Çiller argued that the documents related with this debate has been publicized by Yılmaz. Besides, a long time matter of question Çiller's wealth was once more brought to the investigation of the parliamentary and in the related commission MP members would vote against Çiller for her to be investigated. Nevertheless the dissolving was due to another and legal condition for the Constitutional Court annuled the vote of confidence.

round of a government formation process, to the surprise of many, a conciliation was reached between the WP and the TPP, as Erbakan was once more the responsible chairperson for the construction of the government.¹⁴⁷ The government approved by the President June 28, 1996 and received the vote of confidence July, 8, 1996.

This configuration has received severe reactions and criticism. The suspicion directed to the government is reflected through the anxiety and the nervousness of the hidden coalition between the intelligentsia, media and army all through the government period. Soon after the takeover of the government, the Chief of Staff has declared that the power groups in Turkey should not be silent as it happened in Iran before the fundamentalist period started.¹⁴⁸ Beginning with this declaration all through the period, which finally brought the end of the government in June 18, 1997 by the resignation of Erbakan, the tension between the coalition of army and the bureaucracy and the government never ceased. On the contrary, the stress escalated by various declarations¹⁴⁹ and finally with the procision of the army tanks in the streets of Sincan, a town of Ankara, after a stage play organized by the municipality where the audience has called for the holy war ('*cihat*') and a female journalist has been prosecuted by a WP sympathiser, February 1, 1997.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷"Görev Erbakan'da", *Milliyet*, 7 Haziran 1996.

¹⁴⁸Fatih Çekirge, "Ordu, İran Ordusu Olmayacak", *Sabah*, 31 Ağustos 1996.

¹⁴⁹There are some specific events that provoked this escalation. The major ones might be counted as, i) the Libya visit of Erbakan, where President Quaddafi explicitly criticised Turkey before the media as Erbakan stayed silent (*Hürriyet*, October 6, 1996); ii) the speech delivered by Mayor of Sivas in which he declared that the resentment of the Muslims should never be suspended (*Hürriyet*, November 10, 1996).

¹⁵⁰For the complete chronology of the events see Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, *Ayın Tarihi: Ocak, Şubat, Mart 1997* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık Basımevi, 1996).

The last phase of the developments is the National Security Council meeting of February 28, 1997. In the meeting the army has apparently criticised the WP, as well as the government, and accentuated the 'danger of sharia'¹⁵¹ In the following days the media has started backing the army manifestly. The army, proclaiming the 'danger of sharia' as number one priority problem, started to organise a series of meetings with various interest groups such as media, the judges, the university rectors, to create a common ideological support basis. Meantime, the government escalated the tension with insisting on the veil issue, the mosques to be constructed in Ankara and Istanbul, provoking the fear of fundamentalism.¹⁵² Not being able to overwhelm the opposition in the society coalition government resigned, June 18, 1997, and the chairperson of MP has been nominated as the prime minister for a new coalition government., which was formed by June 30, 1997 and received the confidence vote by July 10, 1997. The last matter of debate has been the stretching of the primary education to eight years from five years. The government has reacted to the demand which has been aised in the declaration of NSC meeting of February 28, 1997, thinking that this would cause the deterioration of the *Imam-Hatip Liseleri*, the secondary education schools designed for the education of future religious practitioners.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹For a discussion of the role of National Security Council in the Turkish politics starting by February 18, 1997 meeting and the content of the declaration submitted to the government see Bülent Tanör, "MGK'nın İlgi Alanları", *Milliyet*, 13 Temmuz 1998, 20.

¹⁵²There is a vast 'litarature' concentrated on this issue reflecting the 'war of positions' between the government and army, presidency and the opposition. See "Demirel: Türban konusu gündemden çıkarılmalıdır", *Sabah*, 6 Şubat 1998, 1; "Yılmaz: RP tabanı militanlaşma ve silahlanma dönemine girmiştir.", *Hürriyet*, 8 Şubat, 1998; "Demirel'in değerlendirmeleri", *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 25 Şubat 1998,1.

¹⁵³"Erbakan: 8 Yıllık Eğitim Mümkün Değildir", *Sabah*, 1 Nisan, 1997, 1.

The February 28, 1997 meeting and its aftermath has been interpreted by many as a 'post-modern coup'.¹⁵⁴ The feeling that the position of the army staying in the middle of the political life has not reversed after the government change. In this context the bureaucracy should also be analysed. The declarations made by the army in this period is of importance for it continues concerning the new government period. In this sense, not only as a political position taken related with the WP-TPP coalition but also a will continued to be declared in the MP-TPP coalition by the army is a matter of curiosity.¹⁵⁵ Yet, after Karadayı's above mentioned August 30, 1996 explanation the process has continued and another one is heard in the late september of the same year¹⁵⁶. On another basis the Ministry of National Defence, as a member of the cabinet has been obliged to explain that the ministry of Justice has been close to the demands of the General Staff .¹⁵⁷

Still, after the February 28 declarations Hüsamettin Cindoruk, a prestigious politician and a close friend of Süleyman Demirel, the president has not refrained from saying that the declaration is an ultimatum.¹⁵⁸ and before the meeting of NSC Ecevit clearly indicated that an intervention would be wrong.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand according

¹⁵⁴Ömer Laçiner, "Geçen Ayın Birikimi: Türkiye", *Birikim*, Ocak/Şubat 1998, no. 105,106, 3.

¹⁵⁵Tansu Çiller has expressed in a subtle way that army has not been affective in the construction of the government; see, *Ayın Tarihi: Ocak, Şubat, Mart* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996), 165.

¹⁵⁶"Karadayı: İşler Kötüye Gidiyor", *Sabah*, 1 Ekim, 1996, 1.

¹⁵⁷"Tayan'ın değerlendirmeleri", *Zaman*, 2 Şubat 1997.

¹⁵⁸"Cindoruk: Bildiri Muhtıradır", *Milliyet*, 1 Mart 1998, 1.

to Abdullah Gül after the declaration there occurred the impression of a military regime.¹⁶⁰ General Staff immediately reacted to these notices and when a general, in a way violating the rules that army members can not make political comments, clearly criticised the government, he has stayed immune to any civil investigation and there has been no reaction from the army. In one another occasion the army has directly and instantly reacted against Çiller's explanations concerning the above mentioned condition and the eight years secondary education.¹⁶¹

It is possible but not sufficient to say that in the post-1980 era, the relations between the civil governments and army has reached the most interesting and complex condition soon after the WP-TPP coalition government. The reason behind this is that the Yılmaz government has not been immune to this tension emanating from the criticism directed to it from the army. Even though it is alleged that this cabinet is tacitly supported by the army and the *raison d'etre* of it has been the realization of the conditions set by the NSC declaration¹⁶², still the army did not refrain from criticising the government by announcing that the 'battle against the fundamentalism' is not satisfactory.

Under this condition, the Prime Minister has felt the need to stress that in the struggle against the fundamentalism the right and priority belongs to the government,

¹⁵⁹"İcavit: 'Darbe Yanlış olur', *Cumhuriyet*, 27 Şubat 1998.

¹⁶⁰"Gül: Askeri Rejim görüntüsü doğmuştur", *Milliyet*, 6 Mart 1998.

¹⁶¹"Genel Kurmay: Çiller'in açıklamaları yanlış", *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Mayıs 1997,1.

¹⁶²The most striking one among them is the implementation of the eight years secondary education. Although the substructural conditions were not adequate still with an irreversible will the necessary laws have been issued and the condition is satisfied.

indirectly reminding the borders between the civils and the soldiers.¹⁶³ The more striking point in this debate is the 'West Work Group' ('*Bati Çalışma Grubu*'). The Group starting its misson during the WP-TPP government, mainly controlled the social and political life, as well as setting the basic criteria for the indoctrination of the society and other interest gorups by the secular norms.¹⁶⁴ Resisting the demands that it should be demolished it continued operating in the following political period . Not only these demands have been refused it is later understood that the Group has even intervened the privacies of the various people by following their phone calls.

Under these conditions, the post 1995 period, especially after the 1996 WP-TPP government has been an era which is open to the debate of democracy or, in other words, an era in search of a democratic opening. The debate, whether a political ideology which has gained power and backed by a certain group in the democratic structure should stay in the system has been one of the main arguments in the debate in the related time period. This is more related with the early¹⁶⁵ debates concerning the WP and its perception as a political ogranization and ideology. At the beginning it was believed that thip political organisation and ideology would help the development of democracy in Turkey¹⁶⁶. It also provoked the arguments concerning both the

¹⁶³"Yılmaz'dan askere ikaz", *Radikal*, 5 Temmuz 1998, 6.

¹⁶⁴Güven İrkaya, then the Chief of Navy, in June 9, 1997 has explained that, the misson of the Group is to make clear the appearance of the fundamentalist menace in Turkey and to make actual the security and order plans against it. *Ayın Tarihi: Haziran-Temmuz-Ağustos 1997* , 136.

¹⁶⁵Mesut Yılmaz once indicated that the democratic system might be changed in a radical way by the political organizations came into power through the system and WP is an example for that. "Yılmaz: Demokratik yoldan gelen partiler rejim için tehlike oluşturabilirler", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 Şubat 1997, 1.

structural issues of democracy, related with the above argument, and the other analysis about the crisis of political life in Turkey. The reaction against the WP-TPP government and the incapability of a long waited coalition government, which united the centre right and left, staying immune to the criticisms emanated from the army shows that in Turkey the crisis is more deep. The ambiguity whether the side supporting the WP or the other side which is against it by moving together with the army is more 'democratic' has been a vital issue in the 1996-1998 period. Every step put forward in this process has helped the escalation of the debate.¹⁶⁷

Legal Turkish left in this period has preferred to continue with the mainstream discourse. The democratic left DLP has been a member of the government and the social democratic RPP, although stayed outside the government, has followed the dominant rhetoric attached to secularism, i.e. the symbol of the statist approach. Its distance to the new demands and expectations and its refrainment from the implementation of the new concepts in the political agenda has deepened the political crisis in Turkey, pushing the social democracy into a corner as well. Although the central cadres and administration has called for a renewal the last congress of the RPP, in September 1998, has been a focus of criticism for its symbolism which has recalled the authoritarian discourse. The dramatic clogging of Turkish social democracy might be understood better as the crisis of Turkish socio-political life is analysed further for if under such a fecund condition this very political practice stays inactive than it might be because it is a part of it, which might be true because the crisis could be taken as the

¹⁶⁶For the background and analysis of this debate see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Demokrasi İçin* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1991), 68-84.

¹⁶⁷The final point is the dissolving of the WP by the Constitutional Court and condemning Tayyip Erdoğan, Mayor of Istanbul to imprisonment.

crisis of the establishment in Turkey. This part will briefly be discussed in the Conclusion chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the thesis argued that the crisis faced by social democracy in the late 1990s, whose analytical and empirical dimensions were shown in the previous chapter, is an outcome of the political, social and cultural developments reached a peak in Turkey in the mentioned time period but whose roots are found in the post-1980 period. Among others, the 1990s is demarcated by a very concrete debate, politically, focusing on the rise of the political Islam and the Islamic revivalism in Turkey. In fact, this is not a situation pertaining to the late 1990s. Its origins are found in the 1970s. The early movements of political Islam has been subject of the military coups of 1971 and 1980. Nevertheless, as has been discussed in the chapter, the emergence of new political, social and economic conditions, which might be epitomised as the outcome of post-modernism first, then globalization, has been effective on the upsurge of this movement. In this context, political Islam should not be conceived as a subject-matter having an 'end in itself' but it is rather a more complicated one, convoluted with the general framework of concepts such as, identity, pluralism, radical democracy, multiculturalism, etc. In this sense, political Islam should be thought together with the crisis of modernity. At least, this crisis should not be isolated from the criticism of modernity, which has started in the 1980s as a part and parcel of postmodernity.

The chapter also argues that, this formation is observed in the West European and North American political and social life but whose precipitation is drastically lived in the former Eastern Block and Soviets has been incorporated by the Turkish politics. WP by subjecting a radical criticism to social, political and cultural establishment in

Turkey has brought the first radical reevaluation of the constitutive ideology reigning in Turkey, which is Kemalism. Being backed by the new social formation came fore in Turkey beginning by the 1980s, WP has played a dual role in the political theory in Turkey after gaining power in the 1995 national elections. On the one hand, the criticism of the establishment on the social and political level has helped the reassessment of the modernity in Turkey. Nevertheless, on the other hand, WP and its political discourse has appeared to be a radically modernist one. In this context, the discourse of the political Islam has also contributed to understand the complex and problematic structure of Kemalism.

In the chapter it has been attempted to show that both Kemalism and political Islam, as a discourse and epistemology, has mutually affected each other. Although, in the early Republican period Kemalism has established itself with a sheer criticism of the Islamic epistemology, yet, various analysis have shown that, hidden in the construction of the discourse is the Islamic world view and its political practice. In the same line, the discourse of the political Islam, observed in the 1990s, has also been deeply impressed by the Kemalist approach. This binary formation is explained in the chapter by referring to the concept of 'constitutive outside.' Nevertheless, the chapter argues that, contrary to a many interpretations and comments, the constitutive ideology continues dominating the political realm in Turkey. This is due to the complicated structure of Kemalism and in this sense it could be said that it has now developed a 'problematic-productive' position. This is a condition especially emanating from its attributions to modernity.

On this basis, as another argument of the thesis, it has been assumed that the crisis of Turkish social democracy in the 1990s has a two-tier structure. First of all,

Turkish social democracy, as has empirically been shown in the previous chapter, is not any more represented uniquely by the RPP. On the contrary DLP has gained enough power to come fore and be taken as the representative of this political ideology. However, there is a problematical situation there for, DLP has never declared itself as a social democratic party. This condition is a consequence of the new social formations in Turkey and DLP's attachment to them with an eclectic ideology which is not social democracy. Second, the party accentuating its social democratic ideology, RPP, has weakened due to the specific condition that it did not receive, perceive and develop the new structure. It has continued with the traditional ideological understanding, defending the 'genuine' Kemalist values and a notion of modernity. This approach has reached its peak when after the 1995 elections a coalition government is formed between WP and TPP and when a new political period is started in Turkey by the NSC meeting of February 28, 1997, which has been analysed in the chapter. In this sense, it has closed itself to the new interpretations of those concepts such as identity, pluralism, multiculturalism, new forms and trends of democracy, in general. This framework, as has been argued in the chapter, has not only subjected RPP to a stagnation but also has annulled the chance of renovating itself and its ideology. This condition will be analysed in the Conclusion chapter.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

PROSPECTS FOR TURKISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The crisis that Turkish social democracy has been facing since the 1980s, according to the argument put forward in this thesis, is a complicated and multi-dimensional one. It has historical, structural and ideological roots and, above all, it is strictly interrelated with the conjuncture. The thesis has argued that, in Turkey, there has never been a 'real' social democracy attached to the genuine social democratic ideals and ideology, whose roots are found in the Western Europe socialist, social democratic and Marxist tradition. Instead, social democracy in Turkey, is a notion, pronounced first both epistemologically and politically, in the early 1980s, after the formation of Social Democratic Party, to replace the former Republican Peoples' Party which was dissolved by the military Junta, in the post-1980 military coup period, which has had a very short life, and then within the Social Democratic Populist Party, by certain, specific intra-party factions. Nevertheless, after the re-establishment of RPP and the merger of this party with SDPP, all attempts and intra-party factions in the struggle of convincing the party grassroots to realise a social democratic

transformation have been isolated. RPP has once more attuned itself to its traditional discourse and tenets. In this sense, social democracy is considered to be a sub-category of the main discourse generated by the history of RPP, making the primary cause of the crisis epistemological.

As a consequence of this understanding, social democracy, in Turkey, as has been shown in the thesis, should be considered to be a new phase in the process of the inner transformations of RPP ideology, that is, Kemalism, which is, in fact, the founding ideology of the state. This structural idiosyncrasy of social democracy in Turkey connects it, organically, to the state and, in this regard, the thesis argued that the first basic condition that causes the crisis is this symbiotic relationship between the social democracy and the state. This is to suggest that in order to understand the crisis it is necessary to analyse the formative and the structural aspects of this founding epistemology and this is what the thesis has attempted to do.

The basic conclusion which comes out of that procedure is that the crisis of social democracy in Turkey is convoluted with the crisis of modernity in the Western social structure for, the traditional reason of being of both RPP and its ideology is the implementation of 'modernity project.' This notion includes both the 'will to modernisation' and the method and the epistemology of modernisation. In this regard, modernisation in Turkey has foreseen the transformation of the existing Ottoman society toward the nation-state founded on Western ideals by the vanguard party which should be under the central control of the political elites. On the other hand, as a part of the long-term modernisation tradition in Turkey, which has started by the late nineteenth century, this ideology, for its specific structural conditions, has been backed by the army and, this brings out the second pillar of the modernisation

process. The third is the state elites and the bureaucrats. This 'modernising body' which is also the carrier of the will of modernisation, has chosen 'from the above' reformation approach as a methodology. Here, it could be stated that, this is not only a choose by the free will but a natural consequence of the model. Finally, the RPP has been, as argued in the thesis, in the first period, the founding party of the nation-state and, in the second phase, it has been the carrier, the conveying band of the state ideology.

The political economy of RPP has been technologist and developmentalist, in the first period, 1923-1950. Statism, in this sense is the basis of both the economy and ideology. The body of the modernisation is completed with a strict devotion to Enlightenment tenets, primarily to secularism, which is a part and parcel of positivism, a concept which has been the pillar of Turkish modernity since the beginning¹. Although there are attempts to change this structure, yet all of them, namely, 'left-of centre' and 'democratic left' openings, are the two significant openings to be mentioned among the others, are linked to this epistemological and methodological framework. In other words, this structure as a whole might be conceptualised as the 'authoritarian modernisation', which has acted as a hegemonic discourse. All attempts in the process of transforming this structure have paid keen attention to reject any 'outsider' effect, namely ideology, but stayed loyal to the constitutive structure. In this sense, even the terminology has been changed and instead of 'social democracy', 'democratic left' is accepted, saying that the first concept is by definition goes to the Marxist tradition but the second one is something which is specific for Turkey. In this

¹In a recent book this notion is analysed and defined as a concept which is anti-hermeneutical and which conveys itself to a closure not letting to understand the other probable and evident developments in the society. Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).

sense, as noted above, Turkish social democracy, as a parochial approach, that emanates from RPP, has one evident epistemological constraint. This constraint is the inner shortcoming of the founding ideology and behind that it is possible to find the perception of the of the abstract notion of the state. This point might be taken as the most important aspect of both the structural idiosyncrasy of Turkish social democracy and the crisis. Even though this aspect of Turkish social democracy has always been a fetter for this political ideology to adopt itself to the universal norms of social democracy, the major shortcoming has been faced in the late 1990s, which is marked as the period of globalisation. If globalisation, as will be analysed comprehensively below, is taken as the whole sum of new developments occurred on the social, political and international relations realm, as a consequence of various different technological changes, whose repercussions are evident on the political economy field, Turkish social democracy, as a parochial and national ideology has lived its dramatic failure in this period of totally being immune from the new developments. The determining factor in this process is the problematic situation of the notion of nation-state to which Turkish social democracy is attached.

Globalization might be taken as the main framework that has dissolved the dominance of the nation-states in the international realm, together with the postmodern approaches that questioned the centrality of the state. The socio-political crisis occurred in the late 1980s and in the 1990s might be put as a crisis of transition from an established order to a new one due to a set of 'global flows'.² Linked with this

²This notion of flow and its effect on the global developments is analysed on three levels as, 'flows of capital; flows of people; flows of images, signs and symbols' in Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland, "Introduction: struggles over *Lebensraum* and social identity in globalizing cities", in Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland, eds., *Space, Culture and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997), 1-20.

development it could be argued that the 1980s and 1990s has been a period of crisis at large in the West European political world. This crisis is interwoven with the new understandings and conceptualisations of democracy. On this ground, mainly, the condition and concept of citizenship, together with civil society, and 'self as an object', has become the problematic argument of the period. As the transition from the nation-state model to a transnational structure, the citizen that has been formed as a consequence of the will of the nationalism, which rests on the homogenisation of the differences, the subordination of the self, is about to be replaced with a new understanding of democracy which relies on the notion of identity³ and the difference by way of a new understanding of 'contract'.⁴

The crisis presented above is felt in Turkey by social democratic politics due to the similar reasons. Here, it should be noted that, in the 1980s, the emergence of the neo-liberal and New Right policies have enhanced and deepened the inner shortcomings of social democracy. This is due to a clash between the two opposing ideologies. As the New Right in Turkey, in the 1980s run for the minimal state and the integration of Turkey with the outer world via technological developments, social democracy, in the same period, contested for the strong and the central state. Nevertheless, in Turkey, the roots of the crisis are more linked to a contradiction between the interest groups, loosely defined as civil society elements and a state model which insists on preserving its established condition in the social and political realm,

³For a discussion how left has approached to this concept and the understanding of the notion itself see Eric Hobsbawm, "Identity Politics and the Left", *New Left Review* (May-June 1996), no. 217, 38-47.

⁴For a discussion of the relationship between pluralism and social democracy, as a new emerging concept see, Michael Walzer, "Pluralism and Social Democracy", *Dissent* (Winter 1998), 47-53.

gaining its power from the alliance and cohabitation between the state elites , bureaucracy and military, whose formative basis is argued in chapters 1 and 2. This tension is considered to happen traditionally between , Yet, it is possible to say that, what is defined as the crisis of the politics and the state is organically the crisis of the centre and the periphery, in Turkey. Nevertheless, the centre-periphery contradiction is not immune to the politics-state tension. On the state level, the basic shortcoming is related with what is called the legitimacy crisis braid with governmentality. Because the levels are not watertight but interrelated, the political level of crisis encompasses those issues related with the crisis of representation, which might be considered as an outcome of legitimacy crisis, that intends to underline the disbelief in politics and calls the end of politics. The crisis of the political level, on the other hand, is correlated and associated with secularism and citizenship. The 1995-1998 period in Turkey, with these assumptions, could be taken as a case to analyse the crisis and the inadequacy of the social democracy to respond to that condition.

The two main turning points in the post 1995 elections period shows the depth and the structural aspects of the crisis. First of all, with the failure of the coalition between MP and TPP, a much expected and accepted government model in the public opinion, it has become observable that, the so called dispersion of the politics, the scattering of the parties located in the same political wing, is not the reason of the crisis. On the other hand, through the same process, it has once more become perceptible that, the representation crisis, as an interrelated component of legitimacy crisis, in Turkish political life has reached its crux, because, behind the dissolving of the coalition government, and the construction of the new one between WP and TPP, the major issues that functioned was the personal problems of the chairpersons of the both parties. In the second period of the era, the WP-TPP government has once more

created the stage for all the issues considered above. This period has witnessed, even though in an indirect way and tacitly, the emergence of the 'established centre' in Turkish politics, namely the military and the bureaucratic elite coalition. This coalition has intervened the political scene and has brought the government change. During this process, the concept of democracy has once more been discussed with reference to its essential concepts.

This discussion has proved that in Turkey, the constitutive modernist approach to politics is still powerful enough to shape the political life. This understanding might be defined as the Jacobean way of solving the problems but doubtless, in the late twentieth century, it could be argued that, the same methodology might be the basic condition from which the problems emerge. In this sense, Jacobinism in Turkey refers to the 'from the above' revolution that transformed the country and introduced the modernist identity which surrounds the secularism and citizenship. The legitimization of the state Jacobinism in Turkey has usually been via secularism. The Jacobin notion of secularism is basically the dominance of the state on the private realm and, in this regard, secularism in Turkey should be comprehended as a concept which is interrelated uniquely with the state. The state controls the whole structure through secularism, where the national identity is a defined and given conditionality as well as the notion of citizenship. Turkish official citizenship, as has been analysed broadly in the thesis, and discussed in the conditional literature, is a subject who is loyal to the state and who, by accepting the already defined identity, helping the state in the eradication of the differences in the social body⁵. On the other hand, secularism, taken as a Constitutional obligation is imposed on the citizen as a duty. This framework

⁵For the early formation of this identity see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Yahya Kemal Rimbeaud'yu Okudu mu?* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997).

encompasses the citizen and the limits of the concept is demarcated by the Constitution.

The demands arisen during the WP-TPP government indicates that a new period is about to start in Turkey which is related basically with the notion of citizenship. Although it is reduced to the debate revolving around the 'problem of veiling' yet, even that discussion well underline a new understanding of politics, which is expected to rely on the intersection of the new understanding of the private realm and self. This is also closely related with the new conceptualisation of the citizenship, far away from the given and existing definition, which runs for the homogenisation and effacing of the differences. On the contrary, in this period, the concept of difference is not only a matter of the private realm, but something which is demanded to be disclosed and even 'performed' in the public realm. No doubt that this process is backed by the feminist movement and, to a certain extent, with the challenges emanated from the ethnic developments, especially through the demands raised by the Kurds, as being the most powerful group among the different ethnics in Turkey.⁶

This framework of crisis is directly related with the condition that Turkish social democracy faces in Turkey. Here, it is necessary to point out that, as has already been mentioned, in the West-European countries, the left in general, but significantly the social democracy, beginning by the late 1980s, has been in the process of transformation and getting adopted to the new demands of the 'new

⁶A new analysis of this notion is in Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

times.⁷ This transformation period consists of a series of radical changes, British Labour Party being the most radical example involved in this process.⁸ The sharp but long transition⁹ to the new structure has been the subject matter of a vast literature and, in this context, not only the excision of the Clause IV¹⁰ but also the implementation of the new concepts of democracy has been considered ground breaking.¹¹ Even though this transition is deliberated in various circles as a shift towards 'revisionism' and there are, in the late 1990s after the electoral victories for the left parties in France¹², and Germany¹³ following Britain, significant differences between various social

⁷For an overall analysis of the transformation and the development of the new trend see, Herman Schwartz, "Social Democracy Going Down or Down Under", *Comparative Politics* (April 1998), 253-272.

⁸For an early discussion of this transformation see, Conrad Russell, "New Labour: Old Tory Writ Large?", *New Left Review*, (November-December 1996), no. 219, 78-88.

⁹This concept is referred by some scholars as 'Labour's long-term modernization.' See Martin J. Smith, "A Return to Revisionism? The Labour Party's Policy Review", in Martin J. Smith and Joanna Spear, eds., *The Changing Labour Party* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 17.

¹⁰For this very much debated issue see, Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, *The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour* (London and New York: Verso, 1998).

¹¹David Marquand, "Half-Way to Citizenship? The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform", in M.J. Smith and J. Spear, eds., *The Changing*, 44-58.

¹²François Hinker, "The French Socialist: Towards post-republican values?", in Donald Sasoon, ed., *Looking Left: European Socialism After the Cold War* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1997), 109-123.

¹³Thomas Meyer, "The Transformation of German Social Democracy", in D. Sasoon, *Looking Left*, 124-141.

democratic parties¹⁴, yet in all above mentioned political organisations in the 1990s observable is an overwhelming renewal.¹⁵

This process is defined by some scholars as the 'Third Way'.¹⁶ The concept has arisen a considerable debate.¹⁷ The basic arguments of the concept will be given briefly below but, suffice is to say here is that, the Third Way is a generic concept used to indicate a revision of the basic policies of the social democratic parties and, in this context, the policies formed by the different social democratic parties, even if there is no direct reference to the concept, and there is no similarity among themselves, is considered to be a derivation of Third Way politics.¹⁸ In fact the differences and discrepancies between German, French, and British social democracy is a shared and

¹⁴As an example see David Marsh, "A Very German Model of Blairism", *New Statesman*, 6 March 1998, 14-15.

¹⁵John Lyod, "Utility Wear for Europe's Socialists", *New Statesman*, 1 May 1998, 26-27.

¹⁶Not the founder but the scholar who reinvigorated the concept, Anthony Giddens has published his book bearing the same name after a long debate perpetuated in the various journals. See, Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). For an early critic of the book see, Steven Lukes, "Left Down the Middle", *Times Literary Supplement*, September 25, 1998, n. 4982, 3-4.

¹⁷For a more populist one see, "Is there such a thing as a Third Way in politics? Yes: Anthony Giddens. No: Hillary Wainwright", *Guardian*, May 23, 1998. Nevertheless, this debate is after Giddens' publication of an early version of his book. See, Anthony Giddens, "After the Left's Paralysis", *New Statesman*, 1 May 1998, 18-21.

¹⁸The early dissent to this approach came from the intellectuals who have taken place in the renewal of the British Labour Party; see, Simon Buckby and Neal Lawson, "Third Way? No Way Tony", *New Statesman*, 13 March 1998, 16-18. This debate is further perpetuated by Steve Richards, "Interview: Jack Straw", *New Statesman*, 3 April 1998, 14-16. Straw then was the shadow Home Secretary and the answers to his views might be found in, Franck Vandenbroucke, "Equality Remains a Key Value", *New Statesman*, 24 April 1998, 30; and, Michael Howard, "Labour's Assault on Freedom", *New Statesman*, 24 April 1998, 31.

reconciled reality.¹⁹ In this context, Third Way is understood as a concept which foresees the adaptation of social democracy to the globalization or the global era or *vice versa*.²⁰ In Lafontaine's words, it is a merging of "putting politics back in its rightful place"²¹ and, tackling with the economic issues on the first hand. This view point is indirectly related with, as Giddens put is, the transgression between the "old style social democracy" and the "neo-liberal outlook"²² which brings fore the core discussion whether 'new social democracy' is a version of neo-liberalism.²³ Here, two reasons force us to analyse the Third Way politics. The first is, the RPP, in its last congress has announced that it is under a transformation process²⁴ which has been interpreted as a process of getting adopted to the Third Way politics²⁵. Second, because the Third Way politics itself has come out as a policy formulation "after the

¹⁹The discrepancies have not come out only from the relations between the social democracies of different countries but also among the leaders of the specific parties where German Social Democratic Party is a good example. The differences between Lafontaine and Schroeder who ran for the chairpersonship of the party see Ian Treynor, "Moderniser issues though plan for power", *Guardian*, December 5, 1997, 5.

²⁰In this regard the former chairperson of German Social Democratic Party makes interesting remarks; see, Oskar Lafontaine, "The Future of German Social Democracy", *New Left Review*, March-April 1997, 72-87.

²¹*Ibid.*, 74.

²²Giddens, *Third*, 8-13.

²³For an approach in this context, framing the British Labour Party see, David Coates, "Labour Governments: Old Constraints and New Parameters," *New Left Review* (November-December 1996), no. 219, 62-77.

²⁴CHP Genel Başkanı Deniz Baykal'ın 28. Olağan Kurultay Konuşma Metni (Ankara: N.p., 1998).

²⁵For a very conservative elaboration see, İlayri Kozanoğlu, "Üçüncü Yol: Sosyal Demokrasi için tek yol mu, son yol mu?", *Birikim*, Eylül 1998, no. 113, 25-32.

left's paralysis²⁶" and as a concept "beyond left and right²⁷", it could force the RPP to realise a transformation in the global era. With this regard now the basics of the Third Way politics can be analysed.

Giddens, in the process of constructing a new framework for a new politics, starts by demarcating five dilemmas. These are "i) globalization; ii) individualism; iii) left and right; iv) political agency; v) ecological issues²⁸." This framework is strictly correlated with what Giddens calls the 'Third Way Politics.' Giddens, suggests that the "major revolutions of our time" is "globalization, transformations in personal life and our relations to nature.²⁹" This also proposes to take all five elements counted above as interrelated but not as isolated elements. If 'new social democracy' is thought to be interrelated with the Third Way politics, than what is defined for the Third Way might be taken as the milestones of this new model and in this frame Giddens clearly purports that

third way politics should take a positive attitude towards globalization...should preserve a core concern with social justice, while accepting that the range of questions which escape the left/right divide is greater before. Equality and individual freedom may conflict but egalitarian measures also often increase the range of freedoms open to individuals. Freedom to social democrats should mean autonomy of action, which in turn demands the involvement of wider social community³⁰. Having abandoned

²⁶Anthony Giddens, "After", 19.

²⁷Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*" (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

²⁸Ibid., 27-54.

²⁹Ibid., 64.

³⁰In the debates in the late 1990s, especially in the circles and politics of British Labour Party, communitarianism has played an enourmous role and Tony Blair has declared that especially Amitai Etzioni has had a great effect on shaping his ideas. For these remarks and his views, stretched on

collectivism, Third Way politics look for a new relationship between the individual and the community, a new definition of rights and obligations...One might suggest as a prime motto for the new politics, *no rights without responsibilities*. Old-style social democracy, however, was inclined to treat right as unconditional claims. With expanding individualism should come an extension of individual obligations.³¹

This framework, brings us to the basic problem that both social democracy in general and Turkish social democracy as a case faces. It is the relationship between the state, society, democracy and social democracy. As has been argued in the thesis, the crisis of Turkish social democracy is due to the symbiotic relationship between the state and the constitutive ideology that social democracy in Turkey internalises and develops. The 'Third Way politics' or the 'new social democracy', in the process of bringing a new solution to the existing problems that emanates from the problematic interaction between the mentioned concepts, suggests that

in today's society should be no authority without democracy...The right has always looked to traditional symbols as the prime means of justifying authority, whether in the nation, government or other institutions...Consequently, democracy can never be more than partial. Social democrats should oppose this view. In a society where tradition and custom are losing their hold, the only route to the establishing of authority is via democracy.³²

This is what Giddens calls "democratising democracy" and this is the reconstruction of the state, in opposition to the views of right that wants to shrink and

a rather broader perspective see, Tony Blair, *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country* (London: Fourth Estate, 1996).

³¹Giddens, *Beyond*, 64-65.

³²Ibid., 66.

traditional social democracy to expand it.³³ In this process, the third way politics emphasises various points

1) The state must respond structurally to globalization but not as one-way process. The democratisation of democracy first of all implies decentralisation. Globalization creates a strong impetus and logic to the downward devolution of power, but also to upward devolution. 2) The state should expand the role of the public sphere, which means constitutional reform directed towards greater transparency and openness, as well as the introduction of new safeguards against corruption.³⁴ 3) To retain or regain legitimacy, states without enemies have to elevate their administrative efficiency. 4) The downward pressure of globalization³⁵ introduces not only the possibility but the necessity of forms of democracy other than the orthodox voting process. Government can re-establish more direct contact with citizens, and citizens with government, through 'experiments with democracy' -local direct democracy, electronic referenda, citizens' juries and other possibilities...5) The democratisation of democracy cannot be only local or national- the state must have a cosmopolitan outlook, while upward democratisation should not stop at the regional level. Downward democratisation presumes the renewal of civil society. These points taken together define of form of government which it should be the aim of social democrats to promote: the new democratic state.³⁶

This 'democratisation of democracy' and the re-establishment of the new democratic state should be via civil society, which constitutes the last dimension of the Third Way politics. The renewal of civil society needs the refurbishment of the following points, even though it includes such crucial proposals as community renewal through harnessing local initiative: "the partnership of government and civil

³³Ibid., 70.

³⁴This point in the text deals specifically with the British context.

³⁵This concept should not be confused with another one developed as 'globalization from the above' and 'globalization from the below.' For details see, Richard Falk, "The Making of Global Citizenship", in Jeremy Bercher, et. al, eds., *Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order* (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 190-192.

³⁶Giddens, *Third*, 72-78.

society, involvement of the third sector³⁷, protection of the local public sphere, community- based crime prevention, the democratic family."³⁸ Finally, the new social democracy should rely on "the cosmopolitan nation and nationalism."³⁹ This notion embraces the dissolving of the conservative understanding and model of nationalism but the "special group affiliations that necessarily prejudice national identity" which conveys to "the radical multiculturalism of the libertarians."⁴⁰ To achieve this task, the concept that should start functioning is the 'cultural pluralism.'⁴¹ Nevertheless, "the cosmopolitan nation implies cosmopolitan democracy, operating on a globalizing scale."⁴² This is, indeed, the acceptance of heterogeneity found in a society, which means the existence of different ethnicities, and the concept of 'global governance'⁴³. However, it is not the global governance that would construct the globalized democracy but it is a two-way interaction and "cosmopolitan democracy is not only about the movement of governance towards a world level but about its diffusion downwards to local regions."⁴⁴

³⁷The notion of the 'Third Sector' encompasses the 'voluntary work.' In this sense it is far away from what has been formulated as 'the public sector' (*halk sektörü*) by Bülent Ecevit in Turkey, as discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

³⁸Giddens, *Third*, 79.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 130-132 and 137.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 132.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 133-138.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 133.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 144-147.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 146.

After this brief analysis it could now be argued once more whether it is possible for Turkish social democracy to have such a transformation. Taking the Third Way politics as a *datum*, because of its attachment to the global politics, and elaborating on the probable new ways of implementing such a concept, it could be proposed that, the characteristic of Turkish social democracy is not enabling enough to operate such a transformation for two reasons: i) it proves once more where the discussed ideology has its constraints and shortcomings ii) it demands an overall transformation of the structure, i.e. the notion of the state, and to a certain extent, detachment from the existing notion of modernisation. Here, it should be noted that, this is not a significant rupture or break but rather it is a gradual process of moving away from the state. Behind this, found is two other idiosyncrasies of Turkish social democracy, as has been analysed in the thesis: i) The social democracy in Turkey does not rest on such a gradual detachment but rather it is, in every step, it emphasises and reinforces the power of the state. This introduces the basic epistemological inadequacy of social democratic parties in Turkey. The social democratic party in Turkey, i.e. the RPP, has never lived a real transformation that would enable it to move away from its roots, namely the state and constitutive ideology as European social democratic parties have lived in their histories, beginning by the Bad Godesberg Programme or the transformation of the communist parties with the emergence of the Mediterranean Socialism. This is not a search for an exact corresponding similarity but rather referring to an epistemological concern; the practice and 'ideology' of change. Lacking this capability, Turkish social democracy, as it faces the necessity to satisfy the need for getting adopted to the continuous flow of change, gets stuck more and more to its already existing discourse. ii) Turkish social democracy, on the legal left wing politics, is characterised with its affiliation to Kemalism, which brings the similarity between the various political parties located on this wing. This point has been the

characteristic that has determined the likeness of the SDPP, DLP and RPP in the left political wing, as has been discussed at length in the thesis.

There are two more points which have been elaborated in the thesis that underline the crisis of Turkish social democracy. The first is, in Turkish left wing politics, as well as in the mainstream political agenda, the inexistence of the liberal thought, if not the liberalism.⁴⁵ This condition has two consequences. First, as discussed in the thesis, Turkish social democracy, following the pattern of radical project of modernisation, has been attached to the first two periods of the left; the left progressivity started by the French Revolution, the emergence of the Republican values and the statist models developed after the Second World War among the left parties of the West Europe. The first left wave, in a similar way in France, is more attuned to Republican values. Nevertheless, the contrast between the Republicanism and the liberal state is a matter of discussion in Turkey. This debate questions, on the one hand, the constitutionalism together with nationalism and national identity issues and, on the other hand, reflects on the possibilities of a liberal state⁴⁶. Although it has started as an economic model in the West, especially after the Second World War, in the second left wave, statism, in Turkey has a more radical and different characteristics

⁴⁵The main structure of Turkish liberalism is analysed in Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Laiklik ve Türkiye'de Liberalizmin Kökenleri", *Defter*, Bahar 1998, no. 11/33, 41-63. Kadioğlu, interestingly shows that two liberal interventions in Turkey, Prince Sabahattin's and Ahmet Ağaoğlu's, have not been successful. Sabahattin's approach has not gained power because of the radical wing of the Community for Union and Progress's was controlling the party and Ağaoğlu was not able to radicalize his views, for he 'became liberal(ist)' after being a member of CUP and the RPP.

⁴⁶E. Fuat Keyman, "'Cumhuriyetçi Liberalizm' Olasılığı", *Varlık*, Ekim 1998, n. 1093, 14-16; Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Soruşturmaya Yanıt", *Varlık*, Ekim 1998, n. 1093, 19-20; Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Cumhuriyet ve Demokrasi", *Varlık*, Ekim 1998, n. 1093, 11-13.

and content. Statism, an inseparable component of the constitutive ideology, has emerged as an economic concept and model but it should be comprehended as a political and ideological element. In this sense, not only Turkish social democracy but also Turkish right has never been critical of a statist understanding.

This is to suggest that, i) the relationship between Turkish social democracy and the constitutive ideology in Turkey is a problematic one. Turkish social democracy is a concept emerged rather lately, in the 1980s. The epistemological origins of this political concept is Kemalism. The way that conformed to social democracy passes through, first, the 'left of centre' process and second, the democratic left, both having a parochial meaning. Social democracy has been developed as a concept in the early 1980s but, in time, once more it is convoluted and merged with Kemalism, through the re-establishment of the RPP, which is a clear rejection of social democracy and social democratic tenets even though the existing party pronounce the concept. As a constitutive ideology, especially in the 1923-1945 period, Kemalism has been the origin of a progressive political movement. In the 1970s, it has helped the conceptualisation of the political change in Turkey but, because of its epistemological roots and discourse that it is attached, and due to such concepts as populism and the socio-economic model it purports, it has not found the chance of having a total renewal and transformation. Nevertheless, in this period, although there are references to the original ideology, yet there is a tacit shift from the Six Arrows model of Kemalism. The structural determinant of this model is populism and parochialism. Due to these two concepts, even the basic constitutional component of the constitutive ideology, secularism, has been reinterpreted. Social democracy, in this context, as has been analysed at length in the thesis, is a hybrid political concept still in the process of getting adopted to the universal values of the mentioned ideology.

ii) Being the determining power behind modernisation, Turkish Kemalist social democracy is more a cultural element rather than being an ideology. This very condition has played the most leading role in the determination of the conservative backbone of Turkish social democracy. As analysed in the relevant chapter, because culture is by definition related with tradition and through the linkage between tradition and conservatism, it could be further argued that, the conservatism in Turkish social democracy is backed by this very idiosyncrasy. Here, it could be argued that the difficulty of transforming Turkish social democracy is because of its cultural character, for it is more difficult to move away from a culture inherited than from an ideology. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, after the loosening of the nation-state notion, as a consequence of globalization process, social democracy in Turkey has faced a radical crisis. Because all values it incorporates are under a sheer attack in the international scenery and Turkish social democracy has had to fall behind of even the centre-right parties. Today, the renewal is more a matter of deconstructing the discourse and epistemology that Turkish social democracy inherits.

On the other hand, it is clear that Turkish social democracy is a tightly knitted ideology. Nevertheless, this ideology of social democracy in Turkey has a specific nature. It is possible to argue that, in the Foucaultian sense of the concept, the discourse of Kemalism, which has already been referred as 'culture', has been tried to be implemented as ideology. As a holistic historical standing, Kemalism, has not refrained from defining a condition which does not incorporate the individual but to determine it. This is in a way the emergence of a hegemonic discourse. Hegemony in this context has a dual function. In this sense it rests on the universal norms and conditions and second, the utilisation of universal language, or better the language of

universality, helps the hegemony to regenerate itself continuously and yet it helps the state to deepen its imposing structure⁴⁷ by equipping itself with a power of legitimacy to impose its discourse on the society and individual. In this context, the Westernisation, the secularism, the strong state, the organic society, the modernisation project, inclusive of a cultural transformation, all are the elements of the hegemonic discourse in Turkey which Turkish social democracy attaches itself.

If one definitive consequence of the hegemonic discourse of Turkish social democracy, because of its epistemological constraints and because of the connections, ties and links between the organic society and strong state, the vanguard party understanding and model, all having their roots in the early construction period of the RPP, is the impossibility to renew its ideological structure, the other is its problematic relationship with democracy and new emerging social conditions.⁴⁸ Turkish social democracy, even when it has tried to transform itself from single-party notion to democratic left has stayed loyal to its basic epistemological preferences and, this very characteristic is clear when the RPP of 1970s and the DLP of 1980s, is considered.⁴⁹

⁴⁷These points have already been discussed in the thesis, but the idea is originally belongs Cox and elaborated in E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), 117.

⁴⁸For an excellent analysis which concentrates on the difficulties of surpassing the existing structure with a new approach, by discussing the origins of the constitutive epistemology see Şerif Mardin, "Some Notes on Normative Conflicts in Turkey", in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Limits of Social Cohesion*, (Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 207-232.

⁴⁹This is also a very much debated issues in relation with the last congress of RPP held in May 1998. See, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "8. Kurultay: Değişim mi Revizyonizme Yeni Bir Halka mı?", *Sosyal Demokrat Değişim*, 98/10, 32-39; and for a variety of different ideas, opininons and criticisms directed to the allegations and even the program of RPP, which argued that it is renewing itself under the influence of British Labour Party, see "CHP Değişiyor mu?", *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 28-29-30 Mayıs, 1998, 19.

This structural, ideological and epistemological aspects, especially in the late 1990s, has prevented Turkish social democracy to adopt itself to conceive the multiple characteristic of new social structures. The multi-dimensional relations between identity-power, state-society have always been ignored in this epistemology, naturally due to the hegemonic discourse, and which is still in favour of a Durkheimian notion of organic society.

The last constraint Turkish social democracy faces in the late twentieth century, to a certain extent, as a consequence of the above mentioned structural aspects, is its affiliation with 'meta-narrations'.⁵⁰ This is a condition having two dimensions. The first is, the affiliation to a meta-narrative is, if the origins of Turkish social democracy is considered, natural, for this political model is derivated as a function of Turkish modernisation project and in the second step, it has grounded itself as the constitutive element and power of Turkish political modernisation. In this sense, all other components of the modernisation is a part and parcel of this meta-narration and this approach includes the notion of democracy as well.

The merging with transcendentalism, yet has two further dimensions. It empowers the existence of the hegemonic discourse and is blind to the concrete and more functional components of the concept under consideration. If social democracy is criticised in this thesis due to its indifference to the transformation in the society and its symbiosis with the existing constitutive discourse, the rationale behind that could be searched on this ground. Through this interrelated and multi-dimensional structure comes out the condition that determines the shortcoming of Turkish social democracy and the prerequisite that is needed for a structural renewal. It is the vicious attempt that

⁵⁰The term is discussed and developed in, Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition* (Minneapolis: The Minnesota University Press, 1984).

this political understanding is carrying forward: trying to transform the crisis of the hegemonic discourse with a reference to itself, which is the source of the crisis. Unless this condition is changed, it is not possible to transform Turkish social democracy. To say that it is not possible to surpass an already existing discourse and step into a completely new one, and that the existing epistemology will continue living in the new constructed one, should not be taken as the only circumstance in this process. Although this very fact is true, and it underlines one of the basic arguments of this thesis, yet it could be put forward that in the history of Turkish social democracy, especially in the period of SDPP, as analysed in the text, there have been possibilities for such, to say with an Althusserian concept, 'epistemological breaks.' In this sense, here it could be speculated that the formation of a genuine social democracy cannot be through RPP and with a reference to its history and tradition but through a movement which is external to it. Although the history of Western social democracy is a proof of the validity of this approach and process, still for the Turkish social democracy it is an answer to judge which of the statements is true; whether "the future lasts forever" or "the present lasts a long time."

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